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“It is my aspiration that health finally will be seen not as a 
blessing to be wished for, but as a human right to be fought for” 
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In recent decades the development of international law grounded on the regulation of 
specific, and supposedly, autonomous areas of knowledge and interest. Along such 
regulation, the international community established both judicial and quasi-judicial 
specialized bodies as well as regimes for cooperation in apparently dissimilar fields of 
law, such as economic, environmental, trade or human rights law. In order to give 
adequate impetus to their goals, States have entered into various treaties within each of 
these independent spheres of interest, without there having been any prior coordination 
or hierarchy among them that would allow harmonic coexistence of such complex 
fragmentation of international law. In this regard, scholars and legal practitioners have 
avidly debated over the challenges encountered in determining the obligations that 
States undertake when entering into a multiplicity of treaties which cover, apparently, 
independent areas of international law. 
Under a broad perspective, this dissertation analyses the relationship between two of 
the aforementioned apparently independent areas of law, namely human rights and 
intellectual property protection (IPP). Certainly, many are the features of the aforesaid 
relationship that deserve time and attention for further inquiry, but the starting point of 
the argumentation is that such two legal frameworks are far from being independent. 
In particular, the overlapping between human rights and IPP finds its highest expression 
in the interaction between the right to access to medicines on the one hand and to patent 
protection for medicines on the other. 
It does not take an expert in the field of international law to observe that multiple 
interests are at stake, ranging from protecting the right to health of patients to enhancing 
innovation in the pharmaceutical sector, as well as to safeguarding the interests of 
developing countries. The primary argument raised against IPP is that patent protection 
for medicines results in higher prices, which negatively impacts patients’ access to 
medicines, especially in lower income countries. Simply stated, patent protection 
provides pharmaceutical companies with a monopoly position for a specified number 
of years, thus excluding competitors from the market.  
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On the contrary, the pharmaceutical industry argues that patents’ rights are key in order 
to encourage the creation of new drugs, which certainly leads to an enhancement of the 
right to health protection worldwide. In fact, the latter industry claims that such 
monopoly is crucial in order to recoup the large research and development investments 
that pharmaceutical corporations incur. Accordingly, with no patent protection 
pharmaceutical companies would have no incentive to participate in innovation.  
Nonetheless, almost two billion people, one-third of the world’s population, lack 
regular access to essential medicines; and in poorest regions such as Africa, Central 
America and Asia, this lack of regular access concerns half of the population. This issue 
is even more noticeable when the treatment and confinement of pandemics and diseases 
such as HIV, tuberculosis and malaria are concerned. For example, the rational 
consumption of antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) can reduce morbidity and mortality rates 
and enhance quality of life of HIV patients, especially in countries in which the risk of 
infection is high. As a result, pharmaceuticals are no ordinary commodities, but are 
rather the cornerstones of human development.  
Yet, for intellectual honesty, worth noting is that patent protection is not the only barrier 
nor the root cause of the problem to access to medicines, since socio-political issues 
are obviously involved. Accordingly, in addition to IP protection, corruption, 
inadequacy of the ruling class and natural disasters are just a few examples of causes 
for the lack of access to medicines.  
The challenging interaction between access to medicines and pharmaceutical patents 
constitutes the hearth of the present analysis, leaving socio-political considerations as 
mere incidental remarks throughout the dissertation. In other words, the aforesaid gap 
in access to medicines is not only a moral-political challenge, but rather a legal 
dilemma: within the international human rights legal framework, access to essential 
medicines has been firmly interpreted as constituting a minimum core prerogative 
under the human right to the highest attainable standard of health (the right to health). 
This results in corresponding obligations and responsibilities on a wide spectrum of 
actors, whose aim should be to enable and ensure access to medicines to people in need 
of it.  
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After the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the contextual 
adoption of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) in the mid-nineties, the debate over the alleged conflict between trade and 
human rights gained fuel. Because regulation plays an important role in any issue, when 
the issue at stake concerns public health, understanding the normative frameworks 
which regulates the patenting system becomes a mandatory step. The TRIPS agreement, 
which constitutes one of the most controversial as well as far-reaching multilateral 
agreements on intellectual of IP to date, recognized for the first-time minimum 
standards for the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights among 
members of WTO. 
The dissertation highlights that, since the adoption of the TRIPS, both developed as 
well as developing states have exposed their frustration for the manner in which the 
TRIPS agreement has been interpreted and executed. On the one hand, the developing 
world has argued that the TRIPS agreement does not suffice in fulfilling their social 
and economic needs while imposing greatly excessive burdens on their domestic legal 
systems. On the other hand, developed countries have called upon stricter protection 
for intellectual property rights.  
The adoption and conclusion of such agreement was no easy task because of the 
numerous national interests involved. As the dissertation manifests, the primary intent 
of the TRIPS agreement was to internationally harmonize intellectual property laws by 
establishing minimum standards for protection of different types of intellectual 
property. The analysis provided in the present work, however, focuses merely of 
pharmaceutical patents and, thus, leaves the inquiries on other types of IP law, such as 
copyright and trademark, outside the scope of such study.  
The TRIPS imposed upon signatory states, inter alia, the obligation to implement in 
their domestic legal systems provisions regarding the conferral of rights upon IP 
holders, dispute settlements mechanisms and available remedies for relevant 
infringements. The strong and effective WTO dispute settlement body monitors and 
assures that the undertakings agreed by States are adequately fulfilled. Such 
effectiveness is one of the key features of the TRIPS framework, in as much that non-
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compliance with the agreement results in concrete sanctions on the responsible State. 
The conclusion may be reached that States are usually keener to address IP 
commitments, rather than their human rights obligations, since IP compliance can 
result in economic and financial sanctions, while human rights enforcement 
mechanisms are rarely binding upon States in practice.  
The aforementioned scenario was further complicated and aggravated as a result of the 
adoption of regional free trade agreements (FTAs), which formed free-trade areas 
between the cooperating states. While FTAs mainly aim at eliminating trade barriers 
among members, they do provide detailed regulations in relation to intellectual 
property such as patents. These provisions, which were mainly demanded by developed 
countries, often establish higher levels of IP protection, thus, worsening access to 
medicines in the countries concerned. Such higher levels of protection norms are often 
referred to as TRIPs Plus, since they take IP provisions enshrined in the TRIPS 
agreement one step further, thus going beyond the minimum standards imposed by the 
latter agreement. Many developing countries, which have signed FTAs, are frequently 
under economic and political pressure to incorporate these tougher conditions in their 
domestic legal systems. 
Hence, the present analysis cannot ignore the legal implications and challenges that 
such FTAs raise, since they are proof of the ways in which trade-related treaties are 
able to impact human rights, such as the right to health. This is the case of the Central 
America Trade Agreement (CAFTA), which in fact is the largest free trade agreement 
to date to include stronger IP provisions than those provided by the TRIPS Agreement. 
CAFTA offers an important case study to examine the broader dynamics of national 
and international regulations and their public health impacts. Comprehending the way 
CAFTA’s IP provisions affect access to affordable medicines in Central America is 
imperative in order to strike a balance between pharmaceutical patents and the right to 
health.  
In light of such premises, this work is structured in three main chapters which aim to 
analyze the aforesaid interplay between pharmaceutical patents and access to essential 
medicines. Worth noting is that in the last two decades many relevant scholars have 
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extensively researched and written on such interplay under numerous perspectives. 
Accordingly, there are several, and often divergent, understandings of the implications 
caused by IP provisions due to the fact that the discussion on this matter reaches beyond 
many ordinary arenas and disciplines.  
Yet, this dissertation is distinct and novel in the sense that it analyses the issue at stake 
under a new multi-perspective approach, in light of which every chapter has been 
designed to both unravel a specific area of such complex tangle and to shed light on 
this fairly knotty legal issue. Accordingly, the outline of the dissertation will proceed 
as follows: the first chapter deals with the international legal framework related to the 
right to health. In particular, the chapter grounds on three main research questions: 
 
1. Is the right to access to medicines a fundamental part of the broader-in-scope 
right to health? 
2. Do States have specific legally binding obligations concerning the right to ac-
cess to medicines under international law? 
3. Does the Inter-American Court of Human Rights provide a broader protection 
of the human rights at stake than international provisions? 
The Chapter, thus, begins with the analysis of the international framework and 
completes it with a focus on the Inter-American system. Such system constitutes one 
of the most internationally innovative legal frameworks with regard to human rights. 
Particular attention is devoted to the meticulous work of the related Court, since its 
jurisprudence has often represented a leading light in this sector, the one that has always 
been at the cutting edge, and also the one that has been able to attract the attention of 
the international scientific community.  
A legal technicality makes the aforesaid human-rights system even more interesting. 
The American Convention on Human Rights does not enshrine any provisions for the 
direct protection of the right to health. In fact, its main focus is on civil and political 
rights, while social and economic rights are covered by a subsequent instrument, 
namely the San Salvador Protocol. This technicality provides valuable academic 
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materials for the study of the legal reasoning adopted by the judges of the Court, who, 
in fact, have usually protected the right to health indirectly as part of the civil right par 
excellence, namely the right to life. Remarkably, in the last few years, such approach 
has shifted towards a direct protection of the right at stake which, thus, offers 
interesting food for thought. The Chapter concludes with a section regarding specific 
legal obligations related to access to medicines in light of the United Nations 
Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights system (CESCR) as well as of the 
aforementioned regional Court. 
 
The second chapter concerns the international legal framework related to intellectual 
property in general and pharmaceutical patents in particular. Diverse are the legal issues 
presented in this chapter; and its relevant research questions are: 
1. Is the conflict between IP-related treaties and human rights treaties genuine or 
only apparent? 
2. Is it possible to avoid conflicts of norms throughout interpretative means? 
3. Can human rights treaties be considered superior to trade-related treaties? 
4. Did CAFTA worsen the access to affordable medicines in the Central American 
region? 
Accordingly, the chapter illustrates the main theories concerning normative antinomy 
between treaties and provides a comprehensive analysis of the TRIPS Agreement. The 
focus regards the so-called TRIPS’ flexibilities as well as an overview of the subsequent 
Doha Declaration, both frameworks being of central importance for pharmaceutical 
companies. The chapter concludes with the analysis of the Central American region, 
which aims at demonstrating how the aforementioned CAFTA Agreement hindered the 
protection of the right to access to medicines for the parties concerned. Two case studies 
are, thus, provided in order to illustrate concrete instances in which the so-called TRIPS 
Plus provisions have impeded, even if to a different extent, both Guatemala and Costa 
Rica in properly fulfilling their human rights undertakings under international law. In 
order to answer the dilemma under discussion, the entire chapter will be based upon 
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the usage of a traditional legal dogmatic methodology, according to which the meaning 
of relevant provisions will be clarified proceeding from their own contents.  
 
Lastly, the third and final chapter addresses an equally valuable aspect of the issue 
under examination, namely the human rights responsibilities of pharmaceutical 
corporations. Such economic actors play a crucial role in ensuring the protection of the 
right to access to medicines, since they are the holders, and principal defenders, of IP 
protection for drugs. This section illustrates the most acknowledged theories on the 
legal personality of such peculiar economic entities under a deductive approach. In fact, 
starting from a general analysis of multinational corporations, the chapter narrows it 
down in order to determine whether or not pharmaceutical corporations are burdened 
with human rights obligations. Accordingly, the chapter grounds, inter alia, on the 
following research questions: 
1. Are multinational corporations in general, and pharmaceutical corporations 
in particular, subject to international human rights law? 
2. Is it possible to directly impose human rights obligations on such actors? 
3. Do soft law instruments, such as Corporate Social Responsibility provisions, 




In the field of human rights, some scholars have highlighted that research attention to 
methodology is often deficient, especially when it is conducted by lawyers1. In this 
regard, the indisputable theoretical and practical value of human rights has led scholars 
to imply that their research surely aims at enhancing the protection and respect of such 
particular sets of rights a priori. In light of this implied “wishful thinking”2 , while 
                                               
1 F. Coomans, F. Grünfeld and M. Kamminga, Methods of Human Rights Research, Intersentia, 2009, 
11. 
2 A. Bastardi, E. Uhlmann and L. Ross, “Wishful Thinking: Belief, Desire, and the Motivated Evaluation 
of Scientific Evidence”, Psychological science 22., 731-732.  
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scholars were passionately driven by the value of human rights, they rarely provided 
explicit methodological frameworks upon which their research was grounded.  
There is no doubt that human rights are central to both the welfare of the human being 
as well as to the accomplishment of wider societal goals. Accordingly, enhancing the 
protection and respect for human rights is a goal worth fighting for. Nonetheless, in 
light of the indivisibility principle concerning human rights, each one of these rights 
should not be regarded as goal in itself, but it should be considered as an instrument to 
enhance the respect of the common denominator for all human rights, namely human 
dignity. The research has, thus, tried to be as unbiased as possible, leaving passionate 
and romantic considerations aside.  
Certainly, personal beliefs, such as considering access to medicines, and at the very 
least access to ARVs, crucial for the respect of human dignity, have definitely 
influenced the tone and perspective under which the research was conducted. Putting 
aside economic and particular interests, an increasing number of people firmly consider 
that patients in need should receive the medical treatment they require, no matter their 
economic, social and cultural status. At the end of the day, academics, human rights 
activists, politicians or representatives of pharmaceutical corporations all agree on such 
issue. Hence, their conflicting views and positions ground on the way such goals should 
be achieved, rather than on the substance of the problem itself.  
This is the reason the access to medicines dilemma has usually been depicted as a battle 
between good versus evil, in which the pharmaceutical industry definitely played the 
latter role, while health activists were portrayed as the heroes of the tale. Such approach, 
however, seems rather simplistic, since it would be unfair to ignore the outstanding 
work conducted by pharmaceutical corporations. Such actors certainly play a massive 
part in enhancing the protection of the right to health worldwide, and thus, of human 
dignity. Likewise, however, the reality demonstrates that the pharmaceutical industry 
is not a philanthropic institution whose main goal is the wellbeing of individuals 
worldwide, but rather an aggressively competitive and profitable industry which 
mainly aims at making profit for its shareholders. 
Under such premises, methodology refers to the approach adopted in carrying out this 
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legal research. Better said, methodology refers to the manner in which relevant 
information has been found, how it has been gathered and the way in which the results 
have been processed. That is the reason competing arguments in favor and against 
patent’s protection will be provided, while bearing in mind the fundamental aim, which 
is to maximize human rights protection.  
In light of the multiple issues analyzed throughout the dissertation, different methods 
have been used in this study. The starting point was an extremely worthy liaison with 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean at 
Mexico City (Mexico), thanks to which official meetings and conferences with state’s 
representatives and relevant experts were conducted. Important data and materials were 
then gathered in light of a theorical and practical approach. Likewise, chapter one was 
the result of a research period at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in San José 
(Costa Rica), during which it was crucial both to attend relevant hearings as well as to 
interview judges and lawyers of such Court. Their comments and remarks were 
fundamental for understanding relevant procedural and substantial issues regarding the 
right to health, with a particular focus on the Central American region.  
Parts of the dissertations are descriptive or expository in nature, and thus, expression 
of lex lata. This is to provide the content of what the law currently entails and to set 
out states’ obligations under international law concerning medicines' access and patent 
protection for pharmaceuticals. Further, references to lex ferenda are provided 
especially in relation to human rights responsibilities of pharmaceutical corporations 
in order to present the emerging consent on such a delicate issue; and, I hope, in order 








The right to health and access to medicines in light of the international and Inter-
American legal framework  
 
 
1. The Evolution of the Right to Health as a Social Right 
 
The notion of health does not have a clear definition and, therefore, it has often been 
used during different historical periods and in the laws of the States according to the 
political objectives of the moment. For this reason, instead of directly carrying out the 
task of elaborating its normative content, the approach adopted in this section is to 
begin with a narrative of the history and theory of this notion, finding the profound 
meaning that relevant actors intended to give to the aforementioned right and clarifying 
the debates as to its origins. The idea of the right to the highest attainable standard of 
health is, after all, a bold exhortation, and its inclusion in international instruments 
represents a clear willingness to focus on the protection of a right that directly 
influences the quality of life of all citizens of the world. A retrospective reading, 
therefore, allows us to discover how recently the reflection on the right to health has 
moved from a theoretical analysis of declarations of principles to a deepening of their 
concrete implications. 
Currently the right to health is commonly recognized as a fundamental right in the 
general population, but professionals who practice international law often encounter 
situations in which the application of such right as fundamental is questioned. The right 
to health, as will be further examined in this chapter, has developed an inclusive nature 
which concerns an array of different components relating to the personal sphere of the 
individual, the community as a whole and international relations among States. 
Indeed, finding an adequate definition of the right to health is not an easy task and 
much clarifications are required in order to define its scope and legal framework. In 
other words, the wording right to health can trigger multiple theoretical debates on its 
nature, which are surely controversial and which hide an incandescent background for 
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its practical application3. 
The first recognition of the right to health in the international order is found, as shown 
in the next section, in the Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health 
Organization (WHO), in which health is defined as "a state of complete physical, 
mental and social well-being and not exclusively the absence of disease or infirmity. 
The enjoyment of the highest possible level of health is one of the fundamental rights 
of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or 
social condition"4. The affirmation of this fundamental right can also be traced back to 
art. 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and art. 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which requires governments to 
recognize the right of everyone to the highest level of physical and mental health (see 
next section).  
Hence, in order to limit and identify the nature and scope of the right to health, several 
issues must be taken into account. Such issues include the intention when this right is 
invoked and a description of the defining elements that characterize the object of this 
right. In addition, the question also arises as to what an individual would be entitled to, 
whether to health care, a healthy environment, access to affordable medicines and/or 
one's own decisions about the health treatments to which one wishes to be, or not, 
subjected5. 
According to Ferrajoli, there are two main categories of rights, namely primary and 
secondary rights. The former refers to those rights that deal with needs or interests 
recognized as vital, and, that therefore belong to all human beings regardless of their 
ability to act, such as the social right to health and education. On the contrary secondary 
rights, depend on the ability of the individual to act in order to achieve goals concerning 
the private or political autonomy of their owners. In light of the latter distinction 
between these two categories of rights, Ferrajoli considers the right to health as a 
                                               
3A. Santosuosso, “Gli sviluppi del diritto alla salute in Italia”, L’Arco di Giano 4, 1994, 54-56.   
4 Preamble of the Constitution of the World Health Organization, New York, 22 July 1946, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 14, 185. 
5  Borsellino, “Alcune considerazioni preliminari in tema di “diritto” e di “salute””, in Borsellino , Il 
diritto alla salute tra libertà e vincoli sociali, Notizie di Politeia, 47/48, 1997, 3-4. 
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primary right of the person which has a dual structure: on the one hand, the right of the 
individual to be treated and to recover, if possible, a state of well-being lost6, and on 
the other hand, that health is not put at risk in situations where the threat is avoidable7. 
In this perspective, the right to health is considered to be a key social right, understood 
as an individual fundamental right, which entails the existence of obligations on States 
(i.e. positive obligations to act) in favor of the holders of this right. These obligations 
aim at promoting minimum levels of substantial equality through the removal, or at 
least the reduction, of social inequalities related to economic and material conditions 
of life. Indeed, in the specific case related to health, these obligations to act can be 
examined under two perspectives: firstly, the obligation to ensure the right to care for 
individuals through the provision of services to ensure health care: secondly, the 
obligation to ensure the presence of hygienic, social and environmental conditions 
conducive to the maintenance of health promoted as a common good8. 
The right to health has been properly addressed and codified from the middle of the 
last century, but health has been a matter of interest for governments since the 19th 
century, when, with the establishment of public health departments, European states 
assumed the obligation of general prevention of infectious diseases and started to 
cooperate with one another in order to avoid international pandemics9 . Since then, 
Governments have linked health to economic considerations and considered public 
hygiene crucial for economic development and growth of States. This attitude towards 
health did not rely on concerns for individual or collective health per se, but towards 
preventing illness as a limit to the performance of the services that every citizen was 
required to provide within the framework of a society inspired by the principle of 
productivity10. 
In those days, public intervention was mainly aimed at improving the hygienic 
                                               
6L. Ferrajoli, Principia Iuris. Teoria del diritto e della democrazia, Laterza, 2007, 733. 
7 V. Pocar, “Il diritto alla salute: un contributo d’analisi nella prospettiva sociologico-giuridica”, in 
Borsellino , Il diritto alla salute tra libertà e vincoli sociali, Notizie di Politeia, 1997, 59. 
8Ferrajoli, Principia Iuris, 742. 
9Borsellino, Alcune considerazioni preliminari, 5-6.   
10B. Poletti Di Teodoro, “Il diritto alla salute dallo Stato liberale alla riforma sanitaria”, in F.D. Busnelli, 
U. Breccia, Il diritto alla salute, Il Mulino, 1978, 15-16. 
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conditions of specific areas of cities which lacked, for instance, an adequate sewer 
system or sanitation. Public policies were, hence, directed to increase life expectancy, 
and indirectly, to extend the life of the workforce. Health, under a functionalist 
perspective, focused on the instrumental role of people and place their productive 
capacity at the center of the public discourse. In this context, health was considered to 
be the requirement for the individual to be able to effectively contribute to the tasks 
and roles assigned to individual by society11. Better stated, until the first half of the 
20th century, health was considered an instrument of social control, based on a concept 
of disease closely linked to the functionality of the individual, which had nothing to do 
with the treatment of diseases nor to biological considerations12. 
It is not surprising that social attention towards health was initially triggered by the 
problems that arose as a result of the emergence of salaried work, because in the 
absence of a social security system, the disease represented an economic loss not only 
for the community, but especially for the worker himself, whose only economic 
resources for him and his family derived from his work. As a result, health was then 
understood as a need for avoiding the consequences of illness and its effects on people's 
work abilities, rather than as a social interest towards the right to be healthy13. 
The establishment of hospitals, the introduction of hygienic standards in public spaces 
and the attention for the creation of healthy environments is understood to be a 
transitional stage to the active participation of State, typical of Welfare State, in which 
public authorities intervene in order to promote the health and well-being of the citizens. 
State's intervention relied on the well-known social contract, according to which the 
State assumed the role of guarantor of the welfare of citizens under considerations of 
substantive equality. In this sense, John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice of 1971, posed 
the problem of finding principles of justice that are the basis of society. He imagines a 
situation defined as the original position in which individuals have to choose the 
principles that will form the basis of the society that is about to be born. These 
                                               
11Ibidem 
12M. Marino, Salute e malattia. Tra vecchi e nuovi paradigmi, Franco Angeli, 2003, 45. 
13Pocar, Il diritto alla salute, 60.   
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individuals know nothing about the personal characteristics they will have afterwards, 
such as their economic and social positions or their physical health. This condition is 
called “Rawls' veil of ignorance” and had the goal to achieve justice, unlike the 
contractualism of Hobbes, Locke, Kant or Rousseau, which aimed to justify the power 
of those who are in charge of governing a State14. 
The role of the State progressed, then, from the position of a simple observer, without 
powers of intervention in the private sphere of its population, to principal operator in 
providing health services with precise obligations. As a result, the recognition of social 
rights marked the transition from the liberal state to the welfare state that is 
characteristic of our times and that is attentive to the needs of the most vulnerable 
subjects of the population15. 
With the affirmation of the welfaristic principles, health became a fully enforceable 
right towards States, often provided for in domestic constitutions16. The concept of 
health, however, was still linked to a biological concept of well-being shaped on the 
absence of disease, thus limiting the object of protection to the treatment of diseases17. 
Only in modern times has the claim to health manifested itself in new dimensions and 
contexts, in which the emphasis has no longer been placed on the mere absence of 
disease, but on the notion of quality of life, understood not only in biological terms but 
also in social terms18. Chronologically speaking, this is the context in which first the 
WHO's Constitution Preamble and then the Universal declaration of Human Rights 
began to codify the right to health at the international level. 
As a result, States and the international community began to consider social progress, 
the achievement of better standards of living, and individual well-being as a direct 
product of the protection of human rights19. From these facts, one may conclude, that 
                                               
14J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971, 56-60. 
15J. Tobin, The Right to Health in International Law, Oxford University Press, 2012, 20. 
16For example, the Political Constitution of Guatemala, Article 93: “Derecho a la salud. El goce de la 
salud es un derecho fundamental del ser humano, sin discriminación alguna”. 
17D. Neri, “Bisogno di salute e nuove frontiere della medicina”, in Borsellino , Il diritto alla salute tra 
libertà e vincoli sociali, Notizie di Politeia, 1997, 63-64. 
18Pocar, Il diritto alla salute, 60. 
19 Santosuosso., Gli sviluppi del diritto, 35-36. 
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only at the end of the 1940s, the right to health acquired the status of subjective right 
which now constitutes a central piece of modern rule of law. As a subjective right, 
health-related norms provide not only for the guarantee of negative and positive 
obligations on the part of the State, but also for the provision of legitimate and directly 
enforceable rights before a court. In this way, any citizen who suffers a violation of the 
right in question may file a lawsuit before a competent court in order to obtain a 
concrete satisfaction of the individual's rights, which can never be overcome by public 
needs20. 
The process leading to the full recognition of the right to health as a subjective right 
has, however, been long and complex. Indeed, the international documents in which 
the right to health was first enshrined did not have binding legal force, such as to 
provide to individuals holding the right concrete instruments that could be immediately 
activated and used vis-à-vis States. Moreover, the idea that health was a matter for the 
subjective sphere of individuals was, and in many ways still is, difficult to accept. The 
affirmation of the right to self-determination in the field of health, even though 
enunciated in various supranational documents and reaffirmed in the Constitutional 
Charters of many States, has been forced to face much cultural and social resistance21. 
Almost ten years elapsed from the date of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the authorship of WHO Constitution for States to achieve full recognition of the 
right to health as an autonomous right in its internal legislation. This goal was reached 
in 1957, when the Supreme Court of the United States of America ruled that informed 
consent was required in order to provide medicines and medical treatments to persons 
in need of such medical attention 22 . In fact, in the Salgo vs. Leland Stanford Jr. 
University Board of Trustees case, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of patient, Martin 
Salgo, who was not informed of the risks of surgery to which he would be subjected 
and after which he became paraplegic. Informed, was added to the notion of consent 
                                               
20Tobin, The Right to health, 54-55. 
21S.  Marks, “The emergence and scope of the human right to health”, in Advancing the Human Right to 
health, Oxford University Press, 2013, 19-20. 
22J. Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002, 78-79. 
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for the first time23 . The virtue of this judgment is to have placed the principle of 
individual self-determination as a key element of the equation. Patients have since that 
time become active subjects of treatments, in which they had the right to be properly 
informed about all aspects of the required cares and to autonomously decide whether 
or not to undergo surgery. 
After the aforementioned judgment health became closely linked to individual freedom 
of human beings as a full enforceable subjective right, which for the first time departed 
from mere considerations of public health. Indeed, people now had freedom of choice 
in relation to their health in light of the principles formulated in the Constitution of the 
WHO and, in so doing, they regained powers over themselves and their choices24. The 
patriarchal doctor-patient relationship, in which only the physician was in charge over 
the situation and the decisions to be made, was finally abandoned25. 
In conclusion, the Content of the right to health cannot, therefore, be reduced to the 
right to an active intervention by the State, but also relies on the acknowledgment of 
the principle of self-determination of the people. Under this perspective the protection 
of health is achieved not only by state intervention, but also by supporting the 
autonomy of individuals in the same manner as in the case of rights of freedom26. 
As will be examined in the next sections, the international corpus iuris related to the 
right to health acknowledges both the obligation of State (immediate and progressive) 
in order to fully realize the right to health and the right of freedom for individuals. This 
means that, as a social right, the right to health entails the obligation of the State to 
create adequate conditions and to provide services to protect health; and as a right of 
freedom, it entails the abstention of the State from intervention in the individual sphere, 
ensuring protection for the self-determination of individuals in light of the principles 
                                               
23For the sake of clarity, in 1914, in the Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hospital case, the Supreme Court 
Judge Benjamin Cardozo expressed the need for consent stating: “Every human being of adult years and 
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his body, and a surgeon who performs an 
operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault for which he is liable in damages.” 
24A. Santosuosso, “Volontà e autonomia: paradigmi giuridici della persona”, in Bonacchi G., Dialoghi 
di bioetica, Annali della Fondazione Lelio e Lisli Basso, Carocci Editore, 2003, 64.   
25A. Santosuosso, “Evoluzione del concetto di salute”, in Bonacchi G., Dialoghi di bioetica, 111-112. 
26P. Borsellino, Bioetica tra ‘morali’ e diritto, Raffaello Cortina Editore, 2009, 116. 
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of autonomy and freedom of individuals27. 
In light of the aforementioned principle of self-determination in relation to medical 
treatments, it is worth mentioning the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine of 1997, often referred to as the Oviedo Convention. The Convention 
grounds on the principles of autonomy and freedom, and its second chapter confers 
legal status to the forms in which individuals express their will in relation to medical 
treatments. The Oviedo Convention, hence, provides for a legal recognition of the right 
to self-determination regarding medical cares. 
In other words, the Convention confirms the departure from the classical tradition, 
which considered health as a tool for the economic and financial development of a State. 
The principles of autonomy and freedom finally prevail, making the individual the 
center of public policies and social considerations. Medical treatments must now be 
instrumental in order to achieve the complete well-being of the citizens under an 
individual perspective that is relative for each one and does not rely on objective and 











                                               
27In this regard, it is worth mentioning the judgment of the Florence Court of Assizes during the Carlo 
Massimo case delivered in 1990. According to the Court, health is not a good that can be imposed 
coercively by the will of others, but must be based solely on the will of the person entitled, since it is a 
choice that concerns the quality of his/her life and that therefore only he/she can legitimately make. 
Judgment n. 13/90 of the Court of Assizes of I degree of Florence, par 57. 
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2. The International Protection of the Right to Health  
 
As presented in the previous section, a clear and unique definition of the right to health 
is not an easy task, mainly due to its multi-facet nature. Today, the right to health has a 
normative content which is embodied at the international level in several treaties and 
declarations. In addition, numerous national constitutions and the consequent 
legislative development enshrine the right to health and provide concrete application at 
the domestic level. As a result, the right to health has been producing significant 
jurisprudence; and it is currently the social right which has greater enforceability and 
justiciability before national courts. 
The issue of the protection of the right to health in international human rights law tends 
to generate debate on its legal nature in two related senses. On the one hand, the 
question arises as to whether it is a fundamental right in itself, or whether it is related 
to other rights, such as, the right to life. On the other hand, health as a right belongs to 
the well-known category of economic, social and cultural rights, which implies an 
active participation of States for protection and realization of these particular rights28. 
The theoretical distinction between economic and social rights on one hand and civil 
and political on the other was believed to rely on the grounds of their different natures29. 
As a result, civil and political rights, such as the right to life, prohibition of torture and 
the right of free expression, were argued to be negative rights, meaning rights granting 
protection to individuals from interference by the state30. On the contrary, economic, 
social and cultural rights, were considered positive rights. This meant that rights such 
as, the right to education, the right to food, and the right to health required states to 
actively intervene in order to safeguard the social position of the individual within 
                                               
28  L. Minkler, The State of Economic and Social Human Rights: A Global Overview, Cambridge 
Univerity Press, 2013, 62-63. 
29 Nonetheless, the Human Rights Council (HRC) jurisprudence has gone beyond this “anachronistic” 
theoretical approach between civil and political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights. 
Accordingly, the HRC has argued that all ICCPR rights impose negative duties of refraining as well as 
positive duties of performance upon States Parties. S. Joseph and M. Castan, The International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2013, 41. 
30A. Conte and R. Burchill, Defining Civil and Political Rights: The Jurisprudence of the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee, Ashgate, 2009. 
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society, according to economic and social equality31. These sets of rights depend on the 
financial resources of States; and this is the reason they are often referred to as 
financially conditioned rights32. However, this analysis is outdated and simplistic33. In 
fact, both categories of rights require States to act for their fulfillment and hence, they 
are considered interdependent for the concrete enjoyment of all human rights34. The 
right to a fair trial is the most frequent example used to prove that civil rights, as well 
as social and economic rights need an active intervention of the State. Indeed, there is 
no doubt that the right to a fair trial obliges state’s authorities to establish an effective 
judicial system, which require a significant allocation of resources and implementation 
of costly domestic laws35.  
It is important to stress that the principle of indivisibility among human rights is 
generally accepted nowadays36. As a result, it is possible to understand the theory of 
the indivisibility of human rights as the doctrine that seeks to overcome all forms of 
division and hierarchy among the different categories of human rights, affirming that 
in order to fully enjoy a human right it is necessary to enjoy all human rights since the 
violation of some also entails the violation of others37. In other words, all human rights, 
whether civil, political, economic, social or cultural, are closely linked to each other in 
                                               
31T. Christian, Human Rights. Between Idealism and Realism, eds Philip Alston, Gráinne De Búrca, and 
Bruno De Witte, The Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, Oxford University Press, 
2003, 24. 
32F. Merusi, “I servizi pubblici negli anni 80”, in Servizi pubblici instabili, 1990, 131-131. 
33A. Rehman, International Human Rights Law, Pearson Education Ltd, 2010, 141-142. 
34C. Courtis, Courts and the Legal Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Comparative 
Experiences of Justiciability, International Commission of Jurists, 2008, 10. 
35Tomuschat, Human Rights. Between Idealism and Realism, 25. 
36D. Hartley, Social Rights and Human Welfare, Routledge, 2015, 141. Another key reaffirmation of the 
equal nature between civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights is to be found in 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 32/130 of 16 December 1977, which states that:“(a) all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent; equal attention and urgent 
consideration should be given to the implementation, promotion and protection of both civil and political, 
and economic, social and cultural rights; (b) the full realization of civil and political rights without the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights is impossible; (c) the achievement of lasting progress 
in the implementation of human rights is dependent upon sound and effective national and international 
policies of economic and social development”. 
37 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-23/17 of November 15, 2017. Series 
A No. 23, par. 2. The Environment and Human Rights (State obligations in relation to the environment 
in the context of the protection and guarantee of the rights to life and to personal integrity – interpretation 
and scope of Articles 4(1) and 5(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights).  
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such a way that it is not possible to sacrifice some rights for the benefit of others without 
harming the human being who is the holder of all rights38. 
In light of the above, the main focus of the present chapter is to highlight the key legal 
obligations related to the right to health that States must respect according to the 
existing international and regional legal framework. The study grounds on the most 
significant sources of the right at stake, inter alia, relevant declarations and treaties, 
and international, regional and domestic jurisprudence39. In addition to its recognition 
at the international and regional level, treaty bodies responsible for the interpretation 
and monitoring of the implementation of the right to health, triggered the development 
and shaped the key features of its content with the aim of clarifying the relevant legal 
framework40. This preliminary consideration is a logical requirement for the deeper 
analysis of the major issue of this thesis, which is the access to medicines as a key part 
of the right to health.  
The development of the right to health is studied, in particular, on the grounds of the 
“jurisprudence” of the Committee on the United Nations Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and of the Inter-American Court of human rights. In this regard, the 
mentioned Committee provided great interpretative work of all the rights envisaged in 
the ICESCR, and, in specific, disclosed concrete attributes of the right to health for 
example, highlighting its minimum or essential content. On the other hand, the Inter-
American Court provides a valuable example of how an international judicial body can  
create the conditions for an effective protection of the right object of the present 
analysis. 
  
                                               
38 D. Vázquez and S. Serrano, “Los principios de universalidad, interdependencia, indivisibilidad y 
progresividad. Apuntes para su aplicación práctica”, in Carbonell M. and Salazar , La reforma 
constitucional de derechos humanos: un nuevo paradigma, México, Instituto de Investigaciones 
Jurídicas-UNAM, 2011, 139; UN World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action (UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23; 1993). 
39 Helena Alviar Garcia; Karl Klare; Lucy A. Williams, Social and Economic Rights in Theory and 
Practice Critical Inquiries, Routledge, 2015. 





2.1. International Declarations and Treaties related to the Right to Health  
 
This section focuses on the description of the right to health according to International 
Human Rights Law. Firstly, it studies how the right to health has been progressively 
included as an autonomous human right in different international treaties, both at the 
universal and regional level. In addition, it   examines briefly a series of specific 
conventions that enhance the acknowledgment of this right and tailor it to make it more 
inclusive for certain groups that are considered vulnerable or with specific needs. The 
last section studies the legal content of the right to health according to its tripartite 
nature and its basic components, namely the elements of availability, accessibility, 
quality and acceptability. 
 
 
2.1.1 The United Nations System (UNS) 
 
The first reference that internationally recognized the importance of health protection 
is to be found in the Charter of the United Nations of 1945. In fact, article 55 (b) 
mentioned health among the key elements for the establishment of the conditions of 
stability and well-being which are required for peaceful and friendly relations 
between nations41. A year later, in 1946, the World Health Organization (WHO) was 
created by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The WHO, is the 
authority responsible for playing a leading role in global health affairs and of which 
194 States are members. Its Constitution is particularly relevant, since for the first 
time it refers to health in terms of right, recognizing in its preamble that “the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental 
                                               
41United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, Art. 55(b). 
The origins of this wording can be found into the preliminary work of the preamble and the aims and 
objectives of the WHO Constitution, which were drafted by sub-committees of the Technical Preparatory 
Committee for the International Health Conference held in March 1946. 
WHO, Official Records of the World Health Organization No 1: Minutes of the Technical Preparatory 
Committee for the International Health Conference Held in Paris from 18 March to 5 April 1946 (UN 
WHO Interim Commission October 1947) annexes 10, 11. 
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rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political ideology or 
economic or social condition”. According to the Constitution health is not simply 
defined as the absence of disease or infirmity, but as 'a state of complete physical, 
mental and social well-being” which significantly broaden its scope and meaning42. 
In spite of the quite remarkable degree of consent among States when the WHO 
definition was drafted, the latter triggered an array of criticisms and was considered 
contentious soon after is adoption due to its vague and unclear nature43 . It clearly 
departed from the so called biostatistical conception which considered health as the 
normal functioning of our physiological system measured by biomedical statistics44. 
The biostatistical definition has the asset of relying on objective biological definitions 
of a healthy organism, but excludes issues of equity or social variables, which are 
significant in the context of health policy and defining health45. This clarification is 
important for comprehending the significance of the right to health as the sum of 
different components that go beyond the mere absence of illnesses. In fact, although 
attempts to restrain the definition of health to a more objective conception, namely the 
biostatistical idea, can be valuable for some areas of public health practice, it definitely 
does not help the cause of promoting the human right to health46. The aim of the WHO 
definition was to overcome and extend the negative definition (absence of illness) to 
positive components in light of the recent attention on social issues of the late 1940s47. 
The programmatic nature of the mentioned norm left to national authorities the duty to 
design the related framework in order to achieve the required standard and determine 
which aspects of health should be understood as essential to this aim48.  
The incorporation of the social factor as a new component of health, alongside its 
                                               
42 Preamble of the Constitution of the World Health Organization, New York, 22 July 1946, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 14, 185. 
43Tobin, The Right to Health, 28. 
44N. Daniels, Just Health. Meeting Health Needs Fairly. Cambridge University Press, 2008, 56. 
45Ibidem 
46J. M. Zuniga, S.  Marks and O. G. Lawrence, Advancing the Human Right to Health, Oxford University 
Press, 2013, 5. 
47B.M. Meier, “Global health governance and the contentious politics of human rights: Mainstreaming 
the right to health for public health advancement”, Stanford Journal of International Law, 2010, 46. 
48Zuniga et al, Advancing the Human Right to Health, 6. 
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conventional "physical" and "mental" determinants, meant a substantial change, 
because health ceased to depend exclusively on the biostatistical conception and 
became part of a more complex realm. This promoted the consideration of health as a 
fundamental social right of all people, placing the State before the dilemma of how 
effectively exercising the protection of this right, since public policies and the cultural 
and ecological environment could harm the right a stake. Since then, the 
unquestionable connection that health had with other rights, such as, among others, the 
right to life and dignity of citizens was another key dilemma that States had to confront 
and deal with49. 
This broader conception of health, which was embodied in the WHO Constitution, is 
to be favored over the biostatistical notion on the grounds of two main considerations. 
Firstly, although the biostatistical definition is a useful tool in measuring individual’s 
health, it does not add much in the design of human rights-inspired health policies for 
the population50. In fact, as the practice within the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR) shows, there is no doubt that biostatistical considerations are 
key in order to identify possible interventions on the grounds of statistical data, such 
as inter alia, life expectancy and infant and maternal mortality51. Nevertheless, these 
markers are just a share of the whole picture since the way human rights monitoring 
bodies tackle public health issues relies on a broader analysis, namely on the study of 
health systems, inequalities, and other determinants of the right to health, as highlighted 
                                               
49This concept of Health of the WHO was an important step forward, although only partial because it 
still had undoubted limitations. Thus, in the 70's, Million Terris, a famous North American public health 
expert, proposed a new definition: "Health is a state of physical, mental and social well-being, with the 
capacity to function and not only the absence of discomfort or illness". Terris introduces a subjective 
aspect of feeling good and an objective aspect of functional ability. He eliminates the word "complete" 
by claiming that health is not an absolute - a heavenly happiness - but that there are different degrees of 
health. And separates the terms "disease" and "ill-ness", as it is possible to coexist with the term "disease". 
"feel good" and the disease. The conceptual advance implied by Milton Terris' proposal requires the 
exclusion of "feeling good" and disease. idea of "state", since it opposes the dynamic and changing 
vision of the flow of life (and health) while, on the contrary, it coincides with mechanistic vision and so 
characteristic with the hegemonic conception of traditional medicine. T. Milton, “La epidemiología y la 
Salud Pública: orígenes e impacto de la segunda revolución epidemiológica”. Rev. San. Hig. Pub. 68., 
1994, 5-10. 
50Zuniga et al, Advancing the Human Right to Health, 5. 




throughout the chapter. As a result, instruments adopted by the aforementioned 
monitoring body, such as CESCR’s guidelines, are centered on policies aimed at 
guaranteeing and solving health related issues rather than on statistical information 
concerning those matters52. 
In the same way, a 2008 study carried out on 194 countries highlighted the need to 
depart from biostatistical considerations of health and showed the urge to employ a 
broader concept on the grounds of a variety of indicators. In sum, the study argued the 
necessity of assessing the right to health in light of a manageable set of indicators, with 
the aim of furthering the insight of health data and indicators in regard to the concrete 
implementation of the right to health.  The vast majority of the selected 72 indicators 
relied on determinants which had little to do with biostatistical considerations and 
biological definitions of what has to be intended as a healthy organism. Indicators such 
as political decisions, non-discrimination, health information, participation, financing 
and social awareness constituted the starting point of the analysis. As a result, the 
purpose of both the CESCR and the 2008 study was to determine fulfillment of the 
right to health, not the health of the population or of an individual53. 
The second consideration which refutes a biostatistical conception of health is key in 
preventing a position that could be antithetical to human rights. Two examples help 
clarifying this view. First, if there were a norm which defined as healthy people only 
those whose sexual drive was solely directed towards reproduction, on the grounds of 
biological considerations, persons who faced fertility issues or those whose sexual 
interest was aimed towards same-sex relations, would be considered pathological, and 
hence not healthy. On the contrary, a human rights approach has nothing to do with 
simplistic biostatistical considerations; and individuals favoring same-sex relations and 
in general, individuals whose sexual drive is not directed to reproduction, would 
definitely be identified as healthy physically, mentally, and socially. Second, even if 
                                               
52United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Guidelines on treaty-specific 
documents to be submitted by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. UN Doc. E/C.12/2008/2, annex. 24 March. United Nations (UN): 
New York, NY, 2009. 
53G. Backman,  Hunt, C. Jaramillo-Strauss et al, “Health systems and the right to health: an assessment 
of 194 countries”, Lancet, 372, 2008, 2048-2050. 
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persons with both physical and mental disabilities fall outside the biostatistical 
definition of being ‘healthy’, such as disabled people, in light of a human rights 
approach and taking into account the State’s position towards their special needs, they 
are considered physically, mentally and socially healthy54. Consequently, health should 
be understood as a complex and dialectical process embodying social, cultural and 
economic determinants and not simply as a biological state. Similarly, illness, is part 
of the vital cycle of persons and is not the opposite of health55. 
Another aspect of the WHO Constitution which is worth mentioning is the alleged 
instrumental nature of the right to health embodied within as demonstrated in one of 
the first version of the Constitution’s Preamble. Indeed, the Preparatory Committee 
stressed that health was a fundamental factor achieving safety and well-being for 
individuals and nations56. In addition, this approach has been confirmed in the final 
version of the preamble which reaffirmed the dependence of health on international 
cooperation and its instrumental character in relation to global security and peace57. In 
this way both the normative and instrumental sides of the right to health were formally 
accepted, with the consequent obligation on states to act individually and collectively 
with the aim at achieving not only the effective protection of the right to health of 
persons but also at fulfilling the key interests of states and of the community as a 
whole58. 
  
                                               
54Zuniga et al, Advancing the Human Right to Health, 6. 
55 M. Ssenyonjo, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law, Hart Publishing, 2009, 
317. 
56 WHO, Official Records No1 (n 84), annex 10. 
57Preamble of the WHO Constitution: “The health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of 
peace and security and is dependent upon the fullest co-operation of individuals and States”. 
58Tobin, The Right to Health, 29. 
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2.1.1.1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
 
In 1948, two years after the adoption of WHO Constitution, the United Nations General 
Assembly enacted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which 
included the right to health in its article 25(1). Interestingly, the article did not provide 
a specific provision in regard with the right to health, instead it was referred to has a 
component of the broader concept of an adequate standard of living59 . Article’s 25 
wording was proposed by the Latin American delegation, which play a crucial role 
during the drafting procedure within the respective Committee of the Commission on 
Human Rights. According to some scholars, Latin American tradition was key in 
including the right to health within the Declaration, since 13 national constitutions 
already contained the right to health as a specific right, in contrast to North Atlantic 
countries, which, at the time, did not provide any constitutional provisions recognizing 
the right at stake60. At the end the American proposal was adopted and after multiple 
editing, the final version established this right alongside the right to food, clothing, and 
housing in light of their close relationship with the practical achievement of healthcare 
and necessary social services61. 
Latin American participation in the drafting was not, however, without consequences. 
As the same scholars argue, this contribution in the wording of the right to health and 
of other economic and social rights within the Declaration was proof that the common 
belief that social and economic rights were a result of Soviet influence was not 
completely accurate. But even though this position is well grounded in the practice and 
within fundamental legal documents of the Latin American continent, reducing 
economic and social right to a sort of Latin American socialism is simplistic. Indeed, 
                                               
59 “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health of himself and of his family, 
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to 
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of 
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control” 
UN General Assembly. (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Doc 217A (III. UN General 
Assembly: New York, NY. 
60J. Morsin, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent. University of 




other important factors must be taken into consideration. 
Firstly, the development of the right to health has been profoundly linked to the 
necessity of implementing a concrete vision of how best addressing human suffering 
and inequality. Certainly, both communism and socialism have probably been the 
product, inter alia, of the idea that political and civil rights did not suffice and, hence, 
other tools were needed to protect the most vulnerable ones62. However, as Tobin points 
out, these movements, especially at their early stages, were more interested in 
addressing the collective sphere and less keen on using rights as a mechanism in order 
to tackle individual economic and social issues63. Marx himself was skeptical as he 
considers that any kind of rights were the expression of the egoistic and selfish 
positions of individuals that should always perish to the interest of the society as a 
whole64. It is worth noting that both communism and socialism did address, among 
others, two specific questions: on the one hand, whether another category of rights was 
needed alongside political and civil ones and, on the other, if personal rights, such as 
the right of private property could co-exist with the community’s interest of improving 
the well-being of its most disadvantaged members65. The need to solve these two key 
issues triggered and shaped the discourse of a new approach to human rights within the 
Latin American continent as its nations reached their political independence in the 
1900’s. As authors such as Mary Ann Glendon highlighted in their works, the 
aforementioned new approach relied on a variety of components such as the different 
legal traditions between states, religion and the continent's historical development, and 
was not the outcome of Marxist or socialist ideology. In conclusion, the author 
demonstrated that this new vision towards human rights was mainly founded on 
Catholic beliefs in regard to human dignity and social justice with the aim of refuting 
positions of extreme individualism and collectivism66.  
                                               
62 L. Hunt, Observing HumanRights:A History , WWNorton & Co, 2007, 197. 
63Tobin, The Right to Health, 21. 
64 K. Baynes, “Rights as Critique and the Critique of Rights: Karl Marx, Wendy Brown and the Social 
Function of Rights”, Political Theory 451, 2000, 451-454. 
65L. Hunt, Observing Human Rights: A History, WW Norton & Co, 2007, 197. 
66 M. A. Glendon, “The Forgotten Crucible: The Latin American Influence on the Universal Human 
Rights Idea”, Harvard Human Rights Journal 16, 2003, 27. 
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The political and sociological analysis of the link between Latin American socialism 
and economic and social rights is surely appealing and engaging: however, it departs 
from the main focus of this chapter, which is to highlight the development of the right 
to health at the international stage67. In line with the nature of this work, the following 
section deals with the study of the legal nature of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which indeed constitutes a milestone in international protection of human rights 




2.1.1.2. The Legal Nature of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
Resolution 217 (III) of the General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA) was 
adopted on December 10, 1948 with 48 votes in favor, 8 abstentions and no votes 
against, and embodied the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As a resolution, the 
recently born document would not have legally binding character for member states. 
Indeed, in light of a literal interpretation of the articles regulating the functions and 
powers of the UNGA, namely Arts. 10 to 17 of the United Nations Charter, this scenario 
was explicitly provided for68. 
However, since the 1960s, many less developed countries have tried to give the UNGA 
the power to establish binding legal norms by means of its Resolutions, but these 
attempts were blocked by the opposition of Western States and the caution of Socialist 
States, that feared the creation of an international legislative assembly in which the 
most “powerful” countries would be a minority69.  
When the Declaration was drafted, all the opinions of United Nations Member States 
                                               
67 For further analysis see T. Campbell, The Left and Rights: A Conceptual Analysis of the Idea of 
Socialist Rights, Routledge, 1983; and P. Carozza, “From Conquest to Constitutions: Retrieving a Latin 
American Tradition of the Idea of Human Rights”, 25 Human Rights Quarterly 281, 2003. 
68 At the San Francisco Conference of 1945, all proposals aimed at granting the UN General Assembly 
the competence to enact binding legal norms were rejected. Specifically, a proposal by the Philippines 
to that end was rejected by 26 votes against and 1 in favor. 
69B. Conforti, Le Nazioni Unite, Cedam, 2010, 105. 
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coincided in pointing out its importance, but at the same time, they rejected the idea 
that the Declaration imposed conventional legal obligations in respect to the Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms embodied within; in this sense, the great majority 
of the members who intervened in its drafting did not intend to create a compulsory 
document70 . In other words, a Declaration rather than a treaty was adopted on the 
grounds that States would not accept being conventionally bound to implement those 
provisions in their legal systems71.  
If there is no doubt that the Declaration was merely a political document at the moment 
of its adoption, its legal nature has faced changes throughout the years. Indeed, 
considering the Declaration a simple Resolution with no legal effects, would mean 
underestimating its formal and substantial value as a fundamental piece of the 
international human rights law framework. The Declaration was in fact referred to as a 
source of legally binding obligations on States by international and national 
jurisprudence on multiple occasions. This section points out the most relevant theories 
on the legal nature of this instrument in light of the aforementioned jurisprudence and 
States’ practice. There have been four main doctrinal assessments regarding the legal 
nature of the Declaration over the years: firstly, some scholars have denied its juridical 
obligatory nature; secondly, others, have not accepted its binding force, but have 
recognized its undeniable juridical relevance and great moral value; thirdly, others have 
considered that it endowed a juridical obligatory value as forming part of General 
International Law or being an expression of Fundamental Principles of the international 
order; and lastly, some have even considered the Declaration endowed with a cogent 
character. An examination of these trends is indicated.  
According to one of the main reasoning excluding the binding nature of the Declaration, 
the UN Charter explicitly provides that the UNGA can adopt non-binding documents, 
                                               
70 Simirarly, Mrs. Roosevelt - Chairman of the Drafting Committee set up within the Human Rights 
Commission and US representative - pointed out that the UDHR was not a Treaty endowed with the 
force of law, but rather a Declaration of Principles on the Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of 
individuals. S. Tchirkovitch, “La Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l’Homme et sa portée 
international", Revue Générale de Droit International Public 3-4, 1949, 376. 
71Szabo, “Fondements historiques et développement des droits de l’homme”, in K. Vasak (Réd. gén.), 
Les dimensions internationales des droits de l’homme, UNESCO, Gand, 1978, 25. 
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namely, recommendations and resolutions, and no new customary norm has modified 
this framework over the years72 . The best proof that UNGA instruments have not 
become binding is the fact that they have generally been followed by the adoption of 
treaties drawn up within the United Nations, treaties which contain provisions 
practically identical to those of the resolutions (in the case of the UDHR, it would be 
the two Covenants of 1966), so that if the resolutions were binding, it would not make 
sense for the United Nations to draw up a subsequent treaty with the same normative 
object73. In other words, the subsequent adoption of treaties with the specific objective 
of giving legal effectiveness to the Rights contained in the UDHR is a sufficient reason 
to deny its binding force74.  
Even the text of the Universal Declaration itself confirms that it has no binding 
character by affirming the Declaration "as a common standard of achievement for all 
peoples and all nations". In short, for this first aspect of the doctrine, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights would not be binding in function: firstly, the competence 
of the General Assembly limited exclusively to the adoption of resolutions and 
recommendations; secondly, the instrument denomination, which refers to a 
declaratory and non-binding document; thirdly, the history of its elaboration, in which 
it was expressly stated that it would not be mandatory; and lastly, from the text of the 
Declaration itself. 
In line with the aforementioned position, other scholars refute the idea that the 
Declaration is either the expression of new customs, nor does it confirm or crystallize 
previously existent customary norms. In support of his argument, these scholars 
highlighted the conditions in which the Declaration was adopted. As stated above, the 
fact that Socialist States did not expressively accept the Declaration and abstained, is 
enough to determine that the instrument was not approved by the generality of the 
States of the International Community. Hence, one of the two main components of 
                                               
72Charter of the United Nations, Articles 9 to 22. 
73 I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, “Propositions algeriennes pour un nouveau cadre de relations entre des 
entreprises des pays du tiers monde et des entreprises des pays developpes”, in Mélanges F., Les progés 
du Droit des Gens, F. Nathan-París, Labor-Bruselas, 1979, 108. 
74 O. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff, 1991, 337. 
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customary norms, namely opinio iuris, was missing75. 
In addition, according to these authors, Resolution 2625 (XXV) does constitute another 
ground on which confirm the political character of the Declaration. The resolution was 
adopted by consensus by the UNGA on 24 October 1970 and contained the Declaration 
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Theses authors 
argue that the latter declaration, which in light of unanimous practice is considered 
declaratory of the fundamental principles of Public International Law 76 , did not 
mention the principle of respecting Human Rights, nor the observance of the UDHR, 
establishing a decisive element for not granting customary value to the Declaration.77 
indeed, the Universal Declaration cannot be considered as a petrified normative text 
and must be interpreted and applied in light of current situations and not merely in light 
of the context of its adoption in 1948. Better said, this international instrument should 
be understood as a living instrument, whose legal nature, in its material aspect, may 
vary over time in accordance with the evolution of international relations and the 
commitment of States to international human rights law. In the same way as the 
European Court of Human Rights has qualified the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, a text must therefore be 
interpreted in the light of the present conditions78. On these grounds, there is no such 
thing as a socialist bloc nowadays, and the States that formerly belonged to this orbit 
have, at least on paper, legally bound themselves to a variety of international 
instruments related to human rights and to the control mechanisms provided for therein. 
The second group of scholars, the largest one, only recognize the undeniable legal 
relevance of the Declaration, in the same way as with other resolutions of the UNGA, 
but without accepting its legal obligatory nature or taking a stance on it79 
                                               
75 F. Sudre, Droit international et européen des droits de l’homme, PUF, 1995, 106. 
76 International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua/United States of 
America) Merits. J. 27.6.1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, 4. 
77 M. C. Ortega Carcelen, “Naturaleza y evoluciones de los Principios Fundamentales del Derecho 
Internacional”, Revista Española de Derecho Internacional, 1998,  60; 
78 European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 13 June 1979, Marckx v. Belgium case, par. 58. 
79 M. Giuliano, T. Scovazzi and T. Treves, Diritto Internazionale. Parte Generale, Giuffrè, 1991, 240. 
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A third group is composed of authors who confer binding legal value to the Declaration, 
understanding that all or some of the rights formulated therein are part of General 
International Law80; thus, they consider that UDHR is directly applicable to States 
whose legal frameworks have established a system of automatic incorporation of 
customary international law. These authors ground their position on the countless 
occasions in which the UDHR has been invoked as a universal standard and on the fact 
that a subsequent resolution of the U.N.G.A., the Declaration on the grant of 
independence to colonial countries and peoples, of 1960, clearly affirmed that "all 
States must observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter and the 
UDHR"81. 
Other scholars did recognize the Declaration legal obligatory nature, but did not derive 
it from a single source of International Law, since they consider the content of the 
UDHR either an international custom, expression of General or Fundamental Principles 
of the international order, or an authorized interpretation of the Charter to which the 
International Community conferred binding force82. 
This doctrine argues that the binding force of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights would derive from considering it as an authentic interpretation of the provisions 
of the UN Charter relating to Human Rights, a document that is binding on Member 
States.  This was precisely the position taken by Judge Tanaka in the South West Africa 
case when he pointed out that even though the Declaration was not binding in itself, it 
constituted proof of the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the 
Charter83. In addition, the Judge Ammoun's opinion in the Barcelona Traction case 
concluded the same thing, when he pointed out that: “Certain writers, for their part, 
see in this an interpretation based upon an argument drawn from the actual text of the 
                                               
80A. Mangas Martín, in M. Díez de Velasco, Instituciones de Derecho Internacional Público, Tecnos, 
1999, 198. 
81UNGA, Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Resolution 
1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, par. 7. 
82 A. Carrillo Salcedo, “Algunas reflexiones sobre el valor jurídico de la Declaración Universal de 
Derechos Humanos”, in Hacia un nuevo orden internacional y europeo. Estudios en homenaje al Prof. 
D. Manuel Díez de Velasco, Tecnos, 1993, 177-178. 
83International Court of Justice, South-West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South 
Africa); Second Phase, 18 July 1966, par. 293. 
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Charter, strengthened by a teleological interpretation of that international 
constitutional instrument, which presupposes the existence of rights and liberties of 
man which "are not only moral ones, [but] . . . also have a legal character by the nature 
of the subject-matter ". They add that such an interpretation should take into account 
the functioning of the Charter in practice”84. 
One of the most interesting and well-founded theory on the binding nature of the 
Declaration was the one developed by Sieghart. The author grounds his thesis on three 
solid arguments, stating that the UDHR creates legal obligations on Member States of 
the United Nations, not because it embodied norms of customary international law, but 
because, there are evidences that States have expressly accepted such obligations85. 
The first argument relies on an attentive analysis of Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter. 
According to the author, the latter article creates a legal obligation for the Member 
States of the United Nations to adopt the necessary measures to achieve respect for 
human rights, even though the Charter does not list these rights, as does the Declaration. 
Hence, the author argued that the Declaration constitutes a text that complemented the 
Charter, in such a way that the Member States of the United Nations have retroactively 
incorporated this list into the Charter itself86.  
According to the second argument, the UDHR constitutes an interpretative guide to the 
wording "human rights and fundamental freedoms" embodied in Article 55(c) of the 
Charter. In fact, in accordance with the general rule of treaty interpretation established 
in Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States of 
23 May 1969, the context shall be to take into account together with “any subsequent 
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation"87 . There is a continuing practice by States, and by the 
United Nations itself, to cite the UDHR as the agreed catalogue of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, often in the specific context of art. 55(c) of the Charter. This 
                                               
84International Court of Justice, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment of 5 
February 1970, I.C.J. Reports 1970, 3; Separate Opinion Judge Ammoun, par. 302. 
85 Sieghart, The International Law of Human Rights, Clarendon Press, 1983, 53-55. 
86Ibidem 
87Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 
1155, 331, art. 31(3)(b). 
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was the case of the Tehran Proclamation of 13 May 1968, adopted at the First United 
Nations World Conference on Human Rights. Therefore, in the view of the author the 
wording "human rights and fundamental freedoms" proclaimed in the UN Charter must 
be interpreted in such a way as to refer to the rights and freedoms provided for in the 
UDHR88. 
The last view argued that in the aforementioned Tehran Proclamation, the 
representatives of 84 States agreed that the UDHR constituted an obligation for the 
members of the International Community, recognizing that if at the time, the UDHR 
did not constitute an obligation for the member States of the United Nations, it does 
since the cited Proclamation, which considers the UDHR "obligatory for the 
International Community"89. 
Subsequent State practice, however, did not confirm this view as shown by the Second 
World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993, where States failed to 
reach the consensus required to confer legal character and reaffirmed the non-binding 
nature of the Declaration. The preamble of the Final Act of the Conference, which inter 
alia enshrined the concept of rights being indivisible, referred to the UDHR as common 
goal and a source of inspiration, in contrast to the binding definition provided for in 
the cited Proclamation of Teheran90. 
Although it is difficult to determine the concrete legal nature of the UDHR, it must be 
noted that it is not an ordinary UNGA Resolution, originally not obligatory but which 
has gradually become part of customary norm, by expressing a general legal conviction 
regarding the obligatory observance of most of the Rights and Freedoms listed therein91. 
In this sense, there is no doubt about the existence of an opinio iuris on the legal value 
                                               
88 Sieghart, The International Law of Human Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983, 53-55. 
89Proclamation of Teheran, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 22 
April to 13 May 1968, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41 at 3 (1968), par. 2. 
90World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, June 1993, NU, 
New York, 1995, 28. 
91Nor should it be forgotten that in the past, in application of Article 73(e) of the Charter of the United 
Nations, the administering States of "Non-Self-Governing Territories" were requested to provide 
information on the means by which, and to what extent, the human rights law was applied in them. A. 
A. Cançado Trindade, “Co-existence and Co-ordination of Mechanisms of International Protection of 
Human Rights (at Global and Regional Levels)”, Recueil des Cours de l’Academie de Droit International 
de La Haya, 1987-II, 202, 309. 
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of the Declaration, since all States recognized their obligation to protect human rights 
over the years. Furthermore, although in practice there are many cases of violations of 
this specific category of rights, the breach of a rule does not mean the denial of its 
existence, even though it does not have a coercive mechanism that sanctions its non-
compliance. For example, as the frequent violations of criminal laws at the domestic 
level do not entail the non-existence of Criminal Law, the fact that many States still do 
not accept or do not observe the international obligations related to Human Rights does 
not undermine the validity of this group of norms. 
The same view has been confirmed by the International Court of Justice in its Judgment 
of 27 June 1986, in the Nicaragua vs. United States case. The Court argued that, in 
order for a rule to be well established as custom, it is not necessary for the 
corresponding practice to have absolute conformity with that rule; since, what is needed 
is a general consistency with the rule and that in cases in which a State departs from 
the required conduct, “should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not 
as indications of the recognition of a new rule”. Moreover, according to the Court, “if 
a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but defends its 
conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, 
then whether or not the State's conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the 
significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule”92. 
In the same way, the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons of 8 July 1996 stated: "(...) General 
Assembly resolutions, although not binding, may sometimes have normative value. In 
certain circumstances, they may provide important evidence to determine the existence 
of a norm or the emergence of an opinio iuris (...)"; In order to do so, its content, the 
conditions under which it was adopted and the existence of a general legal conviction 
as to its normative character must be taken into account93. 
Finally, some authors even consider that the content of the UDHR has to be understood 
                                               
92 International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, 14. par. 186. 
93International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
I.C.J. Reports 1996, 226, par. 255. 
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as endowed with ius cogens norms 94 . According to these scholars, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights is binding insofar as it is a positive legal expression of a 
generally accepted principle in contemporary international law, namely, the dignity of 
the human person. Furthermore, It understands that the Universal Declaration contains 
a set of general principles of law for which there is universal acceptance as shown inter 
alia, in the Barcelona Traction case, which considers the respect for human rights as 
an international obligation erga omnes: it is incumbent upon every State with respect 
to the International Community as a whole and every State has a legal interest in the 
protection of human rights. Similarly, the I.C.J. in its judgment of 24 May 1980 in the 
case of Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, concluded: “Wrongfully to deprive 
human beings of their freedom and to subject them to physical constraint in conditions 
of hardship is in itself manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations, as well as with the fundamental principles enunciated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights”95. 
In conclusion, there is no doubt that a number of rights contained in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights have been addressed by the repeated and uniform 
practice of States and, in that sense, form part of customary law and, some other 
reached the status of ius cogens. In addition, it is not possible to deny the Declaration 
unquestionable legal relevance as an inspiring principle of international instruments of 
conventional character as shown by the practice within the United Nations, as well as 
in that of other United Nations agencies, and regional systems. 
  
                                               
94A. Sanjosé Gil, La protección de los derechos humanos en el ámbito del Derecho Internacional, Tirant 
lo Blanch, 1992, 19- 20; F. S. Nariman, “Universalidad De Los Derechos Humanos”, Revista de la 
Comisión Internacional de Juristas 50, 1993, 13. 
95International Court of Justice, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States 
of America v. Iran), Judgment of 24 May 1980, I.C.J. Reports 1980, 3. par. 91. 
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2.1.2. The United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
rights (ICESCR) 
 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
provides the most comprehensive article on the right to health in international human 
rights law96. The Covenant, counting 169 state parties97, on Economic, protects a array 
of economic, social and cultural rights. For the purpose of the present analysis and 
considering information which will be further examined in Chapter II, it is important 
to mention that most of WTO members have ratified the ICESCR, although there is a 
notable exception. In fact, the United States of America signed the ICESCR in 1977, 
but has not ratified it98. Under article 18(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the 
Treaties, the Covenant, however, does have legal effects on signatories’ parties, indeed, 
the US and the others States with the same status, are obliged to abstain from any acts 
which would be against the object and purpose of the treaty99. 
In accordance with article 12.1 of the ICESCR, States Parties recognize the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental, 
while article 12.2 presents a list of measures to be taken by States Parties to the 
Covenant in order to ensure the full effectiveness of the Covenant, almost all of which 
are directly or indirectly linked to the prevention and control of infectious diseases100. 
A quasi-judicial body, namely the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights 
is in charge of monitoring the correct fulfillment of the rights envisaged by the 
Convention among States parties101. For the sake of clarity, the Convention, as opposed 
to the Convention on Civil and Political rights adopted in the same year (1966), did not 
establish the latter monitoring body. Indeed, the Committee was established by the 
                                               
96 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, New York, 16 December 1966, 
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, 3. 
97 That is at the time of writing, March 2019. See also http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails. 
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en. 
98Other States that have signed the Covenant but not ratified it are: Comoros (2008-09-25), Cuba (2008-
02-28), Palau (2011-09-20). 
99 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, Article 18(a). 
100Tobin, The right to health, 114. 
101K. Arambulo, Strengthening the Supervision of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights: Theoretical and Procedural Aspects, Intersentia, 41-42. 
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Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) following the adoption of Resolution 
1985/17 of 28 May 1985102. Its purpose was to act on behalf of the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council ECOSOC in order to fulfill the oversight requirements 
as stated in Part IV of the Covenant103. 
The work of the Committee relies on a system of regular reports concerning the manner 
in which the rights are being implemented, which all States parties are obliged to 
submit. States must report initially within two years of accepting the Covenant and 
thereafter every five years. The Committee examines each report and addresses its 
concerns and recommendations to the State party in the form of “concluding 
observations”104. Furthermore, since the entering into force of the Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in May 2013, the 
Committee has the competence to receive and address communications from 
individuals claiming alleged violations of the rights provided for in the Covenant105. 
The publication of the interpretation of specific provisions of the Covenant in the form 
of general comments constitutes another key task performed by the Committee106 , 
which may also, assess inter-state complaints, and under particular conditions, initiate 
interrogations on grave or systematic breaching of any of the economic, social and 
cultural rights embodied in the Covenant107. 
  
                                               
102United Nations Economic and Social Council, Resolution 1985/17. 
103M. Ssenyonjo, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law, Hart Publishing, 2009, 
314-315. 
104Ibidem 
105The General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/63/117 on 10 December 2008, Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2. 
106 For instance, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General 
Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12 of the Covenant), 11 
August 2000, E/C.12/2000/4. 




2.1.3. The Right to Health within the United Nations Committee on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights System 
 
As stressed from the beginning of this chapter, the right to health is deeply related to 
the economic and financial situations of States. Under this consideration the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights is aware that“for millions of people 
throughout the world, the full enjoyment of the right to health still remains a distant 
goal. Moreover, in many cases, especially for those living in poverty, this goal is 
becoming increasingly remote. The Committee recognizes the formidable structural 
and other obstacles resulting from international and other factors beyond the control 
of States that impede the full realization of article 12 in many States parties”108 . 
Therefore, determining specific and clear legal obligations is fundamental for the 
concrete protection and implementation of the right object of the current analysis. 
Starting from the consideration that it is now widely accepted that from the wording of 
article 12 ICESCR the right to health does not imply a right to be healthy109 . The 
analysis further explores what article 12 of the Covenant entails. Article 12 of the 
Covenant goes as follow: 
 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. 
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the 
full realization of this right shall include those necessary for: 
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for 
the healthy development of the child; 
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; 
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(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and 
other diseases; 
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical 
attention in the event of sickness. 
The Third Committee of United Nations General Assembly, which was charge with 
drafting the article, decided to depart from the definition of health envisaged in the 
Preamble of the WHO Constitution, which conceives of health as "a state of complete 
physical, mental and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or 
infirmity". In addition, the Committee itself clarifies that the reference to article 12, 
paragraph 1, of the Covenant to the "highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health" is not limited to the right to health care. On the contrary, the wording of article 
12, paragraph 2 recognizes that the right to health encompasses a wide range of socio-
economic factors that promote the conditions under which individuals can lead healthy 
lives and includes basic underlying determinants of health, such as the right to food 
and potable water110. 
As will be further detailed in section 6 of this chapter, access to medicines constitutes 
a key element of the right to health. Under this consideration, it is worthy reading the 
aforementioned article 12 in light of an access to medicines approach. On the one hand, 
there is doubt that medicines are vital and indispensable for the treatment of most 
diseases, and access to and the existence of such medicines is, hence, an essential 
component in permitting individuals to achieve their highest attainable standard of 
health111. On the other, on the grounds of paragraph 2 which lists some of the steps to 
be taken in order to fulfill the right, it goes without saying that medicines are 
particularly relevant in the event of preventing, treating and controlling epidemic, 
endemic, occupational and other diseases (article 12.2(c)) and in creating conditions 
which assure that everyone enjoys medical service and attention in the event of sickness 
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(article 12.2(d)). This interpretation is, therefore, consistent with both the wording of 
article 12 and the context, the object and purpose of the Covenant112. 
Even though General Comments of the CESCR do not have legally binding effects, 
they do constitute a key resource in determining State's obligations in light of the 
Covenant in general and on the right to health in particular. Based on the jurisprudence 
of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in particular under General 
Comment 3 on the nature of States parties' obligations - paras. 1, 2, 9 and 10 and 
General Comment 14 on the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard 
of health - paras. 12, 33, 43 and 44, the delimitation of the content of the right to health 
relies on three typologies of State obligations with respect to economic, social and 
cultural rights: firstly, obligations of availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality; 
secondly, obligations to respect, protect and fulfill; and thirdly, immediate and 
progressive obligations113. 
The Committee constructed and specified the right to health on the grounds of four 
interrelated and essential components, the implementation of which stems from the 
specific context within a state party. In summary, in accordance to the CESCR's 
analysis, availability implies the provision of “[f]unctioning public health and health 
care facilities, goods and services, as well as programmes, which have to be available 
in sufficient quantity within the State Party”114. Indeed, the Committee pointed out that 
level of development within each country must be always be taken into account; and, 
such facilities must be understood as comprising safe drinking water, adequate 
sanitation facilities, hospitals, clinics, trained medical and profession personnel, and 
essential drugs as defined by the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs115. 
According to the Committee, the second component of health is accessibility, which 
entails that “health facilities, goods and services have to be accessible to everyone 
without discrimination, within the jurisdiction of the State Party”. This second 
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component is then broken down to four overlapping dimensions: firstly, accessibility 
must be understood in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination; secondly, 
accessibility entails physical accessibility, understood as that health facilities, goods 
and services must be within safe physical reach, for rural areas as well as urban 
locations; thirdly, accessibility means economic accessibility, implying that health 
facilities, goods and services must be affordable for every individual; and, lastly, 
accessibility must be understood as the individual right of seeking, receiving and 
imparting information and ideas in relation to health issues116. 
Acceptability is the third component mentioned by the Committee, which entails that 
“All health facilities, goods and services must be respectful of medical ethics and 
culturally appropriate”117 . Lastly, quality means that, “health facilities, goods and 
services must also be scientifically and medically appropriate and of good quality”118. 
Since the interface between access to medicines and pharmaceutical patents protection 
constitutes the center of the present dissertation, it becomes clear that the analysis of 
the third dimension of accessibility, namely that health facilities, services and goods 
must be affordable is key in the present study. In fact, as will be presented in chapter 2, 
the international legal framework related to patents grants a 20-year monopoly for 
medicines, which usually result in higher prices. Higher prices lead to an impediment 
in accessing important medicines both for States, especially developing countries 
which generally deal with resource constraints, and private citizens who do not have 
the economic capacity to purchase them. In conclusion, under these considerations, in 
accordance with the interpretation delivered by the Committee and in light of the 
further analysis presented in section 6 of this chapter, access to essential medicines 
constitutes a crucial component of the right to health under article 12 ICESCR. As a 
result, essential medicines must be available and accessible in adequate manner, 
meaning that essential medicines must be affordable to all individuals of the population, 
culturally acceptable and of good quality, and not merely physically accessible. In light 
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of the aforementioned analysis, it is instrumental to determine State's obligations in 
relation to the right to health on the basis of the Committee jurisprudence119. 
 
 
2.1.3.1. State's obligations concerning the Right to Health  
 
General Comment 14 is precise in underlying that if it certain that States parties have 
an obligation to implement ICESCR’s standards, they are, free in choosing the manner 
of implementation, which can differ from state to state. This means, that the ICESCR 
confer to state parties a margin of discretion in assessing which measures are most 
adequate in protecting the Covenant’s rights at the national level. Indeed, even though 
states parties have a considerable margin of action in determining which are the most 
effective measures within their domestic level, the final evaluation on the 
appropriateness of such measures is left to the Committee120. 
 
 
2.1.3.2.The Tripartite Nature of the Right to Health 
 
As with all human rights, the right to health grounds on a tripartite structure which is 
composed of three different kinds of obligations, namely the obligations to respect, 
protect and fulfill. In effect, this structure makes possible the delimitation of the state's 
conduct in such a way that its conduct concentrates on an abstention, on intervention 
in the conduct of third parties, and on the direct assumption of the commitment to 
realize the right. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (General 
Comment 14, para. 33) defines these obligations as follows121: firstly, in light of their 
obligations to respect, States must refrain from hindering, directly or indirectly, the 
enjoyment of the right to health, both for the individual and collective levels. Respect 
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is directed towards freedom of action and the use of each individual's or collective's 
own resources. For example, the State must refrain from adopting discriminatory 
policies that prevent or limit the access of certain persons to health services which is 
an essential element of the right to health122. 
Secondly, obligations to protect require States to take measures to prevent third parties 
from interfering with or hindering the enjoyment of the Convention in the matter of 
right to health. The State must monitor and control the activities of individuals in the 
provision of health services, as well as of individuals whose activity is to provide such 
services. In addition, the State must ensure that certain types of family or community 
customs or practices are taken into account so that such customs and practice do not 
affect people's health123. 
Finally, obligations to fulfill entail that States must adopt legislative, administrative, 
budgetary, judicial or other measures in order to give full effect to the right to health. 
This includes the organization of the corresponding public service that makes the 
enjoyment of the right possible. Obligations to fulfil incorporate obligations to 
facilitate, provide and promote124. 
As has been previously stressed, the CESCR has determined the character of states 
parties’ obligations on the grounds of article 2 ICESCR in its General Comment No. 
3125, which highlights that these obligations include both obligations of conduct and 
obligations of result 126 . According to the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the former set of obligations requires States to 
adopt reasonably calculated actions in order to fulfill the enjoyment of a specific right, 
while the latter obligations require States to accomplish particular goals in order to 
realize a specific substantive standard127. 
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Furthermore, the Committee highlights two kinds of obligations that States must 
confront in relation to ESCR under the Covenant, namely immediate and progressive 
obligations. States parties have two main immediate obligations under the Covenant. 
These obligations are the prohibition of discrimination (in light of Articles 2.2 and 3 
ICESCR)128 and the obligation to take steps in realizing the rights provided for in the 
Covenant. The prohibition of discrimination has already been examined throughout the 
section, on the contrary, the obligation to take steps require States to proceed towards 
realizing the right to health with deliberate, concrete and targeted steps129. Indeed, if 
States must achieve the standards provided for in the Covenant progressively, these 
“steps towards that goal must be taken within a reasonably short time after the 
ICESCR’s entry into force130”. 
Secondly, states parties have the obligation to progressively realize the implementation 
of the Covenant’s rights in general and of the right to health in particular.  In 
consideration of this set of obligations, states parties are free to act, provided that they 
employ all appropriate means and to the maximum of their available resources. As a 
result of this margin of discretion, progressive obligations strictly depend on the 
specific context in light of States' level of development and, hence, are not uniform 
among them131. 
Interestingly, the Committee pointed out that if states parties are incapable respect the 
aforementioned obligations in relation to the right to health due to their specific 
economic and social context, such states have an obligation to seek international 
assistance. Actually, there is no doubt that the protection and fulfillment of ESCR has 
shifted from a territorial protection to more efficient forms of international cooperation, 
however, this is not sufficient to conclude that developed state parties are under an 
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obligation to provide assistance to less developed countries 132 . In this regard, the 
Committee claimed that “core obligations give rise to national responsibilities for all 
States and international responsibilities for developed States, as well as others that are 
‘in a position to assist 133 ”. From the latter wording is ambiguous whether 
“responsibilities” is to be understood as enforceable obligations for States and how to 
determine if a State is in a position to assist134. As a result, it seems unlikely that States 
have an obligation to internationally cooperate in order to provide assistance to States 
which are unable to fulfill their obligations135. This, however, is not to be interpreted 
that the wording of article 2 is without meaning136. On the contrary, such international 
responsibilities on states should be considered as having a complementary tool137. 
The position taken by the Committee concerning other international agreements that 
States parties may conclude and States' conducts within international organizations is 
another issue which is of particular interest in relation to the object of the present work. 
Indeed the Committee stated that “States parties should ensure that the right to health 
is given due attention in international agreements”138, and that “States parties have an 
obligation to ensure that their actions as members of international organizations take 
due account of the right to health.139” In the same way the  Maastricht Principle on 
Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of ESC Rights affirmed that “States 
must elaborate, interpret and apply relevant international agreements and standards 
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in a manner consistent with their human rights obligations. Such obligations include 
those pertaining to international trade, investment, finance, taxation, environmental 
protection, development cooperation, and security140.” In light of this wording, state 
parties have the obligation to take into account the right to health both when concluding 
international agreements and in performing within international organizations. In other 
words, the ICESCR establishes an obligation on states parties to refrain from 
negotiating and ratifying agreements, such as international trade agreements (i.e. in 
relation to IPRs), which could eventually affect the State's capacity to fulfill the right 
to health, including access to medicines141. As will be examined throughout the present 
work, States often adopt agreements which require higher standards of protection for 
IPRs than those provided for by the TRIPS Agreement. These stricter treaties, usually 
referred to as TRIPS-plus Agreements, may and often do, hinder patients' access to 
essential medicines. Unfortunately, the practice has shown that assessing whether a 
State has complied with the obligation of due regard to the right to health in adopting 
an international agreement is quite challenging. For example, when negotiating a 
bilateral agreement which involves IPRs provisions, a state party could comply with 
the aforementioned obligation, by including clauses recognizing the so-called TRIPS 
flexibilities in order to balance IPRs and the right to health. In practice, however, these 
flexibilities rarely were properly implemented, and, thus were often ineffective142. 
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3. The Inter-American Protection of the Right to Health 
 
The Interamerican legal framework has three key legal standards related to economic 
social, and cultural (ESC) rights: the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man (the Declaration), the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), and the 
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, known as the 'Protocol of San Salvador' (the 
Protocol). The applicability and protection of human rights relies on its binary structure, 
which is composed of two main bodies, namely, the Inter-American Commission and 
the Court of Human Rights (hereinafter, "IACHR" or "the tribunal"). 
This section deals with the study of the evolution and definition of the right to health 
within the Inter-American System of Human Rights through the recent jurisprudence 
of the two aforementioned judicial and quasi-judicial organs. Among the obligations 
undertaken by States under the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter, 
"the ACHR" or "the Convention"), the right to health is included in its Article 26 and 
is specified in Article 10 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on 
Human Rights concerning Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter, "ESCR 
Protocol" or "Protocol of San Salvador"). The combination of the latter articles 
constitutes a minimum standard of protection, which States that are parties to the 
Convention shall widen with greater degree of protection that may be afforded through 
other international instruments or through their own domestic legal systems. 
The Inter-American system constitutes a valuable example of the way the enjoyment 
and justiciability of the right to health is weak in practice, in spite of its incorporation 
in the domestic law of States parties and in various international instruments. In fact, 
this section highlights that, in light of current practice and jurisprudence, the right to 
health is not a fully enforceable right, as is any civil or political right. This is the reason 
that some authors argue that rights, in order to become more than mere declarations, 
must be protected by judicial or quasi-judicial organs whose decisions are legally 
binding, concluding that the absence of such bodies equals the absence of rights143. In 
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other words, until some conceptual obstacles are overcome, the alleged injured party 
will not be able to claim the fulfillment of States’ obligations before a judge or court144. 
Furthermore, because of their strict connection with the financial status of States, it is 
likely that social and economic rights are applied differently in different places. Due to 
the high cost of these public services that require an active role by the State, resource 
allocation plays a key role in determining the extent and quality of the rights 
provided145. 
As a result of the economic dependency of social right, the study of the concrete 
application of the right to health in the Inter-American framework is important. After 
all, cultures are not static, but are in continuous movement and, fortunately, are willing 
to advance in the field of human rights, as evidenced by the ratification of human rights 
treaties by the most diverse cultures. Indeed, the legal relevance of the right to health 
is reflected, to a large extent, by its enshrinement in the universal system and, mainly 
in the regional systems for the protection of human rights. 
In order to understand the content and scope of the right to health in the Inter-American 
System, it is necessary to analyze the relevant legal provisions provided by regional 
instruments and emerging commitments of the American Court of Human Rights. 
 
 
3.1. The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
 
The American Declaration consists of 37 articles divided into two chapters: the first is 
devoted to the rights of the human person and the second to one’s duties. The two 
peculiarities of the Declaration are: on one hand, the rights listed in the first chapter 
(Articles 1-28) include both civil and political rights, as well as economic, social and 
cultural rights, including property, culture, work, leisure and social security. The second 
chapter, unlike the Universal Declaration, also lists the duties of individuals towards 
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and within a society (articles 29-37). The duties of the individual include obligations 
to society, to children and relatives, the obligation to receive education, the obligation 
to vote, to obey the law, to serve the community and the nation, to cooperate for the 
respect of social security and welfare, to pay taxes, to work and to refrain from carrying 
out, in a foreign country, political activities that are by law limited to the citizens of 
that country. 
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (also known as the “Bogota 
Declaration”) enshrines in Article XI that everyone has the right "to have their health 
preserved by sanitary and social measures (...)". The Declaration, adopted on May 2, 
1948, is the first broad-spectrum international human rights instrument, preceding the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In spite of its declaratory nature, the 
Declaration has, since its adoption, improved the development of the Inter-American 
legal framework for the protection and endorsement of human rights since its adoption. 
Furthermore, it constitutes, together with the American Convention on Human Rights, 
one of the two pillars within the OAS that establishes states’ human rights obligations. 
The American Declaration was adopted as a soft law instrument, meaning as a merely 
declaratory and non-binding value. This instrument was to serve as a guideline for the 
development of the new inter-American system inaugurated with the establishment of 
the Organization of American States (OAS) and in line with its founding principles, 
including respect for the fundamental rights of the individual without distinction of 
race, nationality or gender146. In order to obtain the consent of the Member States, the 
Declaration was conceived as an initial form of protection of fundamental rights in 
connection with the social and legal conditions of the time, without excluding, however, 
that such a system could be strengthened under more favorable conditions147. 
Nevertheless, the inter-American system has championed the protection of human 
rights with the adoption of binding instruments over time. In this context, both the 
Commission and the American Court, as well as the General Assembly of the OAS, 
have acknowledged that the Declaration cannot be considered simply as soft law, but 
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constitutes a source of international obligations for OAS member states. In this regard, 
it is worth mentioning Resolution 314 (VII-O/77) of 22 June 1977, in which States 
instructed the Inter-American Commission to prepare a study in order to highlight their 
obligations under the American Declaration and Resolution 371 (VIII-O/78) of 1 July 
1978, in which the General Assembly reaffirmed its commitment to promote 
compliance with the American Declaration148. In addition, Resolution 370 (VIII-O/78) 
of 1 July 1978, which, while addressing the crucial situation taking place in Paraguay, 
stressed the Member State's international commitments to respect the rights recognized 
in the American Declaration149. 
The stance taken by the quasi-judicial organ of the OAS, namely the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights, is even more strict. In fact, it is interesting to note that, 
according to the Commission, the Declaration is a source of legally binding obligations 
and not simply a political will150. This interpretation is clear in two specific instances: 
firstly, the Commission stated that the Declaration specifies all the rights that the 
Charter of the Organization of the American States envisaged in general terms. In fact, 
article 106 of the Charter authorizes the Commission to “promote the observance and 
protection of human rights”, thus considering the American Declaration as a source of 
international obligations related to the Charter of the Organization151. 
Secondly, in a well-known Advisory Opinion, the Inter-American Court cites Article 
1(2)(b) and Article 20 of the Statute of the American Commission, which articles refer 
to the Commission’s obligation to adopt the human rights provisions of the American 
Declaration in two specific instances: firstly, to those OAS Member States which are 
not parties to the American Convention, and secondly, to those OAS members of the 
Convention that have not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, thus 
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proving the binding nature of the Declaration as an instrument applicable by the 
Commission152. 
The above stated interpretation had the noble objective of widening the protection of 
human rights within the system, and it has been defended in many final decisions of 
the Commission 153 . However, considering the American Declaration as a legally 
binding instrument contradicts basic principle of law, for instance the principle of 
expressing willingness to enter into a legally binding relationship154. In fact, without 
ratification or accession by all the OAS member States, the Declaration must be 
intended as a soft law instrument, namely a mere political document and not a treaty. 
In regard of the right to health, envisaged in Article XI of the Declaration, the legal 
nature of this soft law instrument has, however, practical purposes. In other words, the 
latter Article broadens the scope and concrete application of the right at stake, 
specifically to those States which are not members of the American Convention. The 
constant interpretative work of the Commission described above must be understood 
as an attempt designed to provide legal application to the Declaration in order to confer 
juridical meaning to its provisions and to provide the Commission with effective tools 
for the protection of human rights within States. It is important to highlight the dynamic 
nature of this legal source. Indeed, when soft law instruments do not envisage the 
existing law (de lege lata), they promote future law (de lege ferenda) understood in the 
sense of "what the law should be" on the grounds of moral and ethical considerations, 
mostly when the Declaration has been adopted by all OAS members155. A practical 
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consequence is that national judges are not required to apply the Declaration as current 
international law, but they could take it into consideration in order to promote future 
law commensurate with universal justice and effective protection of human rights 
acknowledged by existing international non-binding instruments. 
Many of the Universal Declaration's provisions, however, have become incorporated 
into customary international law, which instead is binding on all states. This 
development has been confirmed by States in intergovernmental and diplomatic 
settings, in arguments submitted to judicial tribunals, by the actions of 
intergovernmental organizations, and in the writings of legal scholars. Furthermore, the 
Court considered interpretation as an essential issue in its Advisory Opinions related to 
the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man 156 . In addressing the 
question on the legal status of the Declaration, the Court stressed that the protection of 
human rights constitutes the grounds on which relies the evolution of the Interamerican 
system. The Court based its reasoning on the International Court of Justice's Namibia 
Advisory Opinion157, and emphasized that international treaties, declarations and legal 
instruments in general should always be interpreted in view of the effective legal 
framework at the time the interpretation takes place158. 
The Declaration states that the essential rights of persons do not derive from the 
territorial principle, i.e. from the nationality of a person, but from his or her status as a 
human being. As a result, OAS members recognize that a State's legislation on 
fundamental rights does not create or grant rights, but only recognizes them on the 
grounds that such rights are applicable independently of the existence of a State. 
Article 28, labeled “Scope of the rights of man”, includes a general limitation clause 
with respect to the provisions of the Declaration on Respect for Human Rights. The 
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158In doing so, the Court explicitly refused the so-called historical interpretation. 
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clause provides that: "The rights of man are limited by the rights of others, by the 
security of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare and the advancement of 
democracy"159. These reasons are, therefore, legitimate justifications for OAS members 
to derogate from human rights. The clause admits more cases than those provided 
within the United Nations’ system. Accordingly, the Court had the opportunity to 
express itself more restrictively on the derogation of fundamental rights, for instance 
on the subject of habeas corpus. In this case the Court has made clear that the 
proceedings for habeas corpus are essential judicial guarantees for the protection of 
various rights and for the preservation of rule of law in a democratic society, hence 
declaring prohibited their derogation or suspension160. 
 
 
3.2. The American Convention on Human Rights 
 
The American Convention on Human Rights, often referred to as the Pact of San José, 
was adopted in Costa Rica, on 22 November 1969, and came into force after the 
ratification of Grenada was deposited on 18 July 1978. 
The Convention provided treaty-level protection to the rights previously contained in 
the Declaration, but did not provide a comprehensive legal framework related to 
economic and social rights. In fact, it condensed the entire area of ESC rights in a single 
provision, namely Article 26. The article provides a general provision requiring only 
the progressive development of the economic, social, educational, scientific, and 
cultural standards set out in the OAS Charter. This provision, must therefore be 
interpreted and applied depending on the specific case, even though it has been often 
put into effect in conjunction with other provisions161. 
                                               
159Article 28 of the American Declaration on the rights and duties of man, 1948. 
160Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 8/87 of 30 January 1987 - Habeas corpus 
in state of emergency, par. 42. 
161L. Lixinski, “Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Expansionism at 




Article 26 states as follow: “The States Parties undertake to adopt measures, both 
internally and through international cooperation, especially those of an economic and 
technical nature, with a view to achieving progressively, by legislation or other 
appropriate means, the full realization of the rights implicit in the economic, social, 
educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the Charter of the 
Organization of American States as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires”162. 
Article 26 does not provide any reference or definition of the right to health. It is 
therefore mandatory to study the progressive work of the ICHR, which designed the 
right to health in various decisions over time relying on an extensive interpretation of 
article 26. An important step taken by the Court was to link the principle of progressive 
development to the right to health as a social right. 
In the case of Acevedo Buendía and Others v. Peru the Court determined that the 
commitment required by Article 26 consists of the adoption of measures, especially 
economic and technical to the extent of available resources, whether through legislation 
or other appropriate means to achieve progressively the full realization of certain 
economic, social and cultural rights, such as the right to health163. 
Article 26 of the ACHR establishes the scaffolding of the principle of progressive 
realization and prohibition of retrogression in the area of economic, social and cultural 
rights, as is the case with the right to health. Although this provision does not give rise 
to an interpretation that the American Convention expressly recognizes rights of this 
nature, it allows to affirm that it is the conventional obligation of States, even on the 
basis of the OAS Charter164, to guarantee the securing of such rights, which, as already 
stated, are recognized in different instruments of the inter-American system. This 
means, as highlighted in a well-known Advisory Opinion, that the provisions within 
the Convention should be understood as taking into account the norms that are 
                                               
162Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of San Jose", Costa 
Rica, 22 November 1969, Article 26. 
163 Inter-American Court of Human Rigths, Acevedo Buendía and others case v. Perú. Preliminary 
Exceptions, Merits, Remedies and Costs, Judgment of 1 July 2009, series C, n. 198, par. 105. 




envisaged in other treaties on the same subject matter. In particular, a regional treaty 
should be understood on the grounds of the doctrine and norms of international 
instruments165. The Court further explained that, in a case in which both the Convention 
and another treaty are relevant, the provision most favorable to the applicant must be 
considered 166 . Moreover, the obligation of non-regression constitutes an explicit 
limitation that human rights treaties impose on States and becomes a guarantee for 
citizens for the fulfillment of these rights167. 
 
 
3.3. The Optional Protocol to the American Convention on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights of 1988 
 
It is worth noting that Article 10 of the Optional Protocol to the American Convention 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1988 (also known as the Protocol of San 
Salvador) is the only precise and direct reference to the right to health within the 
Interamerican system. The protocol is an international treaty attached to the Convention, 
which provides a legal framework to ensure that the individuals, groups or communities 
may file complaints of violation of their economic, social and cultural rights. This 
mechanism can be triggered only to present cases in which the alleged victim has 
acknowledged as accountable one of the States Parties to the Convention that has also 
ratified the Optional Protocol. 
Along with the right to health, enshrined in Article 10, the Protocol lists an array of 
ESC rights. However, this instrument provides for a peculiar system of protection, 
which relies on a specific procedural provision that limits the faculty of a victim to 
                                               
165 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of 13 November 1985, 
Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (arts. 13 
and 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Series A, No. 5, par. 55. 
166Ibidem, par. 52. 
167V. Abramovich and L. Pautassi, La medición de derechos en las políticas sociales, CABA, Ed. del 
Puerto, 2010, 30. 
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activate the Commission or the Court. In fact, Article 19(6)168 of the Protocol confer 
jurisdiction ratione materiae to the Commission and the Court explicitly over two ESC 
rights. Better stated, the article specifies that only the violation of the right to Trade 
Union (Article 8.1) and of the right to education (Article 13) may permit the triggering 
of the framework of individual petitions designed by the Convention169. This means 
that the Protocol itself provides for a sort of hierarchy between the rights provided and 
the possible breaching of obligations in violations of other than those rights 
expressively mentioned in Article 19.6 results in a procedural impasse170. 
Nevertheless, some scholars argue that the limitation set by Article 19(6) may be 
overcome by considering Article 26 of the American Convention directly applicable to 
any ESC rights violation 171 . The latter principle, often referred to as the “direct 
approach principle” faces an array of criticisms which rely on a literal interpretation of 
both Article 26 of the Convention and Article 19.6 of the Protocol. The former does not 
acknowledge individual, immediately actionable rights; and the latter Article, as 
described above, recognizes limited jurisdiction to trade union rights and the right to 
education. As a result, in the light of the mentioned literal interpretation, the intention 
of the American States preparing those two instruments was not to grant the Court 
powers to receive claims alleging ESC rights violations via the direct applicability of 
article 26172. 
The aforementioned Acevedo Buendía and Others v. Peru case constitutes a turning 
point in the interpretation of article 26, which departs from the literal approach towards 
                                               
168The article further urged, as is the case in the United Nations system, States to prepare and submit 
periodic reports on "the progressive measures they have adopted to ensure due respect for the rights 
enshrined in the Protocol itself". The subsequent procedure also involves a review by the specialized 
agencies of the Inter-American System of the state of compliance or noncompliance with the obligations 
and corresponding recommendations. 
169O. R. Ruiz-Chiriboga, “The American Convention and the Protocol of San Salvador: Two Intertwined 
treaties. Non-enforceability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American system”, in 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 2012, 161-162. 
170J. L Cavallaro and E. Schaffer, “Less as More: Rethinking Supranational Litigation of Economic and 
Social Rights in the Americas”, Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 56, 2005, 227. 
171 Inter-American Institute of Human Rights (IIHR}, La justiciabilidad directa de los derechos 
economicos, sociales y culturales ['The direct justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights], 
IIHR, 2008, 26. 
172Ruiz-Chiriboga, The American Convention and the Protocol of San Salvador, 163. 
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a more extensive application of the provision within the article at stake. Until the latter 
turning point, in no case, had any State Party objected the Court’s jurisdiction ratione 
materiae concerning alleged ESC rights violations in accordance with Article 26. In 
fact, in the Acevedo Buendía and Others v. Peru case, the representatives of the 
government challenged the competence of the Court regarding the applicant’s claim, 
stressing that the judicial organ lacked jurisdiction on matters related to the supposed 
breach of the right to social security. The State’s position relied on the fact that neither 
had the Convention defined the right to social security, nor had the Protocol included 
it as one of the two rights that would be justiciable before the Interamerican framework 
in light of its Article 19(6)173. 
On the contrary, the judicial organ stated that in accordance with Article 62(1) of the 
Convention, which established the so called compromissory clause, the Court has full 
jurisdiction on “all matters relating to the interpretation or application of this 
Convention”174. Remarkably no reference to the Protocol was made, even if focusing 
on both treaties (the Convention and the Protocol) in the interpretation and application 
of ESC rights within the regional framework would have granted wider protection and 
have been in line with the State Parties’ consent related to the legitimacy of the 
Interamerican judicial and quasi-judicial system175. 
According to Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties of 1969, 
which comprises the general provisions of international law concerning treaties 
interpretation, “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose”176 . However, due to the special nature of human rights 
treaties, general norms on interpretation face some adjustments. In fact, unlike “normal” 
treaties, human rights instruments come into existence in order to provide specific 
rights to individual vis-à-vis States Parties and not to create mutual duties and rights 
                                               
173Ibidem 
174American Convention on Human Rights, Article 62.1. 
175 Ruiz-Chiriboga, The American Convention and the Protocol of San Salvador, 164. 
176 It is worth noting that Article 29 of the American Convention establishes hermeneutical rules in 
accordance to those provided in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). 
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between States. The Inter-merican Court acknowledged and highlighted this distinctive 
nature of human rights treaties in the Advisory Opinion of 1982, known as The effect 
of reservations in the entry into force of the American Convention on Human Rights177, 
according to which the object and purpose of these specific types of treaties play a key 
role in the application of general provisions of international law, above all, those related 
to the rules on interpretation. Article 33.4 of the Vienna Convention contains another 
important reference to the so-called teleological criteria, providing that in a case in 
which the literal interpretation of a provision is inconsistent with the object and purpose 
of the treaty, these must prevail. 
This is the reason that, the Inter-American Court178 , inter alia, stressed that in the 
application of the American Convention and other instruments a pro homine 
interpretation should be used, hence interpreting the norms in the way which are most 
protective of the most vulnerable party in the dispute, namely the individual. According 
to the Court, the main reason that human rights treaties exist is to protect human beings 
from the authoritative power of the States, hence, limiting State’s prerogatives by 
definition179. 
In so doing the Court explicitly dismissed the primary rule of interpretation according 
to general international law and emphasized that the teleological approach prevails over 
the literal interpretation of the legal framework, which relies on the ordinary meaning 
of the treaty wording. In the judgment of 1 September of 2001, on the preliminary 
exceptions in the Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago case 180 , the Court applied the 
teleological approach to a declaration made by the State at the moment of accession to 
                                               
177Advisory Opinion, 2/82 of 24 September 1982, par. 29. 
178It must be noted that the European Court of Human Rights shares the same teleological approach in, 
inter alia, the El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Case, 39630/09, Council of 
Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 13 December 2012, par.134. “The Court reiterates that the 
Convention is an instrument for the protection of human rights and that it is of crucial importance that 
it is interpreted and applied in a manner that renders these rights practical and effective, not theoretical 
and illusory. This concerns not only the interpretation of substantive provisions of the Convention, but 
also procedural provisions”. 
179Lixinski; Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 590. 
180 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Constantine and Benjamin et al v Trinidad and Tobago, 
Hilaire and ors v Trinidad and Tobago, Merits, reparations and costs, IACHR Series C no 9, IHRL 1477 
(IACHR 2002), 21st June 2002. 
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the Convention, that had the same value as a reservation. The judges of San Jose 
concluded that it is for the Court to determine what a legal instrument means in light 
of hermeneutical rules of international law in general, and human rights law in 
particular, bearing in mind that the interpretation of human rights instruments has the 
main goal of championing the effective application (effet utile) of the norms, granting 
the highest degree of protection of individuals under its jurisdiction181. 
This approach has been confirmed in the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia Case of 
2005. This, which constitutes one of the most significant cases of the Inter-American 
Court recent history, dealt with the attribution to the State of responsibility for human 
rights infringements carried out by non-state actors182. The Court departed from general 
rules of international law and stressed the special nature of human rights provisions 
which relies on the purposes of human rights treaties and obligations183. As a result the 
legal framework related to human rights constitutes an independent system from the 
general international legal structure, in which human rights treaties must be understood, 
inter alia, in light of current circumstances unlike an interpretation on the grounds of 
the ‘original meaning’184. 
Notwithstanding, Article 10 of the Protocol of San Salvador constitutes the only direct 
and precise reference to the right to health within the Interamerican system. According 
to the article: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to health, understood to mean the enjoyment of the 
highest level of physical, mental and social well-being. 
2. In order to ensure the exercise of the right to health, the States Parties agree to 
recognize health as a public good and, particularly, to adopt the following measures to 
ensure that right: 
a. Primary health care, that is, essential health care made available to all individuals 
and families in the community; 
b. Extension of the benefits of health services to all individuals subject to the State's 
jurisdiction; 
                                               
181Ibidem, par.79. 
182Interamerican Court of Human Rights, Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia Case, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs, Judgment of 15 Sept. 2005, Series C No. 134, paras. 104-108. 
183Human rights then are considered as lex specialis to general international law. 
184The reasoning of the Court was grounded on Article 29 of the American Convention, and indirectly 
on the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
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c. Universal immunization against the principal infectious diseases; 
d. Prevention and treatment of endemic, occupational and other diseases; 
e. Education of the population on the prevention and treatment of health problems, and 
f. Satisfaction of the health needs of the highest risk groups and of those whose poverty 
makes them the most vulnerable. 
 
 
4. The Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) 
referring to the Right to Health 
 
The Ximenes Lopes v. Brazil case of 2006 constitutes the first case concerning the right 
to health before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The case provides a 
glimpse of some content of the right to health, remarkably not directly in an 
autonomous manner, but because of its connection with some other human rights 
envisaged in the Convention, such as the right to life and the right to a fair trial.  
The lawsuit was filed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights before the 
IACHR for the alleged violation of the rights provided in articles 4 (right to life), 
(personal integrity), 8 (judicial guarantees) and 25 (judicial protection) of the ACHR, 
in light of the general obligation enshrined in article 1.1 (obligation to respect rights) 
of the same international treaty185. 
 
 
4.1. The Ximenes Lopes v. Brazil Case of 2006 
 
The facts of the case concern the inhuman and degrading conditions in which the victim 
Ximenes Lopes, a person with mental disabilities, was hospitalized. He allegedly 
suffered beatings, as well as the violation of his personal integrity perpetrated by the 
staff members of the retirement home in which he was treated. 
Ximenes Lopes was interned on October 1, 1999 in the “Casa de Repouso Guararapes”, 
                                               
185Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil case, Judgment of July 4, 2006, 
(Merits, Reparations and Costs), par. 20. 
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a private psychiatric institution in Brazil, which provided health services within the 
framework of the Brazilian public health system, within the State of Ceará. The victim 
died on October 4, 1999, after three days in the hospital. In the lawsuit submitted to the 
IACHR, the Commission requested the Court to determine the international 
responsibility of the Brazilian State for the facts and for the particular condition of 
vulnerability of persons with mental disabilities in connection with the special 
obligation of the State to provide protection to persons under the healthcare centers that 
operate within the Brazilian Health System186. 
Under a legal perspective, the significance of the case lies mainly in the fact that it was 
the first opportunity for the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights 
to formulate jurisprudence in relation to the rights of persons with mental disabilities 
and, for the sake of the current analysis, to shape the obligations of the State concerning 
the right to health in light of the management of healthcare centers which are, both 
under direct or indirect, control by national authorities. 
In the case submitted before the Commission, the latter recalled the norms protecting 
the rights of detained persons as analogia iuris, in order to tackle the loophole in the 
legal system and offer an objective criterion of assessment, in relation to persons 
detained in institutions providing health services. It is worth noting that the Court itself 
addressed the issue of detained persons in several cases. In fact, the judicial body 
expressively proclaimed the right of whomever is detained to live in conditions of 
detention compatible with human dignity and, therefore the State has the obligation to 
guarantee anyone’s right to life and personal integrity 187 . On the grounds of the 
aforesaid criterion, the Commission held that the State has a special position of 
guarantor because health authorities and their personnel have broader possibilities of 
establishing control over patients with mental disabilities who are in health centers 
under the care or protection of a trained staff, because of their vulnerable conditions. 
                                               
186Ibidem, par. 2. 
187Interamerican Court of Human Rights. Instituto de Reeducación del Menor v. Paraguay, 2 September 
2004, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 2, 2004. Series C, 
paras. 151-153; Bulacio v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 18, 2003. 
Series C No. 100, paras. 126 and 138. 
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The latter status requires further measures, broader than in the case of persons housed 
in detention centers188. 
Finally, the Court, determined that Brazil had violated the right to life and personal 
integrity enshrined in Articles 4.1, 5.1 and 5.2 of the Convention, but no reference to 
any type of autonomous violation of the right to health was asserted. Furthermore, the 
Court declared the breach of the general obligation to respect and guarantee the rights 
established in Article1. The Court concluded ordering the State, inter alia, to develop 
a training program for medical staff on the principles that should govern the treatment 
of persons with mental disabilities, in accordance with relevant international standards 
and human rights law. 
 
 
4.2. The Albán Cornejo et al. v. Ecuador Case of 2007 
 
The Albán Cornejo et al. v. Ecuador case constitutes one of many cases that have been 
filed against Ecuador over the years regarding the State’s failure to discipline the 
medical profession and properly prosecute cases of medical negligence. 
On July 5, 2006, pursuant to Articles 50 and 61 of the American Convention, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights submitted to the Court an application against 
the Republic of Ecuador, which originated in the complaint No. 12,406, forwarded to 
the Secretariat of the Commission on May 31, 2001189. 
The case dealt with the hospitalization of Laura Susana Albán Cornejo in a private 
health institution located in the city of Quito (the Metropolitano hospital), after she had 
been diagnosed with bacterial meningitis. During her stay in the institution, Mrs. Albán 
Cornejo had suffered severe pain. Because of these symptoms, a resident doctor had 
prescribed an injection of morphine to ease her discomfort. Unfortunately, the patient 
died, presumably due to the injection. 
                                               
188Interamerican Commission on Human Rights, Complaint before the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights in the case of Damiao Ximenes Lopes, October 1, 2004, par. 143-144. 
189Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Albán-Cornejo et al. v. Ecuador, Judgment of November 22, 
2007, par. 1.  
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As a result, Mrs. Alban's parents requested access to her daughter's medical file 
pursuant a judicial action and subsequently filed a criminal complaint with the 
Ecuadorian judicial authorities to have their daughter's death investigated. This led to 
criminal lawsuits for medical malpractice against two doctors. However, one of them 
was dismissed because the criminal case was time-barred; and the other respondent had 
another legal situation pending before the national authorities at the time of the 
initiation of the process before the Inter-American System. 
As a result of these circumstances, the Commission requested the IACHR to determine 
the international responsibility of the State of Ecuador for having violated rights 
enshrined in the Convention against Laura Albán and her parents, as indirect victims. 
Specifically, the Commission had alleged that the State of Ecuador had violated articles 
8 (Judicial Guarantees) and 25 (Judicial Protection) in relation to articles 1.1 
(Obligation to Respect Rights) and 2 (Duty to Adopt). Provisions of Domestic Law) of 
the ACHR (24)190. 
In conclusion, the Court held the State of Ecuador responsible without mentioning any 
reference to the right to health. In fact, the Court decided to hold the State 
internationally responsible for the violation of the right to personal integrity enshrined 
in article 5.1 of the Convention, in relation to article 1.1 of that treaty, and ordered 
Ecuador to carry out “within a reasonable time, […] an education and training 
program for justice operators and health care professionals about the laws enacted by 




4.3. The Suarez Peralta vs. Ecuador Case of 2013 
 
Another case related to the right to health was submitted to the contentious jurisdiction 
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, by means of a referral note from Fund 
                                               




Report No. 75/11 of Case No. 12,683 of Melba del Carmen Suárez Peralta v. Republic 
of Ecuador192. This case related to the lack of judicial protection in the criminal process 
carried out against those allegedly responsible for the medical malpractice that affected 
the victim. 
The facts concern the outcome of a surgery for Mrs. Suarez Peralta's appendicitis, in 
the private clinic called Minchala, which had provoked severe permanent damages to 
the patient. The criminal proceedings conducted for the clarification of the facts ended 
without result on the merits due to the time-barring of the case. 
In light of these facts, the Commission submitted the case to the Court on the grounds 
of the failure to prosecute the health professionals who allegedly participated in 
medical malpractice, harming Ms. Suarez Peralta. The Commission requested the 
Court to hold the State of Ecuador internationally responsible for the violation of 
articles 8 and 25 (rights to judicial guarantees and judicial protection), in relation to the 
obligations arising from article 1.1 of the Convention. 
In line with its previous pronouncements, the IACHR has held the State of Ecuador 
internationally responsible for the violation of the duty to guarantee the right to 
personal integrity, recognized in Article 5.1 of the Convention, in relation to Article 1.1 
of that instrument, to Melba del Carmen Suárez Peralta, without declaring the specific 
violation of the right to health. 
 
 
4.4. The Indirect Reference to the Right to Health by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights 
 
In light of the aforementioned analysis, it is clear that the Court addressed and solved 
cases related to an alleged violation, inter alia, of the right to health by referring to a 
violation of the right to personal integrity; and the Court never based its reasoning on 
the direct violation of the right object of the present study. 
From a legal perspective, it is not clear the reason why the Court did not apply the only 
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provision within the Convention which explicitly referred to economic, social and 
cultural rights, namely article 26. However, the three cases studied above have not 
closed the door to the enforceability of the right to health in the inter-American 
system193. Indeed, the possibility of achieving full judiciability of the right to health in 
light of the Convention legal framework of protection provided in the Convention 
remained latent until the Court’s opposite approach of 2018. 
This section deals with the study of the Court’s jurisprudence on the indirect protection 
of the right to health through its connection with other civil rights envisaged in the 
Convention. On the contrary the next section focuses on the Poblete Vilches and others 
v. Chile Case of 2018, which constitutes a cornerstone that reversed the tide. In fact, 
the latter case is the first in which the Court mentioned a direct and autonomous 
violation of the right to health, as part of the repeatedly stressed article 26, hence, 
finally dissolving the bond with civil rights. 
Remarkably, under the scheme of an alleged violation of the right to personal integrity 
ex Article 5.1 of the Convention, the Court has outlined some standards on the right to 
health, although, in a vague manner. For instance, the Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador Case, 
the Court has declared that lack of adequate medical care may lead to a violation of the 
normative content of Article 5.1 of the Convention194. 
At the same time, however, there is no question that over time the Court has built a 
solid system of protection, on the grounds of the various principles settled while 
adjudicating contentious issues. In the very first case submitted to the Court, the famous 
Velásquez Rodríguez Case, the Court has pointed out that International Human Rights 
law required the State to comply with a double set of peer obligations: firstly, the 
negative obligation of respecting the rights and freedoms recognized in the instruments 
for the protection of human rights; and secondly, the positive obligation relating to the 
                                               
193It is worth noting that unlike the Court, the Committee on ESC Rights of the United Nations has 
pointed out that each State Party has a minimum obligation to ensure the satisfaction of at least essential 
levels of each of the rights. For example, a State Party is responsible under the Covenant for the 
deprivation of essential primary health care for a significant number of individuals. 
194Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 21 May 2013. Series C No. 261, par. 1/12 (operative part). 
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obligation to adopt all necessary measures to guarantee the envisaged rights 195 . 
Furthermore, the Court’s jurisprudence, held that under Article 1.1 of the ACHR, States 
parties, such as Costa Rica and Guatemala, have an erga omnes international obligation 
to respect and guarantee the human rights established in the Convention and must 
ensure the concrete implementation of these rights196. 
As will be further outlined in the following sections, the obligation to actively 
guarantee the provisions within the Convention is not confined solely to the orbit of 
States and their State agents, since the obligation also includes the duty to prevent 
individuals or third parties from affecting protected human rights, in the private orbit, 
depending on the particular circumstances of each case197. 
In an array of cases, the judicial organ highlighted that the protection of the right to 
personal integrity relies, inter alia, on the regulation of health services in the internal 
sphere, as well as the implementation of a series of mechanisms aimed at protecting 
the concrete realization of the right at stake. In light of this reasoning, the Court 
determined that in order to comply with the obligation to guarantee the right to personal 
integrity in relation to the right to health, States must clearly regulate the establishment 
and functioning of health services 198 . These services shall bear in mind quality 
standards for public and private institutions in order to prevent any threat of violation 
of the right to personal integrity. Moreover, along with the obligation related to quality 
standards, the Court included that the State should provide mechanisms for monitoring 
and supervising health institutions, in addition to effective administrative and judicial 
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198Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 




protection procedures for the victim199. The latter constitute the first set of obligations 
arising from the interconnection between the right to health and the right to personal 
integrity200.It is remarkable that the source of the international responsibility of the 
State in cases involving the health of individuals has been determined without an 
autonomous consideration of the right to health, but through the normative content of 
the right to personal integrity201. In other words, the State has the obligation to adopt 
active measures in order to protect patients` integrity and lives. To this end, public 
authorities must guarantee quality of health services and regulate public and private 
medical professions202. 
According to the Court, the obligation to monitor and supervise constitutes the other 
side of the relationship between the right to health and personal integrity. Patients are 
under State’s responsibility both when in public or private facilities. Indeed, there is no 
doubt that the State is directly responsible when it provides services first-hand to the 
population through public healthcare institutions such as hospitals or clinics. The State 
is further accountable when health services are provided by private institutions as a 
result of contracts with the State203. Thus, although States may delegate their functions, 
through so-called privatizations, they retain ownership of the obligation to provide 
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public services and to protect the respective public good204 . As a result, the Court 
identifies a special obligation of safeguarding in accordance with its duty of providing 
an effective healthcare system. Better said, the formal delegation to private health 
entities by the State does not exempt it from its duty to guarantee the quality of private 
health care, as another aspect of the relationship between the right to personal integrity 
and health205. 
In summary, the State is responsible for omission if it does not comply with its duty to 
monitor the adequate enforcement of the provisions concerning healthcare services by 
both the private and public system. Instead, in regard to oversight the quality of health 
services, the IACHR has emphasized that "(...) the State has the duty to regulate and 
supervise health benefits, ensuring, among other aspects, that health conditions and 
personnel are adequate, duly qualified, and remain fit to practice their profession"206. 
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5. The turn in the Inter-American Court's approach on social rights  
 
This section will focus much on the analysis of the change in perspective of the approach 
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in addressing the right to health. The 
turning point was marked by the adoption of the decision in Poblete Vilches and others 
vs. Chile case adopted in March of 2018. Indeed, this judgment was the first in which 
the Court considered the right to health in an autonomous manner and, enabling the 
right to health's being directly demanded before both the Commission and Court. 
 
 
5.1. The Poblete Vilches Case of 2018 
Briefly, the case concerned the malpractice in treating a senior Chilean citizen in a 
public hospital, where his special needs were not taken into consideration, which 
subsequently led to his death. Firstly, Mr Poblete was hospitalized, (following a 
diagnosis of diabetes), at which hospital he was not treated properly for his illness and 
in consideration of his advanced age. Due to his state of unconsciousness, he could not 
consent to surgery. His family was not consulted; indeed, investigations found consents 
documents were falsified by the medical personnel. Mr Poblete was then discharged 
from Hospital, after which his conditions became grave. Family members were not 
informed of this discharge, leaving him with no proper care. As a result of his 
increasing illness, he was returned to hospital by private ambulance, where the lack of 
care and adequate treatment was repeated. Mr Poblete was declared deceased on 7 
February 2001207. 
In assessing the case, the Court specified that the right to social security was not 
analyzed because the right to health, life and integrity sufficed208. Furthermore, the 
Court cited its decision in the Lago del Campo case in which two key aspects were 
highlighted209 : on the one hand, the Court's competence on Economic, Social and 
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Cultural rights in light of article 26 of the American Convention; on the other, the direct 
justiciability of this category of rights was substantiated210. 
The Court's competence was supported on the basis of the principle of interdependence 
of human rights, on the grounds of the Preamble of the Convention, which makes a 
direct reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the Charter of the 
OAS 211 . In summary, the aforementioned principle states that all rights must be 
understood integrally and in a conjoint way as human rights, without hierarchy among 
themselves and as enforceable in all cases before the competent domestic and 
international authorities212. 
Additionally the Court, while recalling its decision in the aforementioned Lago del 
Campo case,  included economic, social, cultural and environmental rights as part of 
the newly established international human rights law corpus juris on the grounds of an 
evolutionary and teleological interpretation of  article 29 (d) of the American 
Convention, which completes the framework with the provisions enshrined in the OAS 
Charter and American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man213. 
According to the Court, progressive obligations refer to concrete and constant 
obligations in order to advance as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the 
full protection and implementation of the ESCR. In other words, public authorities 
must design a plan of action at once and provide precise targeted policies, which must 
be implemented in accordance with the principle of due diligence and in a timely 
manner214. In the same way, the Court highlighted another key principle concerning 
ESCR, namely the obligation of non-regression. The latter states that if States have 
already adopted a defined set of norms for the protection of human rights, they must 
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prohibit establishment of norms which could hinder and worsen the level of protection 
currently achieved215. Indeed, if a State does not comply with the principle of non-
regression, it has to justify the reason it had adopted those measures “with the most 
careful consideration” and, only after a “strict scrutiny”, the State can prove that it 
was forced to do so in light of its financial and economic situation216. These provisions 
must be understood in light of Article 1.1 of the American Convention, which requires 
States to adjust and implement, inter alia, legislative measures in order to respect the 
international human rights legal framework217. For the sake of clarity, the Court did not 
go further in analyzing the features of progressive obligations of States and did not 
determined a violation of the progressive element of the right to health by Chile, as the 
State had shown commitment in the enlargement of healthcare services in the 
country218. 
Instead, the Court declared a violation of the obligations under Article 26 ACHR and 
grounded its decision in light of the second category of legal obligations, namely 
immediate obligations concerning the right to health. Furthermore, the Court 
emphasized the need to take into account basic and concrete health services required 
in situations of urgency and medical emergency, such as, in the case object of this 
analysis, the age of the patient 219 . The judicial body nourished its reasoning on 
immediate obligations with the indications provided for by the Committee on ESCR in 
its General Comment No. 14 on the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health. 
The Committee highlighted that the Covenant on ECSR imposes, also, obligations of 
legal effects on State parties, such as, among others, “the guarantee that the right will 
be exercised without discrimination of any kind (art. 2.2) and the obligation to take 
steps (art. 2.1) towards the full realization of the article”220. 
 
                                               
215Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Poblete Vilches and others vs. Chile, 8 March 2018, par. 104. 
216 ICESCR, Arts 4–5; CESCR, General Comment 3, para 9. 
217Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Poblete Vilches and others vs. Chile, 8 March 2018, par. 104. 
218Ibidem, par. 134. 
219Ibidem, paras. 116-134. 
220CESCR, General Comment 14, paras. 30-31. 
73 
 
The Court stressed that the right to health entails a comprehensive status of full physical, 
mental and social welfare and must be understood as the sole absence of afflictions or 
illness. In this regard, States must guarantee access to essential health services that are 
efficient, have good quality and aim at improving the health of their populations. In 
addition, the Court further stated that the principle of non-discrimination must be 
considered thoroughly, in particular for persons who are involved in situations of risk 
or vulnerability and which require equal access to health services221. 
It must be noted that the Court provided that States must oversee that immediate 
obligations are respected by both public and private health providers, highlighting the 
need for a prompt implementation of National Health Programs which must ensure 
appropriate hygienic conditions, adequate facilities and qualified medical 
professionals222 . At the same time, the Court analyzed and provided specific legal 
obligations in relation of the four basic standards of urgent health services already 
highlighted by the UN Committee in its General Observation n. 14, namely, quality, 
accessibility, availability and acceptability. Firstly, States must provide sufficient 
elements and medical staff in order to deliver basic and urgent treatments. Secondly, 
facilities, goods and services must be accessible for anyone in light of the principle of 
non-discrimination and informed consent. Thirdly, States must establish a system in 
which health institutions, with a sufficient number of providers and material elements, 
can be coordinated in order to provide urgent services in a timely manner to those in 
need. Lastly, medical ethics, adequate cultural criteria, gender perspectives, life 
conditions and proper information about diagnosis and treatment must be always taken 
into account223. 
Another aspect of the decision which is worth noting is the Court's analysis on whether 
deaths in medical contexts can trigger State responsibility in relation to article 4 of the 
American Convention, namely to the right to life. The Court began its analysis with the 
understanding that not every death, as a resulted of medical malpractice, can be 
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imputable to the State and specific circumstances of the case must be considered224. 
Indeed, the Court stated that in order to assess States' responsibilities, three basic 
requirements must be fulfilled: firstly, the predictability of risk as a consequence of the 
lack of indispensable medical services; secondly, evident and grave medical 
malpractice.; and lastly, a casual nexus between the medical conduct and the death must 
be identified. In other words, the Court emphasized that the aforementioned nexus does 
not entail solely a direct connection between medical treatment and death, but the State 
is responsible if satisfactory, timely and adequate treatments that were not given could 
have likely averted the deadly outcome225. 
Under this reasoning, the Court assessed that Chile was responsible for the conduct of 
the Hospital Rio Grande medical personnel, which did not provide prompt, urgent and 
basic services that were needed by Mr. Poblete226 . In addition, the aforementioned 
personnel should have acknowledged the risk caused by the lack of treatment, in 
particular, taking into account the advanced age of the patient and that there was no 
justification for their denial227 . Indeed, the Court concluded that there was a high 
probability that adequate health care might have at least prolonged the life of Mr 
Poblete Vilches; hence, the casual nexus existed and the omission of basic health 
treatments affected his right to life228. 
In conclusion, this case constitutes a fundamental building block in the protection of 
the ESCR in general and of the right to health in particular. In the proceedings described 
in the previous section,  cases which involved health related issues were considered as 
indirect violations of other rights provided in the American conventions, namely the 
right to life (Article 4, ACHR), to personal integrity (Article 5.1, ACHR), and to a fair 
trial and effective judicial protection (Articles 8 and 25.1 ACHR). The ambiguity of 
Article 26 of the Convention and the limitations of the Court's jurisdiction established 
in Article 19.6 of the “San Salvador Protocol” undermined the protection of social 
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rights until the shift asserted in 2017, in the ruling of the Lagos del Campo vs Peru case, 
in relation to the right to work, and in 2018, as described above, for the first time the 
Court made an express and direct reference to article 26 of the Convention in order to 
give effective protection to the right to health. In addition, the Judicial body delivered 
and presented a set of key provisions in relation to specific immediate obligations that 
States must comply in light of the American Convention - in doing so providing a 
pattern, certainly non inclusive, but with a practical use. 
Interestingly, the aforementioned shift in the Court's jurisprudence regarding the direct 
justiciability of the right to health did not occur from dawn to dusk. In fact, until the 
Albán Cornejo vs Ecuador case of 2007, judges of the Court agreed on denying the 
direct justiciability of the right to health, as explicitly affirmed in then-judge Sergio 
García Ramírez separate opinion229. Later, in 2013, in the Suárez Peralta vs Ecuador 
case, the current president of the Inter-American Court Eduardo Ferrer MacGregor, 
expressed his perspective on providing insights in considering a direct violation of the 
right to health on the grounds of the interpretation of Article 26 of the American 
Convention230. The President argued that the absence of an explicit reference to the 
right to health in the case (and in the American Convention) does not impede the Court 
from referring directly to it in light of the general principle of law iura novit curia, 
“which international case law has used repeatedly, (understanding it) in the sense that 
the judge has the power and even the obligation to apply the pertinent legal provisions 
in a litigation, even when the parties do not cite it expressly”231. 
On the contrary, it is worth mentioning Judge Humberto Sierra Porto's concurring 
opinion in the Poblete Vilches Case, in which, he agreed with the final decision, but 
disagreed on the direct justiciability of the right to health in light of article 26 of the 
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Convention. In fact, according to the judge the shift of perspective adopted by the Court 
could be destabilizing for the entire system. In summary, the Judge's opinion grounds 
on the assumption that the current Inter-American legal framework does not allow the 
Court to consider the right to health as an autonomously justiciable right. The Judge 
considered that the analysis on the nexus between the rights to life and integrity and 
health-related aspects would have sufficed in order to assess the present case. 
Furthermore, according to the Judge, the Court's decision is ambiguous in providing 
the specific impact of the right to health on the victim in this "individual" dimension 
and assumes a consequentialist position that fuses - and confuses - the effect on the 
integrity and life of Mr. Poblete Vilches with the violation of his right to health232. In 
other words, the Court primarily focuses on establishing the reasons that the State failed 
to comply with its obligations regarding health-related services, deriving from that, that 
his health was affected. 
The right to health should be analyzed under two different perspectives: on the one 
hand, its individual dimension must be taken into account, which entails a connection 
with the right to personal integrity and/or to life; on the other hand, the progressive 
dimension, which relates to the adequacy of the health services provided by the State, 
must be considered as well. Under this reasoning the Court would be able to 
differentiate whether a State's conduct is in breach of the right to health and physical 
integrity in a specific case, or/and whether public policies adopted by a State are in 
breach of the general principle of progressiveness under article 26 of the Convention233. 
In other words, the Court is then able to make a distinction between individual-
conjunctural violations on the one hand, and collective-structural ones on the other. 
According to the Judge, the methodology adopted by the Court made the detection of 
the causal link between the actions and omissions of the State and the harm suffered in 
relation to Mr. Poblete Vilches' right to health difficult to detect234. Even though the 
Court listed a series of actions which determined a violation of the right to health by 
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the State, in the Judge's view, the casual link between the conduct of the State and the 
violation of the right to health was not clear, mainly because of the performative nature 
of the latter right. Providing a clear definition of the features and of the performance 
required in order to respect the right to health would have turned the Court in a 
legislative assembly which in light of a specific violation could wrongly determine the 
violation of the entire health-care system of a State235. 
Another consideration which is worth mentioning concerns the principles of 
interdependence and indivisibility of human rights in light of an extensive 
interpretation of article 26. In the Judge's opinion, indeed, these principles entail that 
the enjoyment of a right depends on the realization of other rights, but this does not 
imply that ESCR must automatically be incorporated into the content of the Convention; 
and the jurisdiction of a court can be altered236. In other words, the aforementioned 
principles allow a broader understanding of the rights protected by the Convention, but 
do not mean an unlimited expansion of the Court's competences. 
According to the Judge, the reading of Article 26 in light of the broader interpretation 
of article 29 of the Convention would expand the Court's jurisdiction extensively away 
from the competences formerly accepted by States. Following this maximalist logic, 
on the basis of article 29 of the Convention, the Court would have jurisdiction to declare 
the international responsibility of the State when it qualifies that it has violated a ESCR 
recognized in domestic or international law, turning article 26 in a permanent referral 
norm through which any kind of ESCR violation can assessed by the Inter-American 
Court237. It must, hence, bear in mind that the Inter-American Court is an international 
tribunal, not a constitutional tribunal, and that the American Convention is an 
international treaty, not a national constitution238. 
In the same way, article 29 of the Convention must be understood as an important tool 
in preventing States from limiting rights recognized at the national level or in other 
international instruments in light of Convention and in updating the normative content 
                                               
235Ibidem 
236Ibidem, par. 15. 




of the Convention itself. On the contrary, using the latter article in order to assess a 
violation of rights which are not provided for in the Convention would determine an 
abuse of the pro-person principle and a violation of the principle of legal certainty that 
would not allow States to foresee the type of conduct in which they must engage in 
compliance with their international obligations239. 
Judge Humberto Sierra Porto concluded that the Court must be especially careful not 
to confuse the obligations that emanate for the States by virtue of conventional clauses, 
which recognize rights and obligations of immediate enforceability, and over which the 
Court has jurisdiction, of those norms or principles that serve for the interpretation of 
such conventional clauses, such as soft law instruments240. 
In conclusion, regardless of whether or not one shares Judge Sierra Porto's opinion, it 
cannot be denied that the Poblete case constitutes a milestone in the protection of ESCR 
and in assessing progressivity aspects, which are further examined in the analysis of 
the recent case against Guatemala presented in the next section. Furthermore, the direct 
approach adopted by the Court permits a deeper understanding of the different 
components and features of the right to health, which will allow national courts to have 
clear standards about access to, and quality of, healthcare services in accordance to 
General Comment No. 14 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights241. A more detailed analysis, is however required, if the Inter-American Court 
decides to deliver structural remedies relating to key issues of healthcare services, both 
from a domestic and an international view. 
Interestingly, after the present case, ESC rights acquired autonomous strength in terms 
of access to justice; and they do not longer constitute an extension the civil and political 
counterparts. This shift in perspective must be understood as another step in getting 
over the obsolete distinction among human rights and in enhancing the principle of 
indivisibility among them. 
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Surely, the complex constitution of the right to health entails a further and instrumental 
examination of the wider economic and political context of each State involved in an 
alleged violation. As with other social rights, the establishment of a human-rights 
friendly healthcare sector depends on economic resources and political decisions which 
must always be taken into account. Nonetheless, the Inter-American Court's new 
approach towards ESCR may provide further guidance for national policy-makers in 
order to respect and implement their human rights obligations. 
 
 
5.2. The Cuscul Pivaral Case of 2018 
 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) reached a decision in the case 
Cuscul Pivaral v. Guatemala on 23 August 2018. In the Judgment, the Court declared, 
for the first time in its more than 40 years as an international tribunal, the violation of 
the obligation of progressive realization (article 26 of the American Convention) which 
focused on the lack of treatments of 49 people living with HIV/AIDS. 
The judgment in the case of Cuscul Pivaral and others v. Guatemala (hereinafter "the 
judgment" or "Cuscul Pivaral") constitutes a milestone in the shift of jurisprudence 
concerning the protection of ESCRs within the inter-american system. The Judgment 
fuels the approach followed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in recent 
cases with respect to the direct justiciability of the ESCR and the interpretative scope 
of Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights.242 
The Judgment reaffirms that the right to health stems from the economic, social, 
educational, scientific, and cultural norms contained in the Charter of the Organization 
of American States; and, it further reaffirms that in light of an extensive interpretation 
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of Article 26 of the American Convention, the right at stake is autonomously justiciable 
before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In fact, as examined in the previous 
section on the Poblete case, the Court highlighted that the right to health can be 
identified through Article 26 of the ACHR in light of the norms contained in the OAS 
Charter which are binding for all States parties243. This new approach towards the right 
to health differs deeply from the aforementioned position of the Court, which protected 
the right indirectly in connection with civil and political rights, such as the right to life 
or personal integrity244. In addition, the Judgment addresses an important distinction 
that is both relevant to the present case and current analysis on ESCR: namely, the 
distinction between immediate and progressive obligations245. 
Interestingly, the Cuscul Pivaral case confirmed recent Court's Jurisprudence on direct 
juscticability of ESCR, but also introduced five important considerations that are 
relevant in the present section. The first of these considerations is that the present 
Judgment furthered the analysis and reasoning on the direct justiciability of the ESCRs 
in general and of the right to health in particular. Secondly, the Judgment identified 
precise health standards applicable to people living with HIV246 in doing so extending 
what has already been stated in this regard in the cases of Gonzáles Lluy v. Ecuador 
and Duque v. Colombia247. Thirdly, the Court highlighted the obligations on State's 
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Parties deriving from the principle of non-discrimination in relation to vulnerable 
groups, such as pregnant women living with HIV248. The fourth consideration, which 
makes the Judgment a milestone in the Jurisprudence of the Court, is that it is first time 
in the Court's history in which the latter determined State's responsibility for a violation 
of the obligation of progressive realization envisaged in Article 26 of the American 
Convention249 . Moreover, in regard to progressive obligations, the Judges provided 
objective standards in order to identify State's efforts in taking steps towards the 
realization of the right to health. Finally, the Court established reparation measures that 
address both the victims of the case and aimed at improving the structural deficiencies 
of the State to provide comprehensive health care250. 
 
 
5.3. Progressive Obligations concerning the Right to Health in light of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights 
 
Understanding the framework in relation to the progressive realization of the 
obligations related to ESCR in general and to the right to health in particular is the 
baseline in assessing State's responsibility in the present case. The judicial effort in 
establishing the boundaries of this kind of international obligations took its first steps 
in the Acevedo Buendía and othes v. Peru case. In the latter, the Court stressed that the 
fulfillment of ECSR cannot be achieved in a short period of time; and flexibility is 
required both in light of the global context in particular and in light of the specific 
situation of the country251 . Despite the aforementioned flexibility, the State has an 
immediate obligation to act, meaning to adopt measures, usually legislative, in order to 
set the stage for the effectiveness of the rights involved. The economic and financial 
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situation of the State, however, must always be taken into consideration252. Under these 
considerations the Court identified related obligations of non-regression which aimed 
at permitting restrictive measures only in exceptional circumstances, namely when 
States acted in light of their economic and financial constraints and proved that their 
conduct was adopted after careful consideration of all the provisions envisaged in the 
CESCR253. 
In this regard, it should be noted that the United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights has presented criteria for the assessment of retrogressive 
measures. In order for regressive measures to be legitimate, States must demonstrate, 
inter alia, that such measures are (a) temporary, (b) necessary, (c) non-discriminatory 
or do not disproportionately affect disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and 
groups, and (d) that they at least respect the basic obligations of the social rights in 
question and are applicable to the specific population group in question254. 
In the present case the Court concluded that Guatemala violated the principle of 
progressive realization provided for under a joint-interpretation of Article 26 and 1.1 
of the American Convention as a result of the State's inaction regarding the protection 
of the right to health for people living with HIV in Guatemala despite the existence of 
an international obligation and state regulation255. The Court grounded its decision on 
the assumption that the progressive dimension of the ESCR, while recognizing a certain 
degree of flexibility for their realization, also include an obligation of progress that 
requires an effective and continuous improvement of rights in such a way that social 
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inequalities are corrected and the inclusion of vulnerable groups is facilitated256. On 
these grounds the Court noted that Guatemala, despite having a series of laws and 
public policies for the treatment of people living with HIV in force prior to 2004, in 
practice, 48 of the 49 victims of this case did not have access to medical care257. 
In summary, the main argument delivered by the majority of the Judges in the Cuscul 
Pivaral case is that, despite the State's enjoyment of a margin of action for the 
fulfillment of its progressive obligations in realization to ECSR, this cannot be 
understood as free rein to not adopt any protective measures or to adopt measures which 
are not effective to their scope, especially in a situation in which vulnerable people are 
involved, such as people living with HIV258. The Court defined the vulnerability of this 
group of people in light of the nature of this chronic disease, of the high risk of suffering 
the so-called opportunistic diseases and of the high risk of being marginalized due to 
their condition. Chances that their right to life and personal integrity could be 
negatively affected are, hence, much higher in that condition of vulnerability. 
Interestingly, the Court did not identify a violation of the principle of non-regression in 
the protection of people living with HIV in Guatemala, since the Judges recognized the 
provision of a series of laws, public policies and budget increases, especially after 2004, 
aimed at tackling the current issue. These measures, however, did not suffice in 
protecting the right to health of people living with HIV in practice259. 
Assessing whether a State is in compliance with its obligation of progressive realization 
of ESCR is not always an easy task, mainly in light of both its undefined nature and of 
the current economic and financial situation of the State involved. In this regard, along 
with the United Nations Committee on ESCR, the General Assembly of the 
Organization of American States (OAS) adopted a resolution with the aim at 
establishing a more confined set of standards in order to assess States' compliance with 
the principle of progressive realization. It is worth noting that the resolution, labeled 
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Progress Indicators for measuring rights under the Protocol of San Salvador, is not a 
legally binding instrument, and rationae materiae has some kind of soft law legal effect 
merely for States' parties of the Protocol under the principle pacta tertiis nec nocent 
nec prosunt260. In other words, these criteria serve as the basis for States Parties to the 
Protocol to submit information on compliance with their obligations under the rights 
contained within. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the Court to hear violations of the 
Protocol of San Salvador encounters the limits set for in Article 19(6) of that instrument 
already described in the Chapter. Notwithstanding, this does not mean that the 
Resolution is meaningless. The aforementioned criteria may still serve a practical 
function and be essential in assessing States' compliance with ESCR in relation to 
Article 26 of the Convention. Indeed, these criteria have a strong probative value before 
both the Court and the Commission, since they can be used by States as evidence in 
order to formulate solid legal arguments showing compliance with the effective 
realization of the rights in the terms of Article 26 of the American Convention. 
Interestingly, national Constitutional Courts of the region seem to be in line with the 
system established by the Inter-American framework in relation to the progressive 
realization of ESCR. In this regard it worth mentioning two examples in which national 
Highest Courts addressed the issue object of the present analysis adopting a similar 
reasoning. 
According to the Colombian Constitutional Court progressive obligations ground on 
three specific considerations on the judicial enforceability of social rights: primary, the 
existence of public policies oriented to the effective enjoyment of rights; secondly, 
these public policies must require a system of judicial protection for their 
implementation; finally, these policies must establish mechanism in order to limit the 
implementation of discretionary regressive measures 261 . Furthermore, the Court 
specified that regressive measures must be understood as measure which limit the 
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substantive scope of protection of the right involved and when the requirements for the 
enjoyment of such right substantially increased. In addition, a regressive measure is 
such if public authorities restricted or diverted the budget previously allocated for the 
protection of the right involved262. Under the aforementioned consideration, the Court 
stated that if a regressive measure is subject to constitutional control, the burden of 
proof on the State is to demonstrate, with sufficient and pertinent data that: i) that the 
measure seeks to satisfy an imperative constitutional purpose; ii) that, after a judicious 
evaluation, it is demonstrated that the measure is effectively conducive to achieving 
the desired purpose; iii) that after an analysis of the different alternatives, the measure 
appears necessary to achieve the proposed goal; iv) that it does not affect the 
unavailable minimum content of the committed social right; and v) that the benefit it  
achieves is clearly greater than the cost involved263. 
In the same way, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court has established whether or not 
a measure is regressive: (i) when it reduces or limits the substantive scope of protection 
of the respective benefit right; (ii) when it substantially increases the requirements for 
access to the right in question; and (iii) when it effectively and significantly reduces or 
diverts public resources allocated to the satisfaction of the right, before the fulfillment 
of such right. In addition, the Court stressed that regressive measure could be justified 
in a certain historical moment, provided that the principles of reasonableness and 
proportionality are observed264. 
In conclusion, the international responsibility of a State party to the American 
Convention for the violation of its obligation of progressive realization can be 
summarized in light of four key considerations: firstly, progressive obligations must be 
understood in light of a general prohibition of inaction by the State towards the 
effective realization of a right. Secondly, legislative measures and the establishment of 
public policies on social rights do not suffice for the correct implementation of the 
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American Convention. In fact, the third consideration implies that, alongside with a 
normative progression, a de facto progression is indeed required, something that can 
be called as progression of result. Lastly, in order to assess compliance with the 
obligation of progressive realization, the maximum use of available resources, with a 
special attention to vulnerable or marginalized groups, must be taken into account. 
Another aspect which makes the Cuscul Pivaral Case a leading judgment in the 
protection of the right to health is that the Inter-American Court set more detailed 
standards for the treatment of people living with HIV/AIDS. It went so far as to 
conceive that it should include access to quality goods, services and information for 
the prevention, treatment, care and support of infection. The Court highlighted the key 
role played by antiretroviral therapy and other medicines, diagnostic tests and safe and 
effective related technologies for the preventive, curative and palliative care of HIV, 
opportunistic diseases and related diseases, as well as social and psychological support, 
family and community care, and access to prevention technologies265. 
The last aspect of the current case which is worth examining in this section is the 
reparation measures ordered by the Court to Guatemala. These measures aimed at 
repairing the violations that occurred for the victims of the case and at preventing future 
violations on the same matter. In this regard, the Court ruled that the State must provide 
the victims with effective life-time medical care and psychological/ psychiatric 
treatment. This treatment should include crucial issues such as the free and lifelong 
provision of medicines needed to combat HIV (antiretroviral) or opportunistic diseases, 
diagnostic tests, social support including aspects such as nutritional or psychological 
assistance, and access to technologies for the prevention of infection. All of these 
aspects have a causal link with the type of treatment that the State failed to provide to 
victims, and which is necessary for the medical care of people living with HIV in 
accordance with the standards defined in the Judgment in light of the valuable reports 
of institutions such as UNAIDS or the World Health Organization266. In addition, the 
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Judgment ordered certain guarantees of non-repetition that are aimed at improving the 
conditions of healthcare for people living with HIV in Guatemala, whether or not they 
were victims of the case. This is an aspect that is relevant to highlight for it seeks to 
promote structural changes in the country for the protection of all the population. 
To conclude, the Judgment represents a point of maturity in a line of a jurisprudence 
that precisely addresses a crucial issue in Latina America: the need for States to comply 
with their obligations to respect and guarantee economic, social, cultural and 
environmental rights. Furthermore, the Cuscul Pivaral addresses specific question on 
the duty to guarantee the right to health for people living with HIV while considering 
for the first time the two features of ESCR - namely immediate and progressive 
obligations. 
The approach adopted by the Court, despite the normative and methodological 
challenges it presented, might be key in addressing and tackling serious issues 
regarding the region such as inequality and social exclusion, especially for the most 
vulnerable groups. In the same way, the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has pointed out that the region remains the 
most unequal region in the world in terms of income distribution and that extreme 
poverty still constitute an issues that must be addressed soon affecting "more children, 
adolescents and young people" and highlighting the increase in the "feminization of 
poverty" in the young and adult population267. For all the aforementioned consideration, 
the Judgment constitute an important step forward in the effective protection and 
implementation of ESCR in Latin America with due regard of the fragile social 
situation and context of the countries of the region268. 
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5.4. Final remarks on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence 
concerning the Right to Health 
 
The shift in the Court's approach and jurisprudence in addressing the protection of 
health-related issues is both remarkable and surely relevant for the effective protection 
of human rights. The aforementioned analysis on the Inter-American system has 
presented the evolution of the Court's approach from those cases in which health related 
issues were assessed as violations of the right to life and personal integrity on the one 
hand, to the most recent cases in which the Court ruled on violations of the right to 
health, considered for the first time as an autonomous and directly enforceable right. 
Furthermore, it is evident that this shift in the Court's perspective triggers an array of 
legal questions and fuels the debate on both the direct applicability of social rights in 
the international human rights framework and on the role of an international court 
established by a treaty in light of basic principles of international law. In this regards, 
Judge Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto's partially dissenting opinion on the Cuscul 
Pivaral Case constitutes a valuable source for the study of this updated Court's 
approach and for highlighting new perspectives that might be useful in order to tackle 
the aforesaid intellectually challenging legal reasoning. The Judge grounded his 
opinion on two main pillars: firstly, the study on the debate on the nature of the right 
to health; secondly, on the remedial measures adopted by the Court in relation to the 
guarantee of non-repetition and public health policies in Guatemala. 
The analysis starts by presenting the Court's definition on the right to health, which 
must be understood as the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical, mental and social well-being. This right includes timely and 
appropriate health care in accordance with the principles of availability, accessibility, 
acceptability and quality269.  In addition, the Court specified that the general obligation 
to protect health enshrines the State's duty to ensure people's access to essential health 
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services, guaranteeing quality and effective medical care, as well as to promote the 
improvement of the population's health conditions270. Under these considerations the 
Court highlighted Guatemala's non-compliance with the two aforementioned sets of 
international obligations concerning ESCR provided for in a article 26 of the American 
State namely immediate and progressive obligations271. 
In addition, the Court also concluded that the State was responsible for having violated 
the rights to life and personal integrity contained in Articles 4 and 5 of the American 
Convention. In this regard, the Court considered the existence of a causal link between 
the omissions of the State in the medical treatment and the cause of death of the alleged 
victims, especially when such death was caused by an opportunistic illness. The Court, 
therefore concluded that the State was responsible for the violation of the obligation to 
guarantee the right to life contained in Article 4(1) of the Convention272. In the same 
way, the Court assessed a violation of the right to personal integrity as defined by article 
5 in light of the causal link between the lack of adequate medical treatment for the 
alleged victims and the physical and psychological harm suffered by the victims as 
people living with HIV273. 
On the grounds of this reasoning, a strong nexus between the violation of the right to 
health on the one hand, and of the right to life and personal integrity of the victims on 
the other, is quite evident. This is the reason Judge Sierra Porto highlighted that 
understanding article 26 in an autonomous manner is unnecessary, although the article 
has enormous relevance when considered in relation to the right to life and personal 
integrity. Indeed, according to the Judge, the conduct and omissions imputed to the 
State as violating the rights to health, life and personal integrity are, in essence, the 
same. In other words, the Judge stressed that the direct enforceability of the right to 
health in light of an extensive interpretation of Article 26 contravenes and illegitimately 
                                               
270Caso Poblete Vilches y otros Vs. Chile. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 8 de marzo de 
2018. Serie C No. 349, párr. 118, y Caso Cuscul Pivaral y otros Vs. Guatemala. Excepción Preliminar, 
Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 23 de agosto de 2018. Serie C No. 359, párr. 105. 
271Caso Cuscul Pivaral y otros Vs. Guatemala. Excepción Preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. 
Sentencia de 23 de agosto de 2018. Serie C No. 359, párr. 119. 
272Ibidem, par. 159. 
273Ibidem, par. 163. 
90 
 
expand the jurisdiction of the Court much further from the powers explicitly provided 
by the Convention. This could cause a situation of juridical uncertainty in which neither 
members States, nor alleged victims, would know how to act.  As an international 
tribunal, the inter-american Court has a specific mandate which has to perform on the 
grounds of the legal settings agreed upon by the States at the moment of the adoption 
of the treaty. 
This reasoning does not mean that ESCR are not protected in the Inter-American 
system. In fact, when the right to health was addressed indirectly, this did not prevent 
the Court from making important advances with respect to the requirements of 
availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality in the provision of health services, 
as well as the obligation to regulate, oversee and supervise the provision of services in 
private health centers. The Judge pointed out that this does not imply the creation of a 
new right. Instead it means to give content and scope to rights such as life and integrity 
that are contained in the Convention and, therefore, have been accepted by the States 
Parties274. 
In this regard, the Judge proposes a double-face construction of the right to health. 
According to this perspective, the right to health is both an individual, in relation to the 
related fundamental rights that may be affected, such as the right to personal integrity 
or to life; and a progressive right in relation to the complacency of health services 
provided by the State275. This reasoning would allow the Court to identify, on the one 
hand, when it is possible to link the actions of the State to the provision of health 
services in light of an alleged violations of the right to life  and personal integrity, and 
on the other hand, to determine when the public policy on ESCR in the State is 
intrinsically in violation of the obligations of progressive realization established in 
Article 26 of the Convention. In doing so the Court could assess the case under a micro 
perspective in the first hypothesis on the basis of article 4 and/or 5 in relation to article 
26 and 1.1 of the Convention; and, under a macro perspective in the second hypothesis, 
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directly on the basis of article 26 in relation to article 1.1 of the mentioned instrument276. 
Furthermore, the Judge highlights that Guatemala was found in breach of its 
progressive obligations, despite not having adopted any regressive measures. In his 
view, if this reasoning were to be accepted as valid, the nature of  progressive 
obligations would be changed into quite different ones, which would imply the 
obligation to comply with the implementation of ESCR, such as the right to health, in 
a reasonable period of time277. 
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6. Access to Medicines as a key part of the Right to Health 
 
In section 2 of this Chapter, the legal framework related to the right to health has been 
studied and developed, without explicitly mentioning a peculiar aspect of this right, i.e. 
access to medicines. According to official reports of the United Nations278 , almost 
2,000 million people lack access to essential medicines (which causes considerable and 
avoidable suffering), directly influencing people's quality of life and causing situations 
such as ill health, pain, anxiety and loss of dignity and life279. Improving access to 
existing medicines could save 20 million lives each year, half of them in Africa and 
South-East Asia280. In addition to deprivation, severe inequality in access to medicines 
remains a major problem and the main feature of the global pharmaceutical situation. 
Average per-capita expenditure on medicines in high-income countries is 100 times 
higher than in low-income countries; about $400 compared to $4 in the other country. 
In fact, the World Health Organization (hereinafter: "WHO") estimates that 15 per cent 
of the world's population consumes more than 90 per cent of the total production of 
pharmaceutical products and has clarified that the right to access to medicines is an 
integral part of the right to health. In addition, pharmaceuticals account for 60% of all 
health-related trade, yet 35% of the world's population, especially in developing 
countries, lacks regular access to essential medicines281. 
WHO defines essential medicines as "those that meet the priority health care needs of 
the population”282. Furthermore, according to WHO, access to essential medicines, as 
defined in the WHO Action Programme on Essential Medicines, should be guaranteed 
to all. WHO's health for all and primary health care strategies can inspire the core 
                                               
278The right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health 
Note by the Secretary-General, 13 September 2006, A/61/338,  10. 
279 World Health Organization, Medicines Strategy: Countries at the Core, 2004-2007, WHO, 2004. 
According to WHO statistics presented at the XVI International AIDS Conference in Toronto in 2006, 
less than a quarter of all AIDS patients in Africa, and less than a tenth of children with AIDS, receive 
the antiretroviral drugs needed to save their lives. 
280Department for International Development (DFID), Increasing access to essential medicines in the 
developing world, 2004. 
281 World Health Organization, “WHO Medicines Strategy: Countries at the Core, 2004-2007”, 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2004/WHO_EDM_2004.5.pdf 
282Definition provided in the OMS website http://www.who.int/medicines/services/essmedicines_def/en 
93 
 
content of the right to health: "there is a health baseline below which no individual in 
any country should find himself”283. In other words, there is a certain threshold below 
which States, regardless of the resources at their disposal, are not allowed to stop 
providing basic medicines to their populations. 
 
Essential content includes the following services284: 
 
(a) access to maternal and child health care, including family planning; 
(b) immunization against major infectious diseases; 
(c) adequate treatment of common diseases and injuries; 
(d) Essential medicines; 
(e) Adequate supply of safe drinking water and basic sanitation; 
(f) absence of serious threats to environmental health. 
 
It is clear that the right to access to medicines is a part of the core content of the right 
to health. Essential medicines, must therefore, be available to the public, at affordable 
prices and in adequate quantities. While there seems to be no doubt about the 
importance of the availability and affordability of life-saving medicines, in practice, 
millions of people are denied access to medicines and health-care services. This section 







                                               
283 World Health Organization (WHO), Global Strategy for Health for All by the Year 2000 (Geneva, 
1981), 31. 
284UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 14: The 
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12 of the Covenant), 11 August 
2000, E/C.12/2000/4, parr. 43-44. 
94 
 
6.1. Recognition of the Right to Access to Medicines as a Fundamental Right 
 
The United Nations, with its various specialized agencies and committees, has played 
a determining role in establishing and recognizing access to medicines as an integral 
part of the right to health. Recalling the most relevant historical events, it should be 
noted that the debate related to access to medicines started after the adoption of the 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health of 2001 (Doha Declaration)285. 
This Declaration was the product of formalized criticism by developing countries of 
the system that had been created in 1994 with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). These countries postulated that the framework 
established by the 1994 agreement strengthened intellectual property rights and left 
aside human rights, specifically the right to health. As a result, the Doha Declaration 
recommended that States reinterpret the TRIPS Agreement in order to guarantee the 
public health of their citizens and, especially, to promote the accessibility and 
availability of medicines for all. This instrument, while not legally binding for States, 
has a validity that is not simply political, but belongs to the so-called group of norms 
referred to as soft law. 
It should be noted that about a year earlier (spring 2000) the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) adopted the already widely cited General 
Comment 14, in which access to medicines was formally recognized as an integral part 
of the right to health; and it is because of the interpretation delivered by the Committee 
and examined in this section that it is possible to determine and clarify the specific 
obligations with which States Parties must comply in relation to the right to the 
aforementioned right286. 
Chronologically speaking, four years after the Doha Declaration, the same CESCR 
adopted another General Comment in which it reaffirmed the importance of access to 
medicines, clarifying the obligation of States "to prevent unreasonably high costs being 
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imposed for access to essential medicines (...)", and above all underlining the role of 
public authorities in prohibiting the patentability of inventions whose 
commercialization and use may have purposes contrary to dignity and other human 
rights, such as the rights to life, health and private life, in other words, endangering 
their full exercise287. 
Similarly, in 2013, the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, Anand 
Grover, addressing the topic on access to medicines, highlighted and confirmed how 
the availability of essential medicines for all sectors of the population (especially the 
weakest strata) represents a fundamental part and is a crucial element for the enjoyment 
of the right to health at all levels288. The Special Rapporteur proposed: 
 
a) Establish a regulatory framework on local drug production to ensure the accessibility 
and long-term affordability of medicines; 
b) Strengthen the regulatory framework to increase the competitiveness of local 
industry and provide administrative and financial support, subsidies and guaranteed 
purchases; 
c) Use flexibility factors under the TRIPS Agreement to promote regional collaboration 
to pool resources and facilitate the competitiveness of local production. 
 
Furthermore, with regard to ensuring affordability of medicines, the Special Rapporteur 
recommends that States: (a) Take price control measures within the framework of 
pricing and reimbursement policies with a view to ensuring the population's access to 
affordable medicines, particularly in the case of vulnerable groups; (b) Select countries 
with a similar level of economic development to that of the State concerned as reference 
countries in order to ensure the lowest possible price of medicines through external 
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pricing; (c) If necessary, monitor and regulate manufacturers' sales prices and 
distribution margins in the supply chain and ensure incentives for wholesalers and 
retailers for sustainable distribution; (d) Resist trade policies that undermine the ability 
of States to reimburse local pharmaceutical companies for the price of essential drugs; 
(e) Eliminate tariffs on the import of drugs, except where they are considered strategic 
for promoting local production of essential drugs; (f) Eliminate taxes on all medicines, 
especially essential medicines, and consider other revenue options in the area of health, 
such as excise taxes on socially harmful products such as tobacco, alcohol and junk 
foods which pharmaceutical companies to abuse anti-competitive practices and 
promote competitive pricing of medicines together with stringent enforcement 
measures289. 
Another significant step in the process for the recognition of access to medicines as a 
fundamental part of the right to health was the Human Rights Council resolution 
32/15290. This resolution declared access to medicines one of the fundamental elements 
for progressively achieving the full realization of the right of everyone to the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.  All countries were 
urged to take advantage of the flexibility clauses established by the TRIPS Agreement 
in light of the importance of intellectual property protection for the development of 
new medicines, as well as the concern caused by the price implications of such 
protection291. 
Interestingly, the General Assembly in 2015 adopted Resolution A/70/L.1, known as 
"Transforming our world: Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development", in which, 
among the 17 goals set, the right to health (Goal 3) is also included, and in particular 
"Ensure a healthy life and promote the well-being of all at all ages". In the part in 
which the objective in question is explained in detail, the Assembly stresses that by 
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2030, States must achieve access to safe, effective, affordable and quality medicines 
and vaccines for all, in accordance with the Declaration on the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and Public Health and adopt the 
abovementioned limitations established by TRIPS292. 
In November 2015, former United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon convened 
a High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines and asked them to propose solutions to 
boost research and development, as well as access to health technologies, through a 
high-level meeting on access to medicines293 . To this end, the High-Level Group 
published a report in September 2016 entitled “Promoting innovation and access to 
health technology”294. 
The Report is composed of four parts, which address different aspects of the 
relationship between public health, trade and intellectual property and emphasize the 
importance of access to medicines as an essential element for the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of health: 
 
a) Technology, innovation and access to health: Reviews the current global situation 
and identifies multiple barriers to access to medicines. According to the Report, there 
are clear inconsistencies between the need to improve access and commercial and 
intellectual property incentives. In addition, the importance of the WHO Essential 
Medicines List (EML) for access is highlighted. 
 
b) Intellectual property law and access to health technologies: Explains how intellectual 
property (IP) law, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the regulatory provisions 
                                               
292 UN General Assembly, Transforming our world: Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development, 
Resolution A/70/L.1, 18. 
293In general, the report identifies ways to improve access to health technologies. Other proposals include 
greater transparency of costs (for pricing), results of clinical trials, governments taking responsibility for 
meeting the health needs of their populations, including increased spending on health-based research 
and development. In addition, it foresees new incentives for neglected areas, more transparent patent 
information, the need for publicly funded research and development to disseminate information obtained 
for the benefit of all. 
294World Health Organization, Report of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on 
Access to Medicines. Promoting innovation and access to health technologies. September 2016. 
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established by TRIPS work in relation to health technology. It also discusses public 
funding of pharmaceutical research and development. 
 
c) New Incentives for Health Technology Research and Development: Shows possible 
new ways to promote research and development, for example, to cure less common 
antimicrobial resistant diseases. In fact, new technologies are rarely developed for 
health conditions that cannot deliver high yields, such as bacterial infections that 
require only antibiotics. As a result, rare diseases affecting comparatively small 
proportions of the population have not traditionally attracted investment. 
  
d) Governance, accountability and transparency: Examines how rules governing trade 
and intellectual property may conflict with public health and human rights because of 
different mechanisms of regulation, accountability and transparency. To this end, it 
discusses the manner in which coordination and integration can help overcome 
inconsistencies and inequalities between countries. 
 
 
6.2. The Obligation of Progressive Realization and the Prohibition of 
Regression in relation to the Right to Access to Medicines 
 
The realization and concrete implementation of the right to health requires, by its very 
nature, the allocation of large amounts of resources by public authorities and depends 
on the economic and financial situation of the country analyzed. In fact, health 
represents the largest item of expenditure in public budgets; and the State, as mentioned 
above, has the positive obligation (to act) to deliver quality services in order to 
guarantee the social rights (health) of its citizens. In other words, the construction of 
hospitals, the training of specialized medical personnel, and the administration of 
vaccines and medicines involve the use of significant amounts of public capital. 
It should be noted that two elements specifically influence the effective protection and 
implementation of the right to health: first, the aforementioned amount of available 
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resources; second, the economic and political decisions that the current government 
wants to implement. For example, in a situation of economic crisis, a government could 
adopt austerity measures and consequently reduce public spending; on the other hand, 
the same government could increase public spending in order to stimulate aggregate 
demand. It is evident that, under a qualitative perspective, the two political decisions 
mentioned (under equal economic conditions) have a different influence on the 
guarantee of the right to health and other social rights. 
For this reason, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
does not establish an obligation of immediate realization of the rights stipulated therein, 
but rather an obligation of progressive realization, with the objective of limiting the 
arbitrariness of States and especially of recognizing that these types of rights depend 
on the amount of available resources (economic-financial situation of a country). In 
addition, article 2, paragraph 1, provides: "Each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and 
cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly 
the adoption of legislative measures”295. 
Similarly, in its General Comment No. 3, the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights stated, with respect to this type of obligations, that "The concept of 
progressive realization constitutes recognition of the fact that the full realization of all 
economic, social and cultural rights in general cannot be achieved in a short period of 
time”296. This view is consistent with the design of the drafters of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights who, despite concerns that some 
States might use this progressive obligation as an excuse for not fulfilling their 
obligations297, recognize that the inclusion of this clarification was inevitable298.    
                                               
295United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 2, paragraph 
1.  
296CESCR, General Comment 3, par. 9. 
297 D. Hartley, Social Rights and Human Welfare, Routledge, 2015, 23. 
298Indeed, the drafting history of the Covenant records that the use of the term progressively imposes on 
signatories the obligation to always achieve higher standards of compliance with rights. Ibidem. 
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The obligation of progressive realization, however, does not mean that States do not 
have specific obligations with which they have to comply, and for this reason, the same 
ESC Committee stressed that on the one hand, flexibility is called for to face the real 
situations of today's world and the challenges that each country faces in guaranteeing 
the full realization of economic, social and cultural rights. On the other hand, the 
obligation must be understood by considering "the general objective, in reality the 
raison d'être, of the Covenant, which is to establish clear obligations for States parties 
with regard to the full realization of the rights in question"299. 
Furthermore, the Committee underlines that progressively it means proceeding as 
expeditiously and efficiently as possible with a view to effectively implementing the 
established rights. Similarly, the Committee enunciates the corresponding prohibition 
of retrogression, that is, "all measures of a deliberately retroactive nature in this regard 
shall require the most careful consideration and shall be fully justified by reference to 
the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use 
of the maximum available resources"300. 
Such a perspective seeks to understand the obligation of progressive realization as a 
mixture of practicality and sensitivity to the local context. Thus, in terms of 
implementation, it imposes an obligation on States to justify the measures they have 
taken to guarantee the right to health in the light of the resources at their disposal. In 
this regard, the Committee (CESCR) in its general comment on the right to health stated 
that, if the socio-economic context makes it impossible for a State party to comply fully 
with its obligations under the Covenant, it is the responsibility of public authorities to 
justify that, nevertheless, every effort has been made to use all the resources at their 
disposal to implement as a matter of priority the obligations imposed under the right to 
health1301. 
It is clear that the context and the economic situation of the country play a determining 
role, but they do not represent the only requirements to be analyzed. Similarly, in 2006, 
                                               
299CESCR, General Comment 3, par. 9. 
300Ibidem par. 10. 
301CESCR, General Comment 14, par. 47. 
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CESCR further clarified that in order to assess the obligation of progressive realization, 
the following points must be taken into consideration302: 
 
* the level of development of the country 
* the gravity of the alleged infringement 
* the current economic situation of the country 
* the existence of other situations that negatively influenced resource management, 
such as those related to natural disasters or armed conflicts 
* whether the state party has attempted to identify low-cost measures 
* whether the state party sought the cooperation of the international community 
 
The same Committee specified more precisely the requirements necessary to assess 
progress towards the fulfillment of the progressive realization obligation with respect 
to the communications procedure under the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights303. 
 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights indicated that it would 
consider factors such as304: 
 
* the extent to which the decisions taken were deliberate, concrete and specified 
towards the fulfillment of economic, social and cultural rights 
* whether the Member State exercised its discretion in a non-discriminatory and non-
arbitrary manner 
* whether the State party's decision not to allocate available resources is in conformity 
with international human rights standards 
* in cases where several options are available, if the State party has adopted the option 
                                               
302 CESCR, An Assessment of the Obligation to Take Steps Towards the "Maximum of Available 
Resources" under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant, UNDocE/C.12/2007/1, 10 May 2007, par. 10. 
303Human Rights Council, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, UNDocA/63/435, 28 November 2008. 
304CESCR, An Assessment of the Obligation to Take Steps, par. 8. 
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that least restricts Covenant rights 
* the timeframe within which the measures were adopted 
* whether the measures have taken into account the precarious situation of 
disadvantaged and marginalized individuals or groups, whether they were non-
discriminatory and whether priority was given to serious or risky situations305. 
 
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that the obligation of progressive realization 
establishes clear limits to the arbitrariness of action on the part of public authorities, 
which have the responsibility to justify the taking of governmental decisions that 
negatively influenced the protection of the right to health. It should be noted that the 
general principle of international law, pacta sunt servanda, should guide States in 
adopting measures that could cause irreparable harm to the most vulnerable citizens. 
For this reason, public authorities must comply with the obligation in good faith and 
with the principle of effectiveness. 
The Committee has, however, recognized that the application of this model will always 
respect the "margin of appreciation" of States to adopt the measures best suited to their 
specific circumstances, and only then will a careful analysis of the context assess the 
State's behavior in the broader context, i.e. in the light of international human rights in 
general and not simply the right to health306. 
  
                                               
305It is significant that this model has been used by the Committee on the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, as an appropriate methodology to evaluate the fulfillment of the norms regarding the 
progressive realization of the obligation of States to ensure the right to health. 
306Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights An Assessment of the Obligation to Take Steps 
Towards the "Maximum of Available Resources" under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant, 
UNDocE/C.12/2007/1 (10 May 2007), par. 12. 
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6.3. Specific Legal Obligations related to Access to Medicines  
 
The aforementioned General Comment 14 constitutes the key moment in defining the 
specific obligations related to access to medicines as a fundamental part of the right to 
health. In this document, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
included the provision of essential medicines among the core obligations to be 
guaranteed by States parties307. In fact, while the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights recognizes the principle of progressive realization of these 
rights, this does not mean that States are free to postpone the fulfillment of their 
obligations with regard to the right to health308. 
Considering the above-mentioned tripartite structure309 (respect, protect and fulfill) 
established for all economic, social and cultural rights by the Committee, specific legal 
obligations related to the right to access to medicines, understood as a fundamental part 
of the broader right to health, can be identified. 
The obligation to respect the right to health with regard to medicines is described in 
paragraph 34 of general comment No. 14 as a duty of non-interference. In particular, 
States must "refrain from denying or limiting equal access to preventive, curative and 
palliative health services for all persons, including prisoners or detainees, 
representatives of minorities, asylum-seekers or illegal immigrants " 310 and refrain 
from marketing unsafe medicines or otherwise interfering with the acceptability, 
availability or accessibility of medicines. An example of denying equal access to 
medicines to all persons would be to limit access to available antibiotics because of the 
nature of the medicine or the patient's family status or because the State's medicines 
                                               
307CESCR, General Comment 14, par. 43(d): "To provide essential medicines, as defined periodically in 
the WHO Action Programme on Essential Medicines". 
308Even in cases of economic crisis or other emergency, these basic requirements must be guaranteed for 
all. States should use all available resources, including international cooperation, to ensure that everyone 
in their territory can enjoy a minimum level of protection of the economic, social and cultural rights set 
out in the Covenant. 
309Previous section 
310 CESCR, General Comment 14, par. 34. 
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policy discriminates against women, ethnic minorities or other disadvantaged groups311. 
The obligation to protect the right to health with regard to medicines is elaborated in 
paragraph 35 of general comment No. 14 and provides for two precise obligations312: 
* to ensure that the privatization of the health sector does not threaten the availability, 
accessibility, acceptability and quality of health facilities, goods and services;   
* control the marketing of medical equipment and medicines by third parties.  
This obligation includes the regulation of the production and sale of medicines in the 
national market. In other words, the obligation to protect is embodied in the task of 
States to take measures to safeguard the market against third party interventions that 
may harm the supply of medicines in relation to quality, price and quantity available.  
For example, the State must ensure that the privatization of the health sector promotes, 
rather than hinders, the realization of the right to health.  Third-party interventions 
include pharmaceutical companies, which must be required by law to adhere to good 
manufacturing practices in order to produce medicines of guaranteed quality313.  In 
addition, not only the production side, but also the supply side of medicines must be 
regulated.  In fact, pharmacists and prescribers must be adequately trained to care for 
patients in the consumption of medicines in the proper manner, prescribing the 
appropriate medicine to the patient, in the appropriate dosage and for the correct 
duration314. The third obligation, to fulfill the right to health, is defined in paragraph 37 
of general comment No. 14. According to this document, States have a duty to facilitate 
the right to health through the adoption of "positive measures which enable and assist 
individuals and communities to enjoy the right"315 . Finally, States are obliged to 
promote the right to health through "actions which create, maintain and restore the 
health of the population”316. As a consequence, the obligation to fulfill requires States 
                                               
311The right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, 
Note by the Secretary-General, A/61/338, par. 59. 
312CESCR, General Comment 14, par. 35. 
313The right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, 
Note by the Secretary-General, A/61/338, par. 59. 
314 CESCR, General Comment 14, par. 36. 




to take positive measures so that rights holders can enjoy their right to access to 
medicines317. In other words, States are responsible for developing and maintaining a 
health-care system through which medicines are available, accessible (affordable, 
physically accessible and without discrimination of any kind), approved and of 
guaranteed quality318. For example, while a State may contract the provision of health 
services to a private company, it does not delegate its right-to-health obligations by 
such an act. A State always retains residual responsibility for the proper regulation of 
its health systems and medicines, as well as for the welfare of the most disadvantaged 
in its jurisdiction319. Therefore, States also have a duty to provide medicines to the most 
vulnerable in society, such as the poor, the disabled146 and ethnic minorities320 
In order to complete the legal framework related to access to medicines, it should be 
noted that the right in question "in all its forms and at all levels encompasses the 
following essential and interrelated elements, the implementation of which will depend 
on the conditions prevailing in a given State "321 , which are as already mentioned: 
availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality. These elements complement legal 
obligations in the sense that such a framework develops the multiple elements 
necessary to fully enjoy the respect, protection and fulfillment of rights related to 
medicines. It should be noted that the element of availability requires not only that 
health goods and services be available in sufficient quantity322 , but also requires 
another determinant aspect for the concrete realization/exercise of the right in question, 
namely the development and availability of new medicines, vaccines and diagnostic 
tools323. Indeed, States must use a variety of economic, financial and trade incentives 
to encourage research and development of specific medicines, primarily for diseases 
                                               
317The right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, 
Note by the Secretary-General, A/61/338, par. 59. 
318CESCR, General Comment 14, par. 30. 
319The right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, 
Note by the Secretary-General, A/61/338, par. 60. 
320 CESCR, General Comment 14, paras. 26-27. 
321Ibidem, par. 26. 
322States must do all they reasonably can to ensure that existing medicines are available in sufficient 
quantities in their jurisdictions. 
323The right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, 
Note by the Secretary-General, A/61/338, par. 47. 
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that create a particular challenge in developing countries. In other words, States have a 
duty to ensure that existing medicines are available within their borders, as well as a 
responsibility to take reasonable measures to ensure that new medicines, which are 
greatly needed are developed, and therefore available324. In addition to being available, 
medications must also be accessible. Accessibility has four dimensions1325: 
* medicines must be accessible in all parts of the country (physical accessibility), 
especially in remote rural areas, far from urban centers. 
* medicines must be affordable for all (economic accessibility), including people living 
in poverty. This dimension has a major impact on drug financing and pricing 
arrangements. In addition, it may mean that a State modifies import tariffs and other 
taxes on medicines in order to improve access for the most vulnerable strata326. 
*medicines must be accessible without discrimination on the basis of sex, race, 
ethnicity and socio-economic status. In this regard, a State must take measures to 
ensure equal access for all individuals and groups, particularly with disadvantaged 
minorities (non-discrimination). 
* Patients and health professionals must have access to reliable information on 
medicines in order to be able to make informed decisions and use them safely 
(accessibility of information). 
Together, health goods and services must also be culturally and generationally 
acceptable and respectful of medical ethics. For example, national measures should 
support the appropriate use of traditional medicine and its integration into health care 
systems, while clinical trials should ensure informed consent of patients. Medicines 
should be available in a form that is available to unconscious patients and incapacitated 
persons, as well as in doses appropriate for newborns327. In addition to being available, 
                                               
324Ibidem, par. 48. 
325Ibidem, par.49. 
326States parties therefore have a duty to prevent excessively high costs of access to essential medicines, 
plant seeds or other means of food production, or textbooks and teaching materials from undermining 
the rights of broad sections of the population to health, food and education. CESCR, General Comment 
17, par. 35. 
327The right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, 
Note by the Secretary-General, A/61/338, par. 50. 
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accessible and acceptable, medicines and related issues should be of good quality. As 
underlined by Paul Hunt, the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, if medicines 
are rejected in the North because they are beyond their expiry date and are unsafe, such 
medicines cannot be recycled in the South. Since medicines can be counterfeit or 
tampered with, States must establish a regulatory system to verify the safety and quality 
of medicines328 . In conclusion, medical care in the event of illness, as well as the 
prevention, treatment and control of illness, are central features of the right to health 
that depend on access to medicines. Consequently, such features constitute an 
indispensable part of the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
health, as confirmed in various court cases 329 , as well as in the aforementioned 
resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights, which furthermore reaffirm that 
access to essential medicines is closely related to other human rights, such as the right 
to life330.  
                                               
328Ibidem 51. 
329 Constitutional Court of Costa Rica, Mr William García Álvarez vs Caja Costarricense de Seguro 
Social, File 5778-V-97, 23 September 1997; Ombudsman for Mrs Ledi Orellana Martínez vs Caja 
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The impact of Intellectual Property protection on the right to access to medicines 
 
 
1 Conflicts between Human Rights and Trade-related Treaties: Preliminary 
Considerations 
The relationship between the norms regulating human rights protection and those 
regulating trade related issues constitutes a clear example of law fragmentation within 
international law. According to some authors, the term fragmentation, which has 
usually been employed in a pejorative manner, refers to three different features of the 
contemporary international legal framework331: firstly, the continuous growth of new 
and specific subfields of international law; secondly, the rise of new actors alongside 
states, such as international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
and corporations; and lastly, the rise of different types of international norms and 
judicial mechanisms related to multiple areas of law332.  
Such fragmentation of international law was further amplified by the collapse of the 
communist bloc in 1989, which resulted in the end of the bi-polar world order and in 
the emergence of an array of new States. This “new world order” was the stage for the 
adoption of multiple multilateral treaties333 and the establishment of new organizations 
and other permanent international bodies, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 1994334.  
                                               
331  M. Andenas and E. Bjorge, A Farewell to Fragmentation: Reassertion and Convergence in 
International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2015, 2. 
332  A. Peters, “The refinement of international law: From fragmentation to regime interaction and 
politicization”, I•CON 3, 2017, 673. 
333 For example, the Rio Conventions and many hard and soft environmental instruments were adopted 
in 1992. Further, the membership of the International Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID Convention) and the number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) increased exponentially.  
334 Moreover, new international courts and tribunals came into exitance such as the Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda criminal tribunals since 1992, the WTO dispute settlement body in 1994, the International 
Criminal Court Statute in 1998, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in 1996, and 
investment arbitration disputes increasing intensely. Further, it must be noted that already existing 
judicial bodies were changed into permanent courts with legal standing for individuals, such as the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 1998. 
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The transformation of the international legal system into an increasingly complex realm 
triggered concerns on possible damages to the coherence of the entire legal 
framework335 . Simply stated, more actors and systems of law were involved, more 
likely scholars were to witness conflicts among norms belonging to such different areas 
of law. Accordingly, the International Law Commission (ILC) addressed the issue of 
fragmentation of international law extensively with the establishment of the Study 
Group on Fragmentation of International Law in 2002 (Fragmentation Study Group)336. 
The aim of the Study Group was to provide a toolbox that legal practitioners could 
adopt when dealing with cases concerning a collision of norms from different areas of 
international law, such is the case of human rights and trade law337. 
The aforementioned scenario constitutes the theoretical foundation of one of the legal 
challenges that the present dissertation wants to address, namely norms conflict 
between human rights provisions concerning the right to health and access to medicines 
on the one hand, and the norms related to intellectual property protection (IP) on the 
other. Accordingly, the first chapter presented the legal framework related to the right 
to health and demonstrated that the right to access to medicines is a fundamental part 
of such right on the grounds, inter alia, of judicial and quasi-judicial rulings. This 
Chapter will focus on the international and regional (Central America) legal framework 
concerning intellectual property, with a particular focus on the protection of the right 
to access to medicines. 
A casual observer could perhaps argue that human rights and trade related treaties cover 
completely different subjects and, thus, debating on their relationship would be quite 
pretentious. On the contrary, the present chapter argues that such apparently unrelated 
areas of law actually collide, and a methodological legal approach is, thus, required in 
order to overcome such conflict among norms338. In line with this argumentation, in 
                                               
335  Jonathan I. Charney, “Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?”, 
Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 271, 1998, 347. 
336 International Law Commission (ILC), Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006). 
337 M. Milanovic, “Norm Conflict in International Law: Whither Human Rights”, Duke Journal of 
Comparative & International Law 20, 2009, 70. 
338 M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy, 
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2015, participant within the UN Human Rights Council raised their concerns in joint 
and separate statements about the impacts that trade-related agreements have on the 
realization of human rights339 . In specific, there is an evident collision among the 
provisions related to the right to access to health envisaged within the UN Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) on the one hand, and the provisions 
related to patent’s protection provided by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) on the other hand. Further, the Chapter argues that 
such collision concerns regional free trade agreements (FTAs) as well. For this aim, a 
particular focus is devoted to the Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA), which actually increased IP provisions for pharmaceutical 
products and in so doing progressively hinder and worsen the protection of the right to 
health. In this regard, the following questions might be posed: should the rules of the 
World Trade Organization trump international human rights agreements? What are the 
rules that govern the issue of conflicts between treaty norms? Should international 
human rights treaties be considered hierarchically superior to trade related treaties? Are 
such legal conflicts among related norms envisaged by TRIPS and CAFTA on one side, 
and by ICESCR on the other, merely apparent or are they genuine? 
The entire chapter, and the present section in particular, will try to find plausible 
solutions to these overwhelming and complex legal issues. Grounding on relevant legal 
provisions and literature concerning the relationship between contrasting norms and 
interpretation of treaties’ provisions, the Chapter proposes legal tools in order to strike 
a balance between IP law and human rights, with the specific objective of enhancing 
access to medicines within the Central American Region. 
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1.1 Normative Antinomy between Treaties: An Introduction  
 
What first needs to be defined, in order to properly address the aforesaid legal issues, 
is the very notion of norms conflicts or normative antinomy under international law. 
For the sake of clarity, the kind of antinomy addressed in this work concerns merely 
conflicts among treaties’ norms. In particular, this section analyses conflicts between 
norms in the strict sense, namely when a party to two treaties cannot simultaneously 
honor its obligations under both340. 
Generally speaking, the issue of conflicts between treaty norms is a quite complex 
matter, since the overall practice has demonstrated that no all legal solutions are 
absolutely established341. Simply stated, it is problematic to derive general rules from 
such scattered practice. Further, it is not always easy to determine when a normative 
antinomy exists. Certainly, there are cases in which such normative collision is obvious, 
for example when two norms, applying to the same State and to the same number of 
facts, require two opposite conducts on such State. In other words, one norm imposes 
the State to do adopt a certain conduct, while the other norm excludes that very course, 
or one norm requires that State to act, while the other requires to abstain; no doubt arise 
that in such cases there is normative antinomy which is often referred to as a genuine 
conflict342.  
Nonetheless, other cases are not so easy to detect. In fact, it is common that normative 
conflicts are merely partial, that is, in relation to only a part of the norm. Under a wider 
perspective there are also apparent or potential normative antinomies. This is the case 
when the collision between two norms stems from the relevant interpretation given to 
that very norm and not from the substance of the norm itself. The solution of this type 
of conflict does not require the legal tools needed to solve normative conflicts, but 
rather can be avoided throughout the process of interpretation343. Accordingly, a further 
                                               
340 C. J. Borgen, “Resolving Treaty Conflicts”, Faculty Publications, 2005, 575. 
341 R. Kolb, The Law of Treaties: An Introduction, Edward Elgar, 2016, 182. 
342 J. Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO law relates to other rules of 
international law, Cambridge, 2003, 164. 
343 Milanovic, Norm Conflict in International Law, 73. 
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distinction can be made between conflict avoidance on one side, and conflict resolution 
on the other.  
An apparent conflict can be avoided resorting to interpretation, as opposed to cases of 
genuine conflicts in which the incompatibility between two norms cannot be 
interpreted away. Such cases can be only resolved by determining which conflicting 
norm has to prevail or have priority over another. Further, the “complete” resolution of 
a genuine conflict not only requires determining which norm must prevail, but also the 
wrongfulness on the part of the state for failing to abide by the displaced norm to be 
precluded as a matter of state responsibility344. 
Notably, there is a general tendency in international law whereby the interpreter 
attempts to blunt or even avoid antinomies by means of “harmonizing”345 toward the 
so-called systemic integration approach. Such approach aims at overcoming certain 
difficulties arising from the aforesaid fragmentation of public international law. The 
main argument concerns the postulation that “when States wanted different rules to be 
applicable, they could not at the same time have wanted normative contradiction. If 
there were such a contradiction, this would lead at the end of the day to the sacrifice 
of one rule to the other. It is more reasonable to presume that the legislator wanted 
both rules to apply. Moreover, the presumption is nourished by the conception that 
international law should be put in a position of smooth functioning. This is all the more 
important since it is structurally weaker than municipal law, where State organs take 
care of enforcement346”. The sake of the unity and coherence of the entire international 
legal framework constitutes, thus, the main objective followed by legal practitioners347. 
Indeed, international human rights courts are particularly inclined to apply 
presumptions against conflict and techniques of harmonious interpretation in an 
explicit or implicit manner348. As the present Chapter will demonstrate, both systemic 
                                               
344 Ibidem 
345 In fact, the general rule grounds on a presumption of non-conflict. 
346 Kolb, The Law of Treaties, 183. 
347  A. Rachovitsa, “The principle of systemic integration in human rights law”, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 66(3), 558. 
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integration and harmonization were the tools adopted by international judicial and 
quasi-judicial bodies in order to avoid conflict between human rights provisions related 
to the right to health on the one hand, and the TRIPS on the other. Such situation, thus, 
falls under the aforesaid apparent normative antinomy examples, in which 
interpretative means are employed to prevent conflicts between such two areas of law; 
and most importantly to guarantee that people in need are granted access to essential 
medicines. An extensive analysis follows throughout the Chapter. 
The peculiar features of the international legal system make the study of normative 
antinomy even more arduous to address. Indeed, the international law system lacks the 
legal and structural characteristics of domestic legal frameworks, namely: a centralized 
system with a well-established hierarchy among different sources as well as judicial 
organs that can rule and determine which norm must prevail in a certain case349. In 
practice, hierarchy between norms in domestic legal systems is a matter of 
constitutional regulation, which provide detailed guidance to legal practitioners both 
about relevant interpretative means and provisions concerning solutions of conflicts 
among such norms350.  
On the contrary, international law has traditionally been considered as a horizontal 
system of legal norms which are legally binding only if states have expressed their 
consent to be bound by them. Further, the international framework lacks a centralized 
system of enforcement, thus, making the judiciary power much limited in comparison 
to the domestic level. “Not only does this imply that the enforcement of international 
law remains a decentralized process, but also that the international legal order lacks a 
judicial mechanism for consistent interpretation and resolution of norm conflicts”351. 
Simply stated, there is no hierarchy in international law, besides few exceptions352, and 
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all sources of law are commonly considered equal353. 
International law, however, does provide methods in order to resolve treaty conflicts 
which stem both from the Vienna Convention of the Law of treaties as well as from 
relevant practice within the international and domestic realm. The case-by-case 
solutions provided by international law are a combination of three well established 
principles within international practice, namely: the pacta sunt servanda principle, 
pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt, and lasty, lex posterior derogate priori principle. 
Other principles such as of hierarchy and of lex specialis derogat generali, which are 
basic principles employed in domestic legal system, play a minor role at the 
international level due to its peculiar structure and relevant practice. These methods 
and principles are described and illustrated in the following section.  
 
 
1.2 Methods of Resolving Treaty Conflicts provided by International Law 
In light of a combined reading of the principles pacta sunt servanda and of good faith 
there is a presumption against conflict among treaties. Nonetheless, when two norms 
are unreconcilable, the normative antinomy cannot be avoided by interpretative means, 
and, thus, the methods of resolving treaty conflicts provided by international law must 
be adopted354.  
This seems to be the case of the conflict between the health-related provisions of the 
ICESCR and the CAFTA agreement (to which a dedicated section is provided in this 
Chapter). At first sight, the aforesaid conflict between provisions cannot be avoided via 
interpretation and relevant international provisions must be taken into account in order 
to establish some kind of primacy among conflicting norms. Accordingly, the present 
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section provides the tools required to properly address the relationship between the two 
aforementioned treaties. 
Under a formal perspective, all treaties appear as independent and autonomous entities 
with one another in light of the aforesaid pacta sunt servanda principle. Accordingly, 
some scholars describe a set of treaties as an accumulation of such agreements rather 
than a joint system355 . Such thought is significant if we consider that the conflict 
settlement system envisaged by the international framework is laconic and provides 
guidance in just few detailed and confined situations. 
Article 30 of the Vienna Convention constitutes the ultimate landmark for any scholar 
willing to address matters related to treaty conflicts. Unfortunately, such article, 
labelled Application of successive treaties relating to the same subject matter, already 
from its title has a quite limited scope. Such article is often regarded as an insufficient 
provision, since it does not provide solutions for all the problems which may arise in 
the case of a conflict of treaties356. For example, nothing in the article can be found in 
regard to treaties negotiated or concluded simultaneously.  
Further, scholars highlighted that Article 30 is deficient in dealing with the complicated 
nature of many treaty conflicts, since, for example, it does not differentiate between 
different treaties, between the time of the treaty and the time of the treaty obligation, 
or between ‘normal obligations’ and erga omnes obligations357. Lastly, scholars raised 
concerns for the lack of provisions regarding situations in which treaties in question 
are compatible in relation to their substantive provisions but establish different dispute 
settlement procedures, thus resulting in to so-called ‘forum shopping’358. 
In practice, the aforesaid article provides guidance for only two potential situations: on 
the one hand, in the case of successive treaties with identical parties; on the other, in 
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the case of successive treaties with different parties 359 . Such limited scope of 
applicability, thus, merits closer scrutiny. 
In specific, Article 30 allows States parties of a treaty to include so-called compatibility 
clauses. Accordingly, these clauses may make express provision for conflicts with 
other treaty norms, either by stipulating the primacy 360  or by admitting the 
subordination of either the latter of former treaty (Article 30.2). Further, paragraph 3 
codifies the chronological principle (lex posterior derogat priori) under which in cases 
of identical parties between two conflicting treaties, the latter must prevail.  
Problems arise when the parties of two conflicting treaties are not identical. Such 
scenario requires the combined application of the pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt 
principle and of the aforesaid chronological principles. According to the latter principle, 
the later treaty will prevail inter partes for the States parties to the previous and the 
later agreement (article 30.4(a)).  
In regard to the remaining parties, which are not identical, it is worth mentioning the 
two main theories on the effect of collision between treaty norms. Firstly, the objective 
theory grounds on the principle of legality; secondly, the subjective theory pivots upon 
the parties’ will. According to the objective theory, in case of collision between two 
norms, the later provision must be considered void when contradicting an earlier one. 
This theory grounds on the argument that a party cannot unilaterally deprive a treaty 
partner of it rights by concluding a contradicting treaty with another State. It must 
honour its existing obligations under the first treaty, which thus prevail over those of 
the later one361. Such position was preferred by Lauterpacht during the drafting process 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) of 1969. He argued that the 
pacta sunt servanda principle placed an implicit limit on the capacity of parties to adopt 
later conflicting treaties362.  
On the other hand, the subjective theory, which was the solution adopted in Article 30 
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and relevant practice, holds that conflict between treaty norms triggers international 
responsibility for the obligation breached on the concerned State, notably to pay 
damages. In other words, such theory argues that while both treaties remain equally 
valid, the State bound by incompatible obligations will have discretion to respect one 
and sacrifice the other. The non-compliance, thus, involves State responsibility for 
breach, not nullity of the contrary provisions363. As far as Article 30 is concerned, the 
conflict between successive treaties does not lead to the invalidity of the former treaty. 
A joint reading of para 2 and 3 of such Article, solely provides the applicability of the 
prevailing treaty and the inapplicability of the previous treaty. The previous treaty still 
applies as far as it is compatible with the latter treaty364. It can be concluded that the 
choice of resorting to state’s responsibility has a deterrent rather than repressive 
function. Accordingly, States which conclude a successive treaty that is incompatible 
with a previous treaty must be conscious of the fact that such action may not involve 
the invalidity of one of the treaties but instead their international responsibility.  
As already stated, Article 30.2 provides the adoption of conflict-avoidance techniques, 
such as the possibility that the relationship between treaties is directly regulated by the 
will of the parties who establish which of the two treaties must prevail365. In such cases, 
the parties include specific conflict clauses. As a result, the will of the party must 
triumph and the aforementioned principles, such as the chronological one, are put aside 
and can only be adopted as subsidiary means when relevant conflicting norms are 
impossible to reconcile366.  
The inclusion of the aforesaid conflict clauses is desirable, since they both facilitate 
interpretation and shed light on how the parties want to address the international 
obligations envisaged in the new treaty. Unfortunately, neither the ICESCR, nor the 
CAFTA agreement provide explicit clauses, making the debate over their relationship 
difficult to address.  
In light of the aforementioned considerations, Article 30 does not suffice in providing 
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the proper tools for studying the specific relationship between human rights and trade-
related treaties. Accordingly, in order to complete the analysis regarding norms of 
conflict between treaties, the principle lex specialis derogat generali (principle of 
speciality) cannot be ignored, even if it is not mentioned into the Vienna Convention.  
In case of conflict between the chronological and specialty principle the general rule 
dictates that lex posterior generalis non derogat prior specialis. In other words, the 
special and more detailed nature of one of the treaties must be taken into consideration 
and suffices in granting precedence over more general provisions. Nonetheless, the ILC 
has recently questioned such approach, emphasizing that it is not always easy to 
determine the general and particular scope of a norm. Indeed, the substantive coverage 
of a provision or the number of legal subjects to whom it is directed may lead the 
observer to different conclusions. To this end, the ILC has argued the need to relativize 
the specialty principle with all to other methods of resolving treaty conflicts provided 
by international law367. 
Additional difficulties arise when one of the treaties in question concerns human rights 
protection. In fact, the requirement of effective protection which stems from every 
human rights treaty leads to a reduced application of both the specialty and 
chronological principles. Leaving aside more technical issues such as reservations, 
interpretations and successions of States in human rights treaties, which regulation 
significantly departs from general rule of international law368, the application of the 
traditional methods of resolving treaty conflicts to human rights vs trade-related 
treaties poses the following problems. Firstly, to determine whether the two treaties 
cover the same subject matter; secondly, to solve the challenges arising from the 
different participation in the treaties; thirdly, to determine whether the traditional 
methods of resolving treaty conflicts can actually apply to human rights treaties. Before 
addressing such significant legal topics, at this point it is important to introduce the 
objective character of human rights obligations in order to properly contextualize the 
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relationship of conflict when one of the two treaties has a human rights nature. 
There is no doubt that international treaties cannot be considered standard treaties 
imposing merely synallagmatic obligations among States. Accordingly, both the Inter-
American Court on Human Rights as well as its European counterpart held that 
differently from classical international treaties, human rights treaties include more than 
the typical mutual legal compromises among the parties. Such treaties create a net of 
bilateral compromises, namely objective obligations369 . When States conclude such 
particular treaties, they do not merely “accomplish the reciprocal exchange of rights 
for the mutual benefit of the contracting States. Such states can be deemed to submit 
themselves to a legal order within which they, for the common good, assume various 
obligations, not in relation to other States, but towards all within their jurisdiction”370.  
The former president of the Inter-American Court, Cançado Trindade, argued that the 
main feature which distinguishes human right treaties from classic ones is the objective 
character of their human rights obligations 371 . Likewise, such different kinds of 
obligations imply that favorable interpretative means for the individual must be 
employed for human rights treaties. In fact, human rights treaties must be interpreted 
in accordance with the objective character of their obligations, which are ultimately 
aimed at the protection of individuals and not at synallagmatic concession of rights 
between states 372 . In this regard, the literal interpretation of particular treaty’s 
provisions must surrender in light of the so-called effet utile. In particular, the Inter-
American Court argued that “the effective protection of human rights constitutes the 
object and purpose of the of the American Convention, so when interpreting it the Court 
shall do so in the sense that the human rights protection regime has all its proper 
effects373”. 
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The analysis regarding the objective character of human rights obligations would not 
be complete without the scrutiny of the erga omnes nature of such obligations. Erga 
omnes norms are not relevant for their particular hierarchy, but rather for their ability 
to determine both their recipients as well as which States have legal interest in ensuring 
compliance. The principle of obligations erga omnes was firstly introduce by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Barcelona Traction case of 1970374. The case 
did not concern human rights obligations but rather an issue of diplomatic protection, 
in which the Belgian capacity to start proceedings against Spain depended on whether 
such a right existed375 . Focusing merely on the ICJ understanding of erga omnes 
obligations, the Court held that they are “owed to the international community as a 
whole, with the consequence that all States in the world have a legal interest in the 
compliance with the obligation”376 . For this reason, in a case of breach of such 
obligations, at least theoretically, any State can claim the international responsibility of 
the State which committed the violation. 
The ICJ specifically mentioned aggression, genocide, slavery and racial discrimination 
as well as “the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person” 
as illustrations of obligations erga omnes377. In addition, it must be noted that acts of 
aggression must be primarily regarded as triggering erga omnes obligations in relation 
to other States, as opposed to the other kinds of obligations trigger obligations erga 
omnes that apply predominantly to human beings. As a result, another distinction can 
be drawn “between obligations erga omnes which seek to protect the interests of other 
States, and obligations erga omnes which seek to protect human beings directly”378. 
For the sake of clarity, the present work focuses only on the type of obligations erga 
omnes which stem from the basic rights of the individual, and on those obligations, 
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which aim to protect the interests of States. 
Unfortunately, the practice of the ICJ or other international courts has not provided 
neither a defined list of erga omnes obligations nor guidance in relation to the 
seriousness of the breach of the obligations. Accordingly, it is not clear under which 
conditions the lack of observance and fulfilment of obligations by one State can trigger 
the legal interest of the international community to act. Some scholars, thus, argue that 
“it is therefore reasonable to conclude that while the principle of obligations erga 
omnes is generally accepted, the principle is not sufficiently specified and clear”379. In 
light of such unclear scenario, the present dissertation tries to shed light on the alleged 
erga omnes character of the right to access to medicines in its relationship with trade-
related treaties such as the CAFTA agreement.  
 
 
1.3 Legal challenges resulting from Article 30 of the Vienna Convention to Human 
Rights Treaties 
The application of Article 30 of the Vienna Convention to the issue at stake, namely 
the relationship between article 12 of the ICESCR and the CAFTA agreement, requires 
a preliminary step to be taken. Indeed, such application depends on the fact that Article 
30 regulates situations in which two conflicting treaties cover the same subject matter. 
Hence, what needs to be determined, in order for Article 30 to apply, is whether the 
ICESCR and the CAFTA agreement regulate identical matters. 
The travaux preparatoires of the Vienna Convention do not provide any guidance in 
relation to the meaning that should be attributed to the wording same subject manner. 
Such an ambiguity triggered an array of different interpretations 380 . While some 
scholars adopted a restrictive approach, others grounded on more pragmatic methods. 
The latter scholars argued that a case-by-case test must be carried out in order to 
determine whether the application of two norms to the same facts leads to 
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incompatibles outcomes. In other words, the element that must be taken into account 
is whether the application of a treaty impacts the application of the other agreement381. 
Otherwise, a narrow interpretation would lift most of the important cases such as 
conflicts between environmental and trade treaties, or conflicts between human rights 
and humanitarian law treaties, outside the Article range of application382. 
The ILC followed the second pragmatic approach and held that “to limit the application 
of article 30 to treaties “dealing with the same subject” would allow States to deviate 
from their obligations simply by qualifying a novel treaty in terms of a novel 
“subject””383. Further, according to the ILC, the requirement established in Article 30 
is met if two different norms are invoked for the regulation of the same subject and if 
the application of a treaty influences the proper fulfillment of another treaty’s 
obligations384. 
In light of such considerations, it can be concluded that the requirement of covering the 
same subject matter is met, since what the ICESCR requires and what the CAFTA 
diminishes cover the same subject matter, namely access to medicines. The possibility 
of two treaties to regulate the same matter from different perspective must, thus, be 
admitted and that it is very likely to occur in light of the aforesaid fragmentation of 
international law 385 . Accordingly, “subject-matter” must refer to the object of the 
measure challenged386. This leads to the conclusion that the measure challenged refers 
to medicines under the perspective of both the ICESCR as well as the CAFTA 
agreement. 
The second challenge relevant to the issue at stake concerns the diverse participation 
of the treaties involved. The parties of the ICESCR are not identical to the parties of 
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the CAFTA agreement, since, for example, the United States has not ratified the former 
human rights treaty. This scenario triggers an additional problem when the treaties in 
question do not provide mere synallagmatic obligations, but rather integral or erga 
omnes undertakings, such as human rights treaties. These treaties “are held by states 
at the international level constitute, not a promise to one or more other states taken 
individually, but a promise to the collectivity or common conscience of all states 
involved. The objective of human rights obligations is essentially to prevent states 
mistreating their own nationals”387. 
Putting aside the issue of erga omnes obligations, Article 41(b) of the Vienna 
Convention, named Agreements to modify multilateral treaties between certain of the 
parties only, seems to include the specific situation of human rights treaties and of the 
ICESCR in particular. Such article prohibits the conclusion of a successive treaty in 
two situations: on the one hand, if the latter negatively affects the enjoyment or the 
performance of the rights envisaged by the first treaty; and on the other, if the 
modification in question is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and 
purpose of the treaty as a whole388. 
In regard to integral obligations, the ILC argued that such obligations enjoy a sort of 
precedence over bilateral or conventional ones. While such consideration does not 
solve the general question of primacy, it does have practical effects, since according to 
the ILC the clauses of conflicts that the parties may include in a treaty cannot derogate 
such integral obligations389. In particular, the ILC emphasized that inter se agreements, 
which modify multilateral agreement including integral obligations, must be prohibited 
if they hinder the execution of the purpose and objective of the former multilateral 
treaty, as provided for by Article 41390. If that is the case, clauses of conflicts would not 
find application in relation to human rights treaties, such as the ICESCR. 
Another issue the needs to be address is that while the US is not a party to the ICESCR, 
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since it has not ratified the agreement, it has signed the text of such convention. In light 
of the general principle pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt, the US is not legally bound 
to the provisions envisaged in the ICESCR. This consideration seems to deprive the 
debate on conflicts among treaty of any relevance, since the US is not a party of one of 
the treaties under consideration. Signature, however, does provide minoris generis 
legal effects. In fact, according to Article 18 of the Vienna Convention, “a State is 
obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty” if 
such state has signed the international instrument, thus, manifesting both its agreement 
of the treaty text and its will to be legally bound upon ratification. 
In light of such reasoning, the provisions provided by the CAFTA agreement which 
impede the fulfillment and proper enjoyment of the right to health should be prohibited. 
In addition, under the considerations outlined in regard to the violations of the so-called 
erga omnes obligations, the legal consequences that must be admitted are their non-
opposability and, as held by the ICJ, “that States were under an obligation not to 
recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and not to 
render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction”391. 
 
 
1.4 Questions concerning the primacy of Human Rights vis-à-vis Trade-related 
Treaties 
The previous section has incidentally highlighted various peculiar features of human 
rights treaties, which lead to the conclusions that they cannot (or should not) be 
considered standard treaties imposing merely synallagmatic obligations among States. 
Under this assumption, some scholars have argued that from the particular nature of 
these kinds of agreements should follow their primacy in a case of collision with other 
treaties392. 
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The joint reading of Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter mandates that States act 
towards the achievement of higher standards of living, progress in the economic, social 
and healthcare sector, and for the universal respect of human rights. Remarkably, the 
Charter constitutes one of the most significant examples concerning the aforesaid 
primacy clauses. Generally speaking, Article 103 provides that in case of collision 
between the obligations established by the Charter and other obligations contracted by 
any other international agreement, the former must always prevail. Such example is 
one of the few cases in which the international system overcome its horizontal character 
and establishes a clear hierarchy among norms. 
The joint reading of the aforementioned Articles of the Charter has led some scholars 
to argue that in a case of norms conflict, international human rights law shall always 
prevail since the obligation to respect human rights is envisaged in the UN Charter, 
which prevalence is turn guaranteed by its Article 103393. According to some scholars, 
such argument applies to the issue at stake, namely the conflict between right to access 
to medicines provisions and intellectual property obligations394. 
Notwithstanding, other scholars argue that the human rights related provisions 
envisaged in the Charter are too broad in scope and, thus, cannot be regarded as sources 
of specific human rights obligations395. Although it is true that the inclusion of human 
rights provisions in the UN Charter constituted a significant progress in that area, such 
rights were neither properly listed nor were they adequately defined. In fact, the Charter 
does not mention any notions, such as protection or safeguard, but merely provides a 
general reference to human rights. 
In support of such argument, it must be noted that also intellectual property right might 
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fall under the protection granted by the Charter, since it is well-established that such 
private rights play a key role in boosting healthcare progress and economic progress. 
In addition, specific cases have demonstrated that human rights provisions yielded 
before decisions of the UN Security Council in light of Article 103 of the UN Charter396. 
Leaving aside such debates, it must be noted that the Charter has been the base line for 
later codification of human rights and for the adoption of specific treaties to this end.  
Another argument, which is worth mentioning at this point of the analysis, is the 
understanding of human rights as ius cogens norms. Acknowledging the right to access 
to medicines as a ius cogens norm would completely reverse the perspective under 
which addressing the issue of conflicts between norms. 
One of the first references to ius cogens dates back to the works of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice in the Oscar Chinn case and in particular to the words of Judge 
Schükingas, which has come to be understood as a precursor to modern debates about 
the ius cogens concept. The Judge argued that it would be impossible to commence the 
process of codification of international law without imagining a set of ius cogens norms, 
in a manner that a violation of such imperative obligations would be legally void397. 
Such universal, fundamental and imperative norms exist to fulfill the highest interest 
of the international community and not the particular needs of States. Remarkably, ius 
cogens norms have strict legal effects in practice, since their primacy refers to hierarchy 
and not only to precedence over a conflicting norm. As a result, in case of conflict not 
only the relevant provision, but the entire treaty, in which the conflicting norm is 
envisaged, is void in accordance with Article 53 of the Vienna Convention398. 
Such hierarchical nature triggered the hope of a number of scholars to include the entire 
category of human rights in the ius cogens box. Unfortunately, such argument lacks 
foundations in the relevant practice. In this regard, the ICJ has been extremely cautious 
when determining whether or not a specific had a ius cogens character. Similarly, the 
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Human Rights Committee had only made express reference to few categories of human 
rights, such as inter alia, the right to life and the prohibition of torture. The Committee 
argued that the latter human rights have peremptory character meaning, for instance, 
that no one can be arbitrarily deprived of his life399. Likewise, the ILC has included 
under the ius cogens category norms related to the prohibition of aggression, slavery, 
torture, genocide, racial discrimination, apartheid, as well as fundamental norms of 
International Humanitarian Law and the right to self-determination400. 
Hence, the relevant practice shows that the human rights related norms are not regarded 
as ius cogens provisions tout court, but rather only few, well-established example of 
gross violations of human rights. In light of such considerations, it would be improper 
and incorrect to conclude that human rights norms enjoy superior hierarchical status in 
relation to trade provisions. Accordingly, if human rights norms are not considered ius 
cogens, even less the provisions related to the right to access to medicines can be 
regarded as such. Such provisions do not fulfill the requirements provided by Article 
53 of the Vienna Convention since they are not norms “accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character”401. The practice has demonstrated that 
States have actually performed in the opposite direction, as showed by the conclusions 
of agreements such as the CAFTA. Notwithstanding, aligning the content and scope of 
the ICESCR to ius cogens would definitely provide stronger protection for this 
category of rights and would prevent trade-related treaties such as the CAFTA 
agreement to carry out its adverse effects.  
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2. The evolution of the international legal framework related to Intellectual 
Property 
 
In today's world, traditional resources such as raw materials, financial capitals and 
labour remain significant for the economic development of countries. The most 
advanced productive activities, however, cannot be achieved without the fruits of 
technical and scientific creativity, making research and innovation indispensable 
ingredients for economic progress. For this reason, in modern economy, the fruits of 
scientific and technological research activities are typically protected by international 
and domestic intellectual property (IP) regime. Indeed, just as raw materials and labor 
were key resources in the first and second industrial revolutions, intellectual property 
is a central asset in an economy based on information and knowledge. 
The intellectual property legal framework allows inventors and creators to market their 
new products under monopoly conditions, albeit for a fixed and limited period, in order 
to achieve economic benefits that outweigh efforts to innovate. Intellectual capital is a 
form of knowledge to which societies have decided to grant specific property rights, 
which in fact have some similarity to property rights over movable and/or immovable 
assets. However, the protection of ingenuity products opens several debates about the 
interpretative challenges related to the typology of protected goods and the scope of 
the guaranteed protection, such as essential medicines402. 
This section examines the evolution of the legal framework related to intellectual 
property, with a particular focus on the most significant international treaties and 
organizations, as developed states, over the years, succeeded in establishing a binding 
international legal regime for most countries involved in international trade. In fact, the 
comparative panorama of rights over intellectual creations, although still marked by 
different regulations between countries, is increasingly characterized by two trends 
which, although different from each other, have a complementary effect: first, it is a 
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question of achieving the expansion of the scope of these rights of protection of human 
ingenuity and second, it is a question of universalizing and guaranteeing at a global 
level the protection related to the intellectual property regime. In short, intellectual 
property regimes seek to balance the moral and economic rights of creators and 
inventors with the broader interests and needs of society. An important justification for 
IP law in general and patents in particular is that incentives and rewards to inventors 
result in benefits to the global community403. 
 
2.1 The History of Intellectual Property Protection 
 
The needs and efforts to protect intellectual property have a long history404, which some 
analysts date back to the 4th century BC and others from 9th century China405. This 
section analyzes and highlights the main phases through which the system of 
recognition and protection of intellectual property rights has progressively developed 
at the international level. In the Middle Ages and especially in the first years of the 
modern age, the rights related to intellectual property had a concessionary character, 
understood as privileges or monopolies granted by the sovereign through 
administrative measures, which established a territorial limited protection. Moreover, 
some extra-territorial exceptions were provided in light of the principle of reciprocity 
or, as in the case of common law countries, on the grounds of international comity406. 
It is worth noting that the Venetians are credited with the creation of the first properly 
developed patent laws in 1474, which established that a formal approval of the 
sovereign, the Dux, would suffice to grant an inventor the privilege of exclusivity for 
a limited number of years over a new and original invention. This regime was extended 
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to other European states in the following 100 years407. 
In 1624, the Parliament of the Kingdom of England enacted the Statute of Monopolies 
which established for the first time the right to all of the temporary exclusivity of an 
invention, provided the latter met the requirements of novelty and originality. In 
particular, the modern copyright law began when the same Parliament adopted Anne's 
Statute in 1710408. 
In the United States of America, Article 1 of the 1787 Constitution empowered 
Congress to promote the progress of science and useful arts by assuring authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their writings and discoveries409. Similarly, in 1790 the 
Act to Promote the Progress of Useful Arts was adopted, providing an early legal 
regime for patent protection; but only in 1836 did the Patent Act come into force, 
introducing a complex administrative procedure that has remained substantially 
unchanged to date410. 
Until the mid-fifties of the XIX century, intellectual property regimes, as the 
aforementioned analysis shows, were characterized by very limited territorial effect 
related to the specific context of the country taken into account. There was no real 
international legal framework related to intellectual property and no sign of cooperation 
between countries. This phase of territorial limitation of the intellectual property 
regime, however, began to decline mainly due to the economic and social changes 
occurred in the afterwards of the Industrial Revolution. In other words, the 
technological novelties implemented during this period and the transformation to a 
market economy made the protection of intellectual property not only a national issue, 
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but also an issue to be addressed at a global level411.  
As a result of the aforementioned socio-economic changes, countries acknowledged 
the importance of providing a more extended protection of intellectual property beyond 
national borders. This led to the first forms of intergovernmental cooperation on the 
subject, at first through the conclusion of bilateral agreements between States. The 
second half of the XIX century is in fact by multiple bilateral agreements (precisely, in 
1883 there were 69 agreements in force mostly dealing with trademark) which, 
however, made the system even more complex. In practice, these agreements created a 
fragmented system which could not satisfy the need of uniformity desired at the 
international level412. For example, contracting States parties were unable to properly 
guarantee the effectiveness of the most favored nation principle. In accordance with the 
latter, any State had the right to enjoy the more advantageous treatment granted by the 
recipient State to any other country. The intricate net of often overlapping bilateral 
agreements, hence, made the aforementioned principle inapplicable in practice and the 
entire system unable to ensure equal treatment among states. 
In light of the above scenario, two multilateral acts, namely the Paris Convention (on 
the Protection of Industrial Property) of 1883 and the Bern Convention (on the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works) of 1886, were adopted. These conventions, 
which gathered the major trading powers of the time, constituted the first pillars of 
international cooperation related to intellectual property. Since then, there have been 
other multilateral agreements (such as the Madrid Convention of 1891 on trademarks 
and the Hague Convention of 1925 on designs), as well as numerous updates and 
revisions of these conventions. In 1893, the international offices established by these 
agreements were unified to create an international organization for the protection of 
intellectual property (better known by its French acronym, BIRPI)413. 
The Paris Convention, emended in 1967 for the last time, concerned, inter alia, the 
protection of inventions, trademarks, industrial designs, geographical indications and 
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the prosecution of unfair competition practices. The Convention surely did not provide 
a comprehensive and exhaustive legal framework in relation to the latter subjects. 
Notwithstanding, the Paris Convention constitutes an important achievement of the 
international diplomacy in the shift from national to international protection of 
intellectual property rights. 
In summary, the Convention introduced at the global stage two main principles which 
would become the foundation of modern intellectual property law, namely, national 
treatment and priority. According to the first principle, when an application for a patent 
or a trademark is filed in another contracting State, the applicant benefits the same 
treatment as if he/she were a national of that particular State. In addition, the system 
granted applicants and right-holders with procedural protection. In fact, once the 
intellectual property right is conferred to the applicant, the latter can access the same 
legal remedy against any IP violation as if the right-holder was a national of that State414. 
The priority right principle constitutes a true update of the intellectual property regime 
and is often referred to as one of the cornerstones of the Paris Convention. In light of 
Article 4 of the Paris Convention, an applicant who firstly filed an application for a 
patent or trademark within one State party is entitled to use that first filing date in order 
to benefit protection in any other contracting State. The subsequent applications in 
other States parties must, however, be submitted within six months for trademarks and 
twelve months for patents from the first submission. In other words, the Convention 
conferred a preferential right to the first applicant, since subsequent applications are 
granted retroactive effect to the first filing date415. 
Nevertheless, the aforementioned regime presented multiple deficiencies in terms of 
substantive protection. For example, in accordance with the principle of national 
treatment, contracting States were required to apply their IP domestic legislation to 
foreigners, but were not compelled to harmonize related norms among them416 . In 
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addition, the Paris Convention did not provide a punitive system in order to secure 
compliance and enforcement in case of infringement of the norms envisaged within, 
nor did the Convention established a mechanism for the settlement of interpretative and 
other disputes over its adequate implementation417. 
Interestingly, article 28 provided that in case of a possible dispute among contracting 
parties, the latter could initiate proceedings before the International Court of Justice of 
the United Nations. This specific provision, however, was not binding upon the parties, 
and this is the reason no proceeding was never brought before the Court418. The drafters 
of the Convention believed that regardless of the lack of uniformity among the different 
legal system, any kind of discrimination would have been avoided throughout the 
adoption of the national treatment principle. The principle, however, proved to be 
ineffective in practice, especially in developing countries which did not provide 
adequate legal frameworks for the protection of ip rights both under a substantive and 
procedural perspective419. 
In a changing world characterized by the liberalization of trade, in which the transfer 
of information and goods between States became every day much easier, developed 
countries soon realized that the former system was ineffective for the protection of their 
national IP rights abroad, and, indirectly, for the protection of their economies. For 
example, starting from the 1970s, phenomena such as counterfeiting and copyright-
piracy developed exponentially, reaching 5 to 6 % of international trade420. The system 
was, hence, unable to address concrete violations of IP rights, which constituted a 
barrier to exportation, since the same goods were produced and sold locally in an 
unlawful manner. As a result, tensions arose between developed and developing 
countries. In most cases, the latter countries did not even ratifie the aforementioned 
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Conventions and, thus, were not bound to the legal regime421. The situation did not 
change when the BIRPI was succeeded by the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) established by the Stockholm Convention in 1967422. The new organization, 
which became a specialized agency under the auspices of the United Nations in 1974, 




2.2.The shift of Intellectual Property protection from the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
 
It is important to note that until 1993, WIPO was the only organization competent in 
dealing with intellectual property and its institutional mandate was substantially limited 
to supporting and facilitating negotiations between governments for the adoption of 
international instruments in this field. The role played by this organization was to 
encourage negotiations and agreements mainly of a technical-specialist nature, which 
were largely limited to dealing with issues for industrialized countries with the 
mediation of professionals who mainly provided legal assistance424. 
It is worth noting that the legal regime established under the Stockholm Convention 
reflected the typical features of public international law, since it had relatively modest 
impact on the domestic legal systems of States parties, which, in fact depended on 
ratification and transposition at the national level of the acts adopted by the 
Organization425. As a result, competent national authorities (legislative, governmental 
and judicial)  enjoyed broad discretion in the implementation of international standards, 
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due to their ambiguous formulation, which, in addition established a weak and almost 
non-existent enforcement mechanism, as proved by the fact that the aforementioned 
referral clause to the International Court of Justice has never been used for the 
settlement of disputes in this matter. 
The reiterated lack of coercive powers of the Organization led a group of countries, 
especially the United States (under the pressure of its multinational companies) with 
the support of other industrialized countries (such as, Europe, Japan and Canada) to 
start negotiations to establish a more effective system of intellectual property 
protection426. Therefore, in the mid-eighties of the last century, at the beginning of 1986 
in Punta del Este, the negotiations of the so-called Uruguay Round were carried out 
with the purpose of satisfying the need to implement a more ambitious strategy of 
international regulation of intellectual property. Intellectual property regulation had 
come to the forefront in reference to the framework of international trade, due to the 
expansion of markets, globalization and the growing demand for integration of so-
called developing countries 427 . The goal was, together with the harmonization of 
domestic systems in this area, to establish an organization with more binding powers 
and effective implementation mechanisms on a global scale, connecting intellectual 
property with international trade within the framework of the General Agreement of 
Tariffs and Trade of 1947 (GATT)428. In other words, developed countries highlighted 
that the failure in protecting intellectual property rights had massive adverse effects on 
international trade and, therefore, GATT was the competent forum in which to tackle 
possible infringements. On the contrary, developing countries disagreed with the 
aforementioned approach, claiming that the GATT framework lacked competence in 
addressing IP related issues and that WIPO was the empowered organization for those 
matters429. 
Actually, the developed countries’ planned of action is quite clear in light of the 
strengths of the GATT system. The latter established an effective dispute settlement 
                                               
426A. Krishen Koul, Guide to the WTO and GATT: Economics, Law and Politics, Springer, 2018, 9. 
427Ibidem, 25. 
428Ibidem 
429Marenghi, Il diritto alla salute e la proprietà intellettuale, 26. 
136 
 
mechanism in which incisive sanctions could have been adopted in case of a breach of 
the agreement 430 . Relocating the international framework related to intellectual 
property under the protection of the GATT system, therefore, appeared as the most 
effective move in order to secure worldwide implementation of those norms. 
Interestingly, the United States' strategy was double fold. On the one hand, at the 
international stage the US pressured States in order to transfer protection of ip law from 
the toothless WIPO to the more effective GATT system. On the other, at the domestic 
level, the American Government acted quickly and in 1984 added the so-called Section 
301 in the Trade Act of 1974. This section, which was amended in 1988, provided a 
specific normative framework in relation to intellectual property law and in particular 
to infringements of IP rights occurred in foreign countries. In other words, according 
to this reform, the United States Trade Representative identified and monitored those 
countries in which their IP legal frameworks did not suffice in providing equal and fair 
access to their markets. Once the countries were found in breach of international IP law 
standards, the United States imposed upon them commercial retaliation in order to 
eliminate counterfeiting and copyright-piracy. Interestingly, the United States was not 
alone in adopting unilateral actions aimed at protecting their national interests. For 
example, in 1987 both Japan and the European Community withdrew trade facilitation 
granted to South Korea on the grounds of alleged violations of IP rights431. Another 
factor influencing the strategic shift towards the GATT system was the growing 
strength of developing countries in WIPO, causing proposals to be rejected or the 
agenda of developed countries to be frustrated. On the other hand, the permissiveness 
and variety of WIPO treaties allowed developing countries to choose, according to their 
development needs, to establish exceptions and to grant some freedom to adjust their 
domestic IP regimes432. It is no surprise that the request for a higher protection of IP 
rights worldwide came from sectors of industry, such as pharmaceutical companies, of 
those countries which presented a higher level of technological advancement and, 
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hence, feared IP infringements of their products433. 
As a result, in 1994, during the negotiations that established the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS Agreement) was adopted, bringing the international system for the 
protection of intellectual property into a new phase of harmonization and global 
cooperation, under the umbrella of international trade. Many scholars argue that if the 
TRIPS agreement were not presented as one of the three “pillars” of the WTO (the 
other two being a revised GATT 1994 agreement and the trade in services agreement 
GATS) which had to be adopted as a single undertaking, most of the States would not 
have accepted them. In fact, no state wanted to be left behind, or worse be economically 
isolated from the commercial advantages of the newly established WTO. Under a cost-
benefit analysis, developing countries realized that bounding themselves to the recently 
designed TRIPS, which made protection of intellectual property rights an integral part 




2.3 The Relationship between WIPO and WTO 
 
In light of the aforementioned analysis, it stands out that intellectual property regime 
involves two different international legal frameworks, namely, on the one hand the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which should logically constitute 
the main forum, and on the other hand, the World Trade Organization (WTO), which 
has recently become the main organization in dealing with intellectual property 
disputes in light of TRIPS. This section highlights the institutional mandate of both 
organizations and the relationship between them in addressing intellectual property-
related issues. 
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There is no doubt that the arrival of TRIPS created a significant strategic dilemma for 
WIPO435. The organization had presided over an intellectual property regime of great 
normative diversity and, since the establishment of WTO, the organization had to share 
its hitherto 'exclusive competence' in intellectual property matters with another actor436. 
In an attempt to preserve its importance in this new scenario, WIPO adopted, in 1994, 
a resolution directing its International Bureau to provide technical assistance to WIPO 
members on matters related to the TRIPS Agreement. This was followed, in 1995, by 
a second resolution to sign a cooperation agreement with the WTO whereby WIPO 
would provide technical assistance to developing country WTO members whether or 
not they were members of WIPO437. 
As a result of the above 1995 resolution and in light of the TRIPS preamble, which 
explicitly sets out that the WTO desires a reciprocally supportive relationship with 
WIPO, both organizations concluded an agreement (WIPO-WTO Cooperation 
Agreement) which came into force on 1, 1996438. This Agreement specifically defined 
cooperation between WIPO and WTO on legal-technical assistance to contracting 
parties in three main areas: first, notification of, access to and translation of national 
laws and regulations; second, implementation of procedures for the protection of 
national emblems; third, technical cooperation on all matters related to ip law439. In 
other words, cooperation between the WIPO and the WTO has not turned into a mere 
de facto separation of roles and competences, but has established a system in which 
both organizations work together in order to administer the TRIPs agreement and the 
governance of IPRs in general440. Hence, it may be argued that the shift of intellectual 
property from WIPO to WTO should be referred to a as forum proliferation rather than 
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a unilateral forum relocation441. 
These resolutions and the Cooperation agreement with WTO implied that WIPO had 
found a place in the TRIPS framework. WIPO also benefited from the fact that, while 
it was seen as lacking of enforcement mechanisms, the standards stipulated within, the 
treaties it oversaw and the technical expertise developed in the organization over the 
years were indispensable to ensure that the TRIPS Agreement was respected442. In fact, 
although since 1995 WIPO no longer has any enforcement obligations in relation to the 
various treaties it once monitored 443 , the organization retains an essential 
administrative and support function in its three main areas of operation, namely, 
registration, technical support, and development of further governance measures. In 
addition, WIPO is turning into the preferred political forum for debating current issues 
relating to the global governance regime for intellectual property444. 
In conclusion, regardless of the aforementioned displacement of WIPO's competencies 
and control over IP-related issues in the aftermath of TRIPS adoption, it would be 
inaccurate to argue that the WIPO no longer plays a key role or it has been outcast in 
practice. On the contrary, the new regime led to a rearrangement of the modalities in 
which the organization perform the framework of global governance. The normative 
provision presented emphasizes an institutionalized system of intellectual property 
protection, with a secretariat whose main objective is to organize diplomatic 
conferences at which States can negotiate new multilateral intellectual property treaties, 
administer existing intellectual property agreements, and provide technical assistance 
and advice to national intellectual property offices, especially in developing countries. 
WIPO has, hence, turned into a much more technically oriented agency, focused on 
diplomatic conferences, norm-making procedures as well as being charged with 
enforcement and disputes settlement procedures445.  
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3. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property rights Agreement 
(TRIPS) 
 
The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS), 
although considered one of the most essential treaties in the eyes of global governance 
of the protection of intellectual property law, is surely controversial within the 
multilateral trading system446. After the adoption of IP rights protection through the 
TRIPS Agreement, both developing countries and least developed countries faced new 
challenges in such different fields as health care and agriculture. There is no doubt that 
as a consequence of the Agreement, prices of life-saving medicines have exponentially 
increased, therefore creating impediments in the access to affordable drugs in 
developing and least developed countries447. This section deals with the legal analysis 
of the TRIPS Agreement, with a particular focus on its normative provisions related to 
patents and their impact on pharmaceutical products, such as medicines. 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 
which, as already highlighted, constitutes one of the three pillars of the World Trade 
Organization, established minimum standards of protection of intellectual property 
rights worldwide. It entered into force on 1 January 1995 and has been referred to as 
the most complete multilateral treaty on intellectual property to date448. The adoption 
of TRIPS is the beginning of the global era of intellectual property protection, which 
resulted from the transfer of IP law enforcement under the WTO legal and political 
framework449. 
TRIPS covers copyright and related rights (including rights of performers, producers 
of sound recordings and broadcasting organizations), trademarks (as well as service 
marks), geographical indications (including appellations of origin), industrial designs, 
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patents (in addition to plant variety protection), layout-designs of integrated circuits, 
and undisclosed information (including trade secrets and protection against unfair 
competition). The agreement gathers virtually all the intellectual property issues whose 
norms were previously provided for in an array of unbundled international legal 
instruments and bodies450. In addition, the TRIPS Agreement obliged WTO contracting 
parties to adhere to the Berne and Paris Conventions in an effort to include most of the 
international community to the global protection of IP law451. 
The main objectives of TRIPS, as expressed in its preamble are: to reduce distortions 
of international trade, to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual 
property rights and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual 
property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade452. In regard to 
specific IP provisions, the  Agreement envisaged three main obligations: firstly, it 
required WTO-member countries to protect  minimum intellectual property rights 
standards in their domestic legislation; secondly, the agreement required parties to 
establish effective enforcement procedures for those rights;  and lastly, States accepted 
to refer disputes to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 
The principle of minimum standards is contained in Article 1.1 of the Agreement, and 
states that WTO Members may provide in their legislation for broader protection than 
that provided for in the Agreement, as long as such protection does not infringe any 
provision of the Agreement. This is not an obligation but a power that may or may not 
be exercised by recognizing the agreement as the framework in which to perform453. 
The principle of minimum intellectual property standards constitutes a significant 
conceptual and strategic basis for further negotiations at the bilateral and multilateral 
levels on intellectual property aimed at setting higher and broader standards454. Indeed, 
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since the adoption of the TRIPS, any rule adopted on intellectual property between 
WTO members, or between members and third parties, can only create higher standards. 
These stricter standards raise concerns in relation to the so-called TRIPS-PLUS 
provisions, which will be further examined in the chapter when addressing IP norms 
included in international trade treaties such as the Dominican Republic-Central 
America Free Trade Treaty (DR-CAFTA)455. 
The national treatment clause is a principle according to which WTO Members must 
accord to nationals of other Members a treatment no less than the one granted to their 
nationals in relation to the existence, acquisition, scope, maintenance, exercise and 
enforcement of IP rights. It differs from the Paris Convention which required States to 
recognize the same rights to nationals of another State. In light of this consideration 
some authors argue that rather than an equal treatment, the Agreement provides a more 
favourable status to foreigners, since nationals from other countries are entitled to at 
least the same treatment as nationals, which can, however, be even better456. 
The most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle has no precedent in intellectual property 
treaties, which by its nature is characteristic of trade treaties. The principle requires that 
any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity that a member grants to nationals of 
another country in relation to the existence, acquisition, scope, maintenance and 
enforcement of IPRs shall be accorded to nationals of all other WTO members. As shall 
be noted later in the chapter, this principle has affected deeply the conclusion of 
bilateral and regional agreements. In fact, the obligations envisaged in them and any 
legal consequences derived from them must be applied equally to all members of the 
WTO's multilateral trade system457. 
Notwithstanding, it is worth mentioning that the TRIPS Agreement does not merely 
impose the voluntary alignment of domestic legislation; in fact, the Agreement also 
requires the mutual acknowledgment of domestic laws that establish minimum 
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standards of substantive IP protection458. 
Furthermore, the TRIPS Agreement was not meant to be a harmonization agreement, 
since States parties do not have to provide identical legal frameworks. In other words, 
contracting States have an obligation of result and are, hence, free to decide their own 
means of conformity with TRIPS Agreement obligations459. Indeed, the often-vague 
provisions of the Agreement in relation to minimum standards to be complied by 
Member States, result in variations in different implementation at national laws460. As 
a consequence, States are also free to provide more encompassing level of IP protection 
than those envisaged in the Agreement, bearing in mind, however, that in light of the 
most-favored nation principle, any privilege extended to a citizen of another country 
must be granted to all461. In case of an alleged violation of the TRIPS provisions, the 
dispute settlement mechanism permitted for cross-agreement retaliation, meaning that 
a party that was proved in breach of its obligations could face retaliatory trade sanctions 
on the grounds of another WTO agreement, normally the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT)462. 
One of the key innovative features of the TRIPS Agreement concerned its enforcement 
provisions. Along with the dispute settlement mechanism established within the WTO 
system, the Agreement require States to ensure through their domestic legislation 
effective procedures and remedies for the protection of IP rights of both national and 
foreign-right holders463. In other words, enacting legislation in line with the provisions 
envisaged by the Agreement does not suffice. States must implement national laws and 
provide enforcement mechanisms to guarantee actual IP rights compliance464. 
In addition, TRIPS is the first multilateral treaty which imposes another burden on 
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States in relation to protection of IP rights. States must enforce further laws and policies 
in order to avoid exportation of counterfeit goods. In fact, on the grounds of the 
Agreement, contracting parties must provide criminal sanctions for the confiscation, 
impounding and destruction of the counterfeit goods and of any tool used in the 
perpetration of the unlawful conduct465. 
As a result, many WTO parties had to significantly reform and adapt their respective 
legislation to the newly established framework. Not surprisingly, developing countries 
were those that endured the greatest modifications of their legal frameworks, since, 
among other reasons, most of these countries did not provide patents law protection for 
inventions prior to the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement and were not parties neither 
to the Paris nor to the Bern Convention. For example, India did not provide patents 
protection until the 1970s and totally exempted pharmaceutical products from the 
intellectual property rights466 . Even some developed countries were not providing 
patent protection to pharmaceuticals before TRIPS did, such is the case of France, 
Germany and Switzerland, which have recognized patents on drugs since the1970s, 
while Portugal and Spain did so in the early 1990s467. In this regard, it is interesting to 
note that including the United States had to adopt its domestic legislation in order to 
meet some of the newly established TRIPS provisions, for instance implementing the 
domestic enforcement procedures provided by the Agreement468. 
In conclusion, the international standards of protection envisaged by the TRIPS 
Agreement had, and continue to have, crucial implications both for developing and 
developed countries. Indeed, the minimum level of protection required at the 
international level was key in creating a more reliable and uniform system, which in 
most cases eased international trade. At the same time, however, the aforementioned 
minimum levels of IP protection have been seen as insensitive to the diverse 
development of contracting parties, therefore, bearing a negative effect on some States' 
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social welfare systems469. Lastly, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism moved the 
TRIPS provisions from theory to practice on the international stage, since the coercive 
powers of the WTO are able to terminate and cancel with ex tunc effectiveness, the 
outcomes of violations of IP rights. 
 
 
3.1 Pharmaceutical Patents and Legal Obligations on States parties under the 
TRIPS Agreement 
 
The raison d'être of intellectual property rights in general, and patents in particular is 
quite clear, as they are intended to encourage research and development, while ensuring 
economic gains protected by law. In other words, when it comes to pharmaceutical 
products, patent is an important incentive that gives the inventor an ius excludendi, 
designed to protect the inventor's investment in the development, production and 
marketing of new drugs. 
The main concern in relation to the TRIPS patent frameworks is its detrimental effect 
on access to new medicines. Indeed, in accordance with Article 27.1 of the Agreement 
Member States are required to make available patents for products and processes 
without discrimination as to the field of technology if they are “new, involve an 
inventive step and are capable of industrial application”470. These provisions include 
patent protections to pharmaceutical products as well, going beyond to what was 
provided for in the Paris Convention for Protection of Industrial Property of 1883, 
under which member states were allowed to exclude patent protection in certain areas 
such as medicines471. Moreover, the wording of article 27.1 and the treaty’s travaux 
préparatoires make obvious that patent protection concerns both pharmaceutical 
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products and processes 472 . The latter consideration entails that product patent, as 
opposed to process patent, undermined the use generic drugs which are more affordable 
than patented/brand-name medicines developed by multinational pharmaceutical 
corporations473. In other words, if States are required to merely protect the process of 
making a new drug, but not the resulting product (so was the case of India), generic 
companies are allowed to develop the same drug with the same active substance, as 
long as they produce it undertaking different processes. As a result, requiring patents 




3.2 Patentability of Pharmaceutical products  
 
Interestingly, the TRIPS agreement does not provide a definition of the term patent, but 
simply states that intellectual property refers to all the categories from section 1 to 7 of 
the Agreement, hence including patents as well474. Neither the Paris Convention set up 
a definition of patents, leaving contracting parties free to regulate what a patent might 
be, bearing in mind that is certainly an exclusive right to apply to an industrial 
invention475. Generally speaking, patent is intended as a legal instrument, usually a 
document, which proves compliance with the application requirements and grants the 
owner with the exclusive right to use the patent in conformity with the invention as 
presented in the application476. 
Patents constitute a really crucial area of intellectual property protection, to which the 
TRIPS Agreement devoted the section from Article 27 to Article 34. In particular, 
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Article 27, labeled Patentable Subject Matter, provides indications for the definition 
and application of patenting requirements. The three threshold requirements 
established by the aforementioned article set substantive positive obligations in making 
patents available for inventions that are new, include an inventive step and must be 
capable of industrial application. Understanding the scope of article 27 is, hence, 
decisive, since a wide interpretation of the patent regime with broad patentability 
criteria for innovations could result in unfair competitive practices that would 
potentially lead to more expensive drugs and, thus, have an adverse effect on access to 
medicines477. Article 27 constitutes a milestone in defining patentability, since for the 
first time an international agreement provided a general framework of eligibility 
criteria for patents478. The latter Article entails that any exclusion from patentability is 
considered as an exception, meaning that the normative content of the article shall be 
interpreted in a restrictive manner479 . In other words, as highlighted above, patent 
protection has to be made available for any inventions whether product or process in 
any field of technology as long as the requirements for patentability are satisfied and 
unless their subject matter falls within a category as defined by Article 27.2, or specific 
class as stated in Article 27.3480. Notwithstanding, it remains unsettled whether or not 
the exceptions of patentability envisaged both in Articles 27.2 and 27.3 provide the 
only exclusions to Article 27.1481. 
Novelty is the first requirement for eligibility. In general term, novelty shall be referred 
to an invention that has not been publicly described or presented prior the submission 
of the application of the patent482. Notwithstanding, international law does not provide 
a generally accepted understanding of the term novelty and neither the TRIPS nor the 
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Paris Convention contain an explicit definition of novelty. The vague nature of the 
definition provides States with flexibility in implementing the requirement in their 
respective domestic law 483 . For example, in the United States an invention is 
considered disclosed and therefore lacking the requirement of novelty only if made in 
written form. This entails that knowledge of particular groups, such as indigenous 
communities, which knowledge has been likely used for centuries in an oral form, is 
considered new in light of the American legislation and, hence, can be protected 
through patents484. Furthermore, the proper understanding of what must be interpreted 
as new invention can have important implications in preventing the so called 
evergreening of patents485 . In practice, if the definition of novelty is too broad, a 
pharmaceutical company could obtain a new patent on an already patented drug by 
making small alterations to it, by so doing delaying competition and extending its 
monopoly status486. This is the reason both India and the Philippines did not allow 
patents on “new forms of known substances unless they were significantly more 
efficacious and new (or second) uses and combinations of new substances”487 . In 
particular, India refused to patent a new version of an already patented drug against 
cancer called Glivec by Novartis, leading to a unsuccessfully lawsuit brought before a 
local court by the latter pharmaceutical company488. 
The “inventive step” constitutes the second requirement of patentability. Similar to the 
term novelty, the TRIPS does not envisage a precise definition of what should be 
understood as “inventive step” nor provide the procedure that should be employed in 
order to assess if the criteria are satisfied489. Actually, different states provide different 
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variations, definitions and criteria for the inventive step requirement. In practice, the 
aim of this second requirement is to limit the robust ius excludendi awarded by patents 
merely to inventions which constitute a significant and concrete step forward in the art 
and to keep irrelevant change outside of such protection490. For example, in regard to 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals, known compounds, such as, among others, salts of 
acids, bases and isomers are often combined with allegedly new and inventive 
compounds. As the aforementioned analysis in relation to the first requirement, namely 
novelty, shows, a vague and broad understanding of the term inventive step could allow 
second use patents, leading into distortive competitive practices. As a result, only 
compounds which are proven to be new and inventive can be granted with patent 
protection491. 
In conclusion, the term in question allows discretion on its interpretation. 
Notwithstanding, the Agreement provides a further explanation as to what the term 
“inventive steps” entails. In fact, the Article 27 footnote states that contracting parties 
must refer to the latter term as a synonym of the term “non-obvious” with the aim, 
inter alia, at accommodating the several understandings of “inventive step” employed 
by different legal regimes 492 . Inventive step’/‘non-obvious constitute a quality 
requirement needed in order to assess if the invention presented in the patent 
application deserves the rights conferred by a patent according to Article 28 of the 
TRIPS 493 . National Courts attempted to identify those required criteria so as to 
differentiate patent worthy inventions from other inventions which did simply provide 
workshop developments and therefore were ineligible for patent protection. In practice, 
the latter attempts by national courts led to the “person skilled in the art” criteria, which 
meant that an invention is patent worthy if involves an inventive step considered under 
the eyes of an expert in a particular field of knowledge494. Similarly, the US Patent Act, 
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35 (U.S.C. 35) states that “A patent may not be obtained though the invention is [novel], 
if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are 
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the 
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject 
matter pertains”495. 
In conclusion, the aforementioned second requirement for patentability has been 
introduced to provide additional elements related to both the novelty of the invention 
in relation to the prior state of art on the one hand and to further provide an artificial 
criterion in light of the expertise of a person skilled in field of the invention on the 
other496. Due to their still subjective nature, these additional criteria have, however, 
been implemented differently among contracting parties497. In an attempt to overcome 
the challenge of implementing such vague criteria, the travaux preparatoires of the 
WIPO Substantive Patent Law Treaty has guided States towards the application of a 
similar standard: “A claimed invention shall involve an inventive step. It shall be 
considered to involve an inventive step (be non-obvious) if, having regard to the 
differences and similarities between the claimed invention and the prior art as defined 
in Article 8(1), the claimed invention as a whole would not have been obvious to a 
person skilled in the art at the priority date of the claimed invention”498. Despite both 
national courts and international organizations efforts for clarification, the 
interpretation of the required criteria of ‘prior art’ and of a ‘person skilled in the art’ is 
still controversial499. 
The last requirement provided for by Article 27 is that the invention must be capable 
of “industrial application”. As it was stated in the analysis for the second requirement, 
the footnote to the article adds further information, providing that industrial application 
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must be understood as a synonym of the term “useful”500. In practice, however, both 
terms “industrial applicability” and “useful” can have different interpretations in the 
numerous States' legal frameworks. In this regard, the negotiation of the WIPO 
Substantive Patent Law Treaty has reaffirmed the need of “industrially applicability 
(useful)” as requirement for patent, but has not shed light on the substance of the 
standard501. The proposed provision reads as follows502: “A claimed invention shall be 
industrially applicable (useful). It shall be considered industrially applicable (useful) 
if it 
• [Alternative A] can be made or used for exploitation in any field of [commercial] 
[economic] activity. 
• [Alternative B] can be made or used in any kind of industry. ‘Industry’ shall be 
understood in its broadest sense, as in the Paris Convention. 
• [Alternative C] has a specific, substantial and credible utility. 
 
The WIPO Substantive Patent Law Treaty negotiations have, hence, the aim to reassert 
that the TRIPS idea of “capable of industrial application” may be applied in light of 
an array of different approaches and considerations, taking into account the numerous 
fields of implementation. The Paris Convention of 1967 constitutes a valuable tool for 
limiting the scope of the term industrial applicability, since its article 1.3 provides a 
definition of: “Industrial property shall be understood in the broadest sense and shall 
apply not only to industry and commerce proper, but likewise to agricultural and 
extractive industries and to all manufactured or natural products, for example, wines, 
grain, tobacco leaf, fruit, cattle, minerals, mineral waters, beer, flowers, and flour”503. 
In conclusion, TRIPS tries to gather consensus on the various interpretative approaches 
in order to standardize them in one text. In regard to pharmaceutical patent protection, 
the requirement of applicability/usefulness goes without saying, due to the particular 
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nature of this sector which combines elements related to chemistry, genetics and bio-
technology and typical elements of the chain of production. Moreover, a medicine is 
certainly useful if it is able to properly treat a condition504. Likewise, with the terms 
novelty and inventive steps criteria, the requirement “industrial application” is still 
subject to different interpretations, leaving room for contracting parties to regulate their 
own concept, definition, scope and tests. As a result, some scholars argue that the three 
requirements shall be understood as flexibilities for member States which are open for 
different modalities of implementation505. 
These particular provisions resulted in some major modifications in patent protection 
at the national level. Indeed, significant changes incorporated the stipulations that there 
be no discrimination among provisions of product or process patents and that patents 
shall be accessible in all fields of technology. Included also are the definition of the 
exclusive rights conferred by the product and process patents as provided for by article 
28, the 20-year protection term counted from the filing date, and the burden of proof in 
Courts. Some of these changes, together with other provisions of TRIPS, have 
important implications for pharmaceutical patent protection, thus they may be relevant 
to the issue of access to medicines506. 
As a result of the ratification of TRIPS, States Parties are obliged to establish in national 
legislation procedures for the enforcement of intellectual property rights that allow for 
the adoption of effective measures against any action infringing intellectual property 
rights, including expeditious remedies to prevent violations and remedies that 
constitute an actual means of deterring further infringements507. 
These procedures, which have to be fair and equitable, shall be applied in such a way 
as to avoid the creation of obstacles to legitimate trade, and shall provide safeguards 
against their abuse. They shall not be unnecessarily complicated or burdensome, nor 
shall they result in unjustifiable time limits or unnecessary delays. In the case of final 
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administrative decisions, which shall be taken in written form and should be reasoned, 
must provide for a review procedure by a competent judicial authority508. These include 
establishing criminal procedures and penalties for at least cases of unlawful trademark 
counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale. The remedies available shall 
include imprisonment and/or the imposition of financial penalties sufficiently 
dissuasive to be consistent with the level of sanctions applied for offenses of a 
corresponding gravity. None of the above implies the creation of a different jurisdiction 
nor a commitment to direct new remedies for IPR enforcement purposes. 
 
 
3.3.Test Data protection in the context of the TRIPS Agreement 
 
Test data refers to the generation of information required to demonstrate to a health 
authority, in a given country, the safety and efficacy of a product whose marketing is 
regulated by the State for reasons of public health. The topic has had its main 
development in the agrochemical and pharmaceutical sectors, since they are areas in 
which the research and development industry had to invest surprisingly large amounts 
of economic and human resources over long periods of time in order. The aim is to 
obtain the information that finally allows accrediting the safety and efficacy required 
to guarantee that the product can be consumed directly or indirectly by human beings. 
The need to implement specific protection systems to prevent unfair commercial use 
of information has been particularly controversial in the pharmaceutical industry, given 
the implications that such use may have from the point of view of access to 
medicines509. 
In many countries of the world, the production and subsequent submission to the 
corresponding authorities of tests that certify the quality, safety and efficacy of the 
product are required before the commercialization of pharmaceutical and agrochemical 
products. The protection that different countries provided for these test data derived 
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from multiple stages of research, large investments and long evaluation periods prior 
to obtaining approval for entry into the market. In general, the provision of all types of 
undisclosed information was very unequal before the entry into force of TRIPS510. The 
lack of an international regime that installed common rules in the matter allowed to 
differentiate the models of protection in two basic forms511. 
The first model, mostly implemented by industrialized countries such as the United 
States and members of the European Union, confers exclusive rights to the person 
generating the data, and may prevent both governments and competition from relying 
on such data for approval of subsequent generic products512. To mitigate the extreme 
character of this system, compulsory licenses are sometimes granted in order to allow 
the use of the data in exchange for economic compensation for the originator of the 
information513. This model grounds on the fact that, in the Research and Development 
(R&D) of the pharmaceutical product manufacturers, invested large sums of money 
that they expect to recover. If companies' economic expectation is not protected, 
scholars argue that drugs producers would lose their incentives and stop technological 
progress by discouraging investment. In fact, originator companies argue that, ten to 
fifteen years and on average USD 1.2 billion are required in order to bring a drug to 
the market. Moreover, only one of every 5 to 10 thousand chemical compounds 
researched gets approved and sold, turning such high investments into a risky bargain, 
as the future gains are unsure 514. In brief, it is considered unfair to allow competition 
(generic companies) to take commercial advantage and to rely on information which 
was produced by another subject (originator companies)515. Indeed, generic companies 
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are merely required to demonstrate bioequivalence to already approved drugs in order 
to be authorized to sell516. In other words, generics companies usually are not required 
to submit preclinical (often performed on animals) and clinical (on human) tests to 
domestic regulatory agencies in order to prove safety and effectiveness of medicines. 
On the contrary, the latter companies must demonstrate scientifically that their drugs 
perform in the same manner as the originator one517. As a result, generics manufacturers 
do not face the same financial expenditure as originator companies are, hence, able to 
sell the same product at a lower price. Some scholars point out that generics always 
enter an already developed and studied market without assuming the risks of being 
pioneers in an undiscovered field of knowledge518. In this regard, originator and generic 
pharmaceutical companies do not carry a similar burden when it comes to achieving 
market approval. As a result, some literature highlighted that when national law does 
not prevent discriminating practice such as early price competition by generics 
manufacturers 519 , the entire pharmaceutical market would be affected. Originator 
companies would not have any incentives in   investing for the submission of safety 
and efficacy data520. 
A second approach, opposed to the aforementioned model, provides a very weak 
protection to test data. According to non-industrialized countries, the use of the 
information provided by the original manufacturer could be used to compare the 
chemical properties or bioequivalence of generic drugs. The adoption of this model 
was the result of the need to foster a more competitive market, which would lower the 
barriers to entry of generic products to the market, since many of the companies that 
manufacture generic pharmaceuticals would be unable to replicate them. The adoption 
of this model was the result of the need to promote a more competitive market, which 
would reduce the obstacles to the entry of generic products to the market, since many 
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of the companies that manufacture generic pharmaceuticals would be unable to 
reproduce the approval data, due to its high cost, which would allow an exclusion of 
competitors beyond the 20 years guaranteed by a patent. The reasons that national 
authorities are not required to submit new test data are economic, practical and ethical. 
Firstly, replicating studies and trials requires a significant economic investment, which 
would have a negative impact on the economic affordability of medicines. Secondly, 
testing may take several years to complete and cause delay of the entry of cheaper 
generic medicines into the market. Finally, it has been argued that it is unethical to 
replicate some drug tests on humans when their efficacy has already been proven521. 
 
 
3.3.1 Legal obligations deriving from the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
The issue of test data does not refer to a specific industrial property right. In practice, 
most of the pharmacological dossier of pharmaceutical products would rather 
constitute a collection of information protected by copyright seen as the result of a 
tedious scientific work. Notwithstanding, the generation of such information usually 
falls under the protection of two industrial property categories, namely patents for 
invention and trade secrets522: patents, because it is common that newly discovered 
active ingredients are protected by patents on both the molecule as such or on specific 
combinations of it; and, trade secrets, since in any case pharmacological dossier would 
be the product of information that has not been previously disclosed, and that in most 
cases is not even included in the dossier itself. This information referred to the patients 
on whom the corresponding tests were performed and that, ultimately, is the one that 
allows validating any conclusion on safety and efficacy proven in the study523. 
The protection of test data, however, cannot be assimilated to a patent or trade secret 
protection, since it involves a percentage of undisclosed information and since the 
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protected good is the investment required to develop a new drug and not the invention 
itself. Nevertheless, test data does merit special and integral protection, since the 
indiscriminate use of the disclosed the information by third parties may have unfair 
competitive effects in a given market as demonstrated above. These considerations led 
to the inclusion of test data protection of new chemical entities within the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of 1994524. 
This section examines the legal regime for test data protection under the TRIPS 
Agreement and the obligations deriving from it on Member States in relation to data 
exclusivity. Prior to the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement, countries were free 
to determine whether to confer protection on test data. This Agreement introduced the 
first international legal provision on the related to test data as defined in its article 39525. 
The Agreement, however, does not provide for specific measures for the 
implementation a national level, thus granting broad discretion to the member countries 
of WTO to apply different models in relation to such protection526. 
It is interesting to note that Article 10bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property provided for an indirect protection of test data, by forbidding 
conducts against unfair competition way before the legal regime established by the 
TRIPS527. Indeed, an extensive understanding of Article 10bis of the aforementioned 
convention may result in including the protection of test data within unfair competitive 
practices, but does not provide anything similar to data exclusivity528. On the contrary, 
the test data protection regime established by the TRIPS goes beyond the mere 
provision of protecting products against unfair competition and designed a data 
exclusivity discipline which confers an autonomous proprietary right to the natural or 
legal person entitled to such protection529. 
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In detail, Article 39 of the TRIPS, which is composed of three different paragraphs, 
provides protection to confidential information submitted by a pharmaceutical 
company in order to obtaining market approval of a new drug. The aforementioned 
Article reads as follow: 
 
1. In the course of ensuring effective protection against unfair competition as 
provided in Article 10bis of the Paris Convention (1967), Members shall protect 
undisclosed information in accordance with paragraph 2 and data submitted to 
governments or governmental agencies in accordance with paragraph 3 
 
2. Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing information 
lawfully within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by 
others without their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial 
practices so long as such information: 
 
a. is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and 
assembly of its components, generally known among or readily accessible to persons 
within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question; 
 
b. has commercial value because it is secret; and 
 
c. has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully 
in control of the information, to keep it secret. 
 
3. Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of 
pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new 
chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the 
origination of which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data 
against unfair commercial use. In addition, Members shall protect such data 
against disclosure, except where necessary to protect the public, or unless steps 
are taken to ensure that the data are protected. 
 
 
As Article 39 shows, TRIPS protects confidential information as an extension of the 
discipline contained in article 10bis of the Paris Convention. The rights and obligations 
contained in section 7 of the TRIPS Agreement, therefore, develop in the context of the 
control of unfair competition. The fact that undisclosed information is considered by 
Art.1.2530  as a category of intellectual property does not mean that it confers an 
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159 
 
exclusive exploitation right or a property right over the controlled information, since 
protection is strictly dispensed in cases of unfair competition, such as the breaking of 
a confidentiality contract to deliver information to the competition. If the information 
is obtained in good faith or by methods parallel to those used by the one who keeps it 
under his control, the TRIPS agreement does not oblige its protection531. The provision 
protects the holder of the information against unfair practices of competitors, not 
against third parties who do not act as such. The article, then, imposes a double basic 
obligation: firstly, to protect against unfair competition and secondly, to protect, 
undisclosed information532. 
Two main theories have arisen on the proper interpretation of Article 39, with the aim 
of identifying precise legal obligations with which member States are bound to comply. 
According to the first interpretation of the latter provision, the wording of Article 39.1 
“ensuring effective protection against unfair competition” implies that the legal regime 
established grounds on the norms concerning unfair competition as stated in Article 
10bis of the Paris Convention533 . In line with this perspective, the latter provision 
would grant protection against unfair commercial practices and provide a de facto 
control to the right holder of the undisclosed information. Under this first theory of 
interpretation, Article 39.1 would not establish exclusive nor proprietary rights534. In 
the same way, scholars such as Correa and Gervais argue that Article 39 is sufficiently 
clear in indicating that its provisions do not go beyond the obligations of protection 
against unfair commercial use provided for by in the Paris Convention535 and that the 
latter protection would suffice for the protection against non-disclosure536. In particular, 
according to Correa the wording of Article 39 is inadequate to recognize data 
exclusivity protection or the establishment of an autonomous proprietary right. Indeed, 
                                               
categories of intellectual property that are the subject of Sections 1 through 7 of Part II” 
531Shaikh, Access to Medicine Versus Test Data Exclusivity, 39. 
532C. M. Correa, “Unfair Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement: Protection of Data Submitted for 
the Registration of Pharmaceuticals”, Chicago Journal of International Law: Vol. 3: No. 1, Article 8, 72. 
533UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, 522. 
534Ibidem 
535Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 367. 
536Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and , 545. 
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Correa argues that understanding the meaning of the article differently would be 
departing from a literal interpretation of the such provisions resulting in a clear 
violation of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties537. The Vienna 
Convention supports the so-called objective method which entails that the Treaty 
should be given the meaning that is made clear by its text, which results from the logical 
connection between the various terms of the treaty538. 
The aforementioned Article 31, which constitutes the main part of the norms for treaty 
interpretation, highlighted three elements for the interpretation of a treaty, namely the 
ordinary meaning of the terms, their context and the object-and-purpose of the treaty. 
Notwithstanding, establishing the ordinary meaning of the text is the primary method 
for interpretation since it is the starting point in order to identify the context and 
purpose of an international agreement 539 . The same position in relation to the 
fundamental value of the treaty-text has been acknowledged in different cases brought 
before the Appellate Body and dispute settlement panels of the WTO, such as in the US 
vs Shrimp case. The Appellate body stated that: “A treaty interpreter must begin with, 
and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to be interpreted. It is in the words 
constituting that provision, read in their context, that the object and purpose of the 
states parties to the treaty must first be sought. Where the meaning imparted by the text 
itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the 
reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a 
whole may usefully be sought”540. It must be, however, taken into account that the same 
Appellate Body stressed that the three aforementioned elements outlined in Article 31 
(text, context and purpose) have to be understood as “one holistic rather than a 
sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order”541. 
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The theory that Article 39 does not go beyond the provisions to protect against unfair 
commercial use and do not provide an autonomous right relating to test data protection 
as outlined in the Paris Convention does sound appealing, but another reasoning can 
be made on the legal obligations stemming from the aforementioned article. 
Considering that a literal interpretation would solely lead to an understanding of Article 
39 as a mere reproduction of Article 10bis of the Paris Convention it is not necessarily 
persuasive542. Indeed, it is noteworthy to remember that there is no doubt about the 
Paris Convention binding nature since its obligations are also part of the TRIPS 
Agreement as provided for by Article 2543. 
Under these considerations, the second theory related to the interpretation of Article 39 
of the TRIPS Agreement, which will be further outlined in the following section, 
grounds on the idea that it would be redundant to solely restate the legal obligations 
under Article 10bis of the Paris Convention in the wording of Article 39. It, thus, seems 
likely to consider that the latter article contains obligations that go beyond and expand 
the scope of Article 10 bis544. 
As a matter of fact, scholars have commonly acknowledged that the first paragraph of 
Article 39 refers to the obligations of Members to protect undisclosed information. The 
main objective of this provision is to guarantee satisfactory protection against unfair 
competition in line with the Paris Convention. In the same manner, however, 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 39 provide greater provisions than those required under 
the Paris Convention, in so doing going beyond the mere protection against unfair 
commercial practice and competition545. 
 
  
                                               
542Owoeye, Data Exclusivity and Public Health Under the TRIPS Agreement, 112. 
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3.3.2 The second theory on the interpretation of Article 39: test data protection as a data 
exclusivity regime? 
 
A literal interpretation of Article 39, and in particular of its paragraph 3, does not clearly 
reveal the establishment of a data exclusivity IP regime546 . In the same way some 
scholars, such as Correa, have stated that the wording of TRIPS in general, and Article 
39 in particular, does not entail that the provided test data protection should be granted 
through the conferral of exclusive rights to entitled subjects547. In addition, the travaux 
preparatoires of TRIPS shows that the US negotiators proposal to include a ten year 
data exclusivity protection was entirely rejected by all other delegations548. Under these 
considerations, it seems fair to conclude that test data protection does not imply the 
establishment of a data exclusivity regime. Notwithstanding, scholars debate as to 
whether article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement imposes a test data exclusivity regime in 
light of the object and scope of the treaty, as countries with strong R&D pharmaceutical 
industry commonly argue549. Unfortunately, art 39(3) has not yet been interpreted by 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Actually, in the year 2001, a WTO panel was 
preparing to interpret the scope and content of the minimum obligations of protection 
stemming by Art 39 (3) in a dispute between the US and Argentina550, but the latter 
parties reached an agreement and the US withdrawn its demand 551 . This section 
attempts to clarify the ambiguity of Art 39(3) for WTO Members with regard to 
understanding whether or not the latter provision establishes a data protection regime 
autonomous from both trade secrets and unfair commercial use. 
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Some scholars have argued that the main object and purpose of Article 39(3) is to 
prevent Member States from acting in a manner incompatible with the trade secret 
status of test data. As a result, the adequate reasoning to be drawn is that Article 39(3) 
is meant to establish a data exclusivity regime, and in so doing, conferring autonomous 
rights to the right-holders552. In the same way, subsequent state practice demonstrates 
that test data have been considerate as a new IP right553. In fact, scholars such as Lorna 
Dwyer have highlighted that test data went from a simple trade secret protection to an 
independent right similar to a patent, usually protected for five years554. Furthermore, 
test data were not merely confined to the protection of undisclosed test information, 
but also extended to the protection of publicly available information555. This led to 
creation of an insurmountable barrier for generic pharmaceutical manufacturers to 
enter the market, hence impeding access to necessary drugs to people in developing 
countries. Lorna Dwayer concluded that “no credible justification for such protection 
has been offered. The research and development costs have already been recovered by 
the patent holders, having been included in the price of the medications for over twenty 
years”556. 
In conclusion, it goes without saying that favoring a specific theory on the 
interpretation of article 39, and in particular of its paragraph 3, has a concrete impact 
on access to affordable medicines, especially in developing countries. Deriving a data 
exclusivity regime from Article 39 entails delaying the entry into the market of 
affordable drugs, thus affecting negatively human rights provisions related to the right 
to health. On the contrary, understanding Article 39 as a provision aimed at preventing 
unfair commercial practice would safeguard both the protection of human rights and 
the prerogatives of pharmaceutical companies. This is the reason that Articles 31 and 
32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 play a key role in 
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determining the legal framework stemming from article 39 paragraph 3 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, as will be outlined in the next section. 
 
 
3.3.3 Treaty interpretation analysis of Article 39 (3) of TRIPS 
 
According to Article 3(2) of the “Understanding on rules and procedures governing 
the settlement of disputes”, the Dispute Settlement System of the WTO (DSS) 
constitutes a cardinal piece in providing stability and certainty in relation to the legal 
provisions established in the WTO Agreements. In light of the aforementioned article, 
the DSS should interpret WTO agreements according to the customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law 557 , thus employing the elements of 
interpretation envisaged in Article 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. Indeed, it is 
now widely accepted that the latter convention has adequately codified the most 
relevant customary norms related to the interpretation of international treaties558. In the 
same manner, in 1991 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) highlighted that even 
though neither of the parties of the dispute had ratified the Vienna Convention, both 
countries, namely Botswana and Namibia, considered Article 31 of the latter 
Convention applicable to the controversy as a reflection of customary international 
law559. 
Under these considerations WTO dispute settlement panels and appellate bodies have 
fallen back on Arts 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention in order to assess disputes 
relating to WTO agreements in general and the TRIPS in particular560. In summary and 
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as briefly mentioned above, Art 31(1) provides that a treaty has to be interpreted in 
good faith, in line with its ordinary meaning bearing in mind the relevant context 
and on the grounds of the treaty object and purpose561. The WTO Appellate Body has 
often noted that the interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty562. 
Paragraph 2 of article 31 requires that the context concerns the treaty’s preamble and 
annexes as well as related agreements and other instruments linked with the the treaty 
at stake563. Paragraph 3 provides that “there shall be taken into account, together with 
the context” any related subsequent agreements, subsequent practice of the treaty 
parties and relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
party564. In addition, Paragraph 4 states the importance of any special meaning given 
to the terms of the treaty by the parties565. 
Furthermore, Article 32 provides the so-called supplementary means of interpretation 
and, in particular lists the travaux preparatoires and the circumstances of conclusion 
of the treaty. The latter may be employed in order to validate the interpretation derived 
from the process envisaged in Art 31 or where such interpretation leaves the meaning 
ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable566. 
As to the good faith element of interpretation, the Appellate Body in the US – Gasoline 
case argued that the aforementioned element must be understood as a tool for assuring 
an effective interpretation of the treaty. In fact, according to the latter Body “one of the 
corollaries of the general rule of interpretation in the Vienna Convention is that 
interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of a treaty. An interpreter 
is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs 
of a treaty to redundancy or inutility 567. As a result, in the eye of the WTO Appellate 
body, the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat), which stems 
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from Article 31, is a fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation. According to the latter 
principle, if an agreement can be interpreted in two different manners and one of the 
two deprives the treaty of factual meaning, good faith and the objects and purpose of 
the treaty require the adoption of the interpretation that confers effectiveness to its 
provisions.568 
With regard to the ordinary meaning element of interpretation, there is little doubt 
that the phrase ‘unfair commercial use’ must be understood as gaining possession of 
confidential test data for the approval of bioequivalent generic products through 
dishonest means569. 
As to context, the WTO Secretariat clarified that “refers to the kinds of conclusions 
that can be drawn on the basis of, for example, the structure, content or terminology in 
other provisions belonging to the same agreement, particularly the ones preceding and 
following the rule subject to interpretation”570. In line with the latter view expressed 
by the WTO Secretariat, some scholars have argued that the text, preamble and annexes 
and the terms of the treaty must be read in the context of the entire treaty, thus favoring 
the so-called holistic approach571. 
 
 
3.3.4 The object and purpose in light of Article 39(3) 
 
As was presented in the previous section, according to the aforementioned article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention, the object and purpose of the treaty constitute a key element 
in determining the meaning of specific provisions of the agreement. Interestingly, in 
light of WTO jurisprudence, the main function of understanding the object and purpose 
of an agreement is to confirm and/or justify the literal interpretation of the text. In a 
dispute concerning the GATT Agreement, facing the European Communities as 
                                               
568Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1966, Vol. II,  219. 
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complainant and Japan as the respondent party, the Dispute Settlement body reaffirmed 
the view that the object and purpose method cannot be used as an autonomous basis 
for interpretation572. 
In the same manner, in another case still concerning the interpretation of the GATT 
Agreement, the WTO appellate body stressed that the object and purpose of a specific 
provision has to be understood in light of the object and purpose of the whole. This is 
the reason the interpreter has to assess the meaning of particular provisions, paragraphs 
or subparagraphs of WTO agreements in connection with its entirety573. 
In practice, the object and purpose of a treaty can be derived from its preamble, from 
the text of the treaty as a whole, and from specific provisions establishing the treaty’s 
object and purpose574. In fact, specific WTO agreements, which are GATT, GATS and 
TRIPS, must also be interpreted in light of the Agreement establishing the WTO (often 
referred to as the Marrakesh Agreement) which, inter alia, stresses the importance of 
striking a balance between sustainable development and trade related goals. As 
described at the beginning of this chapter, the various treaties which formed the 
Marrakesh Agreement constitute an indivisible whole (a single undertaking), making 
impossible for a country to be part to one agreement without being bound to them all. 
With particular reference to the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement as 
provided in its preamble, neither scholars, States, nor law practitioners agree on its 
content. Some scholars such as Correa believe that the wording of the preamble refers 
to the protectionist approach backed by developed countries, and by the US in 
particular, in relation to the international intellectual property regime 575 . On the 
contrary, other scholars believe that the TRIPS preamble allows a flexible interpretation 
in order to tackle all the different and clashing provisions and objectives contain 
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within576 . The TRIPS agreement preamble, as these scholars highlighted, contains 
several provisions which reaffirm the necessity of finding an equilibrium between, inter 
alia, IP rights and free trade, developed and developing nations' interests and more 
generally in all the situations in which public needs are threatened by strict IP rules577. 
Furthermore, other scholars such as Xu Yi-Chong present a quite pessimistic 
perspective. According to the latter, the main object and purpose of the TRIPS 
agreement as a whole is to coerce developing and least developed countries in order to 
implement in their domestic law the limitless minimum standards related to IP as  
“membership fee for the club WTO”578. 
Important to remember is that the TRIPS articles are intended to be understood in 
concert with the aim of carrying out the objective of the WTO Agreement as a whole. 
Indeed, the TRIPS Agreement is a component of the entire WTO system similar to 
other instruments envisaged in the preamble of the WTO Agreement579. In regard to 
access to medicines, this consideration leads to interpreting TRIPS provisions in light 
of the principle of sustainable development of Nations even if the latter is not 
mentioned in the TRIPS preamble. 
The aforementioned preamble refers to provisions related to the protection of IPRs in 
international trade, bearing in mind the different levels of normative development 
among parties, as well as providing special emphasis and waivers for least-developed 
countries 580 . The TRIPS Agreement differs from the WTO one because it has 
established specific provisions (in particular Articles 7 and 8) which state the object 
and purpose of the treaty. As a result, even though the preamble is vague in regard to 
IP rights protectionism or more liberal statements, the latter articles play a crucial role 
in understanding the object and purpose of the TRIPS agreement. Articles 7 and 8 have 
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in fact a higher interpretative status since they are part of the treaty text and do not 
simply have a hortatory value as a treaty preamble581 . Art 7 of the TRIPS labeled 
‘Objectives’ states: “The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights 
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of 
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, 
and to a balance of rights and obligations”582. 
In light of Art 7 the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement are promotion of technological 
innovation and transfer and dissemination of technology. Important to stress here is that 
this article highlighted four significant considerations about the protection and 
implementation of IP right. Firstly, they should trigger technological advancement and 
the dissemination of such innovation; secondly, IP rights should be both profitable for 
the producers and users; thirdly they should at the social and economic welfare of   
countries, and lastly, IP rights should balance the rights and obligations of producers 
and users. Therefore, it would seem that the reasonable inference to be drawn is that 
Art 7 works towards achieving the objective of “sustainable development” as provided 
for by the preamble of the WTO Agreement583. Indeed, the latter article in question 
makes clear that IPRs cannot be understood as an end in themselves, but provide a 
balancing regime which enhances and includes both dynamic and static competition584.   
Likewise, Art 8, labeled “Principles”, reflects the so-called principle of integrated 
development also envisaged in the WTO Agreement’s preamble in introducing the 
public interest principle in order to protect socio-economic and technological 
development of members. Paragraph 1 states: “Members may, in formulating or 
amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public 
health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance 
to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that such measures 
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are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement”585. 
The incorporation of the public interest and health principle constitutes a key element 
in studying the relationship between access to medicines and IP rights since there is no 
doubt that providing affordable/accessible drugs falls under the latter category. 
Unfortunately, no authoritative interpretation is available since Article 8 has not been 
addressed in any WTO disputes to date. Notwithstanding, Article 8 provides two 
specific requirements, namely necessity and TRIPS consistency, that Members must 
satisfy in order to protect public health and public interest in general586. 
As to necessity, there is agreement in interpreting this requirement in a wide manner, 
in particular on the grounds of previous WTO Dispute Settlement Body decisions on 
akin provisions within GATS and GATT such as Article XX 587 . In particular, the 
Appellate Body provided a scheme of the so-called necessity test requirements in order 
to assess whether a measure adopted by a member can be considered necessary. 
According to this test, the States' measures must satisfy three criteria: firstly, they must 
contribute to the realization of the end desired; secondly, measures must be aim at 
protecting significant interests or values; and finally, measures cannot be harmful for 
international trade588. In accordance with this perspective from the WTO Appellate, 
some scholars have applied similar criteria in order to interpret the necessity 
requirement of Article 8 of TRIPS. In their opinion, measures have to be essential in 
the sense that one of the goals provided for in the aforementioned article, namely public 
health and public interest in sectors of vital importance, have to be in jeopardy. In this 
regard, the burden of proof in order to demonstrate this danger lies with the invoking 
State. Secondly, the measure has to be capable of achieving the goal pursued by the 
State. In this respect, the State relying on Article 8 must prove the measure ability to 
contribute to the advancement of the public interest at stake. Lastly, States should 
                                               
585Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement 
586Malbon, The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, 212. 
587WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, 
159–164, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R or art. XX of GATT. 
588I. C. Salinas Alcaraz, “The concept of necessity under the GATT and national regulatory autonomy”, 
Vol. 10, N.° 2 / julio-diciembre 2015 / Bogotá, D. C. / Universidad Santo Tomás, 86. 
171 
 
enforce the least restrictive measure for international trade589. In other words, when 
States implement measures in light of Article 8, they must strike a balance between 
means and ends, thus proving that they have taken into consideration all the possible 
measures and have adopted the least detrimental measure for international trade590. 
Notwithstanding, the necessity requirement cannot be interpreted in isolation and has 
to be understood in concert with the second requirement, namely TRIPS consistency. 
Better said, all measures adopted by members related to public health and public 
interests should not be inconsistent with the framework provided for the TRIPS 
Agreement591. The latter Article establishes a compatibility clause which is not present 
within the wording of Article XX of GATT. In practice, the aforementioned clause 
deprives Article 8 of the power to function as an adequate exception to the obligations 
otherwise provided under the Agreement. As a result, exceptions to the protection 
granted by TRIPS are admissible only if they are provided by a specific provision of 
the TRIPS itself. On this ground, if an evident opposition emerges between a clear 
provision of the TRIPS and the Article 8 principles, the former prevails. An example 
will clarify the described scenario. Article 33 of TRIPS provides a 20 years patent 
protection counted from the filing date. If for instance, a State adopts a measure which 
shortens the unambiguous term of 20 years to 15 years aiming at protecting public 
health, such State is breaching both Articles 8 and 33 of TRIPS592. 
In relation of the specific analysis of this dissertation, Art 8 of TRIPS must be 
interpreted broadly with the aim at striking a balance between the rights and obligations 
and the social and economic welfare of its Members593. In line with this view, scholars 
such as Grosse Ruse-Khan highlighted that the WTO  Doha Declaration of 2001 (which 
will be presented in the next section) stated that the specific provisions as well as the 
text of the Agreement as a whole should be interpreted and enforced in a way which is 
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3.3.5 Final remarks about article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement 
 
In light of the aforementioned analysis, the interpretation of Article 39 of the TRIPS 
Agreement leads to the conclusion that the latter Article does not provide for a data 
exclusivity regime, but rather the protection of unfair commercial practices such as 
unfair competition. In summary, the traveux preparatoires demonstrated a clear intent 
by the parties to avoid the establishment of exclusive rights related to test data and the 
final text, in fact, only envisages protection for ‘undisclosed test and other data’ 
presented as part of a marketing approval for new chemical entity pharmaceutical and 
agricultural chemical products, without mentioning any exclusivity regime nor a term 
of protection. In other words, regardless the status of IP right conferred by the 
provisions of the TRIPS agreement, undisclosed test data do not refer to an exclusive 
right such as a patent, copyright or trademark595. 
This is particularly true if the TRIPS provisions are understood in light of the in dubiis 
benigniora praeferenda sunt principle, which states that the imposition of onerous 
obligations should be deterred in cases in which the wording of a treaty is ambiguous 
thus allowing different interpretations596 . Since the ordinary meaning of Article 39 
TRIPS, as demonstrated, might lead to clashing perspectives, the interpretation that 
results in both a less onerous position for States and in a framework more consistent 
with human rights protection must prevail. As a result, the provisions of Article 39 
should be understood as providing obligations on members in order to prevent unfair 
commercial use of test data and as granting drug safety and efficacy as a crucial part of 
the right to health and consumers' wellbeing. 
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It must be noted that Article 1.1 TRIPS provides that: ‘Members shall be free to 
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement 
within their own legal system and practice’, thus inferring that the Agreement does not 
establish an international harmonization of IP rights, but rather provides a minimum 
standard regime. In the latter, members are free to implement the envisaged provisions 
in the way that best suits their socioeconomic goals, bearing in mind other international 
obligations contracted in some other agreements such as human rights ones. 
Under these considerations the establishment of data exclusivity regime is not the most 
convincing interpretation of article 39. In fact, as confirmed by the interpretative steps 
taken in accordance with articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, namely that a 
treaty has to be understood in good faith, according to the ordinary meaning and in 
light of the its context, object and purpose, States have the sole obligation of protecting 




4 Flexibilities provided by the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health of 2001 
 
The previous parts of this Chapter have highlighted that the TRIPS agreement requires 
members to establish minimum standards of intellectual property protection within 
their domestic legal system in order to set up the so-called harmonization of IP laws. 
Accordingly, as a result of the ratification of the TRIPS agreement, patents extend to 
the protection of both processes and products of the pharmaceutical sector, thus 
creating a wide-ranging protection of originators’ medicines. As discussed throughout 
the entire dissertation, such comprehensive protection resulted in social challenges for 
developing countries, which in light of the high price of patented drugs could not 
always provide essential medicines to millions of affected people.  
Before TRIPS came into force, a large number of countries, which did not have 
sufficient productive capacity to manufacture locally the medicines required by their 
community, could depend with relative ease on imports from the countries that did have 
such infrastructure such as India, China or South Africa. At that time, the main 
producers of generics were free to supply the international market without any 
procedural barriers, since normally neither they nor the importing countries protected 
pharmaceutical products with patents.  
Since 1995 the situation has drastically changed. Currently, only countries which are 
not part of the WTO system have the possibility to lawfully ignore the TRIPS 
framework and, thus, to freely import or export medicines. In addition, the TRIPS itself 
established a transitional period of ten years for least developed countries following 
the entry into force of the agreement, as provided for by its Article 66597. 
This situation is currently unlikely because almost all the countries in the world are 
members of the WTO, and most importantly, least-developed countries subject to the 
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extension do not have productive capacity to take full advantage of such extension598. 
As a result, there is a strong need to analyze the flexibilities of the agreement, their 
practical application, and their ability to offer essential drugs at affordable prices. 
Indeed, the TRIPS Agreement contains specific flexibility mechanisms that are 
available to all signatories’ countries (although they were especially provided for 
developing countries) in light of the particular social and humanitarian needs that any 
country may encounter. Yet, the scope and meaning of some of the provisions 
regulating these flexibilities are still ambiguous. Some scholars have referred to a 
constructive ambiguity to explain the strategy behind the use of unclear language in 
many provisions of the WTO agreements. In fact, the wording of such provisions can 
be dynamically constructed in application and through interpretation depending on the 
particular circumstance and on the specific country involved599. Such ambiguity, which 
was successful for negotiations, however, resulted in harsh complications for 
developing countries wanting to implement such flexibilities, making their 
implementation contentious and ineffective600. 
Generally speaking, the first “flexibilities” pertinent to the right to health can be traced 
in the Preamble, in Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS. The preamble, which established the 
background and tone of the agreement, addressed the desire for a reduction of 
distortions and impediments to international trade, the recognition of the public policy 
objectives of national laws and, most importantly, the requirement to consent 
determined flexibility for least developed countries601 . The Preamble constitutes a 
crucial part of the Agreement when ambiguous provisions of the TRIPS need 
interpretation. Some scholars have highlighted that in comparison to the WIPO treaties, 
the TRIPS Preamble adopted a more economic and welfare-based approach, which, 
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thus, may require a more balanced understanding during interpretation602.  
The aforesaid Article 7, which concerns the objective of TRIPS, establishes that the 
protection and implementation of intellectual property protection is supposed to 
contribute to the dissemination of technology in a way that both users and producers 
can benefit from it, while taking into consideration both the social and economic 
welfare as well as the equilibrium of rights and obligations provided within. As a result, 
the value of intellectual property protection and enforcement is located within a 
general context of social welfare603. 
Likewise, Article 8 envisages some principles to reinforce TRIPS’ balance with socio-
economic provisions. Remarkably, Paragraph 1 explicitly relates to issues of public 
health and nutrition as well as vital areas of socio-economic and technological 
development, which members can take into consideration when implementing the 
Agreement in their domestic systems. In addition, Paragraph two aims to prevent 
owners abusing intellectual property in ways that might negatively distress trade or the 
international transfer of technology. Then, Paragraph 2 calls upon the desirability of 
technology transfer which is generally viewed as beneficial in economic and social 
development. These provisions suggest that policies adopted by Members to confront 
public health, nutrition and matters of significant socio-economic importance should 
be acknowledged to be consistent with TRIPS, and that any other Member wishing to 
question the exercise of discretion should accept the burden of proving inconsistency604. 
In this regard, some academic have highlighted that in light of a developmental 
understanding of Articles 7 and 8, that the TRIPS Agreement grants “considerable room” 
for national regulations to tackle two comprehensive topics. Firstly, the scope and 
boundaries of many legal concepts provided in Article 27 of the Agreement should be 
defined bearing in mind the principle envisaged in the latter two articles. For example, 
concepts such as invention, novelty, inventive step, and ordre public cannot be 
interpreted ignoring the developmental nature of the aforesaid provisions. Secondly, 
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these scholars argue the need to understanding Article 6 (labeled Exhaustion of rights), 
which concerns the exceptions to the patentee’s exclusive rights, as the theoretical 
foundation of one of the main flexibilities in the hands of developing countries, namely 
parallel importations605.  
At this point of the analysis, Article 30 of TRIPS deserves further inquiry. Such article 
envisages that signatory parties provide exception to the exclusive rights of patents’ 
holders provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties 606 . 
Nonetheless, the latter provision does not explicitly define the relevant exceptions, thus 
leaving a wide margin of discretion for domestic regulations, which can freely 
determine the scope and extent of such exceptions607. Remarkably, the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System (DSS) has highlighted that the conditions established by Article 30 
must be met autonomously from the other in light of their cumulative nature608. This 
position taken by the DSS is the ground on which other flexibilities rely, as it will be 
illustrated in the present section.  
The aforesaid flexibilities constitute general provisions which allow all countries to 
consider their health-related issues when implementing the agreement. 
Notwithstanding, such general flexibilities must be analyzed together with specific 
provisions of the agreement which offer practical tools at the disposal of developing 
countries. Accordingly, the focus of this section is on the TRIPS Agreement provisions 
on compulsory licensing and parallel importation and their implications for health in 
least developing countries in order to strike a balance between patents and access to 
medicines. This is because these two flexibilities are perhaps the most effective 
instruments for tackling the access to medicines dilemma. Remarkably, there is broad 
consensus on the acknowledgement of such flexibilities, but debates have arisen on 
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their scope and application. 
In conclusion, the aim of this section is to determine whether or not TRIPS may be able 
to accommodate right to health-related norms in light of the broad language provided 
within the treaty and of the flexibilities of its open-textured provisions. Such 
flexibilities may strike a balance between the public and private sphere interpreting 
intellectual property protection and trade promotion which are envisaged in TRIPS, 
consistently with the protection of public health, as one of the main public goods 
concerned. The actual issue is, however, to understand whether such flexibilities are 
satisfactory to give effect to the right to health and access to medicines in TRIPS. 
 
 
4.1 Compulsory licensing 
 
The compulsory licensing system provided for by the TRIPS has been the subject of 
massive debates. Such debates mainly revolved around the various requirements 
needed in order to use compulsory licenses which often led to formal accusations of 
breaching the Agreement against the countries that tried to take advantage of the 
aforesaid flexibility609. As it is easy to understand, the adoption of compulsory licenses 
has always been followed by substantial disagreement of patents’ holders, especially in 
the pharmaceutical sector. As a result, the circumstances and scope under which 
compulsory licenses may be granted are not well-defined, making the analysis on the 
relevance of compulsory licenses multifaceted and highly interesting610. This section 
provides an insight into the system established by TRIPS in relation to compulsory 
licensing.  
In accordance with article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, compulsory license does not 
stem from the autonomous and free will of the parties concerned, but rather from State 
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intervention which compulsory establishes a new legal relationship611. Consequently, 
compulsory licensing can be defined as an authorization issued by the government or 
by a judicial authority to use patented products without the consent of the holder of the 
patent right612. Public authorities must first try to negotiate with the patent holder for a 
voluntary license, if such attempt does not succeed a member state can then waiver this 
prerequisite in the circumstance of a national emergency, such as for the protection 
public health.  
The licensee can be a state, a company or any other interested party provided that 
adequate remuneration is paid. The right of the patent holder, thus, is converted from 
the enjoyment of the ius excludendi alios to receiving a royalty rate that is likely below 
what the patent owner would spontaneously negotiate613. In this regard, TRIPS does 
not provide any definition on what must be understood as “adequate compensation”, 
thereby allowing the parties concerned to provide different interpretations in their 
domestic laws. Some scholars have argued that in order to determine the quantum 
required for compensation, elements such as the economic development and growth of 
the country concerned must be considered614. 
Nonetheless, the quantum is usually determined in light of the relevant domestic law 
and of the practice of judicial or administrative bodies of the state in which the 
compulsory license was issued. 
Since the origin of the modern system of IP protection, compulsory licensing has been 
regarded as a tool of public policy as well as a fortunate mediation between the 
protection of inventions and the needs of the community 615 . In regard to 
pharmaceuticals products, compulsory licenses constitute a major tool since they act as 
                                               
611H. Hestermeyer, Human Rights and the WTO: The Case of Patents and Access to Medicines, Oxford 
University Press, 2007, 239.   
612X. Seuba, La protección de la salud ante la regulación internacional de los productos farmacéuticos, 
Marcial Pons, 2010, 270. 
613C. M. Ho, “Patent Breaking or Balancing?: Separating Strands of Fact from Fiction under TRIPS”, 34 
North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation 371, 2009, 373.   
614D. R. Cahoy, “Confronting Myths and Myopia on the Road from Doha”,  42 Georgia Law Review 
131, 2007, 143. 
615G. Segade, “Licencias obligatorias e invenciones farmacéuticas”, in La protección jurídica de las 
invenciones y la industria químico-farmacéutica,1974, 348. 
180 
 
a defense against misuses that may arise from the monopoly rights conferred by patents 
in order to enhance competition and to make medicines economical especially in cases 
of public health emergencies616. Some scholars have argued that such flexibility is the 
most important public policy tool at States’ disposal in light of the compulsory license 
capacity to limit the exercise of private rights in favor of the general interest617. In 
relation to medicines, economic or industrial considerations cannot be the only grounds 
for action, since social and humanitarian reasons must always be taken into account by 
public authorities618.  
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement establishes the regulatory framework for 
compulsory licensing. It must be noted that such provisions set out a more inclusive 
framework for the compulsory licensing of patented inventions than the one envisaged 
by the Paris Convention. Nonetheless, Article 31cannot be consider complete nor far-
reaching since may rely on other grounds to invoke the use of compulsory licensing619. 
Naturally, the scope and duration of compulsory license is not unlimited as the very 
reason for the authorization of the waiver stems from unconventional circumstances. 
This means that the use is limited in time and scope to the objective authorized within 
a license, which must terminate if and when the conditions which triggered it cease to 
exist and are improbable to persist620. 
In light of the wording of article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, countries are allowed to 
regulate several motives stated in their national laws for the use of compulsory licenses 
for pharmaceutical patents621. Yet, Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement makes explicit 
reference to five grounds on which member countries may grant compulsory licenses, 
on the condition that they comply with the requirements envisaged therein and they are 
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issued on a case by case approach. These grounds are: 
1. Refusal to deal (article 31 (b)) 
2. Emergency and extreme urgency (article 31 (b))  
3. Anti-competitive practices (article31(k))  
4. Non-commercial use (article 31(b))  
5. Dependent patents (article 31 (l)) 
 
These grounds leave room for wide interpretations, as it is not always easy to determine 
what a national emergency entail or the entire scope of anti-competitive practices. 
Nonetheless, in regard to the issue under consideration, namely access to essential 
medicines, the Doha Declaration of 2001, which will be further analyzed in the 
following sections, emphasized that the fight against HIV dissemination definitely falls 
under such category. 
In sum, when granting a compulsory license, the aforesaid conditions must be met. 
Then, each case must be examined on its individual merits under a case-by-case 
evaluation and decision. The subject requesting the issue of a compulsory license must 
preliminarily request the patentee for a voluntary license, indicating the scope and 
duration of the license demanded. Thirdly, the license must be non-exclusive and 
preferably for the domestic market. This entails that that a compulsory license aimed 
at supplying a third market, would be in breach of TRIPS, unless local supply is central 
or it comprises anti-competitive matters622. Fourthly, as already mentioned, the patent 
holder must both receive adequate remuneration as well as be granted the possibility 
of demanding the revision of decisions and revocation of the relevant license623. 
Notwithstanding, not everything that looks valuable or accurate turns out to be so. In 
practice, even though compulsory licenses are important tools in endorsing actual price 
negotiations with pharmaceutical companies holding patens and, thus, for permitting 
local access of patented medicines at affordable prices, they do require certain pre 
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conditions that not all the counties are actually able to meet. 
In order for a country to be able to appeal for compulsory licensing as a public policy 
tool to promote access to medications, such country must demonstrate that has the 
financial ability or technical capability to locally produce the relevant medicine. 
Secondly, when the party exploiting the patent is not a government (for example a 
generic company), an assessment of whether the relevant market has adequate 
purchasing power between the local population must be made in order to validate the 
investment made by the party. In countries such as Nicaragua or Belize, the population 
does not usually dispose of significant resources, which may guarantee returns for 
investment624 . Likewise, if is the government the party requesting the compulsory 
license (usually for government –use- or acting as an agent on behalf of the population 
buying the patented medicines), there must be proof of both financial resources and 
technical capability for an adequate use of the drug licensed. In addition, the relevant 
legal and political structure must be capable of granting and monitoring the licenses 
issued625. The latter preconditions, which may appear as simple technical requirements, 
constitute an actual obstacle for the appropriate use of the aforesaid flexibility. In fact, 
only developed countries and few developing countries, such as India and Brazil are 
able to make use of this mechanism effectively. Even more, developed countries such 
as the United States have argued that compulsory license can authorize only local 
production of a patented drug, making, thus, impossible for least developed countries, 
which often lack significant pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, to produce them 
within their boundaries. Such argument grounds on the requirement envisaged in 
Article 31 that products manufactured pursuant to a compulsory license shall be 
‘predominantly’ for the supply of domestic markets. The Doha Declaration of 2001 put 
the foundation stone for the amendment of such provision in a way more consistent 
with public health emergencies which trouble countries al over the word. As the 
following section provides, parallel importation is a significant tool in order to 
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overcome the difficulties stemming from the technicalities behind compulsory licenses. 
In conclusion, it worth mentioning one of the most important examples concerning 
compulsory licenses. Brazil, which is one of the main pillars of the so-called BRICS, 
paved the way for assuring that patents do not constitute an obstacle for the treatment 
of curable diseases. In particular, Brazil adopted new legislation in order to overcome 
patents monopoly and, thus, continuing to providing free ART for HIV-positive patients. 
Remarkably, such country has one of the most successful AIDS programs in the world, 
since relevant medicines are produced locally.  
In 2001, the USA started proceedings before the WTO DSS against Brazil after the 
latter threatened to issue compulsory licenses for specific ARVs 626 . International 
pharmaceutical companies threatened to withdraw investments from Brazil and 
persuaded the USA to request a WTO dispute settlement. The US complaint grounded 
on the alleged incompatibility of the recently established article 68 of the Brazilian IP, 
which permitted compulsory licensing if the patent holder did not produce a product 
locally within three years of the granting of the patent. The Brazilian government 
decided face American accusations, arguing that Article 68 was compliant with the 
spirit of the TRIPS Agreement, and in particular with 5.4 of the Paris Convention, 
which consents for compulsory licensing if the patent is not worked locally627. AIDS 
militants and activities as well as NGOs from all around the world strongly supported 
the Latin American Country. Such support pressured the USA to withdrew its WTO 
proceedings against Brazil, which was able to grant access to ARVs to millions of 
people in need628. This illustrates the huge power that compulsory license embodies 
and encouraged governments worldwide to threaten compulsory licensing. The sole 
threatening sufficed in allowing governments to negotiate massive price discounts for 
ARVs from main pharmaceutical corporations. 
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4.2 Parallel importations  
 
The previous section studied the significance of compulsory licensing in the access to 
medicines context, especially highlighting the challenges that such flexibilities provide 
for developing countries in practice. In this section, the highly debated issues of 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights and parallel importation are illustrated in 
relation to access to medicines in the developing world.  
The exhaustion of rights, often referred to as “first sale” doctrine, constitutes one of the 
most significant principles relating to intellectual property (IP) law. This principle 
entails that once a patent holder puts, or authorizes others (an assignee or a licensee) to 
put on the market patented products, the patentee control over the sale and movement 
of goods is exhausted629. It must be noted that such principle merely concerns the rights 
of commercialization of the product and not its production or development. 
Accordingly, the control over the sale of the dispensed goods shifts from the patent 
holder to the buyer for reselling, lending and other third-party commercial uses630. 
The reasoning behind this principle are quite intuitive: by failing to apply the 
exhaustion of rights doctrine the patentee would exercise a perpetual over all the phases 
of production, distribution and use of the patented goods. In fact, once the patentee has 
placed the product on the market before any other competitors, the former has already 
gained an economic competitive advantage which is the foundation of intellectual 
property law. As a result, widening the control of patent holders beyond the point of 
the first sale implies authorizing measures detrimental to the free movement of goods 
and services, which, it is, thus, vital for preventing distortions in all market-based 
economies. Hence, the main goal of exhaustion regimes is to strike and preserve a 
balance between the public interest of assuring free movement of innovative goods on 
the one hand, and the private interest of patent holders, namely compensation for their 
innovative efforts on the other631. 
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While the exhaustion of IP rights appears a logical principle for limiting patentees’ 
privileges, it was cause of multiple debates during the negotiations of the TRIPS 
Agreement 632 . Three were the main positions under discussion. Firstly, national 
exhaustion entails that once a product has been sold (lawfully), patent rights are 
exhausted only within the boundaries of a patent-granting member. The second is 
international exhaustion, which means that the patent rights are exhausted after the first 
authorized sale of patented products anywhere in the world633. The last doctrine, which 
constitutes an intermediate approach between the former two, is regional exhaustion. 
Accordingly, patent rights are exhausted after the first authorized sale of patented goods 
in any country part of a free trade or customs union agreement.  
A renowned example is the exhaustion regime endorsed by the European Economic 
Area (EEA)634.  
During the TRIPS negotiations, developed countries such as the United States and 
Switzerland, were in favor of adopting a rule of national exhaustion, while developing 
countries supported either an international exhaustion regime or granting members 
with the discretion to decide which regime would better suit their national policies. 
Thus, these debates resulted in Article 6 of such Agreement, which ambiguously 
acknowledges the right of any member to freely determine the type of exhaustion 
regime that better accommodate their needs, pending compliance with the WTO non-
discrimination principles (national treatment and most favored nation clause)635. 
It is now clear that the concepts of exhaustion of rights and parallel importation are 
strongly interconnected, since patented products can be imported only after the 
intellectual property rights enshrined within them have been exhausted. In other words, 
once such rights are exhausted, the importation of products from lower prices 
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jurisdictions allows to make the goods accessible at lower price in the importing 
jurisdiction. This scenario refers to parallel importation, which evidently constitutes a 
significant tool for the importation of cheaper drugs. In addition, the decision of 
whether to endorse an international, regional or national exhaustion regime does have 
a strong impact on international trade and disposal of affordable medicines636 . For 
example, if a country adopts a national exhaustion regime, the sale of a patented 
medicine in another country has no impact on the former, since the patentee does not 
lose his rights to resale the good in the first country. Most importantly, in such case the 
patent holder is entitled to oppose patented medicines importation in the country 
adopting national exhaustion regime. 
Parallel imports are a measure concerning the importation, without the consent of the 
patent holder, of a patented product which has a lower price in the exporting country637. 
Since there is a well-established differentiated policy concerning the costs of medicines 
in the different countries, the importation of drugs from third countries at prices more 
accessible to those of the domestic market, represents an economic advantage for the 
final consumer, who is, thus, able to choose between a greater number of alternatives638. 
Therefore, the parallel import of drugs or any other good becomes a suitable tool to 
increase competition in markets where the supply is controlled by one or very few 
companies639. 
Nonetheless, parallel importation should not be confused with neither official 
importation nor with illegal trade of pirated goods. The basic difference rests on the 
fact that while parallel imports were meant to be manufactured and sold in a specific 
market, the goods reached the final consumers in a different market without the 
authorization of the patentee. This scenario demonstrates that parallel imports can 
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expressively affect producers’ revenues when the sales occur in low price markets 
instead of in high price markets640. This is due to the fact that companies, although they 
sell more quantities of products, do so in countries where the fixed price is lower. In 
addition, the importer can capitalize on the price difference by transferring and 
exporting the drugs for sale in a country with higher prices. 
In particular, the patent protection mechanism allows originator companies to exploit 
their exclusive right through a price discrimination strategy by selling the same drug in 
different countries at different prices. For this reason, it is important to emphasize that 
the term parallel imports do not refer to the importation of low-cost generic products, 
but should be understood as the transfer of commercial quantities of the original drug 
in order to benefit from the price difference.  
Many countries, such as the US and EU members, argue that importing a patented drug 
into another country constitutes a violation of the intellectual property rights of the 
originator pharmaceutical companies. On the other hand, developing countries argued 
that parallel imports are based on the aforesaid principle of exhaustion of rights. In 
other words, there is a prohibition related to the production and sale of the protected 
drug, unless the generic company explicitly notifies the sale of a patented product, 
conferring the buyer all the normal rights of an owner, including the right of resale.  
It is important to stress that the marketing of medicines is usually carried out through 
private supply contracts, thus generating legal effects only between the contracting 
parties, and not against third parties. Secondly, parallel imports do not affect the overall 
sales volume of the pharmaceutical companies, but they reduce their total revenues and 
profits641.  
Furthermore, parallel importations may be passive or active642. Passive parallel imports, 
which are the most common method of parallel importation, take place when third 
parties purchase patented goods in a country and then resell them in its domestic 
                                               
640C. Stothers, “State of the Art: Parallel Trade and Free Trade Agreements”, Journal of Intellectual 
Property Law & Practice, 2006, 578. 
641Slotboom, The Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights, 425. 
642 It is worth noting that both these measures must comply with identical border standards pertinent to 
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market643. On the other hand, active parallel imports occur when an arbitrageur of the 
IPR holder sells the relevant goods in the patent holder’s country, or in another licensee 
or distributor’s country, thereby directly competing with the official local distributor in 
the importing country. In other words, the imported goods circulate outside the official 
distribution channels chosen by the authorized owner, turning active importations in a 
breach of contractual obligations committed by the arbitrageur. For this reason, 
international licensing and distribution agreements usually include ad hoc clauses 
aimed at both segregating international markets as well as establishing a prohibition on 
“invasions” of the patented products in parts of competence644.  
The concept of parallel importations triggered the opposition of the pharmaceutical 
industry, which claimed both that parallel importation of patented products is 
incompatible with Article 28 of TRIPS as well as that Article 6 only constitutes a 
procedural mechanisms in order to prevent members from starting proceedings actions 
against another member before the WTO dispute settlement system for infringement of 
the provisions envisaged in the latter article645. 
Such argument, however, cannot be accepted. Article 28, which does confer the 
patentee the right to forbid the importation of its goods without express consent, must 
be read together with Article 6, and thus, in light of the aforementioned exhaustion of 
rights principle. As a result, in cases in which a specific country adopts either the 
regional or international exhaustion principle, the patentee cannot resort to Article 28 
to contain the parallel importation of a patented medicine precisely put on the market 
by himself or under its authorization. At the same time, it should not be ignored that 
the TRIPS agreement merely established a minimum standard for IP protection, thus, 
allowing Members states to impose most advanced provisions than those envisaged by 
the latter treaty.  
In conclusion, an extensive interpretation of Article 6 becomes central for the 
protection of the right to access to medicines in the developing world, since it 
                                               
643 Bonadio, Parallel Imports in a Global Market, 157. 
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645 H. E. Bale, “The Conflicts Between Parallel Trade and Product Access and Innovation: The Case of 
Pharmaceuticals”, Journal of International Economic Law 637, 1999, 641. 
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constitutes another tool that countries can adopt in order to lower prices and thus 
enhance competition. Allowing parallel trade for patented medicines which have been 
put on the market by the IP owner seems to be effective to such end. Another option, 
which is relevant when countries adopt a national exhaustion of right approach, would 
be allowing pharmaceutical companies to use differential price strategy to provide 
accessible medicines in light of the particular situation of the country646. The solution 
that seems more adequate would be a combination of the latter two arguments, namely 
allowing parallel imports as well as promoting differential pricing for pharmaceutical 
corporations. In fact, depending solely on the benevolence of the private sector does 
not seem a viable path in order to satisfy the health needs that the developing world 
faces constantly. And more importantly, pharmaceutical companies could perhaps raise 
the prices of such medicines in developed world in order to recoup the potential loss 
that the differential pricing might entail. Nonetheless, as it will be illustrated in the next 
sections, the Doha Declaration has clarified the scope of Article 6 of TRIPS, clarifying 
that each country is “free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion without 
challenge”. 
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4.3 Other flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement 
 
As outlined at the end of last section, apart from compulsory licensing and parallel 
imports, another mechanism to grant access to affordable drug is for pharmaceuticals 
companies to adopt a differential pricing strategy. This ensures that prices in the least 
developed countries are as low as possible, compared to most developed countries, 
where high prices are maintained and incentives for research and development. 
However, this strategy constitutes a free commercial choice for pharmaceutical 
companies and does not belong to the legal framework related to intellectual property. 
Similarly, even if large pharmaceutical companies agree to adopt this measure in the 
poorest countries, the price may remain unaffordable and inaccessible to them. 
The object and extent of IP flexibilities may apply to non-commercial and commercial 
uses and, may differ substantially depending on the domestic regulations’ taken into 
account. Accordingly, if on the one hand Article 30 of TRIPS provides States with the 
discretion to regulate the flexibilities at their disposal, on the other, such provision 
determines substantive requirements for their admissibility. These other flexibilities or 
exceptions refer to the use of the invention for teaching and research, commercial 
experimentation on the patented drug to try and make it more effective, and trials 
conducted with the aim at seeking regulatory approval for the selling of a drug after the 
expiration of a patent647. The latter exception, which is often referred as early working 
or regulatory review exception, functions automatically, which implies that the use of 
such exception does not require an a priori particular authorization from a 
governmental authority or judicial body, unlike, the aforementioned compulsory 
licenses under article 31 TRIPS. As a result, it is likely that such exceptions constitute 
the legal grounds for proceedings before the WTO dispute settlement body648. 
The early working or regulatory review exception is commonly known as the Bolar 
exception or provision. According to this provision, a patented drug can be used 
without authorization in order to facilitate regulatory approval of a generic drug before 
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the patent expires. In other words, the conduct of research and testing necessary for the 
approval of the marketing of the drug before the competent national authority does not 
constitute an infringement of IP rights649. This permits generic manufacturers to use the 
test data of the originator companies and, thus, to prepare generic drugs before the 
expiry of the patent in order to anticipate their sale in the market. Such anticipation 
would de facto limit the patentee’s period of market exclusivity of the relevant 
medicine650. 
The origin of the Bolar exception can be traced in the case Roche Products Inc v Bolar 
Pharm Co, settled by the USA Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (‘CAFC’) in 
1984651. Without going too far in the case, the latter resulted in the legitimization of 
clinical trials and other tests carried out on patented medicines with the object of 
proving the bio-equivalency of the generic drug under examination. Consequently, the 
case legitimized the submission of information for the drug regulator to secure approval. 
At the WTO level, the case that constitutes a landmark in relation to the opportunity to 
adopt the Bolar exception is the Canada – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical 
Products case of 2000 652 . This case concerned the allegedly unlawful reform of 
Canada’s patent law, which introduced two provisions limiting the exclusive rights of 
patent holders: the first one provided that submitting information for regulatory 
approval before competent national authority (basically the Bolar exception) would not 
be an infringement of patent rights. The second provision established the stockpiling 
exception, which entails the lawfulness of manufacturing and storing generic products 
in the period immediately prior to the expiration of the 20-year related patent term 
(usually such period referred to six months before the patent’s expiration)653. 
EU members lodged a complaint against Canada before the WTO system alleging that 
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the aforesaid limitations to patent rights were neither compliant to the 
nondiscrimination principle as enshrined in article 27.1 TRIPS, nor to “limited 
exceptions” as stated under Article 30. According to the EU such provisions would 
allow a detrimental treatment of pharmaceutical inventions in comparison to inventions 
in other fields of technology 654 . In addition, the claimant argued that the Bolar 
exception would infringe the 20-year minimum patent term as provided by article 33 
TRIPS as well as the rights conferred to the patent holder under Article 30655. On the 
other hand, Canada responded that the newly reformed Patent Act was providing 
justifiable limited exceptions in compliance with article 30 of TRIPS. The WTO 
dispute panel upheld the adoption of the Bolar exception within the Canadian law as 
compatible with Article 30, while the stockpiling exception was rejected as was found 
to in breach of 28.1656.  
Accordingly, the Panel’s ruling in the aforesaid case confirmed that in light of Article 
30 TRIPS, three requirements must be satisfied so as to be considered a lawful 
exception under the TRIPS Agreement: firstly, the measure has to be “limited”; 
secondly, the measure must not “unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of 
the patent”; and lastly, the measure must not “unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third 
parties”657. The panel emphasized that “the three conditions are cumulative, each being 
a separate and independent requirement that must be satisfied” and that the “three 
conditions must, of course, be interpreted in relation to each other. Each of the three 
must be presumed to mean something different from the other two, or else there would 
be redundancy” 658. 
In conclusion, the Bolar provision constitutes a significant flexibility in order to 
concretely protect the right to access to medicines in developing countries. As the 
aforementioned Panel highlighted the Bolar exception is sufficiently limited as it only 
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permitted to adopt specific measures in order to obtaining regulatory drug approval, 
thus being compliant with the spirit and scope of the IPs provisions envisaged by the 
TRIPS. If such exception was not permitted, a generic pharmaceutical producer must 
wait the expiration of the patent to manufacture the generic version which would result 
in a de facto extension of the monopoly for the patent holder, and, thus, in the 
inaccessibility of greatly needed medicines. 
 
 
4.4 The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
 
On November 14th, 2001 the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha (Qatar) 
unanimously adopted the Doha Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
(Doha Declaration) 659 . The Declaration’s aim was to amplify the scope of health 
considerations in regard to the TRIPS Agreement. In this regard, it is worth noting that 
the title of the Declaration was not narrowed to mere reference to pharmaceutical 
products or processes but rather to public health in general in order to include a far 
wider range of situations and matters660. 
The background of the Declaration is significant for determining the causes which led 
to the endorsement of the document. A number of events taking place few years before 
the Ministerial Conference in Doha emphasized the necessity to elucidate the flexibility 
within TRIPS in relation to public health661.  
The first case worth mentioning regards South Africa. At the end of the nineties, the 
latter country was facing a great growth in HIV infection rates, which further 
aggravated the scale of the public health problem. South Africa quickly converted into 
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the country with the greatest absolute number of people affected with HIV/AIDS662. 
Accordingly, in 1997, the South African Parliament adopted a new Section (15C) into 
the South African Medicines and Related Substances Control Act (MRSCA) allowing 
compulsory licensing, parallel importation and price regulation with the purpose of 
enhancing access to medicines and, thus, addressing the HIV/AIDS crisis. The new 
legislation triggered the reaction of the pharmaceutical industry, with both the support 
of the USA and EU, on the grounds of its alleged incompatibility with the TRIPS 
Agreement. Accordingly, the former U.S. Ambassador to South Africa, James Joseph, 
addressed the South African government, emphasizing the urgent need for South Africa 
to amend the aforesaid Section 15C663. As a result, South Africa was also put on US 
Trade watch list since the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) determined that South 
Africa required adequate intellectual property protection to such a degree as motivating 
bilateral confrontations. an extent that merited bilateral attention664. Being on the watch 
list implied the highly chance of being subject to economic sanction by the US, such 
as the burden of unilateral trade sanctions which would be detrimental for South 
African economy. The US Government threatened to start proceedings before the WTO 
system, but strong international campaign in support of South Africa along with intense 
bilateral negations resulted in the US withdrawal in September 1999665.  
The second case leading up to the Doha Declaration concerned the aforementioned US 
vs Brazil controversy, which was examined in the previous sections.  
Remarkably, public health related emergencies do not concern solely developing 
countries. For example, in 2001, soon after the 9/11 attacks, anonymous letters 
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containing anthrax were found in the US.  
Bayer Pharmaceuticals held patent rights on the only available treatment for anthrax 
named Cipro666. Accordingly, both the US and Canada did not doubt in threatening 
Bayer to limit its patent’s rights, which, thus illustrates that public health emergencies 
can affect all countries and that in such cases patent protection should be restricted to 
the advantage of public health considerations667. Eventually, the US threaten to Bayer 
to acquire Cipro at more affordable prices, was kind of a paradox since the same 
strategy has been adopted by Brazil to obtain economical HIV/AIDS medicines. 
Nonetheless, as seen in this chapter, the US Government had criticized and prosecuted 
Brazil for the very same behavior adopted by the former country in response to the 
anthrax emergency. 
At the same time, it cannot be ignored that the period in between the end and beginning 
of the last century was the climax of HIV/AIDS pandemic worldwide. The UN General 
Assembly addressed this emergency by calling upon UN Members to gather in a special 
session on HIV/AIDS. This resulted in the adoption of a Declaration of Commitment668, 
which, then, led to the endorsement of the Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS and other 
related infectious diseases669.  
In conclusion, the adoption of the declaration triggered a significant change in the 
political and legal relations within the WTO. On the one hand, the close cooperation 
between the group of least developed and developing countries demonstrated their 
ability to organize and form joint strategies in defense of their common interests, unlike 
what happened 8 years earlier during the negotiation of the TRIPS agreement when 
sporadic and isolated niches of opposition, represented by Brazil and India, were the 
only focuses of action that underscored the implications that the agreement would have 
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on public health. The attitude led by the African Group exhibits a new paradigm in 
participation, which illustrated the will of the South to be an active player in addressing 
health related concerns. 
The same concerns were shared within the WTO system. In particular, special attention 
was delivered at least developed countries, which were the ones more affected by the 
actual ineffectiveness of the Article 31(f) provisions. The WTO, thus, emphasized: 
“WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing capabilities in the 
pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory 
licensing under the TRIPS Agreement670”. 
In light of the aforementioned scenario, the circumstances were favorable for the 
adoption of a Declaration which clarified the extent and scope of members rights in 
order to adopt the aforesaid TRIPS flexibilities.  
 
 
4.4.1 The content and scope of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health 
 
The Doha Declaration, while confirming the obligations envisaged by the TRIPS 
Agreement, acknowledged the right of members to issue compulsory licenses and to 
regulate the grounds upon which such flexibilities can be adopted671 . Accordingly, 
members have ample discretion in determining the grounds for what constitutes a 
national emergency or other conditions of extreme urgency, for example in cases 
concerning HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics. The Declaration 
also reaffirmed the right of each member to selectin the regime for exhaustion of 
intellectual property rights they find most suitable for their specific situation, pending 
compliance with the most favored nation’s clause and national treatment principles of 
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Articles 3 and 4 of TRIPS672. 
The complete Declaration is made of 7 paragraphs. The first three paragraphs illustrate 
the challenges to be considered and also recognized both the significant function that 
intellectual property rights play in favor of the development of new drugs as well as 
the topic of high prices as a result of intellectual property protection673. 
Paragraph 4 established the major objective of the Declaration: “We agree that the 
TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to 
protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS 
Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Member’s right to protect public health 
and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all. In this connection, we re-
affirm the right of WTO Members to use to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS 
Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose674. 
In light of the important function of the latter paragraph, many controversies arose on 
its interpretations. The legal analysis of the Declaration will be provided in the next 
section, but some considerations regarding the interpretation of Paragraph 4 are 
significant at this point of the study. On the one hand, some scholars have highlighted 
that a formal interpretation of TRIPS must rely on an official “recommendation” by the 
TRIPS Council in light of Article IX(2) of WTO Agreement675.  
On the other hand, the alleged severity of this provision may be softened by the way in 
which paragraph 4 begins, namely with “we agree”. Such wording illustrates that the 
Declaration is made in the form of an agreement and the function of the Declaration 
has already suggested its interpretive status 676 . As a result, this paragraph has 
elucidated the purposes of members of TRIPS to interpret TRIPS provisions in a way 
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favorable to public health-related concerns677. 
Paragraph 5 of the Declaration identified and confirmed the flexibilities provided by 
TRIPS, highlighting the need to interpret the TRIPS in light of its object and purpose 
in light of customary rules of interpretation of public international law. In addition, the 
paragraph clarified the scope of flexibilities such as compulsory licensing and 
exhaustion of rights678. 
Paragraph 6 stressed the worrying situation of members, mainly least developed 
countries, which lack adequate manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector 
and are, thus, incapable of taking advantage of TRIPS’ flexibilities. For that reason, 
members urged the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem679. 
This second part of the paragraph holds great legal values since it constitutes the 
grounds for future TRIPS amendment. Accordingly, in light of such provision, the 
WTO Council adopted a relevant decision in 2003680 and a subsequent Decision in 
2005681, thereby amending the TRIPS Agreement for the first time. The Article 31bis 
was introduced into the agreement.  
The last paragraph, Paragraph 7, focused on two main perspectives: first, the provision 
concerns the “commitment of developed-country members to provide incentives to their 
enterprises and institutions to promote and encourage technology transfer to least-
developed country members pursuant to Article 66.2” 682 . Secondly, paragraph 7 
addressed another significant flexibility for developing countries, namely the extension 
of transitional periods, which exempted least developing countries from complying 
with relevant provisions of TRIPS concerning pharmaceutical products683. The 2001 
Doha Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health had already urged the TRIPS 
Council to extend the period for compliance on pharmaceuticals until 2016. Such 
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instruction was promptly heard by the TRIPS Council, which formally adopted a 
decision implementing this extension. Remarkably, the TRIPS Council adopted another 
decision in November 2015, thereby further extending the transition period until 1 
January 2033 or if a particular country no longer belong to the least developed category 
if that happens before 2033684.  
In conclusion, the Doha Declaration has actually performed as an important tool for 
the interpretation of TRIPS by the Ministerial Conference and the recommendation for 
such an interpretation is approximately a formal “recommendation” by the TRIPS 
Council, examined with the draft text of the negotiation basis of the Doha 
Declaration685. 
The next section focuses on the legal consequences that such amendment had on the 
interpretation and implementation of the TRIPS, while the last addresses the legal 
status of the Declaration. 
 
 
4.4.2 The “Paragraph 6 Decision” and the 2017 TRIPS Amendment of 2017 
 
On the 23 January 2017, the amendment to the WTO Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement entered into force. This date 
constitutes a milestone for the organization, as it marks the first time since the 
organization that WTO agreements have been amended. This significant goal, however, 
was not achieved in one day. As it was presented in the last section, the Doha 
Declaration constituted the first step in order to ease poor countries’ access to 
affordable medicines.  
In accordance with WTO law, a two-thirds threshold is required to formally bring an 
amendment to a WTO agreement into force. This happened at the beginning of 2017, 
when the WTO Secretariat received notifications from five additional members, which 
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have ratified the protocol amending the TRIPS Agreement686.  
The formal steps, which ended in the TRIPS amendment, can be summarized as follows. 
First, in 2001 the Doha Declaration shed light on the use of TRIPS flexibilities for least 
developed countries, with a particular focus on compulsory licensing. Secondly, on 30 
August 2003, the General Council adopted a decision labelled “the Implementation of 
paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health” (2003 Decision) 
with the objective of elucidating technical aspects of the Doha declaration, mostly the 
acknowledgment of the “eligible importing members” and “eligible exporting 
members”. The clarification related to eligible importing and exporting members has 
practical consequences both in relation to the use of compulsory licensing as well as 
parallel importation. Moreover, the 2003 Decision provided useful provisions aimed at 
clarifying the measures that States had to adopt in order to prevent alterations of 
medicines687. This Decision should be regarded as an official act of the WTO in order 
to confer a legitimate waiver of rights and obligations under TRIPS 688 . Both the 
Decision content and its legal source (WTO General Council) demonstrate that the 
aforesaid waiver was meant to be permanent unless a formal amendment was adopted 
to replace the related provisions689.  
From an interpretative perspective, these considerations hold very significant legal 
value. In fact, any interpretation of the TRIPS agreement needed to take the waiver of 
the rights and obligations into account until a formal amendment is made690. This shows 
continuity with the Doha Declaration of 2001, even though the 2003 Decision focused 
mainly of paragraph 6 of such Declaration. 
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The last step before the TRIPS amendment was taken when the Council for the TRIPS 
Agreement submitted a proposal for an amendment to the TRIPS on 6 December 
2005691. This amendment proposal was a further clarification of the General Council 
Decision of 30 August 2003 on the Implementation of Paragraph 6. The General 
Council adopted the Decision on the Amendment of TRIPS (2005 Decision) to adjust 
TRIPS, and Article 31bis constituted the main proposed amendment692. 
This Decision further illustrates the intent of the members to protect health rights 
related concerns as well as to the intent of the members to attend certain important 
complications faced by countries without sufficient manufacturing capacity. In sum, 
the decision secured a legal pathway to access affordable medicines under WTO for 
developing countries allowing the export of medicines by the conferral of compulsory 
licenses to manufacturers within their own jurisdictions693.  
In this regard, at this point of the analysis it is important to examine the new provisions 
introduced by Article 31-bis. Former Article 31allowed Members to grant compulsory 
licenses allowing the use of a patented invention, without the authorization of the patent 
holder, by the government or a third party.  
Nonetheless, Article 31(f), provided the limit that “any such use shall be authorized 
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such 
use”. Such provision clearly discriminates between members that have the capacity to 
manufacture pharmaceutical products on the one hand, and least developed countries 
on the other, which could not grant compulsory licenses to their own generic companies 
authorizing the manufacture and sale of the patented drugs. For this reason, at the time 
of former Article 31, the country that lacked pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity 
was incapable of effectively using compulsory licensing to secure access of lower-cost 
generic versions of patented medicines: firstly, the country could not authorize a 
locally-situated manufacturer; secondly, hence the country had to depend on a 
                                               
691  Implementation of Paragraph 11 of the General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 on the 
Implementation of the Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health: 
Proposal for a Decision on an Amendment to TRIPS, WTO Doc IP/C/41 (6 December 2005) 
692 Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO Doc WT/L/641(8 December 2005). 




compulsory license being granted in another country to approve the production of 
generics; and lastly, the aforesaid provision envisaging the predominant use to supply 
the domestic market of the country that already has the manufacturing capacity limited 
further importation to countries in need. 
The new provisions introduced by Article 31-Bis, primarily refer to some procedural 
requirements which read as follows: firstly, both the importing and exporting country 
issue a compulsory license in order to authorize generic production; secondly, all 
importing countries, except least developed ones, must notify TRIPS of their desire and 
entitlement to adopt compulsory licensing. Lastly, members must specify in the 
aforesaid notifications all the details concerning the medicines produced and must 
provide special packaging to it in order to distinguish it from other medicines. 
Once the aforementioned requirements are met, the member lacking manufacturing 
capacities has the right to ask another member to issue compulsory licensing for the 
production of the required medicine, without any other member being able to oppose 
such actions694. Such provisions established the legal basis for WTO members to issue 
special compulsory licenses exclusively for the production and export of accessible 
generic medicines to other members that could not domestically produce the required 
medicines in sufficient quantities for their population. The domestic use requirement of 
former Article 31 was, thus, overcome and a more health-friendly environment was 
established by the TRIPS amendment.   
Notwithstanding, the WTO has been accused of failing to resolve some outstanding 
issues to ensure production and export of generic medicines to countries that do not 
produce, which some say is indicative of the fact that the optimism felt at Doha was 
premature. Some of these concerns raised will be discussed below.   
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4.4.3 Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health 
 
It is widely accepted that the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health cannot be regarded as a simple political commitment 695 . Nonetheless, the 
Declaration precise legal status is still ambiguous696. Some scholars have pointed out 
that its language imply that the Declaration must be intended as to interpret TRIPS, and, 
thus, should be regarded as an authoritative legal interpretation697. Such consideration, 
if accepted, leads to granting legal force to the Declaration, especially in a dispute 
settlement case. 
The issue of what is the legal status of the Doha Declaration becomes particularly 
contentious as no official text specifies the binding power of the declarations emanating 
from the WTO ministerial conferences. In this regard, under article IX, para. 2, the 
Ministerial Conference and the General Council have the exclusive authority to adopt 
interpretations of the WTO, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the other 
Multilateral Trade Agreements698 ; it is, thus, generally accepted that interpretations 
rendered according to Article IX are “authoritative” and legally binding for all 
Members and the adjudicating bodies of the Organization699; in light of the latter article, 
depending on the subject matter under consideration, the Ministerial Conference and 
the General Council shall exercise such authority pursuant to a recommendation by the 
respective Council overseeing the agreement (for example, if the question regards the 
interpretation of the GATT, General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), or TRIPS 
Agreement, the respective council has to recommend the interpretation to the aforesaid 
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bodies). It is important to stress that the interpretative function, of which the highest 
WTO decision-making political bodies are vested in accordance with Article IX, 
exceeds the task played by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)700. In fact, the power 
of interpretation of the DSB to elucidate existing provisions of relevant agreements is 
limited by the restraints envisaged by Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU)701. On the contrary, the power of the Ministerial Conference and 
the General Council to interpret relevant povisions under Article IX is not bound to 
such restraints, with the only limitation concerning that such authoritative 
interpretation must not subvert the amendment provisions as laid down in Article X of 
the Marrakesh Agreement702. Accordingly, the aim of authoritative interpretations is to 
clarify and to refine the meaning and scope of existing obligations, ‘not to modify their 
content’703. Yet, the extent to which authoritative interpretations may or may not change 
the WTO law is still controversial 704 . Some scholars argue that if authoritative 
interpretations were not able to modify the law, it could effectively clarify existing 
obligations only in accordance with the Vienna Convention interpretation rules705. The 
same scholars emphasized that under a strict legal perspective the application of the 
Vienna rules of interpretation does not make much sense for a decision emanating from 
a non-judicial, political organ that normally does not have the mandate, the habit and 
experience, nor the needed format (especially size) to interpret legal rules in the 
manner known from judicial bodies. Such an understanding would also excessively 
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restrict the purpose for which an authoritative interpretation could be used706.  
In light of the aforesaid considerations, the present understanding regarding the power 
to interpret WTO provisions by the Ministerial Conference and the General Council 
falls somewhere between ‘clarification’ and ‘amendment’707. Unfortunately, a proper 
analysis on the latter issue cannot depart from mere theoretical assumptions. indeed, 
WTO practice on Article IX:2 is insufficient, since no organ has adopted any 
authoritative interpretation to date708. 
In this regard, it is not clear if the Doha Declaration can be considered as an 
authoritative interpretation pursuant to Article IX709 . Therefore, the alternatives for 
resolving this issue span a broad spectrum, ranging from depriving the document of 
any binding force to its concrete use in the interpretation of any agreement covered by 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, as occurred in the Shrimp-Turtle decision710 with 
the Singapore Ministerial Declaration711 . Whatever the result, it is certain that the 
declaration is not self-executing and it is therefore up to the Member States to make 
the necessary amendments to their legislation in order to introduce the changes for 
implementation.  
Nonetheless, the U.S. government, through the report of its trade representative, has 
qualified the declaration as a political declaration, without any legally binding power712. 
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To uphold this view is especially difficult after analyzing the circumstances, language, 
and level of participation and support surrounding the declaration. Indeed, the 
negotiation of the Doha text denotes the concern expressed by both developing as well 
as industrialized countries713. In fact, the USA was one of the states that most actively 
participated in the discussions, presenting various texts and drafts. Once the negotiating 
process was over, the declaration was adopted by consensus, without the abstention or 
dissent of any WTO member. These facts already shed light on the importance of the 
declaration, in which all members expressed their concern, something that proves a 
legal status that goes beyond a mere commitment of good intentions714. 
Likewise, the drafting process of the declaration, in which the most important organs 
of the WTO organization participated, could meet the requirements needed in order to 
consider such Declaration as the other extreme of what was postulated by the USA, 
namely that the declaration is an official decision or is an authoritative or authentic 
interpretation of TRIPS715. In this regard, the difference between an authoritative or 
authentic interpretation is quite slim but significant. On the one hand, an authoritative 
interpretation implies that such interpretation stems from an international organ 
specifically empowered to so by, for example, the treaty establishing an international 
organization716. In particular, in relation to the WTO system, such organ is the General 
Council. On the other hand, an act of interpretation is called authentic when is 
undertaken by the parties to that treaty themselves, namely States717. In both cases, 
however, the interpreted provisions are legally binding on all the parties of the 
organization. 
If the Declaration is regarded as a Decision, the procedure established by the WTO 
establishing Treaty must be met. Accordingly, in order to adopt a decision, both the 
Ministerial Conference and the General Council of the WTO must follow the 
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provisions of Art. IX (1) and Art. IX (2) of the agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organization of 1994718. It could be argued that in practice the declaration meets the 
requirements to be a decision because the agreement was discussed by all members in 
the TRIPS Council for a period of several months; once the discussions in that body 
were over, the obligation to reach a consensus was transferred to the WTO General 
Council, which forwarded its results to the ministerial conference in Doha that issued 
the agreed declaration by consensus, as required by Art. IX (1)719 . Moreover, the 
language used in the declaration is the same as would be expected from a decision, 
since, for examples paragraph 4 of Declaration reads as follows: “We agree that the 
TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to 
protect public health”720. 
Once it has been demonstrated that the mode of approval apparently followed the 
decision-making framework established in the WTO, that the participating bodies had 
the required competence and that the content of the declaration is of enormous 
importance and is expressed, at times, as an agreement, it could be concluded that the 
Doha Declaration is a decision. Nonetheless, some scholars have argued that such 
conclusion is erroneous, since an interpretation was never expressly requested by States, 
nor by a TRIPS Council recommendation. In addition, while the Declaration was 
adopted by unanimous consensus, it was endorsed by a three-fourths majority of 
members within the General Council as required by WTO law721. With that being said, 
it could still be claimed, that the Declaration can be regarded as in a ministerial decision 
in practice722.  
Nonetheless, to affirm that the Doha declaration is a ministerial conference decision 
would be to ignore its character as a declaration and in so doing to forcibly 
accommodate it in a category that does not correspond to it. Indeed, other acts of the 
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WTO organs can also be source of WTO law, even though it is still ambiguous whether 
such other acts establish binding provisions on the WTO parties723. 
The aforementioned debates on the legal status of the Declaration have, perhaps, come 
to an end in June 2018. At that time, the ad hoc WTO panel established to address a 
dispute concerning Australia’s legislation on plain packaging for tobacco products, 
reached the conclusion that 2001 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health has to be considered an agreement on the interpretation of the TRIPS724. 
This ruling constitutes a landmark decision in order to provide legally binding status to 
the Declaration. Accordingly, the Panel has argued that the Declaration “constitutes a 
“subsequent agreement” of WTO Members within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) of 
the Vienna Convention. As the Appellate Body has clarified: Based on the text of Article 
31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention, we consider that a decision adopted by Members 
may qualify as a “subsequent agreement between the parties” regarding the 
interpretation of a covered agreement or the application of its provisions if: (i) the 
decision is, in a temporal sense, adopted subsequent to the relevant covered agreement; 
and (ii) the terms and content of the decision express an agreement between Members 
on the interpretation or application of a provision of WTO law”725. 
The panel went on claiming that “[i]n this instance, the instrument at issue is a 
“declaration”, rather than a “decision”. However, the Doha Declaration was adopted 
by a consensus decision of WTO Members, at the highest level, on 14 November 2001 
on the occasion of the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the WTO, subsequent to the 
adoption of the WTO Agreement, Annex 1C of which comprises the TRIPS Agreement. 
The terms and contents of the decision adopting the Doha Declaration express, in our 
view, an agreement between Members on the approach to be followed in interpreting 
the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. This agreement, rather than reflecting a 
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particular interpretation of a specific provision of the TRIPS Agreement, confirms the 
manner in which “each provision” of the Agreement must be interpreted, and thus 
“bears specifically” on the interpretation of each provision of the TRIPS 
Agreement”726. 
Under Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), a treaty must 
be interpreted in good faith, according to the ordinary meaning of its words within the 
context of the treaty and taking into account its object and purpose. Art. 31.3 a) 
establishes any subsequent agreement between the parties as the primary means of 
interpretation, to be considered in conjunction with the context of the treaty, unlike 
supplementary means such as the travaux preparatoires. The declaration is, thus, an 
agreement between the parties to TRIPS which reflects their shared intention as to the 
interpretation of the latter treaty. 
Firstly, the ad hoc Panel established for the aforesaid case concerning Australia, 
adopted mutatis mutandis, previous considerations that the Appellate Body made about 
a Ministerial Decision adopted in 2001. The related US – Tuna II (Mexico) case 
concerned the interpretation of a provision of a decision adopted by a technical 
committee (the TBT Committee) 727. In this regard, the Appellate Body claimed that 
“the TBT Committee Decision can be considered a ‘subsequent agreement’ within the 
meaning of article 31.3(a) of the Vienna Convention. The extent to which this Decision 
will inform the interpretation and application of a term or provision of the TBT 
Agreement in a specific case, however, will depend on the degree to which it ‘bears 
specifically’ on the interpretation and application of the respective term or 
provision”728. 
In light of the aforesaid requirements, indeed the declaration was adopted subsequently 
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to the WTO Agreements, and in particular to the TRIPS. Secondly, the language of the 
Doha Declaration expresses an agreement between members which bears specifically 
upon the interpretation of the relevant agreement, namely the TRIPS one729 . Some 
scholars even claimed that since Article 31(a) does not provide any formal requirement, 
it would allow the possibility for members to adopt an informal agreement. Such 
agreement may not be in treaty form but must be such as to show that the parties 
intended their understanding to be the basis for an agreed interpretation. The proven 
fact, not the form, of an agreement is what counts in light of Article 31(a)730. 
In this regard, as the International Law Commission has highlighted that: “an 
agreement as to the interpretation of a provision reached after the conclusion of the 
treaty represents an authentic interpretation by the parties which must be read into the 
treaty for purposes of its interpretation”731. As Article 3.2 of the DSU indicates, the 
DSB must resort to customary international law to interpret obscure or ambiguous 
provisions of any WTO agreement. Accordingly, dispute settlement panels, such as the 
appellate body, are referred back to the Vienna Convention for the purpose of following 
its rules of interpretation. These bodies would be forced to resort to the Doha 
Declaration to interpret TRIPS, as Art. 31. 
In case there are objections about considering the declaration as an agreement, at least 
it is the written evidence of the practice agreed between the parties. The conduct of 
members, reflected in the declaration, is a consensual guide to the common 
understanding of the interpretation and application of the provisions of TRIPS. As 
expressed in paragraph 5 of the declaration, each TRIPS provision is read “in the light 
of the object and purpose of the agreement”, making it clear that it is a mandatory 
interpretation guide for the DSB and not just a complementary means. Therefore, for 
practical purposes, to consider that the declaration is a practice or a subsequent 
agreement is the same732; in both cases it is a means of interpretation which requires 
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good faith to be taken into account as well as conferring meaning to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose733.  
 
 
5 Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) and TRIPS-plus 
Provisions concerning Pharmaceutical Patents 
 
When addressing the issue related to the interaction between pharmaceutical patents 
and access to medicines, another significant area of international law cannot be ignored. 
Such area refers to the growth in the negotiation and conclusion of bilateral and 
regional free trade agreements, especially under the impulse of developed world, such 
as the USA and Europe.  
Remarkably, in light of article XXIV of GATT, the WTO system allows its members to 
enter into free trade agreements (FTAs) with the objective of enhancing free-trade by 
the establishment of closer bonds between the economies of countries that are parties 
to such treaties734. Trade does not entail only the regulation of goods and services, but 
also of intellectual property provisions which, thus, need to be protected and 
implemented. It must be highlighted that the lack of provisions similar to article XXIV 
of GATT in the TRIPS agreement has not precluded the aforesaid developed countries 
from including IP-related chapters when concluding FTAs. These chapters usually 
provide for higher and stricter IP provisions, which significantly depart from the 
minimum standard established by the TRIPS Agreement itself735 . Such scenario is 
actually compliant with the latter agreement, since the TRIPS Agreement does not set 
a threshold for the degree of IP protection that WTO members are bound to enforce in 
their domestic legislations. The context is actually the opposite as the TRIPS allows 
individual members to determine whether or not to establish higher standards of IP 
protection than the minimum standards provided by TRIPS736. Accordingly, when the 
                                               
733Dörr, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 595. 
734 A. Guzman and J. Pauwelyn, International Trade Law, 2nd edn (Wolter Kluwers/Aspen Law), 2012  
337. 
735 S.K. Sell, “TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements and Access to Medicines”. Liverpool Law Rev 28, 44. 
736 Correa, Research Handbook on the Protection of Intellectual Property under WTO Rules, 53-54. 
212 
 
aforesaid category of agreements aims at enhancing IP protection, they have been 
labeled “TRIPS-plus” treaties or arrangements. As claimed by Anand Grover, former 
Special Rapporteur on the right to health of the United Nations Human Rights 
Council:“[s]uch agreements have extensive implications for pharmaceutical patent 
protection, which can directly impact access to medicines”737. 
FTAs agreements have been used as tools in order to avoid both the flexibility regime 
established by the TRIPS Agreement, as well as the spirit and scope of the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. The strategy adopted by developed countries 
grounds on two main fronts: first, these countries pressure their counterparts to 
implement more extensive IP rights protection; second, they provide specific 
provisions that go beyond, or which render ineffective, TRIPS flexibilities738. In so 
doing, the already fragile balance between patents and access to medicines is further 
hindered and threatened by the proliferation of such peculiar agreements739. TRIPS-
plus provisions, thus, place an additional burden to the current challenges that 
developing and particularly least-developed members face in order to balance their 
TRIPS obligations with their public needs. 
For intellectual honesty, it must be emphasized that the stricter IP provisions are rarely 
fully accepted by developing countries. On the contrary, the inclusion of such 
provisions is usually realized through a single undertaking mechanism. Under this 
mechanism, developing countries that are willing to conclude FTAs with developed 
countries with the aim at enhancing their national economies, are put before a “single 
package choice”, in which either they accept all the provisions envisaged within or no 
deal is reached740. The reasons behind such behavior by both developing and developed 
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countries are not object the present analysis. Surely, political and economic 
considerations are at stake, which are often address at a multilevel setting, including 
national, regional and international negotiations. 
In particular, FTAs may go beyond TRIPS minimum standards related to patenting of 
pharmaceutical products throughout the adoption of different kinds of provisions, 
ranging from data protection to patentability criteria 741 . Accordingly, TRIPS-Plus 
agreements may provide for actual patent extensions. In fact, even though article 33 
TRIPS establish patent terms of 20 years, everlasting administrative and regulatory 
approval procedures often limit the actual enjoyment of patent-holders’ exclusive rights. 
Such delays justified patent term extensions in TRIPS-plus agreements beyond the 
aforesaid 20 years of protection.  
When it comes to TRIPS flexibilities, both the use of compulsory licensing and parallel 
imports are usually limited by TRIPS-Plus provisions. In this regard, compulsory 
licensing has been generally allowed under TRIPS, especially in light of the Doha 
Declaration. On the contrary, TRIPS-plus provisions confine the adoption of such 
waivers to a restricted number of legal bases, such as, inter alia, anticompetitive 
practices, public non-commercial use and national emergencies742. 
In relation to parallel imports, the TRIPS Agreement, as reaffirmed by the Doha 
Declaration, allows member’s discretion in regulating the issue of exhaustion of 
intellectual property rights, leaving such parties free to determine which national, 
regional or international exhaustion regime they want to adopt. Some FTAs signed by 
the USA (Australia, Morocco and Singapore) expressly acknowledge the patent 
holder’s right to prevent parallel imports, such as Chapter 15, Article 15.9.4 of the 
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USA–Morocco FTA, and Chapter 17, Article 17.9.4 of the USA–Australia FTA743.  
In regard to patentability criteria, while the TRIPS Agreement confers discretion on 
members to determine whether or not to patent new uses or methods of already known 
products, most of the US FTAs permit the protection of already patented drugs if 
combined in a different way and for a different use. This leads to the so-called 
evergreen patents, which grant longer periods of protection than would normally be 
permissible under the law. Accordingly, whether the related IP provision of a specific 
treaty provides either a broad definition, such as of new product, or of new chemical 
entity, the difference is massive744. 
One of the areas of protection, which was object of most controversies, concerns data 
exclusivity regime. The related provisions under the TRIPS Agreement have been 
already analyzed in the previous sections. In sum, the latter agreement imposes upon 
members the duty to protect undisclosed information against unfair competition but 
leaves them free to determine whether such information should be protected under 
exclusive rights or under a system of unfair competition provisions. Likewise, the 
consequences of providing extended protection to clinical test data have already been 
addressed supra. Surely, test data protection constitutes an additional obstacle for 
market entrance of generic drugs, thus, hindering the protection of the right to health.  
While an express provision for data exclusivity had originally been introduced by the 
US delegation during the Uruguay Round, these provisions were removed from the 
ultimate version of the Agreement745. On the contrary, an exclusive five-year protection 
of test data from the date of approval of the pharmaceutical product before competent 
national authority was included in FTAs such as, among others, the North Atlantic Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA)746. 
Specifically, the focus of this section is on the IP-related chapter of the FTA regarding 
Central America, namely the US-DR-CAFTA (hereinafter CAFTA-DR) 747 . This 
                                               
743 Correa, Research Handbook on the Protection of Intellectual Property under WTO Rules, 284. 
744 For example, Article 16.9.11 of the US–Peru FTA states or Article 15 of CAFTA-DR. 
745 UNCTAD- CTSD (2005), 525 
746 Correa, Research Handbook on the Protection of Intellectual Property under WTO Rules, 286. 
747 Dominican Repulic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), 2005. 
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agreement between the US and the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Costa 
Rica, El Salvador and Honduras which entered into force in 2006, offers interesting 
materials to be studied in regard to TRIPS-Plus provisions and access to medicines. 
The goal of CAFTA-DR is to establish a trade free-zone between the United States and 
Central America by eliminating tariffs and other trade barriers.  
Chapter 15 of CAFTA is devoted to the establishment of intellectual property provision. 
In particular, article 15.1 provides a set of obligations that Members must respect in 
light of their status as parties to the CAFTA. Such agreement confirms the approach 
adopted by the TRIPS, since parties are obliged to implement the Chapter in their 
domestic legislation, while being free to adopt more extensive protection of IP748 . 
Likewise, the national treatment principle as well as the most favored nation clause are 
here reaffirmed749. 
With the aim at assessing whether such provisions hinder the right to access to 
medicines, specific TRIPS-Plus provisions are here analyzed. As discussed in the 
previous section, significant efforts carried out by the international community resulted 
in the Doha Declaration and the subsequent TRIPS amendment. Such enhancement of 
human rights-related considerations left the developed world, especially the 
pharmaceutical sector there established, not particularly satisfied 750 . Accordingly, 
CAFTA is proof that the US, under the pressure of the pharmaceutical sector, wanted 
to duck the aforesaid system by clearly introducing adverse provisions on access to 
medicines.  
In regard to patent extension, CAFTA prolonged patent protection by establishing an 
additional term adjustment to compensate for unreasonable delays of national 
competent authorities. Pharmaceuticals products must both acquire national approval 
for the selling in the domestic market as well as file an application for the grant of 
patent protection. These two procedures, which are usually autonomous from each 
other, are often lengthy and complex. Under these considerations, the pharmaceutical 
                                               
748 Article 15.1 (1). 
749 Ibidem, par. 7 & 8. 




sector argues that the effective term of enjoyment of the patent, as well as the possibility 
of recouping research and development costs, are adversely affected by such 
occurrence in practice751. The wording of the CAFTA, however, does not require any 
particular number of years to comply with the agreement, leaving open possible 
interpretative gaps that could be positively used by state parties752.  
Another aspect of patent extension concerns the issue of new active ingredients. In fact, 
common practice shows that only a small number of patents applications regard new 
active ingredients. In the vast majority of cases, patents try to protect small chemical 
changes or different uses of the already patented product, with the objective of delaying 
generic competition753. 
In relation to test Data Exclusivity regime, as was repeatedly mentioned throughout the 
Chapter, Article 39(3) of the TRIPS Agreement does not impose on Members the 
granting of exclusive rights over test data. On the contrary, CAFTA provides specific 
provisions to this end. Indeed, Article 15.10 of the latter agreement grants five years of 
exclusive rights from the date of approval of the product, regardless of whether the 
product is already under patent protection in other states or whether data required for 
approval are undisclosed. Such exclusivity will apply irrespective of whether a Party 
requires the submission of the data (thus even to cases relying on approval given in a 
foreign country) and covers chemical entities that are not ‘new’, as they may have been 
previously approved in other territories. Moreover, CAFTA provides for a waiting 
period of five years754. Consequences of data exclusivity should be analyzed with much 
caution as medicines that do not yet enjoy patent rights might very well be protected 
by administrative procedures that extend monopoly rights on the originator company. 
One of the innovations introduced by FTAs is the so-called linkage between drug 
                                               
751 C. M Correa, “Implications of bilateral free trade agreements on access to medicines”, Bulletin of the 
World Health Organization 84, 2006, 401-402. 
752 CAFTA, Article 15.9.6.(b):“With respect to any pharmaceutical product that is covered by a patent, 
each Party shall make available a restoration of the patent term to compensate the patent owner for 
unreasonable curtailment of the effective patent term resulting from the marketing approval process 
related to the first commercial marketing of the product in that Party”. 
753 Correa, Research Handbook on the Protection of Intellectual Property under WTO Rules, 285. 
754 Ibidem, 287. 
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approval and patent protection authorities. CAFTA is no exception as it provides for 
linkage-related provisions not provided for in the TRIPS Agreement. In sum, this 
procedure imposes upon a Party the duty to provide that its national competent 
authorities, for example the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the US, reject 
marketing approval of the generic version of a product if a patent is still effective and 
if the patent holder did not expressively authorize it. In such scenario, the Bolar 
Exception, provided and admitted under TRIPS, is considered lawful in very limited 
cases which entail the consent of the originator company and that the generic product 
must be sold outside the territory under consideration755. It is evident that the test-data 
protection regime envisaged by the CAFTA agreement places an additional burden on 
the generic companies. 
In addition, a party wishing to apply for the approval of the generic medicines before 
national authorities is obliged to inform the patent owner about such applications. Some 
scholars have highlighted that linkage provision seem to ignore that patents are private 
rights, while the approval before health authorities are usually administrative 
procedures756. Such an obligation would actually transform the regulatory agencies into 
patent enforcement bodies, which would become overwhelmed with applications about 
which they lack sufficient competence. The task of the health authorities should focus 
only in ensuring compliance with standards of quality, safety and efficacy of medicines, 
without any interferences in the merit and enforcement of patent rights.  
In conclusion, the actual consequences of these provisions seem to be in open contrast 
with the TRIPS Agreement as interpreted by the Doha Declaration as access to 
medicines at affordable prices find material obstacles, which are arduous to overcome 
by means of interpretation. In this regard, the interaction between human rights-related 
                                               
755 CAFTA, Article 15.9.5: “Consistent with paragraph 3, if a Party permits a third person to use the 
subject matter of a subsisting patent to generate information necessary to support an application for 
marketing approval of a pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical product, that Party shall provide that 
any product produced under such authority shall not be made, used, or sold in the territory of that Party 
other than for purposes related to generating information to meet requirements for approval to market 
the product once the patent expires, and if the Party permits exportation, the product shall only be 
exported outside the territory of that Party for purposes of meeting marketing approval requirements of 
that Party”.  
756 Ibidem, 288. 
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treaties, such as the ICESCR, and CAFTA sounds like a case of pure conflict, which in 
light of the Vienna Convention should lead to the responsibility of the State for the 
adoption of the incompatible obligation.  
Nevertheless, the theory of systemic integration might be the answer for the challenges 
posed by the interaction of the aforementioned treaties, with the goal of both enhancing 
access to medicines in Central America while avoiding the legal complexities that 
states incur if international responsibility is at stake.  
In fact, similar considerations to those presented in relation to the TRIPS Agreement 
can be made in this regard; and the apparent conflict can be solved by interpretative 
means. Hence, CAFTA provisions may be interpreted in a manner to overcome the 
alleged incompatibility between the FTA under consideration and relevant human 
rights treaties. 
For example, while chapter 15 of CAFTA (unlike relevant provisions of the TRIPS 
agreement) does not make any reference to the protection of health, it does so in relation 
to the protection of the public. Accordingly, the Agreement mentions one specific 
exception to test data protection, which entails that a Member State is entitled to 
derogate the related provisions in order to protect the public interest757. Such broad and 
vague wording definitely allows members to interpret the agreement in a way 
consistent with public health-related concerns, such as HIV pandemics in the region.   
In line with this stream of thoughts, on 5 August 2004 the States concerned have signed 
an “Understanding regarding certain Public Health measures” in order to confirm that 
the obligations provided by Article 15 of CAFTA are not a barrier to implementing 
measures that are essential to protect public health and access to medicines758. Thus, 
“the obligations of Chapter Fifteen do not affect a Party’s ability to take necessary 
measures to protect public health by promoting access to medicines for all, in 
particular concerning cases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other 
                                               
757  Article 15.10(d): “For purposes of this paragraph, each Party shall protect such undisclosed 
information against disclosure except where necessary to protect the public, and no Party may consider 
information accessible within the public domain as undisclosed data”. 
758  R. Gader-Shafran, The Patent Law Dictionary: United States Domestic Patent Law Terms & 
International Patent Law Terms, iUniverse, 2013, 226-227. 
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epidemics as well as circumstances of extreme urgency or national emergency”759. 
It must be noted that Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are usually concluded featuring 
side letters and understandings regarding specific aspects of the treaties themselves. 
These instruments are documents signed by the parties to the main agreement, with the 
object of clarifying the interpretation and scope of certain parts of the text. 
Theoretically, in light of Article 31.2 (b) they should be regarded as primary means of 
interpretation, since these instruments help in identifying the context of the main treaty 
itself760. Even though the legal status of such instruments has never been challenged in 
case of conflicts, some scholars argue that they should have the same legal status as the 
main agreement761. On the contrary other scholars compare the latter documents to a 
peculiar kind of agreement, namely to Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), thus, 
expressing doubt about their legally binding status762.  
What is important to highlight for the sake of the present analysis is that FTAs in 
general, and CAFTA in particular, use numerous mechanisms to preserve certain levels 
of flexibility, such as the use of open-textured terminology, the use of waivers, and the 
use of supplementary instruments such as side letters and contextual understandings. 
As stated by the “Understanding regarding certain Public Health measures” of 2004, 
the parties will have to interpret the provisions contained in CAFTA in accordance with  
TRIPS, including its object and purpose and its subsequent developments. Accordingly: 
“In recognition of the commitment to access to medicines that are supplied in 
accordance with the Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003 on the 
Implementation of Paragraph Six of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
                                               
759See the Understanding Regarding Certain Public Health Measures between the US and CAFTA-DR 
(August 5, 2004). Ping Xiong, An International Law Perspective on the Protection of Human Rights in 
the TRIPS Agreement, 307-308. 
760 Article 31.2(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969: “2. The context for the purpose 
of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the 
treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty”. 
761Correa, Research Handbook on the Protection of Intellectual Property under WTO Rules, 282. 
762P. Roffe, “A New Generation of Regional and Bilateral Trade Agreements: Lessons from the US- 
CAFTA- DR”, in Blouin, Chantal, Heymann, Jody and Drager, Nick, Trade and Health, Seeking 
Common Ground: Integrating Health Objectives and International Trade Policies, McGill- Queen’s 
University Press, 2007. 
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and public health (WT/L/540) and the WTO General Council Chairman’s statement 
accompanying the Decision (JOB(03)/177, WT/GC/M/82) (collectively the 
“TRIPS/health solution”), Chapter Fifteen does not prevent the effective utilization of 
the TRIPS/health solution. With respect to the aforementioned matters, if an 
amendment of a pertinent provision of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (1994) enters into force with respect to the Parties and 
that amendment is incompatible with Chapter Fifteen, our Governments shall 
immediately consult in order to adapt Chapter Fifteen as appropriate in the light of the 
amendment”763 . This leads to the conclusion that all the subsequent development 
regarding the TRIPS agreement, including the Doha Declaration and the 2017 
amendment, must be taken into account when interpreting and implementing health-
related provisions of CAFTA. The CAFTA agreement itself makes numerous express 
references to TRIPS, thus, emphasizing the profound connection between the two 
treaties. 
One last, but significant, consideration, that must be analyzed regards the 
aforementioned flexibilities. Chapter 15 of CAFTA lacks direct provisions similar to 
the ones provided by the TRIPS Agreement relating to compulsory licensing, parallel 
importation and other similar measures. Nonetheless, the abovementioned 
Understanding to the regional agreement makes specific reference to the Doha 
Declaration and the 2003 Decision and requires to take into account any subsequent 
amendment of TRIPS agreement 764 . Such express reference to the flexibilities 
envisaged by the TRIPS-framework in respect to pharmaceutical products seems to 
confirm the capability of members states to adopt compulsory licenses in order to 
address public health concerns 765 . This reasoning, which grounds on the direct 
reference to TRIPS provisions, constitutes the means for accomplishing a 
harmonization between TRIPS-plus and TRIPS through interpretative methods766. 
                                               
763 See the Understanding Regarding Certain Public Health Measures between the US and CAFTA-DR 
(August 5, 2004). 
764 Ping Xiong, An International Law Perspective on the Protection of Human Rights in the TRIPS 
Agreement, 319. 
765Abbott, The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy, 964. 
766 Ping Xiong, An International Law Perspective on the Protection of Human Rights in the TRIPS 
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In addition, the compulsory licensing regime requires further analysis with regard to 
the principles of lex specialis and lex posterior. As the introductory section of this 
chapter has highlighted, in accordance with general rule of international law the lex 
posterior should prevail over lex priori and lex Specialis should prevail over lex 
generali in cases in which a successive treaty addresses the same subject-matter767. In 
light of such premises, the CAFTA provisions should prevail over WTO law agreement, 
since the former was concluded after the treaty establishing the WTO. Accordingly, the 
lack of an express reference to any TRIPS flexibilities should overrule the compulsory 
licensing clauses in TRIPS as a proof of the parties’ will to depart from the former 
regulation. 
Notwithstanding, the principle of lex posterior derogat priori requires further inquiry 
when multilateral treaties, such as the WTO Agreements, are under consideration. In 
the words of scholars such as Pauwelyn, these treaties have a “continuing” or “living” 
nature768. The norms stemming from such treaties are part of a legal framework that 
was created at a specific moment but which continues to produce their effects and 
advance over time769. These norms are constantly and progressively confirmed, applied, 
revised and extended, for example, by means of judicial decisions, interpretations, new 
norms or the accession of new state parties (for which not only the consent of the new 
party is required, but also the reciprocal acceptance of all, or a majority of, existing 
parties)770. In sum, the living nature of such multilateral treaties entails that the system 
under considerations evolves as a functional consequence of the international 
organization activities (such as the WTO). The crystallization of these norms in a 
precise moment of time (for example, when the relevant norms were created) would 
arguably be inconsistent with the evolving character of the norms themselves. These 
kinds of treaty norms derive from what I term ‘continuing’or ‘living’treaties, not 
                                               
Agreement, 319. 
767Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, 361. 
768 Ibidem, 378. 
769McGrogan, On the Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties, 348. 
770 Ibidem. Other examples, besides the WTO Agreements, multilateral conventions such as the EU, 
UNCLOS and many human rights treaties and systems. 
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reflections of a ‘one-shot-end-all’expression of state consent771.  
In light of such premises, in an event of a conflict between TRIPS and CAFTA, an 
evolutionary interpretation approach is required even though the latter agreement was 
concluded later than the TRIPS. 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not make any express reference to 
the evolutionary interpretation of treaties, nor does its Article 31(3)(c), which omits 
any guidance to the challenges posed by living-nature treaties entailing inter-temporal 
rules772. Yet, the International Court of Justice has recognized the evolutionary method 
in different cases in which the judges have argued that such method is accepted on the 
grounds that the treaty under consideration contains evolutionary terms or its 
evolutionary nature is shown in the treaty itself 773.  
In sum, as some scholars have highlighted, a treaty can be interpreted under an 
evolutionary approach when774: 
1. the terms used have or are acquiring an evolving meaning in general 
international law 
2. the language used in expressing the object and purpose of a treaty to show 
a recognition or intention for the treaty to be able to have a progressive 
development 
3. the description of obligations is expressed in broad terms775 
Both the TRIPS Agreement and CAFTA fulfil two out of the three aforementioned 
                                               
771 Ibidem 
772 Campbell McLachlan, ‘the Principle of Systemic Integration and Art 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention’ (2005) 
54 ICLQ 279,  316. 
773 ICJ, Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v Turkey) (1978) ICJ Rep 3, par. 77, and Namibia (Legal 
Consequences) Advisory Opinion (1971) ICJ Rep 3, par. 53: “Mindful as it is of the primary necessity of interpreting 
an instrument in accordance with the intentions of the parties at the time of its conclusion, the Court is bound to 
take into account the fact that the concepts embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant-"the strenuous conditions of 
the modern world" and "the well-being and development" of the peoples concerned-were not static, but were by 
definition evolutionary, as also, therefore, was the concept of the "sacred trust". The parties to the Covenant must 
consequently be deemed to have accepted them as such. That is why, viewing the institutions of 1919, the Court 
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tion cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent development of law, through the Charter of the United Nations 
and by way of customary law”. 
774 C. McLachlan, “The Principle of Systemic Integration and Art 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention”, 
54 ICLQ 279, 2005, 317-318. 




conditions, since they have a living nature and provide open-textured provisions which 
allow different interpretations. Accordingly, expressions such as of “national 
emergency”, “extreme urgency” and “public non-commercial use” envisaged by 
Article 31 permit an evolutionary way of interpretation of the agreement776.  
At this point of the inquiry, analyzing the CAFTA and TRIPS provisions in light of the 
lex specialis principle is important. According to some scholars such as Pauwelyn, the 
lex specialis principle is of little assistance in conferring meaning of terms in a treaty 
in light of arts 31 and 32 of the VCLT, since it is mainly employed as a means in order 
to solve genuine conflicts of norms777. Nonetheless, the question to be asked at this 
point is whether or not lex specialis, as a rule of treaty interpretation, can resolve (or 
avoid) the “conflict” between CAFTA and TRIPS. In addition, this principle can be 
regarded as a way to give full effect to more specific treaty provisions778. This argument 
grounds on the systemic integration presumption against conflict pursuant to the 
conflict-avoidance techniques outlined throughout this chapter779. 
At first stake, the CAFTA Agreement seems to be the special regime in light of its 
narrower membership than TRIPS and regional scope. Notwithstanding, this first 
impression overturns if we take into consideration specific health-related provisions 
such as compulsory licensing. Remarkably, even though CAFTA does not make any 
specific reference to compulsory licensing, subsequent developments in TRIPS have 
further clarified that scope and application of such important flexibility. In addition, as 
the Doha Declaration has emphasized, “the concept of public health crises includes 
“those relating to HIV/ AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics”, which are 
the specific narration of the grounds for issuing compulsory licensing. This specificity 
needs to be treated as lex specialis, and the interpretation of the compulsory licensing 
carve-outs in the FTAs, such as CAFTA, will need to refer to the specific language used 
in TRIPS in order to be given effect in the interpretation of the TRIPS-plus provisions. 
Through this kind of reference, the seeming conflict between TRIPS and TRIPS-plus 
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777 Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, 414. 
778 Ibidem 
779 McGrogan, On the Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties, 349. 
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can be avoided”780. This leads to the conclusion that the framework developed and 
established by the TRIPS Agreement constitutes the special regime with reference to 
health-related flexibilities. 
Some final remarks are, thus, required. As presented, CAFTA comprises many 
provisions that refer to TRIPS plus standards. The analysis has demonstrated that the 
application of TRIPS-plus provisions requires their interpretation in light of the broader 
TRIPS’ regime. Stricter IP’s provisions are surely included in the intellectual property 
chapters of CAFTA, but there should be a “ceiling” upon the level of heightened patent 
protection that is consistent with the facilitation of trade and does not act as an 
impediment to trade781. This leads to the argument that the interpretation of TRIPS-
plus provisions contained in CAFTA not only needs to take the object and purpose of 
this Agreement itself, but also the ones of TRIPS into account.  
Chapter 20 of CAFTA, which is labelled “Dispute settlement”, provides the freedom 
of choice of forum in case no agreement is reached over the interpretation of a specific 
treaty’s provision. In the event a panel is established pursuant to Chapter 20, the 
panelists resort to the rules of interpretation, as highlighted in this chapter, in light of 
which the interpretation of TRIPS-plus provisions needs to refer to the subsequent 
development of TRIPS and not only to its object and purpose. From this argument 
follows that the right to health-related flexibilities provided by TRIPS shall provide 
guidance for the interpretation of TRIPS-plus provisions contained in CAFTA782. It is, 
thus, through this method of interpretation that a main goal can be achieved: the 
harmonization between TRIPS and CAFTA leads to the subsequent harmonization 
between CAFTA and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
rights (ICESCR), hence making the right to access to medicines effective in the 
countries involved.  
Moreover, the lex posterior and the lex specialis principles have to be understood in 
light of the principle of contractual freedom of states in order to determine what 
                                               
780 Ping Xiong, An International Law Perspective on the Protection of Human Rights in the TRIPS 
Agreement, 320. 
781 Ibidem 
782McGrogan, On the Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties, 349. 
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coincides with current state consent. Accordingly, both the 2004 Understanding to 
CAFTA regarding public health-related concerns, as well as the subsequent practice 
within the WTO framework in relation to TRIPS-flexibilities783, prove that States have 
acknowledged and recognized the imperative valued of such flexibilities. To assess 
whether TRIPS-plus provisions constitute an obstacle to international trade and to 
access to medicines, one has to study their implementation within national 
legislation784 . The conflict between TRIPS and CAFTA (and consequently between 
intellectual property law and human rights) is, thus, only apparent, and systemic 
integration constitutes the means thorough which the patent’s protection regime is 
compatible with the right to access to medicines. 
 
 
6 Two case studies concerning the impact of IP provisions on access to medicines  
 
6.1 A focus on Antiretroviral drugs for the fight against HIV 
 
Antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) entered the market in 2000 and in 2015 the United Nations 
reported the start of actions to lower their prices785. These drugs hinder the reproduction 
of the virus and impede its spreading to avoid the progression of the HIV, which is why 
they are the most used and effective drugs in the treatment of the disease in the world. 
There are three main types of antiretroviral drugs: i) nucleoside reverse transcriptase 
inhibitors, which inhibit the enzyme that HIV-1 needs so that new replicas in the genetic 
structure do not occur; ii) non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors, which 
produce a blocking action, and iii) protease inhibitors, the other substance that HIV-1 
needs to replicate786 . What this type of antiretroviral does is prevent HIV-1 from 
multiplying to the point of achieving an imbalance. The medication process begins with 
                                               
783 Which led to the 2017 TRIPS Amendment 
784 See the following section regarding the manner in which CAFTA was implemented respectively in 
Costa Rica and Guatemala. 
785 https://www.who.int/hiv/data/en/ 
786 L. Benítez-Gutiérrez, V. Soriano, S. Requena and C. Mendoza, “Treatment and prevention of HIV 
infection with long-acting antiretrovirals”, Expert Review of Clinical Pharmacology, 2018. 
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a combination of medications known as First-Line Therapy; then, after several years, 
the antiretroviral drugs stop acting against the virus, forcing a new action with other 
retroviral drugs, the so-called Second-Line Regimen; depending on the case, this may 
reach a Third-Line over time787. The recommendation made by WHO has been to apply 
three different medications in the same treatment. Since 2000 there has been a 
considerable increase in the number of patients treated with ARV medications788. This 
is reflected in the reduction of both infections and deaths; although the data varies 
widely by region and although many people still do not have access to these drugs, 
especially in low-income countries. The data and information that has been presented 
clearly shows the importance of access to antiretroviral drugs for the control and 
treatment of the disease789. On one hand, this shows that ARVs play a determining role 
not only in reducing new infections, but also in preventing AIDS-related deaths. On the 
other hand, there are deep inequalities in the supply and access to this therapy in 
countries with fewer resources, which are the countries with the highest number of 
people affected by the virus. These data underscore the unequal access to ARV therapy 
and the relevance of increasing access to it790. 
 
 
6.2 TRIPS-Plus provisions in Costa Rica: the impact of the antiretroviral drug 
Tenofovir 
 
The latter section of this chapter has presented a general analysis of the legal framework 
related to pharmaceutical patents and their implementation after the entry into force of 
DR-CAFTA in the Central American region. Furthermore, significant information has 
been provided on the relevance of timely treatment of HIV/AIDS. This last section will 
examine two case studies that illustrate the impact of intellectual property rules on 
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access to generic and low-priced medicines for HIV / AIDS in Costa Rica and 
Guatemala in light of the relevant provisions in their laws: TRIPS and DR-CAFTA791. 
In 2004, the parties involved in DR-CAFTA signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
regarding public health measures, clarifying that the provisions established in article 




6.2.1  Costa Rica, the Right to Health and Intellectual Property 
 
This section analyses four important aspects related to access to medicines in Costa 
Rica 792 : first, the intellectual property provisions; second, the epidemiological 
relevance of HIV/AIDS in the country; third, the Government's response to it; and 
finally, the Tenofovir drug case analysis to illustrate the practical implications of the 
aforesaid points. Costa Rica recognizes the right to health indirectly in its political 
Constitution throughout its Articles 21793 and 46794 ; and through the ratification of 
instruments such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and its participation in international organizations such as the World Health 
Organization795. The Constitution protects people who are denied access to health and, 
indirectly, access to essential medicines, and provides them with the right to appeal to 
the Constitutional Court through a constitutional complaint (recurso de amparo) in 
                                               
791 For the sake of clarity, some footnotes will be presented in Spanish in order to preserve the substance 
and scope of the relative references and provisions. 
792S. Walker, “The United States–Dominican Republic–Central American Free Trade Agreement and 
Access to Medicines in Costa Rica: A Human Rights Impact Assessment”, Journal of Human Rights 
Practice 3, 2011, 188-190. 
793 “La vida humana es inviolable”. 
794 “Los consumidores y usuarios tienen derecho a la protección de su salud, ambiente, seguridad e 
intereses económicos, a recibir información adecuada y veraz; a la libertad de elección, y a un trato 
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795 Desde 1996, Costa Rica es miembro del Acuerdo de la Organización Mundial del Comercio sobre los 
Aspectos de los Derechos de Propiedad Intelectual (ADPIC), y en 2001, adoptó también la Declaración 
de Doha sobre el Acuerdo ADPIC y la Salud Pública, la cual estableció pautas interpretativas en materia 
de las flexibilidades contenidas en el tratado, como, por ejemplo, el derecho de brindar licencias 
obligatorias y exportaciones paralelas en circunstancias especiales. 
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order to uphold their rights. The nation also has a universal social insurance managed 
and executed by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (CCSS)796. In the last 30 years, 
the CCSS has developed a policy of selection and supply of essential medicines that 
has guaranteed a considerable and free supply for the majority of the population, while 
allowing a sensible use of public spending on medicines. According to data shared by 
the Ministry of Health, the CCSS system is responsible for supplying 43% of 
pharmaceutical products in the country, while the private sector satisfies the rest of the 
demand797. A notable fact is that the resources allocated to the purchase and supply of 
drugs, which constituted almost 10% of the CCSS annual budget between 2007 and 
2008, and was reduced as of 2009 around 7.5% of the total budget of the CCSS. Today, 
approximately 35% of that budget is for patent-protected drugs. The first patent law in 
Costa Rica was enacted in 1983 (Law No. 6867) and did not recognize any rights in 
relation to the patentability of pharmaceutical products. This law was amended in 2000 
and 2008 798  to shape the regulatory framework in accordance with TRIPS and 
subsequently to DR-CAFTA799. The most relevant developments after the entry into 
force of the DR-CAFTA refer to the term of the patents and the exclusivity of the test 
data800. This commercial agreement provides, in fact, that the protection period can be 
extended beyond 20 years if the applicant suffered unjustified delays in the granting of 
the patent license or for the analysis required for the approval for commercialization. 
Although the Patent Law indicates that the restoration cannot exceed a maximum 
period of 18 months801, in case of delay both in the granting of the patent and in the 
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798 En 2000 se aprobó una ley sobre la información no divulgada, (Ley 7975/2000), que fue modificada nuevamente 
en 2008 a la luz de las nuevas disposiciones contenidas en el tratado comercial. 
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approval of the commercialization, the extension may exceed 18 months up to a 
maximum of 3 years, which can pose problems of implementation and interpretation. 
The Ministry of Health is responsible for implementing appropriate measures to 
prevent third parties from marketing a patented product and information related to 
product marketing requests is displayed on the website of the Ministry of Health, so 
that each holder of the patent be properly informed802. As indicated in previous chapters, 
the new rules on intellectual property indicate that, in order to authorize the marketing 
of a new pharmaceutical product, the applicant must disclose undisclosed test data, 
including those related to safety and efficacy (test data). Such data will be protected for 
five years from the date of the initial marketing authorization against unfair commercial 
use and against any disclosure, except when its use is necessary to protect the public 
interest. Therefore, unless generic drug companies are willing to generate this data on 
their own, they are forced to postpone the sale of the drug for five years, since without 
these data it cannot be proven that the drugs are safe and effective803. On the other hand, 
exceptions to the protection of test data are scarce: competent authorities may preclude 
the use of test data to prevent practices that are likely to mislead consumers and may 
choose not to disclose this information in order to protect the life, health or safety of 
persons, or animal or plant life or the environment. Another innovation introduced by 
the DR-CAFTA, which forced the amendment of national law, refers to the definition 
of a new product, that is, one that does not contain any chemical entity that has been 
previously registered in the country804. Executive Decree no. 34927 states that: “Those 
pharmaceutical products with new uses or indications, changes in the route of 
administration, in the dosage, in the pharmaceutical form or in the formulation of a 
chemical entity, or those products that have a combinations of chemical entities 
                                               
determinación de los retrasos. No obstante lo anterior, la compensación total del plazo de la patente 
nunca podrá exceder de dieciocho meses”. 
802 Chávez G, Blanca M., y Montoya B., Yonathan “Comparación de la reformas de los sistemas de salud 
en Colombia y Costa Rica en su dimensión política”, Revista Facultad Nacional de Salud Pública 29, 
no. 1, 2011, 67-74. 
803 Correa, Implications of bilateral free trade agreements, 400-402. 
804 C. M. Correa, Carlos Maria, “Ownership of knowledge: The role of patents in pharmaceutical R&D”, 
Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 82 (10), 2004, 785. 
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previously registered in the country shall not be considered new” 805 . The 
implementation rule could have a positive impact, because it excludes form the test 
data protection the products with a combination of chemical entities previously 
registered in the country, and therefore limits the number of drugs that may enjoy such 
protection, prohibiting the second use patents. However, the definition established by 
the aforementioned article 4 protects chemical entities not previously approved in 
Costa Rica even if they had already been approved in other countries806. This can lead 
to opportunistic behaviours in which the producer seeks the approval of a “new” 
product in Costa Rica after having enjoyed its protection in another country to the 
detriment of the production of generic medicines and the availability of more affordable 
products807. In order to reaffirm the flexibility aimed at protecting public health, the 
parties of the DR-CAFTA signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2004 regarding 
certain public health measures. The agreement made it clear that the obligations 
established in Article 15 of the DR-CAFTA are not an impediment to adopt the 
necessary measures to protect public health and access to medicines. As a result of this 
Memorandum, Costa Rica is not obliged to give retroactive effect to patents, nor to 
grant patents whose exploitation may be contrary to public order or morality, among 
other things. This orientation seems reminiscent of the Doha Declaration agreements 
that reserve the exclusive right to states to determine their health system and the cases 
that constitute an emergency. Costa Rica also follows an international exhaustion 
regime, so it is possible to use parallel imports and issue compulsory licenses to protect 
the public interest. 
 
 
                                               
805 Decreto Ejecutivo Nº 34927-JCOMEX-S-MAG, Reglamento a la Ley de Información No Divulgada , 
artículo 4. 
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6.2.2 HIV / AIDS in Costa Rica808 
 
The first case of AIDS in Costa Rica was detected in 1983 and perinatal transmission 
was detected in 1990 with an increasing trend to 1995, when treatment with AZT was 
initiated for pregnant women with HIV809. As of 1998810, antiretroviral therapy was 
introduced and currently the percentage prevalence of HIV in the general population is 
1.6%; in the group of 15 to 24 years it is 0.11% and in the group of 15 to 49 years 
0.4%811 . There are currently 13,000 people living with HIV in Costa Rica, and the 
number has increased considerably over the past two decades. In addition, the impact 
of the introduction of antiretroviral treatment in reducing the rate of infection can be 
seen from 2000 to 2011812. Costa Rica has made great economic and institutional efforts 
to take on HIV / AIDS. These efforts have generated a multi-sectoral work where 
different actors of society are incorporated with the objective of strengthening 
capacities in a coordinated manner and developing strategic actions to build up 
relationships according to established needs and priorities813. This multi-sectoral work 
is generated by Public institutions, NGOs, members of the National Council for 
Comprehensive Care of HIV and AIDS (CONASIDA), international cooperation 
agencies and other support organizations. The National Council for Comprehensive 
Care of HIV and AIDS (CONASIDA) is the highest body responsible for 
recommending policies and programs of action on HIV/AIDS issues throughout the 
public sector. It has the function of advising the Minister of Health on policies and 
updating national plans for addressing HIV and AIDS. It should also coordinate with 
the different institutions on the issues related to the epidemic, promoting coordination 
                                               
808 All the data relative to the medicine Tenofivir provided in this section have been gathered as a result 
of interviews with states’ officials in San José, Costa Rica. 
809  Ministerio de Salud Consejo Nacional de Atención Integral del VIH/SIDA Organización 
Panamericana de la Salud oficina regional de la Organización Mundial de la Salud Programa Conjunto 
de las Naciones Unidas sobre el VIH/SIDA, La situación del VIH/SIDA en Costa Rica, 2004. 
810 Programa Conjunto de las Naciones Unidas sobre el VIH/Sida (ONUSIDA), “Costa Rica: HIV and 
AIDS Estimates”, 2018 [en línea] https://www.unaids.org/es/regionscountries/countries/costarica 
811 https://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/costarica 
812 Ibidem 
813 Costa Rica, Plan Estrategíco Nacional 2016-2021. 
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and inter-institutional agreements and ensuring full observance and respect for the 
rights and guarantees of people with HIV/AIDS, their families and relatives. Seeking 
to control and eradicate this epidemic, Costa Rica has been implementing actions in 
terms of capacity building, training in strategic information, in representation spaces, 
in strategic planning and in participation in national dialogues and forums. Access to 
antiretroviral drugs is an important part of this strategy and the purchases of these 
medicines by the CCSS is a relevant indicator of their evolution and success814. Costa 
Rican social security currently allocates about 7.5% of its budget to the purchase of 
medicines. For any country, this represents an important economic effort but even more 
so for one in development and with universal health coverage. This effort is aligned 
with the conception of a welfare state that seeks universal access to health. As explained, 
Costa Rican social security acquires antiretroviral drugs and to provides them to a 
necessary extent since 1998 as part of the strategy against HIV/AIDS. In recent years, 
Costa Rican social security sought the purchase of Tenofivir through the Strategic Fund 
of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) to facilitate the purchase and reduce 
costs thanks to volumes and guaranteed access to certified suppliers. For the care of 
patients with HIV/AIDS, social insurance acquired the drug Tenofivir through the 
PAHO Strategic Fund at a price of 15.14 colones per one hundred (100 tablets), that is, 
0.15 colones per tablet. The Strategic Fund purchased a product not registered in Costa 
Rica, which was imported under the Health Law (Article 117). It is established that the 
Ministry of Health, the CCSS and any other state entity, with functions of public health 
or social security, may acquire unregistered medicines, at any time or circumstance; In 
case of urgency or public necessity, the ministry can authorize the importation of 
unregistered medicines. The holder of the marketing authorization for the Tenofovir 
drug claimed before the Ministry of Health that the protection of test data was still in 
force, that is, a protection for five years in accordance with DR-CAFTA and Costa 
Rican legislation. Based on this legislation, the Ministry of Health suspended the 
authorization to import the medicine. From that moment, the price increased to 96.74 




colones per one hundred, that is, 0.96 colones per tablet. In 2016 the price was even 
higher, 125.62 colones per one hundred or 1.25 colones per tablet. Once the test data 
protection time expired, the drug could be acquired through the PAHO Strategic Fund, 
as of 2018, at a price of 13.96 colones, that is, 0.13 colones per tablet815. Costa Rican 
social security estimates that the purchase of medicines for the treatment of HIV/AIDS 
through the PAHO Strategic Fund has had a positive impact on their finances thanks to 
the inclusion of two medicines in combination at fixed doses48. Their inclusion was 
possible because they are available in the Strategic Fund, which resulted in savings of 
close to 1.5 million colones by implementing the use of these alternatives in the first-
line treatment of patients with HIV infection. Acquiring these drugs at the market price 
in Costa Rica, where there is only one registered bidder for each combination, would 




6.3 TRIPS-Plus provisions in Guatemala: the situation concerning Abbott’s 
antiretroviral drug Kaletra 
 
Guatemala’s Constitution recognizes the right to health in its Article 94, which is 
labelled “Obligaciones del Estado, sobre salud y asistencia social”. The constitutional 
protection provided by the latter article states that: “El Estado velará por la salud y la 
asistencia social de todos los habitantes. Desarrollará, a través de sus instituciones, 
acciones de prevención, promoción, recuperación, rehabilitación, coordinación y las 
complementarias pertinentes a fin de procurarles el más completo bienestar físico, 
mental y social”816. At the same time, the Constitution grants protection to IP in light 
of Article 42, which provides that: “Según este artículo titulado Derecho de autor o 
inventor, “Se reconoce el derecho de autor y el derecho de inventor; los titulares de 
los mismos gozarán de la propiedad exclusiva de su obra o invento, de conformidad 
                                               
815 Elaboración propia sobre la base de información de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. 
816Constitución de Guatemala, art. 94. 
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con la ley y los tratados internacionales” 817 . Guatemala allows the patenting of 
products and processes for 20 years since 1999, when it passed the Industrial Property 
Law (Decree Number 57 200)818. In this way, more than 400 pharmaceutical products 
and processes are patented in Guatemala and 250 patent applications were filed in the 
first ten months of 2016 alone 819 . Most of the chemical substances for which 
applications have been submitted are not yet associated with drugs on the market and 
may incorporate patents on numerous and different molecules and processes. Despite 
the formal constitutional recognition of intellectual property, before the entry into force 
of TRIPS and DR-CAFTA, originating pharmaceutical companies generally did not 
seek recognition of patents on most of their medications in Guatemala. The reason 
given was that the little competition in that market and the reduced profits did not 
justify the implementation of complicated and long administrative processes. 
Guatemalan intellectual property regulations have been a controversial legislative issue 
in the country since the late 1990s. The main provisions of the Industrial Property Law 
of 1999 have been amended almost every year since their approval and the rules on the 
exclusivity of the test data has also been modified many times 820 . In 2000 the 
Guatemalan Parliament established the exclusivity of test data for a period of fifteen 
years for each patented drug. Although this exclusivity was revoked in 2002, after 
protests from civil society and generic companies, in 2003 a five-year protection was 
reintroduced, which was again repealed in 2004. Despite this, after the approval of DR-
CAFTA in 2005, the exclusivity was established again for a period of five years. In 
order to prevent different and softer rules from being implemented in the legal 
frameworks, DR-CAFTA specifies its supremacy over the corresponding national laws 
in case of conflict. Guatemala established a period of five years for the exclusivity of 
the data and, as anticipated, that DR-CAFTA prevails over this law in case of conflict 
(Decree 30-2005 that repeals Decree 34-04). Finally, legal reforms were introduced for 
                                               
817Constitución de Guatemala, art. 42. 
818 Godoy, Of Medicines and Markets Intellectual Property, 2013. 
819 Perfil Farmacéutico de la República de Guatemala, Publicado por el Ministerio de Salud Pública y 
Asistencia Social de Guatemala en colaboración con la Organización Panamericana de la 
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820Godoy, Of Medicines and Markets Intellectual Property, 2013. 
235 
 
the implementation of DR-CAFTA in Guatemala by means of Decree 11-2006821. The 
decree provides that if the companies are entitled to compensation if they suffered 
unjustified delays before the registration to obtain the patent, specifically, more than 
five years from the patent application, or more than three months from the request 
before the Department of Regulation and Control of Pharmaceutical Products to obtain 
the marketing permit822. The latter, despite the fact that no request for extension of the 
deadline has been made to date, in practice constitutes an extension of the ius 
excludendi from patent rights. This decree formalizes the aforementioned protection of 
test data. Through this rule, the protection obtains the duration of five years and a new 
type of “administrative monopoly” is established even when the patent has expired. In 
fact, as noted, this protection has an adverse effect on generic drugs, because they 
cannot be registered in the country since they cannot use the information on efficacy 
and safety that has been provided before the Department of Regulation and Control of 
Pharmaceutical products. To achieve the ius excludendi derived from patent rights 
companies must apply for the related claim before the Intellectual Property Registry 
(RPI), which a dependency of the Ministry of Economy823. The RPI is responsible for 
promoting the observance of the Rights of the Intellectual Property, as well as the 
enlisting and registration thereof, in the light of the intellectual property treaties to 
which the state of Guatemala is a party. In addition, to bring their medications to the 
market, pharmaceutical companies must demonstrate to the Department of Regulation 
and Control of Pharmaceutical Products that their medications are proven safe and 
effective through clinical studies and several trials. Instead, producers of generic drugs 
must demonstrate bioequivalence to brand names, that is, show that they work in the 
same way. Normally the manufacturers of generic medicines verify the safety and 
efficacy referring to the results of the clinical trials already produced by the equivalent 
brand name drugs. However, in Guatemala generic companies are prohibited from 
using or referring to the data of the clinical trials of the author of the drugs during the 
                                               
821 Decreto 11‐2006, Artículo 61. 
822 Ibidem, Aartículos 66, 67, 68 y 69 
823 Acuerdo Gubernativo No. 182-2000 Reglamento Orgánico Interno del Ministerio de Economía. 
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period of time they are protected (5 years). Originating companies can select which 
medications they want to present to the Guatemalan drug regulatory agency - 
Department of Regulation and Control of Pharmaceutical and Related Products - to be 
included in the data protection list.  The suspension of a request for registration (or 
sanitary license) as a precautionary measure under legal action to protect the 
intellectual property of a drug is another mechanism that negatively affects the 
competition of generics in practical terms. This may happen because a system has been 
established in which the patent office and the sanitary registration office work in direct 
contact (linkage) with each other and with the patent holders. This means that, if a 
company wants to request the registration of the generic version of a medicine, the 
national offices are obliged to inform the holders of a patent and the corresponding test 
data, about the process initiated. Finally, in Guatemala, other administrative protections 
are established that are not regulated by either TRIPS or DR-CAFTA, known as 
CAFTA-Plus, inter alia, border measures. These measures, which are common in 
Europe, regulate that customs authorities prevent the entry of a generic drug into the 
national market if the drug has legal protection in Guatemala. The regulatory provision 
is of interest even to drugs in transit, as national authorities can confiscate and even 
destroy those that not only have the Guatemalan market as their final destination but 
also another country where the drug is not patented. This creates administrative 
mechanisms applied by customs authorities that are an additional barrier to the 
marketing and circulation of generic medicines. 
According to the United Nations and the World Bank (WB), Guatemala and Honduras 
are the two countries in Latin America with the highest presence of HIV and AIDS. In 
2016, there were 46,000 people with HIV - it is necessary to bear in mind that 
underreporting is possible and therefore the data could be higher - of which 36% had 
access to antiretroviral therapy824. In 2017, 2,300 new HIV infections and 2,000 AIDS-
related deaths occurred. Among pregnant women living with HIV, only 19% had access 
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to treatment or prophylaxis to prevent the transmission of HIV to their children. The 
United Nations estimates that more than 500 children were infected with HIV due to 
mother-to-child transmission. It is estimated that 25% of people living with HIV in 
Guatemala have suppressed viral loads thanks to antiretroviral therapies, which 
decreases the likelihood of virus transmission825.  
In 2000, the Guatemalan Parliament recognized the HIV/AIDS epidemic as a national 
emergency in Decree no. 27-2000-06-26826. This document highlighted that the state 
has an important role in the prevention and control of the virus, since in those days the 
pandemic was taking worrying dimensions in the country and throughout the region. 
Since 2000, the importance of physical and economic accessibility of antiretroviral 
drugs for HIV/AIDS treatment was also recognised through the Drug Accessibility 
Program827. It was established that the Ministry of Public Finance and Economy has to 
implement a program that allows access to quality antiretroviral drugs, at affordable 
prices for people affected by the virus. The country made an institutional effort to face 
the national emergency and established the National Program for the Prevention and 
Control of Sexually Transmitted Infections, Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) 
and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (PNS), within the Ministry of Public 
Health and Social care. In addition, the law prompted the Ministry of Public Health to 
create the National Multi-sectoral Commission, consisting of organizations that work 
on the prevention of sexually transmitted infections, HIV and AIDS, with the aim of 
coordinating and supporting the ministry's policies at the national level. Eight years 
later, in 2008, the government launched the National Commission against AIDS 
(CONASIDA), to promote and implement plans, policies and programs that allowed 
the prevention of sexually transmitted infections and HIV/AIDS. 
In 2011 the commission presented the National Strategic Plan for HIV and AIDS (PEN) 
2011-2015. To address the epidemic, Guatemala updated its national response in a plan 
                                               
825 Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) 
https://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/guatemala 
826 Ley General para el Combate del Virus de Inmunodeficiencia Humana (VIH) y del Síndrome de 
Inmunodeficiencia Adquirida (SIDA) y de la Promoción, Protección y Defensa de los Derechos 
Humanos ante el VIH/SIDA, Guatemala, 2000. 
827 Programa Nacional de Prevención y Control de ITS/ VIH y SIDA 
238 
 
now titled Institutional Strategic Plan (Plan Estratégico Institucional) 2016-2021 and 
established five strategic guidelines 828 : 1) Increase the availability of combined 
prevention programs. 2) Eliminate mother-to-child transmission of HIV. 3) Integrate 
health care and social support to individuals, families and communities. 4) Promote a 
legal and social environment that favours human rights and gender equality. 5) 
Strengthen the public health sector for the improvement and sustainability of the 
national response829. The accessibility and availability of the combined antiretroviral 
drug lopinavir + ritonavir in the Guatemalan health system and the implementation of 
the PNS is essential for the success of the aforementioned strategic plans. This program 
and the other government responses to the HIV/AIDS epidemic have a decisive impact 
on the health of the population living with the disease. The PNS reports highlight that 
the number of people receiving high intensity antiretroviral treatment has increased 
fivefold in the last eight years, even though only 60% of the almost 30,000 people who 
require treatment receive it. 
Guatemalan law requires the Ministry of Health to opt for the most affordable option 
among a range of options presented during the bidding process in light of a transparent 
and impartial cost-benefit analysis. This framework should favour generic medicines 
to the extent that they are more affordable, can meet the treatment needs of a larger 
number of patients and are proven safe and effective. However, several organizations 
such as the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the Office of the Human 
Rights Ombudsman of Guatemala have detected anomalies in the bidding processes 
and documented anti-competitive irregularities between 2003 and 2008830.As a result 
of these anomalies, it has not always been possible to choose the most affordable 
solution831 . Moreover, in most cases, tender processes were presented with unique 
                                               
828 Plan Estratégico Nacional para la Prevención, Atención y Control de ITS, VIH y Sida, Guatemala. 
2016-2021. 
829 Godoy, Of Medicines and Markets Intellectual Property, 2013. 
830 Organizacion Panamericana de la Salud. 2005. Opinion tecnica al evento DNCAE no. 08-2005 para 
la provision de productos medicinales y farmaceuticos paquete I, II, y III. Organizacion Panamericana 
de la Salud, Expediente No. EIO.GUA 442-2004/DESC. 
831 En específico, los licitadores genéricos tienen que presentar una documentación adicional con el 
objetivo de probar la seguridad y eficacia de sus productos. Estos requerimientos van más allá de lo 
exigido por la ley marco de la contratación pública para el proceso de licitación, de tal forma que 
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offers by originating companies, being the only ones that could meet the additional 
administrative requirements. The case study of the Kaletra drug represents an example 
of what has just been mentioned and how intellectual property conditions hinders the 
access to the most economical medicines in the country. Kaletra is a multidrug 
compound consisting of two protease inhibitors, lopinavir and ritonavir, and is used for 
first- and second-line treatment of HIV/AIDS. 
The history of this medicine in Guatemala begins in November 2000 when the 
pharmaceutical company Abbot obtained the certification of the Sanitary Registry PF-
23619, after the presentation of the test data to the competent authority. In accordance 
with articles 165-167 of the Health Code, he was able to enjoy the right to market the 
product in Guatemala. The drug Kaletra enjoys protection of test data for 15 years, 
since the requesting company managed to obtain the authorization for sale before the 
legal changes from Decree 153-85 to Decree 57-2000 were pronounced. As noted, the 
data protection established in the DR-CAFTA constitutes a de facto limit for the use of 
compulsory licenses, since the latter are aimed at reducing the effect of a patent and do 
not produce any effect towards an administrative procedure, like the exclusivity of the 
test data832. The generic producer would still have to rely on clinical trial data from the 
original pharmaceutical company to produce the drug and since these are protected, the 
new company will not be able to manufacture the drug. In 2005, the Abbott 
representative in Guatemala was awarded the public contract at the price of 20,255 
quetzales ($ 2.70) per capsule, surpassing the competence of three other applicant 
companies. The other participants, specifically the generic producers, presented a 
constitutional complaint in order to freeze the contracting process in light of the alleged 
anti-competitive practices. Although the lawsuits managed to stop the adjudication 
procedure, the Guatemalan government bought the medicine (Kaletra) directly from 
Abbott for the next three years. In addition, since the purchases were not made through 
a tender, the information on the prices obtained or the quantity purchased has not been 
published. Therefore, it is not easy to determine the total sum of resources spent; 
                                               
constituye una carga excesiva para los licitadores genéricos por su costo y tiempo. 
832 Godoy, Of Medicines and Markets Intellectual Property, 2013. 
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however, in light of the available data it is possible to analyse the prices corresponding 
to 2009 and 2012. Due to several protests, Abbott lowered prices considerably, 
although they remained more expensive compared to generics and with the prices 
offered at public purchases made through the Strategic Fund of the Pan American 
Health Organization. According to information from the Intellectual Property Registry, 
on July 5, 2006, Abbott achieved the protection and exclusivity of the sale of the 
lopinavir/ritonavir compound until July 2026. In summary, before the Industrial 
Property Law, Abbott obtained an additional protection for nine years by filing a patent 
application for the drug from the date of admission of said application, even though the 
latter could have been granted several years later. 
In 2005, the drug Kaletra became essential when a new version was introduced that 
included the same active ingredients in a slightly different proportion, with 200 mg of 
lopinavir and 33 mg of ritonavir, instead of the previous version with 133 mg and 33 
mg respectively. With these changes, new therapeutic advantages were introduced 
since fewer pills could be taken per day and, not needing refrigeration, it became one 
of the few antiretroviral compounds suitable for the treatment of the disease in tropical 
countries (Snodgrass Godoy, 2013).  Of the medications recommended by WHO for 
second-line therapy, this version of Kaletra is the only one available in a thermostable 
version. In 2005, the World Health Organization recognized Kaletra as an essential 
drug and since then several countries have shown interest in using compulsory licenses 
to guarantee the supply of this medicine 833 . Today, Kaletra continues to have a 
privileged position in Guatemala even when there are generic alternatives. However, 
intellectual property is not the only obstacle in accessing low-cost medicines. First of 
all, the mere presence of a generic alternative in the market does not guarantee greater 
access to the medicine, as happened in Guatemala where, despite the fact that a generic 
version of antiretroviral was available for years before the introduction of Kaletra, the 
State decided to buy only the patent version. Of course, when Kaletra achieved 
protection through intellectual property, the state bought only the patented drug in 
                                               
833 World Health Organization. 2005. WHO model list of essential medicines, 14th ed., in World Health 
Organization [database online]. Geneva: WHO. http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2005/a87017_ eng.pdf. 
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accordance with the current legal framework 834 . Although trade agreements allow 
flexibility to guarantee public health, that is, parallel imports and compulsory licenses, 





                                               
834 El análisis demuestra que la Organización Panamericana de la Salud (OPS) puede comprar genéricos, 
en la medida en que sean para uso público, no comercial y por cuenta del Gobierno de Guatemala, como 
confirmado por el ADPIC, la Declaración de Doha. Sin embargo, hasta la fecha, el Ministerio de Salud 
Pública y Asistencia Social de Guatemala no ha usado las posibilidades que se otorgan a los miembros 






Human Rights Responsibilities of Pharmaceutical Corporations  
 
 
1. Globalization, Pharmaceuticals and Transnational Corporations: definition 
and development in international law 
 
Over the last few decades, the phenomenon of economic globalization and the 
liberalization of trade have triggered the emergence and expansion on the world stage 
of new actors capable of playing decisive roles in both the economic and political 
spheres. In addition to the international financial institutions, often referred to as the 
Bretton Woods organizations835, the players that dominate the new era of global trade 
are undoubtedly transnational corporations which have gradually and progressively 
increased their economic might over the years836. In fact, a document presented by UN 
Sub-commission on Human Rights has shown that transnational companies are often 
able to gain more economic power than the host states themselves, as demonstrated by 
the fact that of the 100 largest concentrations of wealth in the world, 51% are owned 
by multinational companies and 49% are owned by States837. 
 
 
1.1.The definition of Transnational Corporations in international law 
Multinationals are certainly a completely new model for the organizational structure 
and functioning of economic enterprises that originated after the Second World War 
(WWII). Previously, the expansion of the activities of large companies abroad had 
mainly taken place through commercial operations. Indeed, companies purchased raw 
                                               
835 S. Skogly, The human rights obligations of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2003, 9. 
836 Picone, Diritto internazionale dell’economia, 699. 
837 UN Subcommission on Human Rights, The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
The Question of Transnational Corporations, Working Document on the impact of activities of 
transnational corporations on the realization of economic, social and cultural rights, E/CN.4/1998/6, 
10 June 1998, 2. 
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materials abroad, but the production processes were carried out entirely within the 
country of origin. Occasionally, the expansion abroad took the form of granting 
independent foreign companies the production and/or marketing of the product. The 
phases of production, however, took place in the same country and no real 
delocalization occurred838. 
In the aftermath of WWII, the gradual improvement of information technology 
combined with the perfection of telecommunications and transports, has, on the one 
hand, made possible the connection and control of business centers located thousands 
of miles away, and on the other, has favored the development of an international market 
in which consumers demanded similar categories of goods 839 . As a result, these 
economic opportunities have led to a real race to conquer new markets, which has 
accentuated competition between companies. 
The grounds of the aforementioned changes at the global economic stage have been 
spotted in a variety of factors such as, among others, the speed and reduction of 
production costs of long-distance transports on the one hand and the technological 
progress on the other. The easier and faster exchange of goods, services and 
information across the world has improved the international integration among nations 
and private actors. As a result, companies could reconsider the logistics of their 
production systems internationally with the aim at decreasing costs and enhancing 
efficiency, which actions have led to the formation of large business groups 
characterized by a fragmentation of production and/or distribution activities in many 
countries, especially in developing countries. In these countries, in fact, large Western 
companies have found extremely favorable conditions for production facilities, 
obtaining strong competitive advantages based on the containment of operating costs. 
The phenomenon of delocalization constitutes the key element of the economic, 
productive, and legal framework of transnational corporations and explains the 
relevance of such analysis840. 
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In general terms, transnational corporations have multiple stages of production which 
are located in different countries, but which are directed centrally from the companies’ 
headquarters. Interestingly, the international delocalization of production and 
processing of goods can be implemented in different ways by the company. For 
example, such delocalization can be carried out by creating subsidiaries or by acquiring 
control over companies established in foreign states (usually referred to as host States) 
in respect to the country in which the parent company is located (home States). 
Furthermore, the parent company can conclude contractual relationships of agency, 
cooperation, franchising or license with private entities located abroad841. Nonetheless, 
the parent company always enjoys autonomous legal personality in respect to all the 
other legal subjects located abroad.  
Before proceeding to a full analysis of the main issue of the present work, assessing 
what transnational corporations are and how their complex structure can be studied 
under international law is necessary. Indeed, the ability of such corporations to operate 
across national borders and outside the effective supervision of national and 
international law makes them the object of further investigation under international 
law842. Specifically, their nebulous structure often produces a sort of legal immunity to 
the control of particular States, posing doubts over desirable regulation and protection 
at the international level. 
For all of the above, there is no doubt about the impact and reach that transnational 
corporations have and have had in the world. Notwithstanding, there is no agreed 
definition among the different countries, much less among the different international 
actors, regarding an adequate definition of such corporations. Even today, there is no 
terminological consensus on how to refer to them; and suffixes such as, “multi”, “supra” 
and “supra” are often used and exchanged in the same manner843. Such entities can be 
defined and classified differently depending on the perspective taken into account. 
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Scholars worldwide noted that the notion of transnational corporations does not have a 
precise legal connotation and could not provide an exhaustive definition in 
international law. In their views, the studies and intergovernmental negotiations aimed 
at regulating international corporations provided a clarification of the concept, but did 
not offer a proper definition844. 
This nominative discrepancy reflects the complexity of their legal nature, the constant 
mutability and the difficulty of adapting conceptual instruments to these new business 
realities. Consequently, in the absence of a universally accepted delimitation of its 
concept, various public institutions, international organizations and academic fora have 
outlined what they believe would be a definition of transnational corporations. 
The first reference to the term multinational company appears in the early 1960s, 
specifically in a paper presented by David E. Lilienthal, in which he defines these kinds 
of entities as those companies that are based in one country but operate and function 
according to the laws of other countries845. 
Subsequently, the term multinational developed in such a way as to feature three main 
specifications: firstly, they had to present some form of direct investment in at least one 
foreign country; secondly, the management of the undertaking had to take full 
responsibility for the company’s activities abroad; and lastly, that decisions would be 
made on grounds of the alternatives envisaged anywhere in the world and be not limited 
to a single country. 
 
 
1.2. Examples of judicial understanding of Corporations  
Interestingly, the Court of Justice of the European Communities (in the case 270/83 of 
1986), defined a transnational company as an entity constituted by a parent company, 
created in accordance with the law of a given country. The Court added that the latter 
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company has to be established in other countries through direct investments, either 
without creating local companies or through subsidiaries which are constituted in 
accordance with the law of the host country846. Important to note is that since the 1970s 
national Courts have highlighted the peculiar situation in which multinational 
corporations have acted. Indeed, in 1973, the Argentine Supreme Court stressed that, 
in those cases in which the legal status of subsidiaries companies turned them into 
independent entities, it was necessary to "lift the veil" of such legal fiction and let the 
factual and economic reality prevail. According to the Court, the parent company may 
shirk its responsibilities thanks to the special legal status these companies enjoy847. In 
practice, however, on several occasions the jurisprudence of national Courts has 
considered parent companies as completely different entities from the subsidiaries they 
control, granting legal immunities to the latter. For the same reason, it is not surprising 
that scholars argue that the refined corporate structure such corporations have, as well 
as their global reach, is what allows them to benefit from an extraordinary lack of 
responsibility for all but their shareholders. In other words, transnational corporations, 
although they have the legal appearance of a plurality of corporations, constitute, in 
essence, an economic unit with a single center of decision-making power848. A clear 
and precise definition of a multinational corporation is, hence, a difficult task to achieve. 
Notwithstanding, the identification of the features that distinguish such companies 
from other entities on the one hand, and makes them fascinating from a legal 
perspective on the other, is propaedeutic for the present analysis. Detecting accurate 
international legal obligations upon transnational corporations without having outlined 
a set of key qualities and notions would be, thus, unfeasible. As a result, it is appropriate 
to build a desirable legal framework on the grounds of the definitions provided by 
international organizations, which in different time and occasions have attempted to 
regulate the activities performed by multinational corporations and have highlighted 
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their distinguishing features and characteristics849. 
 
 
1.3. Multilateral approach to corporations  
The United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (UN Norms) addressed the 
term “transnational corporation” as “an economic entity operating in more than one 
country or a cluster of economic entities operating in two or more countries - whatever 
their legal form, whether in their home country or country of activity, and whether 
taken individually or collectively”850. This definition enhanced some key aspects, such 
as that these corporations are single economic units or a group of entities which operate 
in different countries under different juridical statuses851. 
Another document that constitutes a pillar for the identification of a definition of such 
corporations is the OECD Declaration and Decisions on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises and in particular its Annex 1 labelled OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines) 852 . In paragraph I.4 of the latter, 
multinational corporations are referred to as “companies or other entities established 
in more than one country and so linked that they may coordinate their operations in 
various ways. While one or more of these entities may be able to exercise a significant 
influence over the activities of others, their degree of autonomy within the enterprise 
may vary widely from one multinational enterprise to another. Ownership may be 
private, State or mixed”853. Interestingly, the Guidelines themselves provide a broad 
notion which intentionally avoid delivering an accurate definition. In fact, the latter 
paragraph aimed at stressing that a fundamental element of these corporations is the 
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tight link among the multiple companies that constitute multinational undertakings. 
Such link can be carried out in numerous ways854. According to the aforementioned 
Guidelines the latter link does not depend on the majority of share ownership by the 
parent company. Furthermore, such Guidelines exclude that the share of know-how and 
resources among the parent company and its subsidiaries suffice in determining the 
liaison among them855. 
In the same manner, paragraph 6 of the OIL Tripartite Declaration of 1977 provides 
important requirements of multinational corporations, without even attempting to 
deliver a definition of such entities856. The broad wording of paragraph 6 is intended to 
simplify the comprehension of the Declaration and not to offer such a definition. 
Notwithstanding, the latter paragraph highlights three important elements of 
multinational enterprises: firstly, their delocalized structure; secondly, their 
international nature and establishment in different countries outside the State of origin; 
and thirdly, “The degree of autonomy of entities within multinational enterprises in 
relation to each other varies widely from one such enterprise to another, depending on 
the nature of the links between such entities and their fields of activity and having 
regard to the great diversity in the form of ownership, in the size, in the nature and 
location of the operations of the enterprises concerned”857. 
Another definition, proposed within the United Nations and in specific within the 
Commission on Transnational Corporations in 1990, stressed the importance of the link 
among the entities and companies that constitutes the enterprise and the existence of a 
common decision making-center. This definition was included in the draft code of 
conduct on transnational corporations submitted to the UN Economic and Social 
Council on 31 May 1990. Regrettably, this proposal has never been formalized in an 
official document due to the unsolvable disagreement among the members of the 
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aforementioned Commission which works finally stopped in 1992858.  
Lastly, the UN Conference on Trade and Development focused on other aspects related 
to multinational corporations, which aspects were presented in the World Investment 
Report of 2007. The report emphasized three requirements as elements important in 
order to identify the multinational status of the company: firstly, the intensity of 
commercial transactions with foreign countries; secondly, the membership of the 
management; and, lastly, the composition of its shareholders859. 
Another definition worth noting was presented outside the UN system by the Institut 
de Droit International in the resolution labeled Les enterprises multinationals adopted 
in Oslo in 1977. According to the resolution “enterprises which consist of a decision-
making center located in one country and of operating centers, with or without legal 
personality, situated in one or more other countries should, in law, be considered as 
multinational enterprises860”. 
In light of the aforementioned definitions and understandings of to what a multinational 
corporation refers, the following conclusions and considerations may be drawn. What 
really differentiate a multinational company from a national counterpart are: the 
company’s size, the magnitude of its know-how, the international delocalization of its 
productive structure, the multitude companies that make part of it and the pursuit of 
common economic objectives by every unit that composes the multinational 
corporation861. Some scholars argue that the latter two aspects are the most relevant 
under a legal perspective, claiming that the most qualifying elements of multinational 
corporations are the dichotomy between economic unity and the fragmentated structure 
in multiple entities with different legal personalities 862 . As a result, each of the 
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companies/subsidiaries is an autonomous legal subject that has to comply with the law 
of the country of registration and incorporation. Simply stated, under a legal 
perspective the group of companies itself is not a corporation. Consequently, domestic 
law for can only regulate the conduct of the distinct legal entities, not of the single 
economic group. On the contrary, the enterprise acts as a unitary entity in light of an 
economic and strategic perspective under the monitoring and guidance of a single 
decision-making center863. Other scholars, such as Cassese, added that the power of 
such companies to conclude agreements not only with private actors, but specifically 
with States and international organizations constitutes an additional key requirement in 
the process of identifying a multinational corporation864. 
Worth noting at this point is that the legal status acquired by a company within a 
specific nation is not relevant in detecting the requirements that a multinational 
company must present. In fact, the notion of company at the domestic level is broad 
and differs depending on the particular national legal system taken into account. As a 
result, the subsidiaries of a company can be registered in the host State with different 
legal statuses. The aforementioned legal autonomy of the different entities of a 
multinational corporation is, however, a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the 
parent company can allow each of its subsidiaries to enjoy limited responsibility; but 
on the other, the structural fragmentation entails the formal compliance with a variety 
of different legal systems which regulate the conduct of companies within their 
jurisdictions865. 
Notwithstanding, the benefits go beyond the drawbacks. In practice, the different legal 
systems provide opportunities for multinational corporations, which can benefit from 
the grey areas and lack of coordination among such legal frameworks. These situations 
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are often referred to as forum shopping and/or jurisdiction shopping866 . Nowadays, 
companies enjoy having the choice among distinctive conveniences under legal and 
economic perspectives. For example, a company could pick a State in which tax laws 
are particularly beneficial or a State with a weak environmental, social or trade union 
law867. 
In detail, the control of the parent company over its subsidiaries can take place through 
a formal legal control, such as the ownership of the majority of the shareholding, or the 
control can be a de facto through, inter alia, the direction of production, composition 
of the executive board and financial dependency868.  
In practice, detecting the link between the headquarters and subsidiaries is often 
complicated. It is common for multinational corporation to hide their real internal 
structure throughout an array of different mechanisms. These mechanisms make up the 
so-called corporate veil, which entails the implementation of layers of intermediaries 
to distance the parent company legally from the host State subsidiary in order to 
become legally autonomous and benefit from favorable normative systems869. 
From such legal autonomy derives the power of the subsidiaries, at least theoretically, 
to independently manage their assets and assume contractual and/or non-contractual 
obligations. As result, the real decision center (the parent company) remains outside 
the legally binding agreements concluded by its subsidiaries, especially in connection 
with unlawful conducts by the latter and the consequent obligation to pay compensation 
for infractions of laws.   
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2. Legal Status of Transnational Corporations in International Law 
The first sections of this chapter have highlighted the unquestionable and constant 
progression of multinational corporations on the international stage. Their economic 
and political might has overcome the power and influence of multiple States. Therefore, 
international law cannot ignore the rise of such new actors and changes that these kinds 
of corporations have brought worldwide. In this regard, some scholars point out that 
while economists, political scientists and sociologists widely recognize multinational 
corporations as global economic actors with a relevant role in international politics and 
society, practitioners and academics of international law have lagged behind in the legal 
status of companies despite the de facto influence of such enterprises in this area870. 
According to traditional theories on international legal personality, however, States and 
International Organizations remain the sole actors, leaving to multinational 
corporations the role of mere object of the international legal system871. Furthermore, 
as part of the doctrine has argued over the years, the issue of legal personality 
constitutes one of the most difficult problem of all international law 872 , negatively 
impacting the proper respect of human rights globally873. 
In practice, international law has great potential to create a comprehensive legal 
framework that articulates direct obligations on multinational corporations to respect 
human rights, especially in those States that lack an adequate and efficient domestic 
judicial system. In such cases, international law could provide satisfactory means in 
order to stop human rights violations and to bring justice to the victims. So far, however, 
the international legal framework’s role has been more focused on regulating the inter-
state structure that sustains the international community; and the regulation of non-
state actors has rarely been put at the top of the agenda.  
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This section studies the legal status of multinational corporations within the 
international framework. The question related to the international legal personality of 
these companies requires a brief analysis of the notion of international legal personality 
in light of the prominent theories on such matter, with the aim at understanding whether 
or not the current framework allows the inclusion of these powerful actors as new 
subjects of international law.  
Having identified an acceptable definition of such companies in the previous section, 
traditional and recent theories on legal personality will be here presented in order to 
demonstrate the urgency for renovation and improvement of the international 
framework. Indeed, an innovative doctrine on international legal personality which 
could satisfactorily mirror the current global context in relation to business and human 
rights would be, hence, desirable874.  
 
 
2.1 An introduction to International Legal Personality 
 
Generally speaking, the concept of legal personality refers to the capability of a certain 
actor to be entitled of rights and duties within a specific legal system. Any legal system 
has to establish whom it provides with the rights and duties enshrined in it and “whose 
actions it takes account of by attaching legal consequences to them” 875 . Legal 
personality is a key concept of domestic legal frameworks as well as of the International 
one. Still, two characteristics, which make the international legal framework peculiar 
and unique, differentiate personality in international law from that in domestic law.  
The first feature of the international legal system is that international personality is not 
limited to the quality of having rights and duties, as well as particular powers according 
to the law, but that it also comprises the capability to create the law876. 
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Law-creation, as a key requirement of international personality, is the result of another 
peculiar feature of the international system: the absence of a centralized legislator. In 
fact, as opposed to domestic legal systems in which the formation of the law relies 
within the powers of centralized State organs, such as national parliaments and 
governments, at the international stage States enact international law themselves 
through different modes of explicit and implicit coordination877. Stated differently, the 
creation of international law derives directly from the will of States, which are the 
addressees of that very law. 
There is no doubt in considering States as typical international subjects to the extent 
that often the terms statehood and international personality were treated as synonymous. 
In the same manner, no question exists that at least international personality of States 
embraces the power to create law while being subject to this very law878. In practice, 
the focal issue to be addressed is whether the competence to create law is a fundamental 
requirement of an international person, or, on the contrary, whether there also can be 
international subjects lacking such competence. This issue will be tackled in this 
section, putting traditional and innovative approaches to legal personality in 
perspective, in light of international jurisprudence and main doctrine.  
The second characteristic that distinguishes personality in international law from that 
in domestic law is the absence of an ad hoc treaty or established norms of customary 
international law that properly addresses matters of personality. In the words of some 
scholars, there is no centralized law of persons in the international legal framework879. 
For example, in contrast to the attitude towards Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, which is 
commonly seen as the authoritative provision on the sources of international law, the 
same cannot be said about Article 34 of such Statute, which gives standing only to 
States but does not provide a statement on international legal personality more 
generally. Additionally, not even the International Law Commission has ever chosen 
the law of persons for codification regardless of a suggestion forwarded in 1949, as 
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opposed to the law of treaties or international responsibility to which the ILC has 
devoted much of its attention880. 
In this respect, the International Court of Justice’s relevant comment on this matter was 
delivered in the Reparation for Injuries Advisory Opinion of 1949, which constitutes 
the first step for anyone attempting to comprehend theories related to the concept of 
international legal subjectivity 881 . The definition provided in the latter Opinion 
constitutes the closest international law gets to an authoritative pronunciation on 
international personality, since, as mentioned above, there is neither a relevant treaty 
nor are there consolidated customary norms that address such issues882. 
Without analyzing the merits of the issue presented before the Court, the latter had to 
determine whether the United Nations, as an international organization, was entitled to 
bring an international claim for damages against a State for the injuries suffered by a 
UN agent during an official mission in that very State883. Another peculiarity of this 
Advisory Opinion was that the State concerned, Israel, was not a member of the UN at 
the time, an aspect which further complicated the task of the Court. 
The Court concluded that the United Nations enjoyed international personality, which 
meant that in the words of the Court: “it is a subject of international law and capable 
of possessing international rights and duties, and that it has the capacity to maintain 
its rights by bringing international claims”884. 
The aforementioned conclusion grounded on a reasoning by the Court, which is quite 
flexible and surely permits for a different conception of what is an international 
subject885. According to the Court, international subjects are not necessarily alike, and 
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the extension of their rights and duties depends on the needs of the community and the 
requirements of international life 886 . In light of this assumption, if international 
personality varies in its scope and content depending on the needs of the community, 
the number and kinds of international subjects could progressively increase over the 
course of the development of international law887 . As a result, this reasoning could 
allow the inclusion of multinational corporations as subject of international law, in view 
of the important economic and social changes occurring globally over time. 
Notwithstanding, not all that glitters is gold. In fact, some scholars have emphasized 
the absence of a legal provision in accordance to which entities actually are 
international persons or pursuant to which requirements personality is attributed888. In 
addition, other authors have highlighted the tautological nature of the definition of 
international personality presented by the Court889. In their views, “International law 
recognizes the capacity to act at the international level of an entity that is already 
capable of acting at the international level”890. In other words, it can be inferred that 
international personality, as well as the capacity to act at the international stage, 
constitutes essential requirements for the exercise of functions and rights. The Court, 
however, addressed international personality as the capacity to have rights and to 
exercise them. In the words of the former President of the International Court of Justice, 
Judge Higgins, the Court itself created a sort of “intellectual prison” over the 
understanding of international personality891. To break out of this prison, the Judge 
argued the need to adopt a functional approach to international personality and to leave 
behind the dichotomy subject-object of law which has “no credible reality”892. 
In this context, the progressive recognition of international law of the legal personality 
to entities which have different features from States, such as international organization, 
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individuals and rebels, demonstrates how the notion and concept of legal subjectivity 
must essentially present functional ends. Accordingly, the traditional division of the 
international legal system into subjects and objects seems outdated and a more dynamic 
and realistic approach would be desirable. To this end, acknowledging the role played 
by all the different actors at the international level by referring to them as participants 
rather than subjects/objects would undoubtedly bring international law more in line 
with the current situation893.  
As has been presented throughout this dissertation, the progressive development of 
human rights law and international economic law has enhanced the role played by non-
state actors and their scope for participation in international law. Studying the extent to 
which international law recognizes the presence of diverse classes of participants in the 
international legal context would thus be a more beneficial method in order to update 
theories on international personality894. 
In conclusion, if international law reflects the needs and requirements of the 
international community, understanding multinationals corporations as participants of 
international system offers a much more accurate description of the role played by 
private entities globally. As a result, the definition provided by Brownlie, according to 
which “a subject of International law is an entity possessing international rights and 
obligations and having the power to maintain its rights by bringing international 
claims and be responsible for its breaches of obligation by being subjected to such 
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2.2 Theories on International Legal Personality  
 
In light of the preliminary considerations presented on the concept of international 
personality, this section undertakes a literature review in order to determine to which 
extent multinational corporations can be considered legal persons under international 
law. The supporting structure and guiding line of the next section are the five 
conceptions that Portmann presents in relation to international legal personality, which 
are namely: States-only, Recognition, Individualistic, Formal and Actor conception896. 
 
 
2.2.1 The States-Only Conception 
 
The states-only conception acknowledged by Portmann summarized traditional 
conceptions related to international personality which hold the State as the exclusive 
subject of international law897. Accordingly, individuals and other entities only fully 
exist as nationals of a State and are therefore not directly relevant for international 
law898. Such approach grounded on philosophers such as Hegel, the German socio-
political and legal context in the aftermath of its unification of 1971, as well as on the 
work of authors such as Heinrich Triepel 899 , Lassa Oppenheim 900  and Dionisio 
Anzilotti 901 . In this understanding, statehood and international personality are 
considered as synonymous902. 
In the aftermath of the German and Italian unification, scholars needed to find 
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theoretical assumptions in order to legitimize these recently born States903 . In this 
regard, Hegel’s view of the State was taken into consideration and used to develop the 
States-only conception. The philosopher refuted the idea of the State as the product of 
a social-contract among free individuals with the aim of protecting their specific 
interests. On the contrary, Hegel argued that the State was the result of an historical 
process which started from the social institutions of the family and the civil society and 
which finally terminated in modern statehood904. Accordingly, the State was conceived 
as an entity resembling the human body, with the capability of organizing itself in order 
to preserve and to develop in light of mutating social needs during the course of time905. 
The state was therefore considered as a factual organism, rather than an abstract entity 
created by a formal contract of individuals. In this scenario, international law, merely 
took reality into account while transforming social reality into legal prescriptions. As a 
result, some scholars argued that the State precedes the law and “becomes a ‘natural’, 
‘original’ or ‘absolute’ international person existing a priori”906. 
The backbone principle of the international system is sovereign equality among States, 
as entities superiorem non recognoscentes, which are the only one that can create, 
consent and modify international law 907 . In other words, States are bound to the 
international provisions upon which they have explicitly or tacitly agreed908, bearing in 
mind the principle of sovereign equality among States, also codified in the United 
Nations Charter, which inter alia codified the equal and horizontal nature of the 
international community909.  
According to this conception, individuals are conceived as component parts of the State 
in which the nationality resides. As a result, the consideration of the relationship 
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between international and domestic law as dualistic may be considered adequate. In 
fact, the latter and former frameworks feature different sources and different subjects, 
allowing the drawing of a sharp line between the two. In the words of Triepel, the 
aforementioned legal systems are two circles touching each other but never 
overlapping910. 
In light of this dualistic conception, international law derives from the collective will 
of a number of States, as opposed to domestic law which is the result of the will of one 
State. Accordingly, “international law is not a mere external public law (and thus part 
of national law) that one state can lawfully create and change according to its own will. 
There must be a common will of several states to establish or to change international 
rules”911.  
Under the aforementioned considerations, the inference is that domestic law regulates 
both the relations among individuals on the one hand and between the State and 
individuals on the other. On the contrary, international law applies to the relations 
among those States that have formed the international norms under discussion.  
In conclusion, if we were to apply the theoretical elements of the State-only conception 
described above to the reality of multinational corporations, which in fact is the aim of 
this section, the following remarks can be drawn. Firstly, international law cannot be 
applied to corporations since international norms are only relevant for those States that 
have concurred with them. Secondly, if a particular State has participated in the 
formation of a specific international norm which envisage provisions relating 
corporations, such provisions are not considered as being directly applicable to those 
corporations. The latter are not in fact subjects of the international community, rather 
only constitutive members of the State such corporations are incorporated to in 
accordance to the respective domestic law912. 
This leads to the conclusion that corporations enjoy no rights or obligations under 
international law and that even treaties providing norms affecting corporations have to 
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be interpreted as obligations only on the member State to such treaty913.  
In regard to human rights, only States are bound to abide to the respect, protect and 
fulfil framework, which they have agreed upon either under international treaty law or 
under customary international law. According to the State-only conception, the only 
way corporations can be bound to human rights law is for the State to provide specific 
norms in its national law 914 , making international law ineffective without State’s 
action 915 . This traditional view of international personality, thus concludes that 
corporations cannot be considered subjects of law and are relevant to international law 
in general and human rights law in particular, solely indirectly through the intervention 
of States916. The main legal displays of the aforementioned conception on international 
personality can be found in the well-know Mavrommatis case and in the Jurisdiction 
of the Courts of Danzig advisory opinion. 
 
 
2.2.2 Legal manifestations of the State-Only Conception (A) – the Mavrommatis Case 
 
The relevant part to the present section concerns the so-called Mavrommatis formula, 
through which the Judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
emphasized that the individual has no direct rights in the international legal system, but 
that a state can call upon its own international rights in order to safeguard interests of 
its nationals 917 . This resembles the states-only conception of international legal 
subjectivity: the individual is not an independent entity and becomes significant under 
international law as a national of a State, since States are the only international right 
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holders918. Such understanding of international personality has been acknowledged in 
numerous leading cases and, to some degree, is currently affirmed in the ILC’s work 
on diplomatic protection today919. 
The Mavrommatis case concerned the dispute between a Greek national named Mr 
Mavrommatis and the British government. Before de commencement of World War I, 
Mr Mavrommatis was awarded concession to begin public works in Palestine by the 
then presiding Ottoman government. When the British mandate over Palestine920 came 
into existence, as a result of a mandate from the League of Nations in June 1922921, the 
government had allegedly failed to protect Mr Mavrommatis concessionary rights. The 
Greek national claimed a violation of Article 9 of Protocol XII of the Lausanne Peace 
Treaty between Turkey and the Allied Powers, as well as Greece and Great Britain. 
Mavrommatis’s claim was then taken on by Greece, which brought the case before the 
PCIJ. The British government questioned the jurisdiction of the Court, since in light of 
Article 26 of the Mandate for Palestine, the requirements for jurisdiction were not met. 
The first issue to be addressed by the Court was thus to determine whether the dispute 
was related to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the Mandate 
when applying the Article 26. 
In this regard, the Court replied with the aforementioned Mavrommatis Formula which 
reads as follows: “In the case of the Mavrommatis Concessions it is true that the dispute 
was at first between a private person and a State – i.e. between M. Mavrommatis and 
Great Britain. Subsequently, the Greek Government took up the case. The dispute then 
entered upon a new phase; it entered the domain of international law, and became a 
dispute between two States. . . . By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by 
resorting to diplomatic action or international juridical proceedings on his behalf, a 
State is in reality asserting its own rights. . . . The question, therefore, whether the 
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present dispute originates in an injury to a private interest, which in point of fact is the 
case in many international disputes, is irrelevant from this standpoint. Once a State 
has taken up a case on behalf of one of its subjects before an international tribunal, in 
the eyes of the latter the State is sole claimant”922. 
The argument presented by the Court constitutes the typical understanding of 
diplomatic protection under international law, according to which the mistreatment of 
a foreign national’s interests undermines the international rights of the national’s home 
state, not the rights of the individual923. International law is thus concerned only when 
the home state of a private party becomes involved in a case related to a private interest 
and calls upon its own international rights against other states. Hence, in the 
Mavrommatis case the supposed inadequacy of the British government to protect 
Mavrommatis’s concessionary rights concerned the international rights of Greece, not 
the rights of Mr Mavrommatis924.  
Despite the fact that the Mavrommatis-formula has been, and is, frequently challenged 
in doctrine, clearly it is still applied in current international legal practice related to 
diplomatic protection. There is no doubt that such continuous use of the formula 
demonstrates that the basic assumptions of the states-only conception of international 
subjectivity are implicitly accepted, in specific the view that the individual has no 
independent existence in the international realm except as being a national of a state925. 
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2.2.3. Legal manifestations of the State-Only Conception (B) – The Jurisdiction of the 
Courts of Danzig Advisory Opinion 
 
The Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig opinion has raised criticism over its 
interpretation. Some scholars, such as Anzilotti926 , consider the opinion as a firm 
testimony of the states-only conception of international subjectivity. On the contrary, 
another part of academia perceives such opinion as a manifestation of the direct 
applicability of international law to individuals (if the parties have so envisaged) and 
thus they regard it as a valuable tool in order to broaden the notion of international 
personality. In this respect, Portmann argues that the Jurisdiction of the Courts of 
Danzig opinion is a useful evidence of the states-only conception, but applied it in such 
a way as to partly open the (back) door for involving the individual in international 
law927. 
The Advisory Opinion concerned whether specific agreements concluded between the 
Free City of Danzig and Poland were applicable to individuals. The case stemmed from 
the special settings related to the city of Danzig during the interval between the two 
great wars. In fact, in 1919 the Treaty of Versailles established Danzig as a Free City 
with the aim of granting Poland’s access to the sea while safeguarding the city’s 
German-speaking population.  
Danzig had the requirements of statehood provided by international law 928, and thus 
could enter into two agreements with Poland, one establishing that the Danzig railways 
were to be managed by Polish authorities 929  and the other, namely the Definitive 
Agreement Regarding Officials (Beamtenabkommen), regulating the entry of the 
Danzig railway workers into Polish employment930.  
Several cases were brought before the courts of Danzig by Danzig railway officials 
against the Polish Railway Administration, claiming monetary compensations for 
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alleged violations of the aforementioned Definitive Agreement Regarding Officials. 
Once these cases were brought to the consideration of the High Commissioner of the 
League of Nations at Danzig, the latter concluded that the proceedings could not be 
grounded on the Definitive Agreement Regarding Officials931. The Free City of Danzig 
confronted this conclusion before the Council of the League of Nations, which 
requested an advisory opinion to the PCIJ on this matter. The issue was, hence, to 
determine whether an international agreement, namely Definitive Agreement 
Regarding Officials, was directly applicable to individual railway workers or, on the 
contrary, only to the parties to the treaty as claimed by the Polish government932. The 
Court replied that: “It may be readily admitted that, according to a well-established 
principle of international law, the Beamtenabkommen, being an international 
agreement, cannot, as such, create direct rights and obligations for private individuals. 
But it cannot be disputed that the very object of an international agreement, according 
to the intention of the contracting Parties, may be the adoption by the Parties of some 
definite rules creating individual rights and obligations and enforceable by the national 
courts. That there is such an intention in the present case can be established by 
reference to the terms of the Beamtenabkommen”933.  
The pronouncement of the Court on the issue at stake was controversial, since some 
authors have interpreted it as a recognition by the Court that treaties can create 
individual rights if the parties so have established934. Notwithstanding, such position 
appears to be extreme, especially in light of the reasoning delivered by Anzilotti, who 
argued that a treaty could not be directly applicable to individuals, but at most could 
compel the parties to implement into their domestic law the provisions provided by the 
treaty935. Only in such a way, could treaties be directly relevant to individuals. 
In conclusion, the theoretical approach adopted by the Court in the Danzig opinion is 
a demonstration of the state-only conception on international personality. Accordingly, 
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an international treaty cannot create rights directly applicable for individuals, but only 
States are the right holders. Individuals can, however, be objects but never subjects of 
international agreements. In fact, pursuant to the second part of the Court’s reasoning, 
international agreements can regulate matters concerning individuals, but the relevant 
norms cannot bestow direct rights on them. Such provisions merely establish an 
obligation of the parties to adopt appropriate norms into their domestic law in order to 
thus be enforceable before national courts. 
 
 
2.3. The Recognition Conception 
 
The recognition conception constitutes the evolution and adjustment of the states-only 
conception. The primacy of the state in international law remains a basic assumption 
of this legal theory, but States are no longer the only international subjects. States can 
in fact recognize other entities as non-state actors.  
The recognition approach grounds on the work and studies of scholars such as Karl 
Strupp, Arrigo Cavaglieri and Georg Schwarzenberger, who developed this theory in 
light of what they identified as state practice regarding international subjectivity936. 
This conception, which some authors consider the leading theory on international 
subjectivity today, developed as a result of social, economic and political changes 
which occurred over time and which weakened the ‘States-only’ approach’s basic 
assumptions 937 . In particular, this corrective conception towards international 
personality emerged in response of the increasing importance within the international 
framework of the United Nations and of international organizations in general. Such 
approach grounded on the assumption that if legal analysis distanced itself too far from 
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social reality, a corrective measure is, hence, needed938. 
The recognition conception, while relying on the basic analytical structure of the 
‘States-only’ conception, accepts other international subjects alongside States. Indeed, 
States remain the main legal persons granted with full subjectivity and are the only 
authorities competent to confer and consent to limited international legal personality to 
other entities939. In other words, this conception argues that the emergence and scope 
of a new subject of law in the international realm stems completely from the will and 
recognition of States, which, thus, have the power both to establish and exclude which 
entities can be part of the international legal framework940. According to some scholars, 
State’s recognition to non-States actors has to be carried out by at least two States as 
well as being explicit and unequivocal. This scrupulous degree of recognition in 
reference to such entities is required due to the presumption that non-state actors (such 
as individuals) belong to the domestic framework and not to the international one. 
State’s will, thus, has to be unquestionable in order to grant limited personality which 
exists pursuant to the limitations provided in the act of recognition 941.  
Apparently, the aforesaid conception leaves room for the hypothesis that multinational 
corporations are granted with limited international legal personality separated from that 
of States942 , certainly, if the latter have recognized such corporations as subjects of 
international law943. Accordingly, corporations’ existence and scope of action at the 
international stage are the result of states’ recognition and will. 
Regrettably, the practice differs greatly from the theory. In fact, certain kinds of 
international subjects have widely been accepted at the international level as separate 
and autonomous international legal persons, such is the case of international 
organizations and individuals 944 . The same can be said in reference to another 
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categories of actors deemed to have State-like qualities as well as to entities in the 
process of becoming States. Among the aforementioned category are insurgents 
recognized as belligerents, national liberation movements (‘NLMs’) which act on 
behalf of peoples campaigning for self-determination, de facto regimes, the Holy See, 
and including the Sovereign Military Order of Malta945. 
Notwithstanding, the same observations cannot be made in relation to multinational 
corporations since in practice, States have never explicitly agreed to recognize legal 
status to such enterprises, nor have they concluded a treaty providing specific norms 
on this matter946. 
The relevant legal practice related to the recognition conception is identified, inter alia, 
in two specific cases, namely the aforementioned ICJ Advisory Opinion of 1949 and 
in the case concerning the international legal status of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC). 
The main features of the 1949 ICJ Reparations for Injuries Advisory Opinion have 
already be presented in the introduction of this section in order to set the theoretical 
framework in relation to international legal personality. The Court’s definition 
regarding the UN legal status “a subject of international law and capable of possessing 
international rights and duties, and it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing 
international claims” has already been mentioned and discussed947. 
However, the key assumptions of such Advisory Opinion, are here further studied and 
presented in order to highlight the foundations of the recognition conception. 
Briefly stated, the Court concluded that the UN, as an international organization, was 
a peculiar subject of international law, since even entities that were not States could be 
granted with international legal personality. Such personality does not inevitably 
require that the same rights and obligations that apply to States also extend to 
international organizationd. This leads to the conclusion that statehood and 
international personality have different theoretical and practical implications, since the 
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legal status of international organizations can vary in scope and content from the legal 
status that States or other recognized actors have. The flexibility of the international 
system948 entails that such organizations may have different degrees of legal personality, 
which may differ over time, depending on the international capacities States have 
provided for in their respective founding treaties949. 
The ICJ emphasized the developing nature of the international arena and accordingly 
the fact that “subjects of law in any legal system depend on the needs of the 
community”950. This means that the recognition of new legal subjects is needed since 
the international legal framework is dynamic and may considerably change over time951. 
As already described above, the Court pointed out the functional nature of the UN legal 
personality. In fact, the personality attributed by States to the organization serves a 
precise purpose, namely allowing the UN to carry out its objectives and goals952. In 
this regard, some scholars have argued that the personality of an international 
organization is limited by its respective constitution which explicitly provides the scope 
and extent of the legal status such organization enjoys, such as the capacity to conclude 
treaties and to start international proceedings953. Another important consideration made 
by the Court concerns the fact that UN personality is objective and valid even for non-
member States although such organizations are usually the product of a specific treaty 
that is only binding on the parties954.  
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2.3.1. The Recognition Conception and Transnational Corporations  
 
The ICJ’s understanding of international personality is flexible enough to recognize 
multinational corporations as subjects of international law. The latter personality does 
however, depend on State action. In fact, as some scholars have highlighted, State’s 
conduct is necessary in order to assess whether a specific entity has legal personality 
and to what extent such personality can be exercised by a non-state actor955. As a result, 
multinational corporations upon States will are granted with legal rights and obligations 
that are not relevant to other categories of international legal persons and which depend 
on “needs of the international community”956. 
It is worth noting that a specific area of international law, namely the international 
investment regime, provides a valuable practical example of the aforesaid theoretical 
assumptions. In light of the ICJ reasoning in the Reparation Case, international 
enterprises and other investors under Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs) enjoy international legal status to the same extent the UN 
was understood as a subject of International law by the Court957. Indeed, investment 
treaties provide precise rights to corporations different than those envisaged for the 
States parties to such treaties, resulting in a limited personality of these enterprises, 
likewise the UN Charter tacitly acknowledges distinct legal status to the organization 
than to its member States958. 
In addition, in the same manner the U.N. Charter provides the faculty of the 
organization to conclude certain agreements and treaties under international law, 
“many BITs’ and FTAs’ umbrella clauses explicitly ‘internationalize’ investor-State 
contracts, thereby elevating such contractual assurances to the level of inter-State 
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pacts”959. Furthermore, the majority of BITs and FTAs, as opposed to the UN Charter, 
envisage explicit clauses providing investors with the right to institute proceedings 
against States before international tribunals (usually arbitral tribunal) in order to pursue 
their claims. To state it in the words of Alvarez: “to the extent the ICJ concluded in the 
Reparation Case that the ability to act as a person is the principal determinant of 
personhood status, the same conclusion can even more readily be drawn with respect 
to corporations and other investors under the international investment regime”960. 
The recognition conception, thus, theoretically allows States to recognize multinational 
corporations as subjects of international law and the study of de lex lata demonstrates 
that such corporations enjoy specific rights under international investment treaties. 
Many scholars, however, argue that such rights seem unsatisfactory to conclude that 
States have conferred legal status to such corporations961. Emerging from the practice 
is States’ unwillingness to properly attribute international legal personality to 
multinational corporations via any formal act expressing consent. On the contrary, 
States’ practice proves that the creation of corporation takes place through domestic 
law. In this regard Cassese concludes that States have never upgraded these entities to 
international subjects and thus, the author pointed out that multinational corporations 
enjoy no international rights and nor are bound to international obligations. “They are 
only subjects of municipal and ‘transnational’ law”962. In this regard, in the words of 
the SRSG “nothing prevents States from imposing international legal responsibility for 
human rights directly on corporations. But the evidence we reviewed does not indicate 
that they have already done so to any appreciable extent”963.  
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2.4. The Individualistic Conception 
 
The third conception acknowledged by Portmann is the individualistic conception. 
According to the latter, as a general rule, the human being is placed at the center of the 
international system and, as such, is an international subject enjoying certain basic 
international rights and duties964. This conception emerged from the work of Hersch 
Lauterpacht who, over the course of and in the aftermath of the atrocities of WWII, 
attempted to put the individual back at the center of the international debate965 . 
The main assumption is that the human being is a priori international subject and such 
legal status does not derive from the explicit or implicit recognition nor consent of 
States. In this regard, in light of sociological, philosophical and natural law remarks, 
some scholars have drawn the ultimate conclusion that individuals and not States are 
the only subjects at the international level966. Hersch Lauterpacht, however, mitigated 
such extreme approaches and elaborated a theory which influenced following legal 
practice mostly related to international criminal law and human rights law 967 . 
Nowadays, this approach towards legal personality has been championed by prominent 
figures such as Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade and, with less strength, by Antonio 
Cassese968. 
The individualistic conception grounds on two main theoretical pillars, which 
combined result in considering the human being as a priori subject of international law. 
The first pillar concerns the understanding of the State as a functional entity governed 
by human beings who are subject to the rule of law in the interest of those being 
governed969; the second pillar relies on understating international law as consisting of 
fundamental principles of law being superior to expressions of state will (constitutional 
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principles of ius cogens character)970.  
As a result, the principal goal of the international legal system is to protect the freedom 
and well-being of all individuals, making, thus, necessary for international law and 
ultimately States, to directly represent the interests of all human beings. Accordingly, 
the individualistic approach understands public and private spheres as a single entity 
in which all the provisions adopted are aimed at enhancing the wellbeing of 
individuals971.  
In brief, the individualistic conception addresses three specific aspects of the 
international legal framework. Firstly, the conception challenges and rejects the 
aforesaid Hegelian understanding of the State. The State is in fact understood as a 
corporate entity created by individuals for fulfilling their own interests and not merely 
as a mystical entity resulting from an historical process. In principle there is no 
distinction between State and individual interests972. This leads to the assumption that 
international law can confer rights upon individuals (both if acting on behalf of the 
State or privately) and requires obligations of the individual973. 
Secondly, the individualistic conception criticizes the system of the sources of law 
outlined in the state-only conception and proposes a new regime. Accordingly, sources 
of law do not merely originate from the will of State, and natural law principles are 
placed at the center of the legal framework independently of the positive law of a 
certain political order, community or State. This understanding of the international 
legal system relies on Article 38(3) of the ICJ, which allows the Court to apply general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations. The latter provision is understood to 
support the idea, also often found in international arbitration practice, that natural law 
is an acknowledged source of international law supplementing treaties and custom974. 
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In this scenario, there are general rules that bind and concern all States, namely 
fundamental legal principles and international peremptory norms (often referred to as 
ius cogens norms)975. Without going into further details, ius cogens refers to a specific 
group of dominant norms which do not derive from customs nor treaties and which are 
hierarchically superior to them976. Consequently, ius cogens norms can be modified 
only by subsequent norms of the same status and, in addition, may function to 
invalidate a treaty or agreement between states to the extent of the incompatibility with 
any such principles or norms977. 
The latter kinds of norms ground on the existence of an opinion iuris which acceptance 
is broader than ordinary international customs and which aim is to protect fundamental 
values of the international community and the human being. This is the reason ius 
cogens norms refer to the safeguarding of peace, and inter alia the prohibition against 
crimes against humanity, genocide and gross violations of human rights 978 . The 
violation of such norms shocks the conscience of humankind and ius cogens is thus 
binding regardless of protests, acknowledgment and acquiescence by States979. 
Lastly, the individualistic conception challenges the view that international personality 
of non-state actors depends upon State’s recognition as presented in the recognition 
conception. Indeed, the international personality of the individual is not the result of 
the expressions of State will, since the individual is understood as a priori subject on 
the grounds of general principles establishing individuals to be the ultimate recipients 
of the law. Individuals, thus, have certain fundamental rights a State and other 
individuals cannot interfere with980.  
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2.4.1. Legal manifestations of the Individualistic Conception – (A) The Nuremberg 
judgment 
 
The main manifestations of the individualistic conception in legal practice are 
identified in the Nuremberg judgment and in much of the human rights practice OF the 
ECHR981 . In October 1946, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) applied the 
individualistic conception of international personality since twelve Nazi defendants 
were sentenced to death and seven to jail for committing international crimes under 
international law and not under municipal penal law982. 
The IMT was established as a result of the London Agreement signed by the Allied 
Powers (including France) for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis. In detail, the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal, which was attached to the aforesaid agreement, defined the international 
crimes for which individuals could be brought before the Tribunal, namely crimes 
against peace (war of aggression), war crimes, and crimes against humanity983.  
The tribunal, however, faced a procedural and theoretical impasse. According to the 
principle of non-retroactivity, also referred to as nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege, 
no one can face criminal punishment except for a conduct that was specifically 
criminalized by predetermined law before such conduct took place984. The latter Latin 
maxim, which is the legal foundation of all domestic criminal systems and is enshrined 
in human rights instruments such as the ICCPR and ECHR985 , poses a prohibition 
against ex post facto criminal laws and its subsequent rule of non-retroactive 
application of penal laws and sanctions  
The issue at stake was to determine whether the establishment of the IMT conferred 
                                               
981 As well as, in the Jurisprudence related to the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). 
982 In re Goering and Others (International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Judgment), 41 AJIL 1947, 
172–333, at 217). See also 13 Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases (ILR) 203, 
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jurisdiction to try individuals for international crimes considered as such according to 
the Tribunal’s Charter or whether such crimes were part of international law before the 
creation of the Tribunal. The former scenario entailed a violation of the non-
retroactivity principle and an ex post facto criminal procedure, as opposed to the latter 
scenario which would comply with such principle since the crimes were already 
enshrined within the international legal framework at the time the offences occurred986. 
The question was mostly relevant in relation to the crime of aggressive war, for which 
the Tribunal considered mandatory to prove that international law had already 
envisaged individual responsibility for aggressive war at the time Nazis’ unlawful 
conducts took place. In practice the Tribunal had to assess whether aggressive war had 
previously been banned in 1939 and whether such banning concerned individuals 
acting on behalf of States987.  
To this end, the Tribunal found that the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, to which 
Germany was a party, had already established a prohibition of aggressive war not 
merely in terms of a normal international delict, but specifically in terms of an 
international crime. This understanding, however, did not derive directly from the Pact 
but was extracted from “general principles of justice”, since in accordance with the 
Tribunal, aggressive war could lead only to “inevitable and terrible consequences for 
the international community as a whole”988. 
Once having identified the criminal provision prohibiting aggressive war, the Tribunal 
highlighted that its violation led to individual rather than to state responsibility989 . 
Indeed, when the defendants presented the argument that international law prescribed 
obligations only upon states and not upon individuals, the Tribunal remarkably 
responded: “That international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as 
well as upon States has long been recognized […]. Crimes against international law 
are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who 
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commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced”990. Hence, in 
the eyes of the Tribunal, the crime of aggression was well established within the 
international framework and implied international responsibility of individuals and not 
of States. The arguments presented by the Tribunal concerning individual responsibility 
for the crime of aggression reflects the main features of the individualistic conception 
of international subjectivity. Indeed, the Tribunal referred to States as not being 
“abstract entities” in accordance with the individualistic conception understanding of 
the State as a corporate entity created by individuals991.  
Interestingly, the Tribunal did not tackle the issue of whether States had displayed their 
intention to confer international legal status to individuals with regard to international 
crimes, nor had the magistrates researched whether existed a customary norm to that 
end. Instead, the reasoning of the Tribunal grounded on the assumption that there must 
be individual responsibility for international crimes in order to make international law 
an effective legal system992. This is in accordance with the individualistic view that 
there are fundamental international rights and duties binding upon every individual 
(be they gouvernants or gouverne´s) in the interest of individual freedom. Finally, the 
fact that the tribunal had recourse to general principles of justice in order to declare 
aggressive war an international crime reveals the same view on sources of 
international law as in the individualistic conception993. 
In conclusion, the Nuremberg case demonstrates that in a specific branch of 
international law, namely criminal law, there is the assumption of the individual being 
an international subject; accordingly, international criminal law subsists because the 
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individual is understood as the recipient of fundamental international norms in 
accordance with the individualistic conception of international subjectivity.  
 
 
2.4.2. (B) The Human Rights practice within the European Court of Human Rights 
framework  
 
International human rights law is often considered a direct manifestation of the 
individualistic conception of international personality, mainly in light of its scope and 
aim which places human beings at the center of the legal framework 994 . This 
consideration is in fact illustrated in the case law of multiple judicial and quasi-judicial 
systems such as, among others, the UN Human Rights Committee and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights995 . This section, however, focuses purely on the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, since the reasoning behind the 
work of the Strasbourg Judges is a valuable example of how the theoretical implications 
of the individualistic conception have come into existence.  
As a preliminary reflection, it is worth noting that it is not common for regional human 
rights tribunals to directly address matters of international personality. It is hence 
problematic to identify the features of the international legal status of individuals at 
first hand from the case law. Therefore, the key qualifications of the individualistic 
conception are here inferred from the broad reasoning behind the Loizidou v. Turkey 
case996 and its following applications in the “European” jurisprudence. 
Indeed, what can be deduced from the Court’s argument in the Loizidou v. Turkey case 
is that the individual must be deemed an international subject in the European human 
rights framework due to the very nature of human rights representing constitutional 
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norms of the international legal system997. 
The case of Loizidou v. Turkey concerned the alleged violations of different rights 
envisaged in the European Convention perpetrated by Turkey in the aftermath of the 
Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus in 1974. In particular the case involved a 
Cypriot national named Ms Titina Loizidou who lived in Southern Cyprus and who 
was prohibited by Turkish authorities to have access to her property situated in the 
northern part of the island. On 19 March 1989, Ms Titina Loizidou was arrested by 
Turkish forces after having participated in a demonstration during which she crossed 
the border to Northern Cyprus. On 22 July after her release, Ms Loizidou and the 
government of Cyprus started proceedings against Turkey claiming that Turkey had 
violated Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and numerous other norms of the European 
Convention on Human Rights998. 
On its side, Turkey preliminary objected the lack of jurisdiction of the ECHR to assess 
facts that that occurred outside Turkish boundaries. In fact, Turkey pointed out that in 
light of former article 25 (1) of the Convention, Turkey accepted the competence of the 
human rights system of protection of the Council of Europe only “to allegations 
concerning acts or omissions of public authorities in Turkey performed within the 
boundaries of the territory to which the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey”999. In 
this regard, the respondent State stressed that the facts occurred in the Northern 
Republic of Cyprus were not imputable to Turkey referring to a reservation presented 
on 28 January 1987 with the aim of excluding Northern Cyprus from the jurisdiction 
of the Court. The reservation was undoubtably still in force given that it had been 
renewed numerous times afterwards its submission1000. The legal issue that the Court 
had to tackle was whether the reservation filed by Turkey was permissible under 
specific provisions enshrined within the Convention, namely articles 25 and 46 of the 
latter. According to the Court the Convention could not be regarded as a typical 
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international agreement. Indeed, recalling an already presented statement, the Judges 
highlighted the special character of the Convention which “unlike international treaties 
of the classic kind, the Convention comprises more than mere reciprocal engagements 
between Contracting States. It creates, over and above a network of mutual, bilateral 
undertakings, objective obligations which, in the words of the Preamble benefit from a 
collective enforcement”1001.  
From this argument it follows that Articles 25 and 46 of the Convention are essential 
in conferring effectiveness to the entire human rights-protective system since they 
delineate the responsibility of the Commission and Court to ensure the observance 
of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties, bearing in mind the 
special character of the Convention as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms1002.  
In the eyes of the Court, the object and purpose of the Convention is the protection of 
individual human beings. This means that its provisions have to be interpreted and 
applied in a such a manner to make its safeguards practical and effective. It follows 
that a reservation which hinders the proper application of the aforementioned two 
articles could render the entire system ineffective since the European Convention on 
Human Rights did not embody mere bilateral obligations, but rather represented a 
constitutional instrument of European public order (ordre public) intended for the 
protection of the human being1003. 
Accordingly, the reservation filed by Turkey in order to restrict the Court’s jurisdiction, 
even if admissible under general international law, could not be considered acceptable 
in light of the special character of the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
required special considerations with respect to treaty interpretation1004. Thus, the Court, 
stressed the constitutional character of international human rights law, which is situated 
in the ov\\erall international legal system. As a result, according to the Judges human 
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rights norms do not create a self-contained legal system nor a new legal order, rather 
such norms have to be regarded as constitutional norms protecting the individual within 
the framework of existing general international law.  
In conclusion, though not addressing matters relating to international personality, the 
Court adopted the individualistic conception of international subjectivity mainly in 
light of both the style of the Courts’ reasoning and the reference to certain expressions 
such as constitutional norms, fundamental freedoms. Furthermore, the unambiguous 
placement of the human being as the pivot of the entire European human rights system 
reflects the individualistic understanding of the individual as a priori subject of the 
international framework. As the Court pointed out in the Al-Adsani and Bankovic 
judgments, such international framework is thus perceived as able to provide the 
overall legal framework in which these constitutional norms for the protection of the 
individual are positioned1005. Accordingly, it can be inferred that the individual must be 
considered an international person in the European human rights system, mainly due 
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2.4.3. Individualistic Conception and Multinational companies 
 
In light of the aforementioned arguments on the individualistic conception, it can be 
inferred that such conception on international personality provides scope for 
multinational corporations created under national law to be regarded as international 
legal subjects. Indeed, as international legal rights and obligations are conferred 
directly on human beings, mutatis mutandis, they can be applicable to corporations, as 
there are no logical reasons precluding analogy with individuals1007. 
Grounding on the theoretical assumptions of the individualistic conception, 
corporations are in fact associations of individuals and as such are conceptually equal 
to individuals. As some scholars have pointed out, national courts have treated 
corporations as mere groups of persons under the consideration that “what is illegal for 
one individual to do should be equally illegal for a group of them, even when this group 
is formed to make a profit”1008. The same was inferred by the US Supreme Court which 
in the Citizens United v Federal Election Commission case held that freedom of speech 
provisions extend to corporations in the same manner as the First amendment protects 
individuals, even though such corporations are not natural persons1009.  
There are a number of considerations upon which the academia supported the view that 
multinational corporations can be directly bound by norms of international human 
rights law, which, in fact ground on the reasoning behind the individualistic conception. 
The point of departure of such considerations is the opinion that the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), as provided for within its preamble, targets “all 
organs of society”, thus addressing companies as well. Accordingly, human rights 
obligations envisaged in the UDHR are legally binding for companies as are binding 
for any other organ in society1010 . Undoubted, the UDHR is the most commonly 
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recognized benchmark in order to identify relevant human rights norms 1011 . 
Nonetheless, as some scholars have highlighted, both the Declaration peculiar legal 
status as a soft law instrument and the fact that the preambles of international 
agreements are not binding on the parties have the effect that the source of such norms 
as well as the conditions for their application are embodied elsewhere, beyond and 
outside the Declaration 1012 . Under human rights law the view that multinational 
corporations have legal personality equivalent to that of individuals is, in fact, 
desirable 1013 . There is a great number of scholars who welcome the argument of 
acknowledging corporate rights under international Human Rights law1014. One logical 
implication of recognizing such corporate rights would be beneficial, mainly in terms 
of enhancing the commitment and acceptance of human rights and subsequent 
responsibilities for multinational companies1015. Such recognition would result in the 
effective use of existing mechanisms with the aim of bolstering companies’ 
responsibility and accountability for human rights, without the need of creating new 
legal mechanisms 1016 . Accordingly, some scholars have noted that the option of 
establishing direct obligations on corporations is desirable, since monitoring 
procedures such as that of the Human Rights Council might be applicable to such 
entities. In the same manner, the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute could theoretically be 
extended in order to recognize companies as legal persons next to individuals. Similarly, 
domestic norms, such as the Alien Tort Claim Act, could be used by alleged victims in 
order to assess corporate conducts, in cases in which a corporation has perpetrated 
direct violations of customary international human rights law1017. 
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2.5.The Formal Conception 
Hans Kelsen is the founder of the formal conception which was developed as part of 
his pure theory of law1018. Other scholars such as Julio A. Barberis and D.P. O’ Connell 
have embraced, with some minor addenda, such conception in their works1019. The core 
legal displays of this conception are, among others, the LaGrand and Avena 
pronouncements of the ICJ, mixed cases under Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
human rights treaties in general. 
In light of the formal conception, there is no presumption related to the international 
status of a particular entity, given that both international personality as well as the 
international legal system are understood a completely open concept. Accordingly, 
there are no pre-established suppositions related to which entities have international 
legal subjectivity in international law. International personality is thus an a posteriori 
concept: in practice, any entity which is the recipient of an international norm (right or 
duty) is, thus, an international subject. As a result, legal persons are simple legal 
creations established as a consequence of an international norm creating and targeting 
them.  
In this regard, Portmann added that, in theory, there are no direct legal implications 
connected with holding the status of international persons since inter alia, according to 
the formal conception, the ability to create international law does not stem from 
enjoying the status of international subject1020.  
Under the aforementioned conception there are no restrictions as to which entities can 
be international subjects. In this respect, scholars such as Kelsen emphasized that: “in 
considering the scope of international law, it is necessary to ask for which subjects this 
order is valid for, to whom it is addressed, i.e. which subjects it regulates the conduct, 
rights and duties of. We will have to show that in this respect the validity of 
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international law knows no limits”1021. 
Therefore, the formal conception refutes that legal subjectivity is an a priori concept 
and on the contrary, regards it as a posteriori legal construction. Such subjectivity is in 
fact not deemed as a notion belonging to positive law. Conversely, being considered an 
international subject is regarded as the result of a descriptive process belonging to the 
realm of legal theory and, as such, is without tangible legal effects1022 : being an 
international subject thus merely mirrors the sum of legal norms addressing a certain 
entity1023.  
International norms determine their recipients and, as such, their legal persons lead to 
the conclusion that provided that the interpretation of a norm results in addressing the 
conduct of a particular entity, this entity is an international person1024. Interestingly, 
Kelsen emphasized that international norms, in the same manner as all legal rules, are 
basically aimed at addressing the conduct of human beings. That is the reason that all 
international norms are ultimately targeted at individuals and the only social reality to 
which legal norms can refer are he relations between human beings. Hence, a legal 
obligation as well as a legal right cannon have for its contents anything but the 
behavior of human beings. If, then, international law should not obligate and authorize 
individuals, the obligations and rights stipulated by international law would have no 
contents at all and international law would not oblige or authorize anybody to do 
anything1025. According to Kelsen, the traditional idea that only States are subjects of 
international law and that the latter law is incapable of regulating the conduct of 
individuals is, thus, inaccurate1026. This allows to the deduction that such conception 
discards traditional notions of Statehood and the hierarchical superiority of States to 
law. States are perceived as juristic persons, which are a combination of individuals 
acting as organs on behalf of them.  
Notwithstanding, the latter assumption does not entail that, under the formal conception, 
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only individuals are international subjects. Indeed, it is evident that international norms 
are often referred to individuals indirectly as organs of collective organizations, namely 
States and not as private entities. In such a scenario, states and other corporate bodies 
such as international organizations do become international subjects, since the relevant 
international norm is oriented to an individual who acts on behalf of the corporate body 
of which is an organ and not to the individual itself1027. Remarkably, every domestic 
system determine which individual has the power to act on behalf of the State and 
accordingly who is the ultimate addressee of the international norm1028.  
Furthermore, under the formal conception individuals can also be direct recipients of 
international norms and not merely indirect addressee as organs of collective 
organizations. This is the case when their conduct is regulated by international norms 
in matters not attributable to a corporate entity according to the national legal 
system1029.  
In addition, in light of the aforementioned conception, being an international subject 
does not have any auxiliary legal implications outside those specifically provided 
within the relevant norms. This entails that fundamental rights and duties or certain 
capacities do not depend on the concept of legal personality in the abstract. On the 
contrary all these powers and competences stem from particular international norms 
which specifically address the relevant subject1030. In sum, an entity is an international 
person because it is a subject of international rights and duties1031.  
In the same manner, international norms are those that confer upon social entities the 
power to create international law. Law creation is, thus, not a consequence of being an 
international person, but it is only by means of customary international norms that 
individuals, as organs of states, acquired the competence to create such law1032. As a 
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result, law-creation merely regards the application of a hierarchically higher norm 
allowing a particular entity to create law, making the distinction between law-creation 
and law-application basically inoperative under the formal conception1033.  
 
 
2.5.1. Legal manifestations of the Formal Conception in practice – the LaGrand Case 
 
In legal practice the formal conception of international personality is mainly relevant 
when the direct effect of treaties on individuals, and corporations within the 
international investment law framework, is at stake. Such conception has been the 
theoretical foundation of the LaGrand and Avena case and, in general when individual 
treaty rights had to be applied. The present section focuses only on the analysis of the 
LaGrand Judgment in light of the aforesaid theoretical considerations regarding the 
formal conception.  
Certainly, the LaGrand case constitutes the steering contemporary case regarding the 
direct effect of treaties on individuals1034. As opposed to the aforesaid Courts of Danzig 
advisory opinion, in LaGrand the ICJ explicitly embraced the argument that an 
international treaty norm can create individual rights 1035 . Some scholars have 
interpreted the case reasoning as the conceptual foundation to confer the individual the 
status of international person1036 , although the decision entirely referred to Article 
36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) and did not hold 
any assumption with respect to international personality1037. The case was brought to 
the attention of the ICJ under rather uncommon situations toward the end of numerous 
sets of judicial proceedings in the United States. Without going into the merits, the case 
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before the American Courts concerned the sentence to death of two German nationals, 
namely the LaGrand brothers. In that case, the ICJ found that the United States had 
violated Article 36 of the Vienna Convention of 24 April 1963 on Consular Relations 
in light of two main reasons1038: firstly, the US did not inform the two German citizens 
about their right to consular assistance under the aforesaid conventional text; secondly, 
the US did not allow the review and revision of the verdict delivered against the 
LaGrand brothers, once the violation of the previous obligation had been 
acknowledged1039. As a result, the Court explicitly recognized that the 1963 Vienna 
Convention, pursuant its Article 36, created rights not only for the State but for 
individuals who benefited from consular assistance as well. Therefore, the violations 
that had taken place were not only against the German State but also against the 
LaGrand brothers1040. This means that under modern international law individual rights 
do not solely derive from human rights treaties, but are a universal phenomenon that 
can concern any kind of international agreement. The same argument was proposed by 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) in its Advisory Opinion of 1999 
on the right to consular assistance1041. Remarkably, the IACHR took the reasoning on 
the right at stake one step ahead by emphasizing the human right status of the individual 
right to consular assistance, which according to the Court cannot be subject by the 
protests of the sending State nor hindered by the State’s will to exercise such right1042. 
Nevertheless, the ICJ avoided to tackle the issue of whether Article 36 of the VCCR 
was also to be considered a human right, therby cautiously dodging a tricky 
politicization of the decision1043.The Court in fact merely focused on the text of Article 
                                               
1038 Tams, Christian J., Consular Assistance: Rights, Remedies, and Responsibility Comments on the 
ICJ's Judgment in the LaGrand Case. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, 2002, 1257. 
1039 In addition, it is worth noting that the ICJ affirms for the first time the value of the ordinances 
indicating provisional measures, which resulted in the responsibility of the United States for non-
compliance with the Court's Ruling of March 3, 1999. “The Court will now consider the Order of 3 
March 1999. This Order was not a mere exhortation. It had been adopted pursuant to Article 41 of the 
Statute. This Order was consequently binding in character and created a legal obligation for the United 
States”. LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States), Judgment, 2001 ICJ Reports 466, par. 110. 
1040 LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States), Judgment, 2001 ICJ Reports 466, par. 85. 
1041 Inter-American Court of Human Rigths, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99  
1042 Ibidem,  65. 
1043 Tams, Consular Assistance, 1257. 
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36(1)(b) VCCR in light of the interpretative framework provided for by Article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in order to assess whether Article 36 
could apply to individuals. According to the Court, the text of the aforesaid Article 
itself was sufficiently explicit in recognizing specific individual rights, resulting in a 
self-winding application of the provisions “as they stand”1044. Yet, it is noteworthy to 
highlight that the Judgment at stake did not address the issue of direct effects of treaties 
on individuals, but of treaty interpretation in general1045 . On the grounds of such 
reasoning, the Court concluded that the direct effect of treaties on individuals depended 
on the treaty provisions itself and in particular on the clarity of such provisions1046. 
In conclusion, the reasoning of the ICJ in the LaGrand case is a clear demonstration of 
the formal conception of international personality. In light of the aforementioned 
considerations on such conception, the Court “complied” with the formal approach by 
solely focusing on the treaty norm in question in order to assessing both the identity of 
the real recipient of such norm and whether the treaty attributed direct international 
rights to individuals. “Without even mentioning the concept of international personality, 
the Court stated that Article 36(1)(b) VCCR directly applies to individuals. 
International personality is then only a device of legal doctrine to conceptualize the 
fact that the individual holds a direct international right, but no legal concept stating 
any material presumptions or consequences. This clearly is in conformity with the 
formal conception of international personality”1047. 
 
  
                                               
1044 LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States), Judgment, 2001 ICJ Reports 466, par. 92. 
1045 Portmann, Legal personality in International Law, 200. 
1046 “Based on the text of these provisions, the Court concludes that Article 36, paragraph 1, creates 
individual rights, which, by virtue of Article 1 of the Optional Protocol, may be invoked in this Court by 
the national State of the detained person. These rights were violated in the present case”. LaGrand Case 
(Germany v. United States), Judgment, 2001 ICJ Reports 466, para 77. 
1047 Portmann, Legal personality in International Law, 203. 
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2.5.2. The Formal Conception and Transnational Corporations  
 
Having presented the key assumptions of the formal conception, it is now interesting 
to observe whether such considerations allow the view that multinational corporations 
can be regarded as international persons under such conception and, thus, be the 
ultimate addressees of rights and duties. 
The formal conception grounds on the assumption that international personality is an 
open concept. This consideration allows, at least theoretically, that multinational 
corporations can be treated as international legal subjects. The reasoning behind 
international personality in the formal conception depends on the existence of a norm 
the specifically address an entity. This means that the legal personality of multinational 
corporations can be determined on the basis of the assessment of the rights, duties or 
capacities that international norms have attributed to such entities. In such a scenario, 
international personality is attained a posteriori to the international legal framework 
making legal subjectivity nothing more than a descriptive tool1048.  
Even though individuals are the original recipients of the norm, such norm can be 
ascribed to corporations on the basis that those individuals are addressed in their role 
and function of organs of the latter corporation. As a result, the scope and extent of 
legal personality cannot be determined a priori, but rather under a case by case analysis 
of the relevant norms imputed to corporations.  
Clapham is a one of the scholars who seemed to have accepted the basic assumptions 
of the formal conception. Remarkably, he endeavored to divert the discussion towards 
issues related to capacity and discrete obligations1049 with the aim at going one step 
ahead the quarrels on whether multinational corporations are primary or secondary 
subjects of international law1050. According to Clapham, an adequate manner to tackle 
                                               
1048 Ibidem 
1049 Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, 78. 
1050 A. Cassese, International Law in a Divided World, Oxford Univ Press, 1986, 103. Many scholars 
and Cassese in particular have presented the demarcation between States as primary subjects of 
international law on the one hand and all other non-state actors as secondary subjects on the other. 
According to Cassese when it comes to multinational corporations: “Socialist countries are politically 
opposed to them and the majority of developing countries are suspicious of their power; both groups 
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the issue at stake is to put aside the concerns on primary and secondary subjects of law 
and simply emphasizes that corporations have limited international legal personality1051. 
“As long as we admit that individuals have rights and duties under customary 
international law and international humanitarian law, we have to admit that legal 
persons may also possess the international legal personality necessary to enjoy some 
of these rights, and conversely to be prosecuted or held accountable for violations of 
the relevant duties”1052 . The scholar argued that international rights and duties are 
subject to the capacity of the entity to enjoy such rights and abide those obligations as 
provided by the relevant international norm and not on the riddle of international 
personality1053. In this regard, there is no doubt about the existence of specific norms 
that address directly non-State actors, even when such actors have no state-like 
characteristics or pretensions1054. 
Accordingly, Clapham suggests a two-question model, as presented in the Reparation 
for Injuries Advisory Opinion of 1949, in order to assess whether or not a non-State 
actor enjoys the status of international personality. Firstly, the author asks whether the 
entity has the necessary legal capacity to directly acquire rights and obligations under 
international law. Secondly, Clapham questions whether the entity has the capacity to 
be party to a claim (either as a claimant or as a defendant) at the international level 1055. 
If the answer to both the aforesaid questions is positive, the entity can be regarded as 
an international subject. 
In practice the aforementioned two-question model constitutes the tool used by many 
scholars in order to assess the international legal personality of multinational 
                                               
will never allow them to play an autonomous role in international affairs. Even Western countries are 
reluctant to grant them international standing; they prefer to keep them under their control—of course, 
to the extent that this is possible. It follows that multinational corporations possess no international 
rights and duties: they are only subjects of municipal and ‘transnational law’”. 
In this regard, Clapham argues the opportunity to challenge this reasoning and thus change the focus of 
the debate outside the aforementioned distinction in order to tackle new issues concerning the current 
global situation.  
1051 Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, 77-80. 
1052 Ibidem  79. 
1053 Ibidem  71. 
1054 Ibidem  80. 
1055 Ibidem 71. 
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corporations1056. Accordingly, if such corporations are the addressee of international 
rights and obligations norms and/or have a capacity to start international proceeding, 
then they are international persons1057. This is the case in the realm of two specific areas 
of international law: human rights law, under specific treaty provisions, such as the 
case of the European Convention on Human Rights1058; and international investment 
law, under those detailed provisions provided by relevant investment treaties1059. Hence, 
corporations enjoy limited international personality pursuant to specific treaties and 
conventions, and not automatically through customary international law. In the view of 
Ku, such corporations are the recipients of a specific textual authorization in a 
particular treaty or convention, turning the reasoning to conclude that corporations can 
be acknowledged subjects of international customary norms unsatisfactory1060. 
In conclusion, Clapham suggests that since multinational corporations have limited, 
but still acceptable international personality in order to enjoy rights and bring claims 
under international human rights law, they can also be acknowledged as to have 
adequate faculty to abide international human rights obligations. As highlighted by the 
author, if entity such as the Sunday Times1061 has sufficient capacity to enjoy rights and 
start international proceedings in light of the European Convention on Human 
Rights1062, it might surely have enough personality and capacity to be subject to duties 
under International Human Rights law1063. 
                                               
1056 See counter argument by Gatto, according to which corporations are in fact an anomaly since as 
opposed to other new subjects of international law, their progressive acquisition of rights has not been 
matched by a similar acquisition of duties. Gatto Alexandra, Multinational enterprises and human rights 
obligations under EU law and international law, Edward Elgar, 2011, 53. 
1057 Wouters, Jan and Chané, Anna-Luise, Multinational Corporations in International Law (December 
1, 2013). KU Leuven Working Paper No. 129, 3. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the 
United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1949] ICJ Rep 174. 
1058 For example, Right to a fair trial Article 6 and Freedom of Expression Article 10. 
1059 For example, the Amco v. Indonesia under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) and numerous bilateral investment treaties. 
1060 Julian G. Ku, The Limits of Corporate Rights Under International law, 12 Chicago Journal of 
International law, 2012, 730. 
1061 Sunday Times v United Kingdom, Judgment, App No 6538/74, A/30, [1979] ECHR 1, (1979-80) 2 
EHRR 245, (1979) 76 LSG 328, IHRL 21 (ECHR 1979), 26th April 1979, European Court of Human 
Rights [ECHR] 
1062 Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, 81. 
1063 Ibidem, 82. 
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Differently stated, the faculty of multinational corporations to be the recipients, and 
thus the holders, of international rights seems to infer that such corporations have 
international legal subjectivity, and accordingly that they can also abide international 
obligations. This reasoning leads to the conclusion that since corporations already 
enjoy international, albeit limited, personality nothing stands in the way for ascribing 
international human rights obligations on multinationals. 
 
 
2.6. The Actor Conception 
 
Some of the basic features of the actor conception have been presented previously in 
the introductory part of this section concerning the theories on international personality. 
Briefly stated, this conception perceives as international subjects all the entities which 
exercise effective power within the international decision-making process1064.  
Remarkably, in light of the factual nature of such conception, the concept and notion 
of international personality are not taken into account; and the terms actor or 
participant are indeed favored. Basically, the concept of participant has the same 
practical usage of the concept of international personality; and in fact it is often used 
in this very manner. References to the status of specific participants as subjects of 
international law are frequently employed, mainly in order to identify and describe 
which social entities are relevant to international law1065. 
The genesis of the actor conception has to be inferred from the joint efforts of 
McDougal and Lasswell1066, who had originally posited the theoretical grounds of such 
conception, and its further development by former ICJ president Ms. Higgins1067. It is 
worth noting that Lasswell was a sociologist, thus explaining the functional nature of 
                                               
1064 Portmann, Legal personality in International Law, 208. 
1065 Ibidem 
1066 McDougal, Myers S., ‘International Law, Power, and Policy: A Contemporary Conception’, RCADI, 
82 (1953-I), 133–259 and 160-162. 
1067 R. Higgins, “Conceptual Thinking about the Individual in International Law” in Richard Falk, 
Friedrich Kratochwil and S. H. Mendlovitz, International Law: A Contemporary Perspective ,Westview 
Press, 1985, 479. 
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this policy-oriented approach to international personality which considers the 
dichotomy between subjects and mere objects of international law as basically 
fallacious1068. Subjects are perceived as carriers of the elements of personhood and as 
having been acknowledged as such by a norm of international law. On the contrary, 
objects of international law are defined by elimination: any entity which is not a subject, 
is hence an object1069. The aforesaid dichotomy surely eases in providing the entire 
international legal system with both simplicity and structural clarity. Nonetheless, 
according to some scholars, this distinction between subjects and objects seems 
simplistic rather than simple and clear. Indeed, such view fails to represent the current 
international situation and does not take into account the legally relevant detail that 
non-State actors are fully present within the international scene, as opposed to what the 
term object of international law refers. In order to move ahead from such outdated and 
non-realistic view of personhood, the actor conception departs from the common 
understanding of international law as a set of rules1070 and proposes the view that such 
law should be considered as an authoritative decision-making process 1071 . This 
dynamic view of the international system, as a process, allows the consideration and 
inclusion of a variety of participants, making claims across State lines, with the object 
of maximizing various values. Determinations will be made on those claims by various 
authoritative decision-makers – Foreign Office Legal Advisers, arbitral tribunals, 
courts. Now, in this model, there are no ‘subjects’ or ‘objects’, but only participants. 
Individuals are participants along with States, international organizations (such as the 
United Nations, or the IMF, or the ILO), multinational corporations, and indeed private 
                                               
1068 Portmann, Legal personality in International Law, 210. 
1069 R. Higgins, Problems and process: International law and how we use it, Clarendon Press, 1994, 49. 
1070 Such view of the international legal system relies on pragmatic assumptions which take into account 
mainly practical aspects of specific problems, leaving formal considerations aside. In this scenario, 
policy rationales as the outcome of this decision-making process are promptly preferred over norms. To 
this end, Portmann, highlights that such view clashes with the acceptance in international practice and 
doctrine of general and indeed peremptory norms. In fact, peremptory norms, as stated above, are not 
open for negotiation and most importantly they may not be derogated from, regardless of whether there 
are policies standing against them. 
1071 McDougal, Myers S., Harold D. Lasswell and Lung-chu Chen, Human Rights and World Public 
Order: The Basic Policies of an International Law of Human Dignity, Yale University Press, 1980, 162. 
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nongovernmental groups1072. Simply stated, under this conception all participants in 
the international legal system are international subjects. This approach seems 
consistent with Morgenthau’s functional understanding on international law, which was 
based entirely on psychological and sociological elements and according to which a 
norm was significant only if had effect in practice. Accordingly, the observation of the 
actual international realm was a mandatory step in order to determine the normative 
content of the international order1073. 
The entire conception grounds on the idea that there is no norm providing the legal 
capacity to an entity in order to engage in this process. This implies that the 
participation in such decision-making process depends only on factual power and all 
of the actors actually involved are participants of the international legal order regardless 
of the cause for participation1074 . Accordingly, international legal practitioners and 
scholars do not have to identify particular rules or formal acts of recognition by States 
in order to assess the legal status of a particular entity, but rather they have to detect 
which actors participated in the decision-making process in practice 1075 . Stated 
differently, neither the lack of legal rules conferring legal personality nor the absence 
of an act of recognition by States has any noteworthiness in conferring legal personality 
to non-States actors in international law. In conclusion, the actor conception can be 
summarized as follows: international law is not a set of rules, but an authoritative 
decision-making process to which participation does not rely on legal rules or specific 
acts of recognition, but on the effective power and ability to participate.  
 
  
                                               
1072 R. Higgins, International Law and the Avoidance, Containment and Resolution of Disputes: General 
Course on Public International Law, RCADI, 230, 1991-V, 81. 
1073 Such understanding of international law is often referred to as international realism. Morgenthau, 
Hans J., La Réalité des Normes, en Particulier des Normes du Droit International: Fondements d’une 
The´orie des Normes, Librairie Felix Alcan, 1934, 8. 
1074 Roland Portmann, Legal personality in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2010,  212. 
1075 R. Higgins, International Law and the Avoidance, Containment and Resolution of Disputes: General 
Course on Public International Law, RCADI, 230 (1991-V),  80. 
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2.6.1 The Actor Conception and Transnational Corporations 
 
The literature review, assumptions that have been presented throughout the section, and 
the current global situation propose that, under the actor conception, multinational 
corporations have all the requirements to be participants of the international 
community like any other actor. 
It is certain that multinationals actively participate to the aforesaid authoritative 
decision-making process, along with States, international organizations and private 
actors. This implies that observation is required in order to assess the legal status of 
multinationals, their concrete participation in such decision-making processes and thus 
their de facto power to influence the international agenda. 
In the same manner, in order to determine the exact content of a norm that enshrines 
duties and responsibilities of corporations, under the actor conception assessment is 
needed in order to determine whether the core of such norm deploys full effects in 
practice and has the ability to condition actual behavior.  
The traditional positivists distinction between subjects and objects of international law 
seems anachronistic and, thus, unable to properly address the needs of modern society. 
In fact, the subject/object dichotomy fails to recognize three main factual 
considerations: firstly, multinational corporations actively participate in international 
conferences and fora, such as the multiple diplomatic meetings that led to the adoption 
of the TRIPS agreement1076. Secondly, lobbying by such corporations has become a 
typical practice especially when enormous economic and political interests are 
involved. Their economic might impacts and significantly influences the international 
agenda in such a manner as to orient international policies and objectives, even at the 
United Nations. Lastly, corporations have taken over central provision of services 
which were previously of State competence, such as, among others, the supply of 
running water and the establishment of healthcare structures.  
For all the above, the role that corporations have come to exercise in the international 
                                               
1076 R. Smith, C. Correa and C. Oh, Trade, TRIPS, and pharmaceuticals, Lancet, 2008, 685. 
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community over the last few decades is evident and massive 1077 . Accordingly, the 
identification of corporations as mere objects of international law seems, to say the 
least, static, inadequate and insensitive to changes in international legal sphere 1078. In 
this regard, Higgins argues that corporations should be considered at minimum 
participants in the international legal system, with the capacity to bear some rights and 
duties under international law1079.   
According to Higgins, business enterprises can be considered participants in 
international law ‘making claims across State lines, with the object of maximizing 
various values’1080.  
Other scholars such as Ruggie shared this argument, highlighting that both the 
international framework and contemporary international law have become much more 
intricate1081. Indeed, the acknowledgement of corporations as participants rather than 
subjects mirrors the current state of affairs as corporations are further and further 
involved in the making of international law. In particular, as has been briefly mentioned 
above, their participation is key in the establishment of international investment law as 
a result of investor-State adjudications1082. 
Other scholars have supported the view that considering the degree to which 
international law distinguishes the existence of diverse kinds of participants in the 
international legal framework constitutes a much more useful method than that of 
adopting the subject/object approach1083.  
In light of current events, referring to a corporate entity as “subject” or “object” of 
international law confuses more than enlightens and debating on whether business 
enterprises are subject or legal persons is at best a distraction and that affirmative 
                                               
1077Zerk, Multinationals and corporate social responsibility, 74. 
1078Higgins, Problems and process, 50. 
1079 J. Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 20 (John F.  Kennedy 
School of Government, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 31, 2007), 32. 
1080 Higgins, Problem and Process, 51. 
1081 Ibidem 
1082 J. Alvarez, Are Corporations "Subjects" of International law, 9. 
1083 “The idea of multinationals as ‘participants’ in the international system provides a much more 
realistic picture of the role of private commercial organizations within the international system than the 
traditional ‘subject--object’ dichotomy”. Zerk, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility, 74. 
298 
 
decisions to this effect may be a very bad idea1084. Accordingly, some scholars propose, 
in line with the actor conception, that norms should be meaningful under existing 
realities in order to actually impact and influence behavior. This is the reason such 
scholars challenge the so called top-down approach to human rights1085 , especially 
when determining which obligations apply to corporations. According to this part of 
the literature: “In any case, such a top down approach to finding international 
corporate obligations is precisely the wrong way to figure out what obligations make 
sense or reflect what the principal makers of international law, namely states, actually 
want. Most importantly, such a top down approach loses sight of the ways that 
corporations are distinct from states or natural persons. It makes it more difficult to 
contextualize corporate obligations in light of these realities”1086. 
A case by case approach ought to be adopted when determining specific obligations on 
corporations and their role and capacities vis-à-vis States as profit-creating actors 
cannot be ignored1087 . In practice, corporations greatly differ from both States and 
individuals, which implies that the theoretical implications of both the state-only and 
the individualistic conception are thus superfluous and ineffective in determining the 
accountability and responsibilities of corporations1088. 
Remarkably, under the actor conception there are not real legal consequences on 
corporations as a result of their acknowledgment as legal persons, since such status has 
been considered a mere social construct with slight practical effect. Theoretically, such 
status can provide the legal grounds for stemming human rights and obligations, but no 
real legal outcome must automatically derive from such conferral. No matter how 
judicial organisms such as the International Court of Justice and the International 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia have tackled the issue of subject and personality in 
                                               
1084 Ibidem, 3. 
1085  According to the top-down approach, human rights and respective obligations depend on the 
principle or principle from which they are said to be derivable and their social use is not taken into 
account. J. Griffin, On Human Rights, Oxford University Press, 2008, 29. 
1086 Alvarez, Are Corporations "Subjects" of International law, 25. 
1087  M. Pentikäinen, “Changing International ‘Subjectivity’ and Rights and Obligations under 
International law – Status of Corporations”, 8 Utrecht Law Review 145, 2012, 153. 
1088 Alvarez, Are Corporations "Subjects" of International law, 26. 
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their decisions, this can only represent an ad hoc declaration of the situation rather 
than a constitutive act creating personality1089. To report the words of Klabbers: “After 
all is said and done, personality in international law, like “subjectivity”, is but a 
descriptive notion: useful to describe a state of affairs, but normatively empty, as 
neither rights nor obligations flow automatically from a grant of personality1090”. 
In conclusion, the actor conception presents valuable assumptions which mirror the 
current state of affairs of the international realm. Firstly, in light of the peculiar status 
of multinational corporations considering them as participants rather than 
subjects/objects reflects their international relevance and factual power to take part in 
authoritative decision-making processes. Secondly, even though the acts of recognition 
of international personality are vain for corporations to exist as international legal 
subjects, such recognition, however, reinforces the status of multinationals as 
participants in the international decision-making process. Thirdly, even in light of the 
classical approach to personality1091, some scholars have pointed out that there is more 
and more acknowledgement of considering corporations as subjects under international 
law, since they do hold rights under international law, some of which may be enforced 
directly, for example pursuant to treaty-based dispute resolution procedures; secondly, 
they do participate in law making mechanisms such as diplomatic conferences; thirdly, 
they to possess locus standi before international tribunals. For all of the above, a case 
by case approach seems beneficial in order to assess the factual participation of 
corporations to the international lige and, thus, to this direction it can be concluded that 
they surely hold some degree of international legal personality. 
  
                                               
1089  L. Boisson De Chazournes and M. Gustavo Kohen, International Law and the Quest for Its 
Implementation, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010, 48. 
1090 J. Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law, Cambridge University Press, 2002, 
57. 
1091 According to which a legal person is the entity which holds “the ability to participate in the 
development of international law through custom, the capacity to enter into international treaties, the 
prospect of direct legal responsibility for breaches of obligations and the ability to bring legal claims”.  
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3. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) under International Law 
 
The difficulties in providing an adequate understanding of what multinational 
corporations are and their status under international law resulted in decades of debates 
over which legal standards might apply to multinationals and on their relevance to 
human rights norms. In addition, concerns arose on the consideration that such actors 
are actually capable of operating outside State's control and regulations, and thus are 
able to act in so-called “grey zones”. Accordingly, the most important task is to ensure 
that the desire for profit from corporations does not allow corporate human rights 
abuses as well as to find effective mechanisms to impose norms bearing duties upon 
these peculiar and powerful actors.  
The preceding sections have followed two lines of argumentation. The first part of this 
chapter emphasized the role played by multinational corporations in the present-day 
world, mostly focusing on the consequences of social, political and economic 
globalization. A legal definition of such corporations was provided, taking into account 
the most relevant literature and approach adopted in international organizations and 
fora.  
The second part of the chapter focused on the analysis of traditional as well as 
unorthodox approaches on international legal personality of non-state actors in general 
and on corporations in particular. It was demonstrated that recent developments of the 
theoretical conceptions regarding legal personality are shifting the discourse about 
human rights protection towards the inclusion of non-State actors’ responsibility and, 
thus, of corporations.  
In light of the aforementioned considerations, the next logical step in the reasoning 
would be allowing a legal framework for the direct application of international human 
rights law to multinational corporations. Notwithstanding, the theoretical likelihood of 
this deduction needs now to be assessed on the grounds of the relevant practice within 
the international realm. Definitely, due to the peculiar nature of the international system, 
in which practice is decisive in both law-making processes as well as in understanding 
relations among states, simply ascertaining the theoretical direct applicability of 
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international human rights norms on corporations does not suffice1092. 
For this reason, the study and examination of relevant elements of practice of 
international actors become central in determining whether the theory has actually 
become reality. Simply stated, once displayed that there is a changing attitude towards 
holding corporations legally accountable for violations of international human rights, 
it is now time to analyze the practice from the main subjects of international law in 
order to be able, or not, to posit the emergence of a new custom of direct applicability 
of international human rights norms on corporations on the grounds of the existence of 
a uniform pattern of thought and behavior1093.  
In particular, three issues need to be addressed at this point: firstly, attempts towards 
the adoption of a binding instruments for corporations, such as inter alia, the United 
Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, have been unsuccessful since 
the 1960s. Secondly, concerns arose regarding the unprecedented economic and 
political might of corporations and the perceived negative impact of their activities 
worldwide. Lastly, national legal frameworks, especially those of developing countries, 
proved their inability in monitoring multinationals which could then operate in a de 
facto regulatory vacuum. For all of the above, civil society raised awareness on this 
regulatory vacuum and called on corporations to assume greater governance 
responsibilities1094. These debates led to the so-called corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) of business enterprises, which refers to the voluntary commitment of such 
entities in order to address social and environmental issues in parallel to their natural 
goal of maximizing shareholders value and to make profits1095. Since the 1990s, the 
topic of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has gained momentum in both national 
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1093 S. Danailov, “The Accountability of Non-State Actors for Human Rights Violations: The Special 
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and international policy programs and CSR is now employed in a wide range of social 
challenges, ranging from environmental sustainability to human rights and labor 
market issues1096. Nowadays, CSR constitutes an important item in the global corporate 




3.1 Defining Corporate Social Responsibility in light of the relevant literature 
Many scholars and practitioners have highlighted that CSR, as a notion, is unclear and 
frequently vaguely defined1097. This is mainly because since the 1950s, when the actual 
term was firstly employed as a management idea1098, definitions of CSR often have 
varied depending on the various industry sectors and agenda taken into account. Such 
definitions, however, all grounded on the voluntary aspect of CSR which has seemed 
to distinguish between “legislative standards and that additional activity which many 
businesses undertake anyway to add value to the business and build their 
reputation”1099.  
According to current literature, CSR refers only to the aforementioned additional 
activity over and beyond legal requirements which also demonstrates the non-juridical 
link between corporations and sustainable development objectives 1100 . Generally 
speaking, CRS concerns the way corporations take into consideration their economic, 
social and environmental impacts with the aim at maximizing the benefits and 
minimizing the downsides1101. In other words, CSR refers to voluntary actions that 
corporations can carry out beyond compliance with minimum legal requirements in 
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order to address both their own economic competitive interests as well as the interests 
of the community1102. In this regard, CSR is often addressed as the result of the so-
called PPP framework (profit, people, planet) which has the purpose of generating 
economic (profit), social (people), and environmental (planet) value while considering 
the whole set of issues and processes that companies shall voluntarily take into account 
in order to reduce any damage resulting from their actions1103. The PPP framework led 
to a general expectation from corporations to be profitable as well as socially and 
environmentally responsible in light of a more transparent, ethical and humane way of 
carrying out their businesses1104. This comprises being explicit about the corporation’s 
goal while bearing in mind the needs of all the parties involved, such as shareholders, 
clients, personnel, business partners, governments, local societies, and the public in 
general1105.  
Likewise, the European Commission appears to understand CSR mainly as a voluntary 
activity. Nonetheless, the Commission’s view includes compliance with the law as a 
key determinant of being socially responsible. In fact, in the words of the European 
body: “Being socially responsible means not only fulfilling legal expectations, but also 
going beyond compliance and investing more into human capital, the environment and 
relations with stakeholders” 1106. On the contrary, other global entities such as NGOs 
tend to belittle the view that CSR is grounded on voluntary commitments, emphasizing 
instead the ethical requirements for companies to behave as good corporate citizens1107. 
In this regard, corporate citizenship is a term often used as a synonym of CSR; and the 
World Economic Forum (WEF) has defined it as: “the contribution that a company 
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1105 Esther M.J. Schouten, Defining the corporate social responsibility of business from international 
law, Emerald, Managerial Law, Vol. 49 No. 1/2, 2007,  21. 
1106  European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission concerning Corporate Social 
Responsibility: a Business Contribution to Sustainable Development’, COM (2002) 347, final, Brussels, 
2 July 2002,  5. 
1107Zerk, Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility, 31. 
304 
 
makes in society through its core business activities, its social investment and 
philanthropy programmes, and its engagement in public policy. That contribution is 
determined by the manner in which a company manages its economic, social and 
environmental impacts and manages its relationships with different stakeholders, in 
particular, shareholders, employees, customers, business partners, governments, 
communities and future generations”1108 . As this description displays, CSR can be 
likely referred to both in terms of decision-making procedures and in terms of social 
and environmental results. In addition, this definition, such as other more neutral 
understandings of CSR, evades mentioning legal standards and instead supposes that 
there is a group of ethical principles to which all corporations should adhere. In fact, 
drawing a line between law and CSR is misleading and obstructive1109. Furthermore, 
other aspects of CSR remain unclear, such as what its results should be or which actor 
should do what to make CSR work, mainly because CSR involves different meanings 
to different observers 1110 . Most importantly, while there is consensus that CSR 
concerns social and ethical obligations on corporations, there is little agreement about 
what these obligations might comprise1111. 
Understanding the meaning of CSR is thus a complex task; and the emergence of new 
terms such as corporate citizenship and corporate sustainability, which are commonly 
used in the same manner, turned providing a definition of CSR to be a real challenge1112. 
The recent practice of corporations to use the term corporate responsibility, excluding 
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the word social, is evidence of a dangerous approach by politicians and companies. 
Such actors can easily deflect attention from away from social and environmental 
matters, towards more business-centred concerns like corporate governance and 
financial reporting1113.  
In light of the aforementioned consideration, the term corporate social responsibility is 
chosen for the goals of this dissertation and must be understood as the notion that each 
business enterprise, as a member of society, has a responsibility to operate ethically 
and in accordance with its legal obligations and to strive to minimize any adverse 
effects of its operations and activities on the environment, society and human health1114. 
In order to avoid losing track of the focus of this chapter, namely addressing human 
rights responsibilities of pharmaceutical companies, such definition can be 
theoretically applied to a broad range of management-related topics, such as corporate 
governance, trade practices and other business ethics topics, including political 
pressure on governments in order to adopt stricter IP regulations and bribery.  
In conclusion, the advent of CSR as a phenomenon, characterized by the voluntary 
nature of corporations’ will to self-regulate their activities, has been molded by specific 
socio-political changes that have occurred since the early 1980s. Such changes can be 
summarized in four factors that the relevant literature has identified as the reasons the 
international community has resorted to voluntary practices such as CSR. The first 
factor concerns the political change towards economic liberalism policies which 
promoted market autonomy instead of governmental intervention. Corporations were 
thus released from any “chains” mandated by States, and market deregulation was 
adopted as the most suitable route to economic growth and social wealth1115 . In a 
context in which markets constituted the engine of global economy, CSR self-
regulatory standards were vastly endorsed as operative tools of controlling business 
activities. 
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Secondly, socio-political globalization reduced the role of the state as mere spectators. 
Accordingly, pseudo-regulatory practices, such as voluntariness, unilateralism, self-
regulation and legal unenforceability become central elements in the delimitation of 
corporate social responsibility in light of a drastic change in the relationship between 
companies and workers. Briefly put, CSR nourished of the understanding of 
globalization as an unalterable and inevitable socio-political model in which neoliberal 
management theories took over class struggle as well as debates on social inequality1116. 
In this scenario, the normative control of transnational corporations by States and the 
international community is considered unfeasible, due to both the decline of States 
sovereignty as well as the fragility of international institutions. In fact, these institutions 
have opted for the logic of voluntarism, since the relevant practice has proven their 
inability to regulate corporations via legally binding instruments. On the other hand, 
the crisis of sovereignty can be briefly explained as the result of economic and political 
globalization, which has had stronger effects on developing countries, since 
corporations are often more powerful than governments and States must be ready to 
give up some sovereignty to global institutions if the international system is to 
function1117. Indeed, the farther States are from decision-making centers, the deeper 
and more severe the crisis expresses itself1118.  
Thirdly, in order to fill the void left by the retreat of the state as a result of globalization, 
NGOs together with corporations, have started to address issues and tackle challenges 
that were once within the domain of the government1119. As a result, new institutional 
measures involving various non-governmental actors became more frequent and civil 
society organizations pressured corporations in order to alter their agendas. In addition, 
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while exercising pressure through confrontational activism, such non-governmental 
actors cooperated with corporations, business associations and international 
organizations through various forms of participations1120. 
Lastly, numerous corporate accidents and exposures of business misbehavior have 
drawn corporations to the center of public blame, enhancing the need for more 
responsible business processes and activities. For instance, many are the cases which 
involved environmental disasters caused by corporations, such as the BP's Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill of 2010 or the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill of 1989. Furthermore, many 
reports revealed illegal practices perpetrated by leading corporations such as NIKE and 
Shell which undermined fundamental human rights, including the prohibition of child 
labor or the protection of decent working conditions1121. In this context, the normative 
asymmetry between the protection of rights and the fulfilment of obligations by 
transnational corporations fully displays its consequences. As a result, within the 
aforesaid framework, in which the unviability of alternatives to capitalism becomes an 
immovable principle, CSR constitutes a required, yet partial, step in order to limit the 
socio-economic might of corporations. 
 
 
3.2 Corporate Social Responsibility and Human Rights 
The general perception concerning corporations has shifted from expecting such actors 
to simply generate economic wealth towards a more inclusive social role. Such role 
should, in fact, ground on shared responsibilities for human rights and related ethical 
responsibilities in a manner more in line with the vision envisaged by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. This led to a call for corporations to conduct their 
business in a more human rights friendly manner, bearing in mind the legal challenges 
that such statement encompasses1122. 
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Creating a link between corporations having responsibilities towards human rights and 
CSR is a logical step in order to identify human rights commitments in practice.  
Indeed, human rights are frequently perceived as the social pillar of CSR, mainly due 
to their status as inalienable rights of individuals and, thus, they must always be taken 
into consideration1123. Likewise, in 2001 the European Commission presented a Green 
Paper entitled Promoting a European framework for corporate social responsibility, 
which emphasized the strong human rights dimension of CSR, especially in realtion to 
international operations and global supply chains 1124 . Yet, such CSR approach to 
human rights departs significantly from the positivist conception which grounds on the 
understanding of human rights as moral and legal prerogatives resulting in equivalent 
legally binding obligations. This CRS’s human rights dimension perceives such 
particular rights as a portion of a wider CSR schema that includes substantive issues 
such as transparency, management and community investment1125. 
In practice, the human rights dimension of CSR resulted in a proliferation of multiple 
CSR regulatory initiatives such as codes of conduct, guidelines and framework 
conventions. In specific, codes of conduct constitute the favorite means through which 
corporations usually identify their human rights responsibilities. Such codes usually 
establish provisions related to working conditions, human rights and environmental 
aspects, with particular attention to those of their subcontractors and suppliers1126 . 
Nonetheless, these valuable attempts to recognize the human rights dimension of CSR 
are not purely driven by philanthropic impulses. Indeed, codes of conduct are precious 
marketing strategies aim at enhancing corporate’s image and, thus, reduce the risk of 
negative consumer reaction. Accordingly, Robert Reich, Minister of Labour under 
former President Clinton, considers that a supercapitalism is currently being 
                                               
Ethics, Vol. 27 No. 27, 206. 
1123 E. M.J. Schouten, “Defining the corporate social responsibility of business from international law”, 
Emerald Managerial Law, Vol. 49 No. 1/2, 2007, 22. 
1124 European Commission, DOC 01/09, Brussels, 18 July 2001. 
1125  F. Wettstein, “From side show to main act: can business and human rights save corporate 
responsibility”, in Business and Human Rights: From Principles to Practise, Dorothe Baumann-Pauly 
& Justine Nolan, 2016, 81. 
1126 European Commission, DOC 01/09, Brussels, 18 July 2001., par. 55. 
309 
 
consolidated, empty of democratic principles, where CSR is a farce that is used to win 
in the economic field at the expense of social and environmental principles. He 
understands that voluntary actions do not work and that the best guarantee is legally 
binding control and inspection over the company1127. 
As a result, codes of conduct should not be an alternative to national and international 
laws and binding rules, since binding regulations guarantee minimum standards of 
protection, while codes of conduct and other voluntary initiatives can round out these 
and endorse higher standards. The mandatory versus voluntary debate is, thus, key in 
understanding the scope of the relationship between CRS and human rights, bearing in 
mind that not governments but corporations (and respective stakeholders) are the 
driving force and executers of CSR initiatives1128. 
Such stimulating debate is helpful in order to address challenging inquiries, such as 
how to determine where corporations responsibilities lie as distinct from those of 
governments, how to monitor whether their business partners are complying with their 
core values, how to approach countries with broad human rights violations, and how 
to operate in countries where human rights principles are not fully respected1129. 
There is no consensus on the role that hard law should play concerning CRS in future. 
On one side representatives of corporations and industry organizations claim that CSR 
should not be legally binding, since in their view such regulation would suffocate 
innovation and hinder national competitiveness 1130 . According to these actors, 
corporations are capable to elaborate effective solutions to CSR related challenges and 
peer pressure is sufficient in order to raise the standards of the entire sector1131. New 
regulations would be, thus, counter-productive and unnecessary as corporations already 
know that monetary gains are to be made in acting socially responsible. On the other 
side, public opinion and many NGOs argue that the voluntaristic approach to CSR does 
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not suffice in itself as an assurance of responsible corporate behavior, and only legally 
binding instruments would enhance human rights protection. 
Without going too further into the debate, some scholars argued that paying too much 
attention to the mandatory versus voluntary discussion is misleading and irrelevant for 
three main reasons1132. Firstly, such debate ignores that numerous CSR-related issues 
are already carefully regulated. Indeed, many States have already provided detailed 
regulatory frameworks for corporations in relation to issues such as workplace health 
and safety consumer protection and environmental issues. Corporations which do not 
comply with the aforesaid regulations are, at least theoretically, subjected to liability 
for their victims under civil law as well as to criminal law proceedings. 
Secondly, voluntary versus mandatory debate grounds on an excessively simplistic 
perception of what law is and how it can steer human conduct. In light of the above, 
CSR refers to an obligation for corporations to act ethically and to consider social and 
environmental issues as well as include legal compliance. This is especially significant 
in countries in which institutions and legal provisions are blurred or vague or are not 
properly imposed. Yet, no legal framework is perfect; and grey areas in which 
corporations could act within the boundaries of the law, while still adopting socially 
irresponsible conducts can exist1133. Corporations are, in fact, frequently criticized for 
the tactics they adopt in approaching legal claims, since they understand that no 
regulatory regime is bullet-proof and what the law is does not often match what the law 
should be.  
Lastly, the voluntary versus mandatory tends to overlook the fact that binding legal 
requirements will not automatically result in more advanced standards of corporate 
behavior and transparency. In reality, the law, as important as it is, is only one of a 
range of factors that influence corporate behaviour. In many cases – especially where 
the legal standards are flexible or unclear or are unlikely to be enforced -- other factors, 
such as corporate culture or pressure from consumer groups, will be just as important, 
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if not more so. Simply put, the fact that something is required by law does not 
necessarily mean it will be done well1134. 
In conclusion, focusing too much on the legal status of CSR and human rights seems 
to confuse rather than simplify the debate on the scope of CRS regulations. Codes of 
conduct and other voluntary instruments adopted by corporations are not legally 
binding and simply constitute a sort of gentleman agreement among the parties 
involved, with no concrete legal consequences. The crucial issue to address is thus not 
if CSR should be ‘voluntary’ or ‘mandatory’, but rather, what is the most effective 
regulatory option in order to enhance human rights protection worldwide. 
This section has provided a definition and explanations regarding CSR in general and 
on specific voluntary corporations’ regulations. The internal sphere of CSR has, thus, 
been the focus of the discourse. The next section will focus of the external sphere of 
CRS in light of the relevant soft law instruments adopted at the international level by 
the United Nations and other international organizations. 
 
 
4. The Human Rights Responsibilities of Corporations under the UN System 
The previous section concerns the internal sphere of CSR. Multinational corporations 
had voluntarily adopted internal codes of conduct as a response to the numerous 
criticisms regarding their approach to protecting the environment, human rights and 
the social sphere more broadly. On the contrary, the present section focuses on the so-
called external sphere of CSR, which refers to voluntary instruments adopted at the 
intergovernmental level aimed towards corporations which provide a set of values and 
principles promoting ethical behavior and human rights. The most relevant examples 
of such external sphere were firstly endorsed in the 1970s, both within the UN system 
(i.e. the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises 
and Social Policy of 1977) as well as by the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (i.e. the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises of 1976). 
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The goal of the ILO Tripartite Declaration is to boost the positive influence, which 
corporations can make to economic and social progress with a particular focus on the 
realization of decent work conditions while minimizing the negative impact of such 
corporations in the community. “This aim will be furthered by appropriate laws and 
policies, measures and actions adopted by the governments, including in the fields of 
labour administration and public labour inspection, and by cooperation among the 
governments and the employers’ and workers’ organizations of all countries”1135. 
On the other hand, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which were 
amended in 2011, bind 42 countries to new, tougher criterion of corporate behavior. 
These, which constitute the first inter-governmental arrangement in the field of 
company responsibility for supply chains, provide new recommendations on human 
rights misapplication. In specific, the Guidelines establish that corporations should 
respect human rights and environmental and labor standards in every country in which 
they carry out their activities, throughout having suitable due diligence procedures in 
place to ensure such compliance1136. Both the OECD Guidelines and the ILO Tripartite 
Declaration comprise a comprehensive, non-binding code of conduct that member 
countries and others have agreed to advocate among the business sector. The soft law 
nature of such instruments makes their legal analysis challenging and interesting under 
human rights law.  
After having briefly mentioned these two relevant instruments related to the external 
sphere of CSR, the present section will focus only on the legal analysis of the major 
soft law regulations adopted by the United Nations since the late 1990s onwards. The 
reasons for narrowing down the analysis to such a precise timeframe and to just one 
international organization is based on a qualitative approach. In fact, the particular 
nature of the UN, which is the largest, most internationally represented and most 
influential intergovernmental organization in the world, makes the study of its attempts 
regarding regulating corporations crucial and decisive. Secondly, the UN is the only 
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organizations that has expressively tackled the issue of determining detailed 
responsibilities for pharmaceutical companies. As a result, the main objective of this 
chapter is to identify key responsibilities of such companies in relation to access to 
essential medicines in light of a deductive approach, which departs from corporations 
in general and concludes with the drug sector in particular. 
 
 
4.1. The United Nations Global Compact 
 
In 1974, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) established the Commission on 
Multinational Enterprises (UNCTC) with the mandate to gather information on the 
activities and impact of multinationals in terms of development and to draw up a Code 
of Conduct as a universal regulatory instrument1137. The Commission presented the 
first draft to the General Assembly in 1982. Despite ten years of negotiations, however, 
the project sank definitively in 1992. The main reason for the lack of success of the 
negotiations was the disagreement on the binding or non-mandatory nature of the Code 
as well as other details regarding the protection of multinational companies. In 1993 
the Commission was removed from office and transferred to the Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) 1138 . The fiasco in establishing a universal code of 
conduct for multinational companies marked a new UN approach to corporate social 
responsibility, which basically consisted of focusing on non-binding regulations. 
In this scenario, on 31 January 1999 the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
presented at the World Economic Forum in Davos a new proposal for business and the 
UN to work together in order to create a compact of shared values and principles. As a 
result, the UN Global Compact was adopted in 2000 as a voluntary instrument for 
multinational corporations with the aim at promoting ethical behavior and human 
rights1139. Such instrument does not provide any active part for States or any other 
                                               
1137  K. Weilert, “Taming the Untamable? Transnational Corporations in United Nations Law and 
Practice”, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Volume 14, 2010, 462. 
1138 Sauvant, The Negotiations of the United Nations Code of Conduct, 19. 
1139 The international document was published in 2000 and updated in June 2010 during the Leaders’ 
314 
 
regulative bodies, but it rather constitutes a network-model organization to which 
companies can directly adhere in order promote constructive engagement between 
them and civil society 1140 . Each of the OECD Guidelines, the ILO Tripartite 
Declaration and the UN’s Global Compact principles includes an explicit provision to 
the effect that no legal obligations are proposed1141. Currently, there are almost 14,000 
participating companies from more than 170 countries. While this data may appear to 
be a fairly large number, facts prove the contrary, as there are over 80,000 multinational 
corporations operating worldwide which did not take part in the initiative1142.  
The procedure establishes that corporations who are willing to take part in the initiative 
are required to pledge to honor and to sign the ten principles set out in the Global 
Compact. The Global Compact’s ten principles concern human rights, labor, the 
environment and anti-corruption standards1143. Interestingly, the such principles extend 
their effect in relation to all of corporations’ strategies and operations from the supply 
chain, including the exclusion to claim a lack of competence in monitoring 
subcontractors1144. This leads to an internalization of human rights protection within 
the companies’ sphere of influence, strategies and activities, which consequently steer 
the overall company’s activities.  
The first two principles include explicit provisions regarding human rights which 
provide to support and respect internationally proclaimed human rights1145 and to 
assure that corporations are not complicit in human rights abuses1146. The principles 
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aim at giving actual application rather than offering legal definitions of the provisions 
envisaged within. Such task is transferred onto corporations which are free to regulate 
their activities on the grounds of the Global Compact human rights standards of 
protection1147.  
One of the most significant features of the Global Compact was the inclusion of the 
term sphere of influence, which is understood to refer to the various individuals and 
groups to whom the company has a certain political, contractual, economic or 
geographic proximity1148 . Such sphere can be represented as a series of concentric 
circles in which influence weakens as the observers move farther from the center and 
the circles become greater1149 . The closest to the core circle the strongest business 
activities are directly linked to the corporation’s activities. An example of this sphere 
can be presented as follows: the first circle includes the corporation’s employees; the 
second one, includes the supply chain; the third circle encompasses a corporation’s 
community interaction, social investment and philanthropy activities. And the last one 
refers corporation’s ‘engagement in public policy dialogue and advocacy activities1150. 
Even if the corporation’s control becomes weaker as the operations move away from 
the decision-making center, companies are still under a duty of supervision. 
Notwithstanding, the Global Compact recognizes that the primary responsibility to 
protect human rights falls on states and governments; but it acknowledges that 
individuals and organizations must play a decisive role in supporting and respecting 
such rights1151. 
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At this point, studying the procedure envisaged by the Global Compact is key to 
comprehending its legal significance and strength. Accordingly, a written statement, 
which has to be adopted by their board of directors or corresponding body, constitutes 
the first step that corporations must take in order to become part of the initiative1152. 
An annual follow-up process is established, according to which corporations must 
report on their progress to stakeholders while also indicating their efforts in enforcing 
the Global Compact principles and in assisting the UN partnership projects1153 . In 
addition, the companies’ compromise requires annual renewal to prove that such entity 
is still willing and able to observe the principles envisaged in the Global Compact1154.  
Regrettably, such procedure relies on the corporation’s own will to share its progress 
with the community. In practice, no mechanisms for compliance or sanctions exist to 
assure that corporations actually submit their annual reports, nor is there a way to 
ensure that the facts presented are true. The real consequence of not complying with 
such duty is the publication of the non-cooperative corporations’ names on the 
database’s website. The success of the procedures thus depends on the will of all 
companies to project a good image of themselves in the community, mainly for 
economic and financial gains. 
In this regard, it must be noted that the Compact is often not even included in the 
category of soft law, since under a legal analysis it is not a declaration, a 
recommendation, nor a resolution of an international organization. The Global 
Compact could be labeled more precisely as a platform for dialogue in order to support 
existing international standards by a direct communication with TNCs. The 
distinctiveness does not lie in any new standards, but in the approach to address TNCs 
not only via the nation states but via different stakeholders1155.  
The Global Compact has triggered mixed reactions among non-governmental 
organizations and the business world. The initiative has in fact received a very positive 
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response among big multinational corporations, but such optimistic view was far from 
being shared by the majority relevant NGOs. Their main fear was that a partnership 
with companies could seriously compromise the role of the United Nations, as the only 
supranational body able to control corporations’ activities. Moreover, in their opinion, 
the Global Compact was only a vague declaration of principles that did not provide, 
among other provisions, for an independent monitoring system capable of concretely 
assessing companies' compliance with the principles 1156 . Such situation was 
highlighted in a letter by a large number of academics, economists and NGOs 
representatives sent to Kofi Annan in July 2000. The letter emphasized allegations and 
doubts on the role of the Global Compact, which in fact functioned as a shield behind 
which companies could refuge under the United Nations flag in order to purify their 
public image while preventing any real change in their conduct 1157 . Many 
pharmaceutical companies, such as Johnson&Johnson, are in fact part of the initiative, 
but their practice is distant from a human rights-friendly approach. 
In order to tackle and respond to such criticism, in 2004 the United Nations introduced 
a formal complaint which charged the Global Compact Office with the function of 
assessing any reports of non-compliance or abuse of the general principles perpetrated 
by corporations. Unfortunately, these initiatives have also proved to be unsatisfactory. 
In the event of a complaint, the Global Compact Office could use its means to 
encourage the resolution of the dispute. Such means included reporting the existence 
of the matter to one or more United Nations competent agencies, asking for their 
support, assistance or intervention. Or, the office could ask the relevant local/regional 
Global Compact Network or other organizations participating in the initiative to assist 
the company in resolving the dispute. The only sanction, however, remained the 
removal of the delinquent companies from the list of participants and the publication 
of their names on the database’s website. 
In conclusion, the mechanisms envisaged by the Global Compact do not seem to be 
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effective or reliable1158. Corporations have proven to participate to the initiative merely 
under economic and financial drives with the intent of boosting their public image 
among consumers. Nonetheless, the authority of the Global Compact is in its political 
rather than legal value. Its emphasis is more on corporations learning the significance 
of the various principles than on instant compliance1159. Moreover, the initiative confers 
upon corporations the competence to differentiate themselves apart from their 
competitors and, in so doing, are able to determine a baseline for ethical behavior. 
Corporations’ accountability is obtained through the so-called blame & shame 
approach, since their activities are increasingly under public scrutiny. Further, the legal 
value of the initiative can be traced as the Global compact constitutes an important step 
in acknowledging human rights responsibilities of corporations and in making them 
aware that their operations are constantly under attention and causing stakeholders to 
be increasingly more conscious about their rights. 
 
 
4.2 The United Nations Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and 
other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (UN Norms) 
 
The critiques concerning the alleged ineffectiveness of the UN Global Compact 
boosted interest in codifying legally binding international human rights norms for 
corporations. As a result, an ad hoc Working Group of the Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 1160  was officially tasked to collect 
information and to assist in drafting related human rights norms. In particular, the 
Working Group was given the mandate to “analyze the possibility of establishing a 
monitoring mechanism in order to apply sanctions and obtain compensation for 
infringements committed and damage caused by transnational corporations, and 
contribute to the drafting of binding norms for that purpose”1161.  
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The task was accomplished in August 2003 when the Sub-Commission adopted the 
draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (from here UN Norms) in its Resolution 
2003/16 and forwarded the text to the former Commission on Human Rights for “its 
consideration and adoption” 1162. 
The UN Norms and their Commentary, which are acknowledged by the Norms itself 
as a valuable interpretation and elaboration of the standards, constitute a general guide 
to ethical business conduct concerning human rights. The object of the UN Norms and 
their essence considerably differ from the other initiatives that have been mentioned so 
far. Accordingly, the UN Norms aimed at mandatory regulations and thus attempted to 
discontinue the practice of adopting ineffective voluntary regulative measures by the 
UN. A consistent number of insiders pointed out that the UN Norms were not supposed 
to automatically and immediately become binding, but rather were to progress from 
soft law towards hard law after building consensus among States and stakeholders in 
general1163. The UN Norms were intended to be an instrument in the middle between 
the voluntary Global Compact and a completely compulsory instrument as hoped for 
many NGOs1164. Similarly, the UN Norms were expected to go beyond the voluntary 
guidelines offered in the Global Compact, the ILO Tripartite Declaration and the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations, since they were the first non-
voluntary initiative accepted at the international level1165 
Regrettably, such hopes of becoming binding regulations were crushed by the 
objections of the international community that confirmed that the UN Norms would 
not secure such legal status. In fact, via Resolution 116 of April 2004 of the UN Human 
Rights Commission, the UN Norms were destined to merely exist as a draft 
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proposal1166.The UN Norms were finally laid aside in 2005, as the High Commissioner 
observed that similar norms already existed among other initiatives for corporations 
and human rights1167. 
 
 
4.2.1 The Content and Legal Status of the UN Norms 
 
The Norms were intended to create a ‘non-voluntary’, comprehensive framework, 
providing direct obligations for corporations and enhanced by a rigid enforcement 
mechanism which included the monitoring by non-state actors (NGOs and corporations 
themselves). Notwithstanding, the UN Commission on Human Rights expressively 
pointed out that the aforementioned UN Norms, while containing useful “elements and 
ideas”, were not being requested by such Commission and were not given any legal 
standing1168. This outcome was quite expected for the UN Norms to be divisive and 
ineffective in obtaining the backing from the Members of the former UN Commission, 
since many states, multinational corporations and UN organs had criticized such Norms 
from the very beginning.  
For examples, both developing and developed states objected that the UN Norms could 
de facto transfer the responsibility for the implementation of human rights standards 
from States to companies1169. Backer viewed the Norms as going even further, arguing 
that a change was needed in the foundations of corporate regulation which altered the 
way in which human rights were to be implemented at national level and their 
relationship with international law. In this regard, “human rights under the Norms 
                                               
1166 Human Rights Commission, Resolution 2004/116, E/CN.4/DEC/2004/116 (2004). 
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would enter municipal legal systems and international law not from above as part of 
prescribed international treaty law, but rather from below through private law 
governing business relations, which would then establish binding rules which in turn 
would become new customary international law”1170. Most states articulated robust 
doubts and emphasized their will not to leave the traditional framework of international 
law, which stresses the central and pivotal role of the state as a legal subject of public 
international law1171. 
In practice, the Norms were innovative, and perhaps mainly controversial, due to the 
fact that such norms imposed human rights obligations directly on corporations, rather 
than requiring States to implement legislation within their jurisdiction in order to 
regulate the operations of these commercial entities1172.  
The Norms were, in several respects, establishing new legal standards concerning 
corporate human rights responsibilities. They mirrored and nourished from already 
existing human rights obligations, but boldly incorporated concepts of progressive 
development and novel notions of human rights protection. The Norms attempted to 
establish an explicit duty for corporations to promote human rights from the “bottom”, 
even with regard to corporations incorporated in non-state parties1173.  
Unusually, the UN Norms did not provide so called negative duties, under which 
corporations were merely bound to refrain from violating human rights, but rather 
enshrined a positive duty upon such entities to promote and ensure respect for those 
rights1174. The attempt was, thus, to create a quasi-horizontal structure of human rights 
protection. On the contrary, countries highlighted the State’s role as the main legal actor 
responsible for the implementation of human rights standards throughout the regulation 
of corporations’ conduct under domestic law. Further, some states, while mentioning 
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the OECD Guidelines and the ILO Tripartite Declaration as positive cases in this 
respect, complained to the fact that the UN Norms could bound corporations to observe 
treaties that either did not apply nor were enforced in the countries where they carried 
out their activities1175. 
The business community raised similar concerns and doubts about the UN Norms. 
According to them, the main issue regarded the likely risk of the so-called 
“privatization of human rights”1176. This notion concerned the distinction between the 
private operations of corporations and the public duties of States, which according to 
the business community were the ultimate and only human rights duty holders1177. In 
fact, if the UN Norms were to be treated as binding legal instruments, such scholars 
argued, corporations would replace states in public functions and be burdened with 
tasks incumbent on States. In this scenario, States could escape and avoid their 
responsibilities and, thus, create a situation characterized by misperception on who was 
supposed to do what 1178 . The same complexity would involve cases in which 
corporations were faced with the difficult task determining the scope of the imprecisely 
formulated obligations of conduct, which instead is a state duty1179. 
With respect to the content, the UN Norms did not limit corporations’ obligations to 
only civil and political rights. In fact, the norms also incorporated both collective social, 
economic and cultural rights of the second and third generations of human rights. In 
addition to such a variety of different kinds of human rights envisaged by the Norms, 
its Preamble basically restated the fundamental feature of Corporate Social 
Responsibility as a way to promote and protect human rights. In light of such preamble, 
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many scholars grounded the legal foundations of the duty of corporations to promote 
and protect human rights directly from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights1180. 
Interestingly, the provisions contained within the Preamble of the Norms created an 
open, non-exhaustive list of the international treaties and conventions which 
determined the legal basis for human rights obligations of corporations. This was a 
clear attempt to “characterise the Norms as a mere codification of already established 
principles of customary international law, rather than a progressive development of 
such legal principles”1181. Nonetheless, the legitimization of human rights standards 
upon corporations becomes challenging if the legal documents that are referenced are 
not built to embrace other actors than state entities, such was the case concerning the 
UN Norms. 
At this point of the scrutiny, the legal analysis on the legal basis of the UN Norms is 
grounded on the commentaries to it provided by Prof. Ruggie, who would be later 
appointed (in 2005) as the Special Representative to the UN Secretary General on this 
delicate matter.  
Ruggie’s main complaint regarded the dual statement that the UN Norms restated 
international law while providing that international law imposes direct human rights 
obligations on corporation on the one hand; and that the UN Norms were non-voluntary 
and thus binding on such economic actors on the other1182. 
The drafters of the UN Norms derived such assumptions from the language of the 
UDHR Preamble, which stated that the provisions contained in the UNHR should apply 
to “all organs of society”; thus, including that human rights apply to corporations like 
any other ‘organ’ in society1183. On the contrary, Ruggie objected to considering the 
pre-ambular language of the UDHR as an authoritative legal basis for conferring 
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human rights obligations to corporations. As broadly presented in the first chapter of 
this dissertation, the UDHR was envisioned to be non-binding at its inception. Further, 
Ruggie emphasized that “preambles, even to binding international instruments are not 
themselves legally binding”1184. 
These considerations led to the conclusion that moral claims and aspirational language 
envisaged in the UDHR could only turn into hard law indirectly, after their codification 
in international human rights treaties or their crystallization as norms of customary 
international law1185.  
In light of the above, it would be inadequate to impose human rights obligations which 
were provided to states mutatis mutandis to international corporations 1186 . Such 
economic actors cannot be functionally treated as States, since their goals and conducts 
largely differ from public functions. As a result, features and scope of the corporate 
responsibilities for human rights must, thus, reflect these special natures and 
function1187. 
In light of the above, Ruggie added that: “while corporations may be considered 
“organs of society”, they are specialized economic organs, not democratic public 
interest institutions. As such, their responsibilities cannot and should not simply mirror 
the duties of States. Accordingly, the Special Representative has focused on identifying 
the distinctive responsibilities of companies in relation to human rights”1188. 
In conclusion, while the Norms may have been a bold attempt in order to present a 
good vision of de lege ferenda, or the law to which the community may aspire, they 
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did not reproduce lex lata, or positive existing law. Accordingly, this section 
highlighted the reasons and arguments, which led to the actual abandoning of the draft 
Norms by the international community which can be summarized as follows: firstly, 
the fact that a large part of the provisioned contained within the Norms did not 
constitute a mere codification of existing international law but rather represented a 
further development of existing international norms. This contrasted with the positivist 
approach to international law. Secondly, the fact that the Norms assigned a significant 
legal role to corporations rather than to the traditional recipients of international law, 
namely the states. This construction shook the entire international realm and 
destabilized the central role of states as international law subjects, since it blurred the 
distinction between international public and private legal frameworks. Third, both 
developing and developed countries objected to the lack of transparency in the adoption 
of the Norms. In particular, such states pointed out that the actual mandate to draft such 
norms was never given to the Sub-Commission on Human Rights. Lastly, as opposed 
to other human rights instruments, the Norms focused mainly on the duty-bearers, to 
which the different provisions apply, rather than establishing a single set of rights (i.e. 
civil, political, and economic) or rights holders (i.e. women, children, indigenous 
people). This resulted in vagueness regarding their overall nature and applicability and 
the exact scope of the specific rights which led to raising criticism on their actual 
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4.3 Professor Ruggie’s contribution to the issue regarding Business and Human 
Rights 
 
As the controversies on the UN Norms had not been resolved, in April 2005 the 
Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution for the nomination of a Special 
Representative on the issue of Human Rights and Business Enterprises (from here 
Special Representative)1190. In light of the Commission, such expert was to be given 
the task to determine and clarify standards of corporate responsibility and 
accountability for transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard 
to human rights, including clarifying notions such as “complicity” and “sphere of 
influence”1191.  
On 25 July 2005, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed Harvard 
Professor John Ruggie to the position with the aim at moving “beyond what had been 
a long-standing and deeply divisive debate over the human rights responsibilities of 
companies”1192. The initial mandate was supposed to last for a period of 2 years, but 
the term of the Special Representative was extended for one more year and in June 
2008, the Human Rights Council1193 prolonged the mandate further for another 3 
years1194. Ruggie’s mandate resulted in two key accomplishments related to the subject 
at stake, namely the Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework and its outcome, the 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights of 2011. 
The setbacks of the aforementioned Global Compact and UN Norms fueled, instead of 
appease, the discussion over the voluntary or mandatory nature of the regulative 
measures regarding business and human rights. On the one hand, the Global Compact, 
while gathering a fair amount of consensus from the international community, proved 
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to be quite ineffective. On the other hand, the intent of the UN Norms of becoming a 
mandatory instrument had found the objections of the majority of the actors involved, 
ranging from States to corporations1195. The Special Representative himself labelled 
the UN Norms a train wreck, while delivering a speech in Geneva1196. In this scenario, 
the UN acknowledged the need for a completely new approach in order to address the 
thorny issue regarding corporations and human rights.  
Since the beginning of his mandate, Ruggie distanced himself from previous attempts 
carried out within the UN, which showed in a number of important documents 
presented to the Human Rights Commission1197. In fact, in Ruggie’s first interim report 
of 2006, the representative pointed out that international human rights had been 
acknowledged by states for states; and his mission was to comprehend which of these 
standards, if any, could be transferred onto transnational corporations1198. Remarkably, 
he emphasized the valuable role of the Global Compact as an important complementary 
instrument. In practice Ruggie, together with his team of researchers and advisors, 
embarked on consultations with the most significant actors in this matter and has led 
extensive academic research in this field. 
 
 
4.3.1 The Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework 
 
The focus of this section will be on the so-colled “Protect, Respect and Remedy 
framework” (hereinafter the Framework) which was presented in a report released in 
2008 and unanimously approved by the Human Rights Council. Such framework 
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contains a proposed a “conceptual and policy framework, a foundation on which 
thinking and action can build”1199 with aim at closing the normative gaps caused by 
globalization1200. To this end, the Framework creates simple steps for governments, 
companies and society to address the various duties and responsibilities which have not 
been properly defined in the past.  
The framework grounds on “differentiated but complementary responsibilities”, which 
are interconnected and includes three main pillars1201. First, the report established the 
state’s duty to protect human rights against non-state actors’ abuse1202. For this purpose, 
states are encouraged to adopt regulatory measures to reinforce the legal framework 
governing human rights and corporations, as well as to establish mechanisms for the 
implementation of such obligations1203 . Such duty on states is well established and 
documented in international law1204 . Generally speaking, human rights duties upon 
states rests on the often referred to tripartite structure, which identifies the States 
obligations to protect, respect and fulfil1205.  
The obligation to “protect” concerns the protection by the state against human rights 
violation by third parties and, thus, by private actors. Much of the early understanding 
about third parties’ detection revolved around armed rebel groups. Nonetheless, by 
definition third parties comprise corporations. Thus, the state duty to protect against 
business-related human rights abuse became the point of departure for the Framework. 
Ruggie’s first challenge was, thus, to make the meaning of such duty clear, and 
consequently to detect ways for states to carry out this duty more successfully. 
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Governments are, inter alia, required to create a corporate culture recognizing that 
respect for human rights is an integral part of all businesses1206.  
The international community agrees that the state duty to protect is a criterion of 
conduct, not of result. This entails that states are not per se to blame when corporations 
commit a human rights violation. On the contrary, states may find themselves in breach 
of their international human rights obligations when they overlook to taking proper 
steps to avoid such violation, as well as to investigate, punish, and compensate the 
violation when it occurs; or in such a case in which the conduct of a corporation may 
be directly attributable to the state, as the former economic entity simply served as the 
state’s agent1207. In this respect, states themselves are logically more likely to bear some 
responsibility when the acts are carried out by a state-owned enterprise. Within this 
legal framework, international law provides states with wide-ranging discretion as to 
how to fulfill their duty to protect.  
The second pillar concerns the corporate responsibility to respect human rights in light 
of a basic expectation society has on businesses to that extent. Corporations know they 
must comply with all applicable laws to gain their legal license to operate within a 
particular country1208. Besides compliance with domestic law, the framework claims 
that corporate responsibility ranges to all internationally recognized human rights. 
Ruggie highlighted that the responsibility of corporations to respect human rights 
already existed as deep-rooted social norm. In this regard, the professor used the term 
responsibility in order to emphasized that it differs from legal obligations 1209 . 
Interestingly, he argues: “social norms exist over and above compliance with laws and 
regulations. And of course, some social norms become law over time; in many countries 
there were social norms against racial bias in employment, for example, or against 
smoking in restaurants, long before laws prohibited the practice. Social norms exist 
independently of states’ abilities or willingness to fulfill their own duties”1210. 
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As a result, Ruggie emphasized the need to focus on the detailed responsibilities of 
corporations in relation to fundamental rights and to differentiate these from the duties 
of states. In the words of the relative provision envisaged in the Framework, “to respect 
rights essentially means not to infringe on the rights of others – put simply to do no 
harm”1211. In this respect, the report provided a “due diligence” approach in which 
corporations are expected to guarantee that the effects and impacts of their operations 
does not cause adverse human rights consequences. Corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights is autonomous from the obligations of States, thus eliminating the 
primary and secondary responsibility dispute initiated by the Draft Norms1212. 
Finally, the third pillar provides that there must be access to remedies if disputes arise 
regarding the confirmed adverse effects of corporations upon fundamental 
rights 1213 .This comprises guaranteeing that investigative processes occur where 
violations are detected, as well as establishing provisions for compensation and 
punishment where needed. The framework outlines a range of judicial and non-judicial 
mechanisms aimed at fostering and strengthening enforcement.  
The aforementioned Framework constitutes the backbone of the later endorsed Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, which will be widely analyzed in the next 
section. At this point, it is important to stress the main reasons the Framework was 
welcomed by the international community as a significant step forward in determining 
human rights responsibilities on corporations. Such reasons revolve around three main 
considerations: firstly, the Framework was perceived by all the relevant stakeholders 
as the product of a democratic process in which States and corporations were allowed 
to be heard and shared their comments and proposals. Secondly, the Framework 
expressively discerned between the primary duty-holders, namely the States and the 
complementary subjects, namely corporations. In this regard, it was the first time in 
which the different nature and scope of the actors involved were actually acknowledged 
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and that different obligations stemmed from such considerations. In other words, the 
economic functional nature of corporations was taken into account. Lastly, the 
document expressively presented itself as a non-binding instruments, which constituted 
a huge factor for its adoption. The legal analysis of the Framework will be provided in 
the next section, since, as was mentioned above, it constitutes the grounds on which 
the Guiding principles developed and were adopted. 
 
 
4.3.2. The Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights  
 
The Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (hereinafter the Guiding 
Principles) were adopted by the Human Rights Council on 16 June 20111214 . The 
Guiding Principles provide thirty-one principles built around and in light of the 
aforementioned Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework.  
The Guiding Principles are provided with a detailed Commentary. Their aim is to 
deliver a cohesive set of standards applicable to all corporations in all states 
“regardless of their size, sector, operational context, ownership and structure”1215. 
A significant aspect of the Guiding Principles is the provision of specified guidance on 
how to incorporate the Framework and due diligence into the corporation’s activities. 
According to Ruggie, three autonomous but deeply related systems are at stake in 
relation to business and human rights, namely: the domestic law system, the 
international system and the social-norm system1216. The Guiding Principles attempt to 
find inter-systemic harmonization among the latter systems and to create the right 
                                               
1214 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue 
of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie - Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework, A/HRC/17/31 (2011). 
1215 The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011) 14 
1216 L. Catá Backer, “From Institutional Misalignments to Socially Sustainable Governance: The Guiding 
Principles for the Implementation of the United Nations: Protect, Respect and Remedy and the 
Construction of Inter-Systemic Global Governance”, Pacific McGeorge Global Business & 




conditions for corporations to develop a form of responsibility alongside national law. 
Remarkably, Ruggie emphasized the fact that the Principles do not wish to create 
binding international obligations or to alter the existing state of international law. 
Further, they do not create law or generate new legal responsibilities for corporations. 
In fact, “nothing in these Guiding Principles should be read as creating new 
international obligations, or as limiting or undermining any legal obligations a State 
may have undertaken or be subject to under international law with regard to human 
rights”1217 . These merely voluntary principles aim at steering away from possible 
theoretical difficulties surrounding corporate obligations. 
In the words of Ruggie himself: “the Guiding Principles’ normative contribution lies 
not in the creation of new international law obligations but in elaborating the 
implications of existing standards and practices for States and businesses; integrating 
them within a single, logically coherent and comprehensive template; and identifying 
where the current regime falls short and how it should be improved”1218. 
In light of the above, the Framework endorsed in 2008 by the Human Rights Council 
constitutes the theoretical foundation of the Guiding Principles, which has thus become 
the operational instrument of the framework itself. In the words of Ruggie: “if the 
Framework addresses the ‘what’ then the Guiding Principles address the ‘how’”1219. 
The voluntary nature of the provisions envisaged within these instruments highlights 
the distinction between state obligations and corporate responsibilities and provide 
practical recommendations that assist in defining existing international rules1220. The 
role of corporations, which is described as a critical element of this framework, is 
hierarchically inferior to the role of States, which are acknowledged as the principal 
actors responsible for the fulfillment of human rights and fundamental freedoms1221.  
                                               
1217 Backer, From Institutional Misalignments to Socially Sustainable Governance, 106. 
1218 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework (n 373) Introduction; 14. 
1219 J. Ruggie, “The Construction of the UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework: The True 
Confession of a Principled Pragmatist”, European Human Rights Law Review, 2011, 129. 
1220 C. Lopez, ‘The “Ruggie Process”: from Legal Obligations to Corporate Social Responsibility?’ in 
Surya Deva and David Bilchitz (eds), Human Rights Obligations of Business - Beyond the Corporate 
Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge University Press 2013),  59. 
1221 L. Catá Backer, “From Institutional Misalignments to Socially Sustainable Governance: The Guiding 
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In fact, the social role of corporations is distinguished from public functions carried out 
by States. This reflects the different sources and extent of the relevant obligations upon 
these actors. On the one hand, State’s obligations are set by International Human Rights 
treaties, to which states are parties, and customary law. On the other hand, the 
responsibilities of corporations reflect their nature as economic-specialized organs of 
society and are of a dual character. Firstly, corporations must comply with all applicable 
law; and secondly, they must respect human rights.  
The following sections will provide further analysis on the Guiding Principles in order 
to properly outline and describe the content and scope of the specific obligations and 
objectives established in such instrument. Both the Framework and the Guiding 
Principles provide to a large extent the same structure and obligations. For this reason, 
the previous section had merely presented the Framework’s structure and briefly 
illustrated its content. The focus of the following sections will be on the tripartite nature 
of the Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework with particular emphasis on the role 




4.3.2.1 The State Duty to Protect Human Rights 
 
The first ten principles of the aforesaid instrument regard the State duty to protect 
human rights. This grounds on the traditional responsibility of States in relation to such 
rights in light of International Human Rights Law and State commitments to human 
rights that the international community has generally acknowledged. The role of States 
as primary bearers of human rights obligations within their territories and/or 
jurisdictions is here reaffirmed1222.  
                                               
Principles for the Implementation of the United Nations Protect, Respect and Remedy and the 
Construction of Inter-Systemic Global Governance”, 25 Global Business & Development Law Journal 
69, 2012, 86. 
1222 Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, Report of the Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises in Accordance with Human Rights Council resolution 17/4, transmitted 
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The State duty to protect human rights requires States to protect against human rights 
violations committed by third parties, as is, inter alia, the case of corporations1223 . 
Further, such duty includes that States must take proper measures to prevent, 
investigate, punish and compensate corporate breaches within the States’ territories or 
jurisdictions1224. The Guiding Principles establish an obligation upon states to impose 
human rights on corporations as well as to provide within their domestic legal 
framework and territory that such corporations conduct their activities accordingly.  
Under a broader human rights analysis, the State duty to protect is intrinsic to the State 
duty to “ensure” human rights, as established in numerous human rights treaties, such 
as the ICCPR1225 and the ICESCR. In regard to violations committed by non-state 
actors, the UN Human Rights Committee further explained the general obligation on 
State parties in its General Comment 31. According to the Committee, the duty to 
respect entails that the rights envisaged by the Covenant are protected not only against 
violations by the State’s agents of their rights, but also against acts committed by 
private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so 
far as they are amenable to application between private persons or entities”1226. In 
other words, in light of the Committee’s view, State’s obligations under the Covenant 
are fulfilled if individuals are protected by the State against violations of their rights 
also committed by non-state actors1227. 
                                               
by note of the Secretary General, ¶ 6, U.N. doc. A/68/279 (Aug. 6, 2013). 
1223 As mentioned above, the obligations of states and the responsibilities of corporations are separated 
and do not depend on one another. Such a distinction is to designate that an autonomously existing 
corporate responsibility is not an obligation provided by the existing international human rights law. 
1224 Report of the Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human 
Rights, ¶ 3, U.N. doc. A/HRC/8/5 (April 7, 2008) 
1225 According to Article 2 of such instrument: “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to 
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant”. Paragraph 2 states as follows: “Each State Party to the present 
Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and 
with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary 
to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant”. International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, art.2.2, opened for signature 16 December 1966. 
1226 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on 
States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 80th Sess., 2187th meeting (Mar. 
29, 2004). General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI). 
1227 Ibidme, par. 8. 
335 
 
Further, the duty of States to ensure the human rights of all individuals within their 
territory and jurisdiction implies that States have an obligation in relation to individuals 
situated under their power and effective control, including if an individual is not within 
the territory of the State party1228. This is often referred to as to the extraterritorial 
effects of human rights. 
 
 
4.3.2.1.1. Hints on extraterritorial effects regarding Human Rights and Corporations 
 
The enforceability of human rights is deeply connected with sovereignty, which for its 
part closely depends on territoriality. In this context, the sovereign authority of a State 
is able to exercise its power within its jurisdiction 1229. Jurisdiction basically refers to 
the power of the State to regulate and enforce persons and events within its boundaries 
in light of the territoriality principle. In other words, jurisdiction refers to the scope of 
each state’s right “to regulate conduct or the consequences of events”1230.  
Territoriality is in fact the general rule1231, but such principle is not absolute. In fact, 
the complexity of the international realm results in several circumstances in which 
doubts arise on jurisdiction. Such are the cases of conducts and activities with 
transnational quality, which, thus, either take place or produce their effects outside 
domestic borders1232 . The aim is clearly to prevent human rights violations abroad, 
especially when such abuses occur in countries with a permissive or inadequate 
domestic legal system. 
Defining extraterritoriality is, hence, a multifaceted task in which there are no 
                                               
1228 Such provision also extends to individuals within the power or effective control of the milirary forces 
of a State conducting its activities outside the territory and in situations of armed conflict in which the 
rules of International Humanitarian Law apply. Ibidem, par. 10. 
1229 J. Scott, “Territorial Sovereignty and Territorial Extension in an Inter-Connected World”, in R. 
Rawlings, P. Leyland, and A. Young (ed.), Sovereignty and the Law: Domestic, European and 
International Perspectives, Oxford University Press, 2013, 270.  
1230 R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, Longman 1992, 456. 
1231 N. Bernaz, “Enhancing Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Violations: Is Extraterritoriality 
the Magic Potion?”, Journal of Business Ethics, 2013, 495. 
1232 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 163. 
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unambiguous guiding principle or norms in force, especially regarding international 
human rights law1233 . Extraterritoriality raises procedural questions about finding a 
justification for the exercise of a State’s sovereignty outside its jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, the international legal framework provides guidance in cases in which 
there is a connection between the state and the relevant conduct object of the 
regulation1234. In such cases there are not many problems on the application of the 
extraterritoriality principle1235. For instance, nationality, in both its active and passive 
dimension, constitutes a valid element of connection which allows State’s jurisdiction 
in cases in which either the offender or the victim is its national. 
On the contrary, the universal jurisdiction principle grounds only on the nature of the 
conduct and does not depend upon the aforesaid requirement of connection1236. The 
international community attributes a faculty on States to act, even though such State is 
not directly concerned with the relevant conduct. Such universality rests on the fact 
that other states cannot or are unwilling to exercise jurisdiction pursuant with the 
aforementioned rules. This risky impasse can be overcome in light of the interest of the 
international community as a whole, to which the State acts as a surrogate, with the 
aim at protecting against the breach of a erga omnes violation1237 . Nonetheless, as 
confirmed by judge Van den Wyngaert in the Arrest Warrant case of 2000, there is no 
generally accepted definition of universal jurisdiction, which surely causes difficulties 
concerning its applicability1238.  
In practice, treaties such as the Geneva Conventions explicitly permit extraterritorial 
prosecution for war crimes. Universal jurisdiction, inter alia, regards the so-called 
                                               
1233 A. J Colangelo, “An Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality”, Virginia Law Review 97, 2011, 1021. 
1234 W. O’Neill, “(Re)Building the Rule of Law after Identity-Based Conflict: What Responsibility to 
Protect Practitioners Will Confront”, 1 Global Responsibility to Protect, 2009, 353. 
1235 In addition, according to the protective principle States have jurisdiction in any case in which their 
vital interests are at stake. F. A Gevurtz, “Determining Extraterritoriality”, 56 William & Mary Law 
Review, 2014, 352. 
1236 A. J Colangelo, “The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction”, 47 Virginia Journal of International 
Law, 2007, 150. 
1237  M. C. Bassiouni, “Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and 
Contemporary Practice”, 42 Virginia Journal of International Law, 2001, 96. 
1238 International Court of Justice, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, Democratic Republic of the Congo 
v. Belgium, dissenting opinion Van den Wyngaert (14 February 2002), par. 46. 
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gross violations of human rights such as genocide. Accordingly, some scholars have 
argued the applicability of universal jurisdiction to the entire ius cogens category, 
which is surely desirable, but unlikely in practice, due to the lack of consensus on the 
scope and definition of such peculiar rights1239. 
In respect to the issue at stake, the second Principle of the Guiding Principles 
enunciates the obligation of States to openly articulate their expectation that all 
corporations registered under their jurisdiction respect human rights in carrying out 
their activities. In relation to these premises, Ruggie approached the issue regarding 
the obligations of States to regulate the extraterritorial operations of corporations.  
The Commentary to Principle 2 helps to clarify the view regarding extraterritoriality 
envisaged in the Guiding Principles. Such commentary states that: “At present States 
are not generally required under international human rights law to regulate the 
extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction. 
Nor are they generally prohibited from doing so, provided there is a recognized 
jurisdictional basis. Within these parameters some human rights treaty bodies 
recommend that home States take steps to prevent abuse abroad by business enterprises 
within their jurisdiction”1240.  
The wording of the Commentary suggests that present international human rights law 
does not impose extraterritorial obligations on States, but either does it prohibit its 
exercise. In fact, in light of the Commentary, human rights law acknowledges that 
States are permitted to regulate extraterritorially if this does not lead to a violation of 
international law. 
Regardless of the view outlined in the commentary, a large number of scholars embrace 
the idea that States have at the minimum some extraterritorial obligations, even if the 
extent and implications of such obligations are still unclear 1241 . The Maastricht 
Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and 
                                               
1239 Clapham, Human Rights Obligations, 94. 
1240 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: "Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework", 2011,  3. 
1241 O. De Schutter, Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States 
in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Human Rights Quarterly, The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2012, 1094. 
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Cultural Rights (Maastricht Principles) seems to confirm this perspective. Despite their 
non-binding character, the Maastricht principles constitute a valuable tool in order to 
determine the scope of States’ obligations. According to Principle 3 of such instrument, 
all States have obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, including civil, 
cultural, economic, political and social rights, both within their territories and 
extraterritorially1242.  
Principle 8, which is labeled “Definition of extraterritorial obligations”, provides two 
situations in which such obligations occur:  
For the purposes of these Principles, extraterritorial obligations encompass: a) 
obligations relating to the acts and omissions of a State, within or beyond its territory, 
that have effects on the enjoyment of human rights outside of that State’s territory; and 
b) obligations of a global character that are set out in the Charter of the United Nations 
and human rights instruments to take action, separately, and jointly through 
international cooperation, to realize human rights universally1243. 
The Commentary itself offers an example in which a corporate-related activity may 
trigger extraterritorial obligations for the State where the two aforesaid grounds 
combines. A State has an obligation to ensure that a corporation domiciled within its 
jurisdiction does not provide loans to projects leading to forced evictions for two 
reasons. Firstly, because the state has the legal and factual power to regulate the 
corporation’s conduct, and secondly, the State has the obligation to take separate and 
joint action to realize human rights internationally1244. 
Scholars, such as De Schutter, argue that from the authoritative ruling of several UN 
human rights bodies stems the obligation of States to control the conduct of 
corporations that are incorporated in a State’s territory/jurisdiction, when such conduct 
may cause human rights abuses abroad1245. 
                                               
1242 Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. (2011). Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 29(4), 9. 581.  
1243 Ibidem,  1101. 
1244 Ibidem,  1102. 
1245 In its capacity as the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to food, De Schutter emphasized 
such situation with regard to food related issues. De Schutter, Regulating Transnational Corporations: A 
Duty under International Human Rights Law, 
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In conclusion, in relation to extraterritorial obligations, recent literature endorsed the 
perspective that the Guiding Principles do not replicate contemporary advances in the 
developing body of International Human Rights Law. These progresses have identified 
a regular consolidation of the extraterritorial duties of States to regulate the conduct of 
companies1246. 
Despite the non-binding character of the interpretations and observations delivered by 
the UN, the academia has acknowledged them as authoritative pronunciations. The 
same scholars argue that to not recognize extraterritorial obligations on State by default 
seems based on an inaccurate regressive approach in light of relevant practice1247. As a 
result, the approach proposed concerned the characterization of such obligations as 
“disputed or unsettled”, instead of completely rejecting the scheme of the 
extraterritorial State duty to protect. 
 
 
4.3.2.1.2. Horizontal effects regarding Human Rights and Corporations 
 
Generally, the duties of States concerning human rights can be divided in negative and 
positive obligations. While the former obligations bind States to abstain from directly 
violating human rights provisions, the latter oblige States to actively intervene or adopt 
measures for the protection of such rights. As a result, non-compliance by the State in 
regard to its negative obligations turns into an unlawful commissive act. On the 
contrary, from the violation of positive obligations stems the omissive unlawful act of 
the State. 
In respect to the object of the present study, here provided will be an analysis of the 
positive obligations, which in fact are the kinds of duties that most characterize the 
conduct of the state in relation to corporations’ activities. Usually, human rights abuses 
                                               
Contribution of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Mr. Olivier de Schutter, to the workshop 
‘Human Rights and Transnational corporations: Paving the way for a legally binding instrument’ 
convened by Ecuador; 11-12 March 2014, during the 25th session of the Human Rights Council (2014).  
1246 Ibidem 
1247 J. H.Knox, “The Ruggie Rules: Applying Human Rights Law to Corporations”, in The UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Foundations and Implementation, R. Mares ed., 2012, 81. 
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committed by corporations take place when states fail to comply with their positive 
obligations concerning the adoption of preventive and repressive measures between 
private actors. In practice, states have three obligations in relation to the private realm, 
namely: “to prevent violations of human rights in the private sphere”; “to regulate and 
control private actors”; and “to investigate violations, punish perpetrators and provide 
effective remedies to victims”1248 
In such circumstances, violations of human rights result from the actions put in place 
by private actors (individuals), rather than by the States. In order to prevent such 
violations occurring, scholars have debated on the horizontal application of human 
rights, which concerns the ability of this category of rights to have effect in relations 
between private actors1249. This is surely the case of multinational corporations, which 
throughout their activities can deeply impact the adequate enjoyment of human rights 
of private actors, such as individuals and communities. 
In accordance with the dynamic interpretation of human rights treaties and with the 
Drittwirkung theory1250, States are bound to adopt relevant positive measures in order 
to prevent that inter-privatistic abuses occcorur committed by individuals under their 
jurisdiction 1251 . Remarkably, some scholars have argued that, in specific cases, 
corporations act as catalyseur of State’s responsibility, bearing in mind that acts of 
private actors are not attributable to a state1252. Notwithstanding, the responsibility of 
the state may stem from the unlawful activities of a non-state actor, if such activities 
are attributed to the state in light of international law provisions1253 and if the State has 
not taken adequate due diligence steps to prevent the respective violation1254. 
                                               
1248 D. M. Chirwa, “The Doctrine of State Responsibility as a Potential Means of Holding Private Actors 
Accountable for Human Rights”, 4 Melbourne Journal of International Law, 2004, 40. 
1249  E. Pariotti, “International Soft Law, Human Rights and Non-State Actors: Towards the 
Accountability of Transnational Corporations?”, 10 Human Rights Review, 2009, 142. 
1250 Horizontal effects of human rights 
1251 Bonfanti, Imprese multinazionali, diritti umani e ambiente, 49. 
1252 L. Condorelli, L'Imputation à l'Etat d'un fait internationalement illicite: solutions classiques et 
nouvelles tendances, M. Nijhoff, 1988, 96. 
1253 K. Creutz, “Transnational Privatised Security and the International Protection of Human Rights”, 
Erik Castren Institute of Itnernational Law and Human Rights, University of Helsinki, 2006, 72. 
1254 Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework. U.N.Doc. A/HRC/17/31, General Principles 
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The considerations provided by the ICJ Judges in the United States Diplomatic and 
Consular Staff in Tehran case of 1979 concerning the Iranian students1255 , mutatis 
mutandis can be applied to corporations. The State, thus, does not respond 
internationally for the unlawful conduct perpetrated by corporations, but does so only 
in light of an omissive conduct by the State for not having complied with its positive 
duties to prevention and repression. 
At this point, it is important to inquire whether the State’s duty to protect human rights 
is an obligation of conduct or an obligation of result. Such inquiry is significant in light 
of both the attribution of the burden of proof on the claimant as well as its use as a 
possible justification that the State can raise in order to be considered unaccountable.  
In light of Ruggie, the duties at stake must be considered obligation of conduct or of 
due diligence, under which States are bound to adopt reasonable measures in order to 
safeguard the enjoyment of specific rights. In other words, due diligence concerns 
s’efforcer obligations1256, which violation occur if the State does not adopt the required 
diligence in the adoption or implementation of the relevant measure concerning 
prevention mechanisms and remedies for all victims of human rights violation1257. 
The scope of such obligations is clarified by a number of international and regional 
human rights bodies such as the Commission of Human Rights1258 and the Committee 
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights1259, as well as by the Inter-American Court on 
Human Rights. 
The latter regional Court addressed the issue of due diligence in two cases concerning 
Honduras namely, the Velasquez Rodrigues Case of 1988 and the Godínez-Cruz Case 
                                               
(March 21, 2011). Commentary to Principle 1. 
1255 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America 
v. Iran); Order, 12 V 81, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 12 May 1981, par. 58. 
1256 R. Pisillo Mazzeschi, “Responsabilité de l’État pour violation des obligations positives relatives aux 
droits de l’homme”, Recueil des Cours 333, 2009, 224-225. 
1257 J. Kulesza, Due Diligence in International Law, Brill Nijhoff, 2016, 29. 
1258 See the aforementioned General Comment 31; UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), General 
comment no. 31 [80], The nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States Parties to the 
Covenant, 26 May 2004, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 
1259 U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15 The right to water 
(arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), ¶ 23-24, U.N. 
doc. E/C.12/2002/11, 29th Sess. (Nov. 11-29, 2004). 
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of 19891260. The Court stated that to comply with the duty ‘to ensure’ human rights 
enshrined in Article 1 of the American Convention 1261 , States must “prevent, 
investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized by the Convention and, 
moreover, if possible attempt to restore the right violated and provide compensation as 
warranted for damages resulting from the violation”1262. 
The Court confirmed that private actors that abuse human rights may not trigger State 
responsibility, unless it is proven “the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or 
to respond to it as required by the Convention” upon States1263. The Court took the task 
of clarifying the obligations of states one step further; and concerning due diligence, 
the State has to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to use the 
means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within 
its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and 
to ensure the victim adequate compensation1264. 
Without attempting to provide a comprehensive list regarding the duty to prevent, the 
Court emphasized that such duty includes all those means of a legal, political, 
administrative and cultural nature that promote the protection of human rights and 
ensure that any violations are considered and treated as illegal acts, which, as such, 
may lead to the punishment of those responsible and the obligation to indemnify the 
victims for damages1265. In addition, this means that states are obligated to investigate 
every situation involving a violation of the rights protected by the Convention and 
punish private actors if violations occur1266. 
In conclusion, using the words provided by the Commentary to Principle one of the 
Ruggie’s Guidelines: “The State duty to protect is a standard of conduct. Therefore, 
                                               
1260 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, (29 July 1988), para 174; 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Godínez-Cruz v. Honduras, (20 January 1989), par. 184. 
1261 Article 1: “The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms 
recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of 
those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition”. 
1262 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, (29 July 1988), para 66. 
1263 Ibidem, par. 172. 
1264 Ibidem 174. 
1265 Ibidem 175. 
1266 Ibidem 176. 
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States are not per se responsible for human rights abuse by private actors. However, 
States may breach their international human rights law obligations where such abuse 
can be attributed to them, or where they fail to take appropriate steps to prevent, 
investigate, punish and redress private actors’ abuse. While States generally have 
discretion in deciding upon these steps, they should consider the full range of 
permissible preventative and remedial measures, including policies, legislation, 
regulations and adjudication. States also have the duty to protect and promote the rule 
of law, including by taking measures to ensure equality before the law, fairness in its 
application, and by providing for adequate accountability, legal certainty, and 
procedural and legal transparency”. 
 
 
4.3.2.2 The Corporate Responsibility to respect Human Rights. 
The second pillar of the Guiding Principles concerns the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights. It does not take an extremely attentive reader to realize that the 
wording itself implies a key different approach from the aforesaid state duty. The legal 
approach for corporations deliberately revolves around the use of the notion 
responsibility as opposed to the term duty. Such terminological choice is aimed at 
stressing that international law does not provide legal obligations for multinational 
corporations1267. In the same manner, as a consequence of corporate activities, terms 
such as impact and risk are favored to the notion of violation, which is merely attributed 
for states. 
The goal is quite clear. Corporate responsibilities must be distinguished from the 
obligations of the state on the one hand, and they cannot be considered legally binding 
and enforceable standards under International Human Rights Law on the other1268. In 
fact, the notion of responsibility places a much lighter burden on its holder, since such 
                                               
1267 S. Wheeler, “Global Production, Csr and Human Rights: The Courts of Public Opinion and the Social 
Licence to Operate”, 19 International Journal of Human Rights, 2015, 761. 
1268 N. Jägers, “Will transnational private regulation close the governance gap?” in Human Rights 
Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect?, 2013, 298. 
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notion can be understood as a much ductile term than duty. In this respect, scholars 
have emphasized that the state duty grounds on the language of law and policy while 
corporate responsibility to respect is sets on the language of due diligence1269. Hence, 
corporate responsibilities are non-binding standards of expected conduct that ground 
on international social expectations rather than on international legal obligations and 
that do not lessen any of the obligations contracted internationally by a state1270. 
In specific, the corporate responsibility to respect is built as a negative responsibility, 
with entails two detailed expected conducts. Firstly, corporations must not harm and 
thus should “avoid infringing on the human rights of others”. Secondly, corporations 
should “address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved”. 
Notwithstanding, corporate responsibility comprises also the necessity of active steps, 
in specific human rights due diligence requirements1271 . While these requirements 
'apply to all enterprises regardless of their size, sector, operational context, ownership 
and structure', their scope and complexity may vary depending on the size and capacity 
of the corporations and on the potential human rights impacts 1272 . In practice, 
corporations have to carry out policy self-commitments and processes to identify and 
prevent (possible) human rights infringements. This applies to the entire spectrum of 
internationally recognized human rights that corporations are capable of harming, such 
as civil and political, as well as social, economic and cultural rights1273.  
Corporate due diligence as opposed to State due diligence is delimited to the areas in 
which corporations might have adverse human rights impacts. Nonetheless, analogous 
to States, such corporate responsibility is a standard of conduct, rather than a standard 
of result, which, thus, must be process-oriented rather than performance oriented1274. 
                                               
1269 Backer, From Institutional Misalignments to Socially Sustainable Governance, 124.. 
1270  N. Jägers, Will transnational private regulation close the governance gap? in Human Rights 
Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect?, 2013, 299. 
1271 C. Glinski, “The Ruggie Framework, tort law and business human rights self-regulation: Increasing 
standards through mutual impact and learning”, CEVIA Working Paper Series, Issue 1/2017, No. 4., 5. 
1272 Principle 14. 
1273 Ibidem, 15. 
1274 C. Parker and J. Howe, “Ruggie's diplomatic project and its missing regulatory infrastructure” in R. 
Mares, The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Foundations and Implementation, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013, 273 - 301.  
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In specific, such due diligence process must comprise at least these four foundations: 
firstly, it must assess actual and potential human rights impacts; secondly, the process 
must integrate and act upon the findings; thirdly, it must track responses; and lastly, the 
process has to provide communications on how impacts are addressed1275. 
The Guiding Principles go further, and along with requiring compliance with domestic 
legislation, they demand companies to comply with all applicable law, respect human 
rights and honor internationally accepted human rights. As is the case of this 
dissertation, pharmaceutical companies often conduct their activities in countries in 
which the state is incapable or unwilling to regulate and enforce human rights 
provisions. In these peculiar situations, pharmaceuticals must consider issues such as 
the countries in which they operate, the risks their operations carry and the relationships 
they have with third parties1276. In addition, under the Guiding Principles, these factors 
do not depend on the place where corporations operate and, thus, corporations must 
endorse the responsibility regardless of geographical location or territorial boundaries.  
In conclusion, as was previously presented, neither the Reggie’s framework nor the 
Guiding Principles are intended to provide a comprehensive list of human rights 
relevant to multinational corporations. Both instruments were written to tackle the 
entire subject of human rights providing general scope responsibilities for corporations 
in a manner more realistic and practical than they had been in the past. The extent of 
corporate activities is much too broad and multifaceted for the adoption of a specific 
set of rules for such economic entities. The creation of a due diligence framework, 
which in practice can be applied to all kinds of rights and situations, seems a valuable 
means for monitoring and diminishing the chances of corporate harmful conduct. 
  
                                               
1275 Commentary GP 17. 
1276 The UN Guiding Principles, 57. 
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4.3.2.3. Access to remedy for victims of business-related abuses 
The last pillar of the Guiding Principles concerns the access to remedy for victims of 
business-related abuses. The State remains at the center of the framework in light of 
the traditional understanding of state power supremacy. Notwithstanding, the 
integrated set of redress methods envisaged in the Guiding Principles apply to both 
States and corporations in order to guarantee that victims of human rights violations 
have access to remedies. Such remedies cover national judicial and quasi-judicial 
structures as well as private complaint mechanisms provided by companies and 
international mechanisms. “One category of non-State-based grievance mechanisms 
encompasses those administered by a business enterprise alone or with stakeholders, 
by an industry association or a multi-stakeholder group. They are non-judicial, but may 
use adjudicative, dialogue-based or other culturally appropriate and rights-compatible 
processes. These mechanisms may offer particular benefits such as speed of access and 
remediation, reduced costs and/or transnational reach”1277. 
Such State duty to provide effective remedy, which specifically entails the duty to 
investigate, punish and redress, in case a human rights violation has taken place1278, 
confirms a general principle founded in International Human Rights Law.  
States must ensure that the formal judicial mechanism as well as complementary 
administrative, legislative and other State-based non-judicial grievance mechanisms 
are effective. Such effectiveness relies on their “impartiality, integrity and ability to 
accord due process”1279. 
Remarkably, States must ensure that where judicial remedy is not compulsory or 
preferred, non-judicial complaint procedures assume a complementary and 
supplementary role. In addition, no practical or procedural obstacles may avert human 
rights abuses from being brought before courts1280. To this end, States must raise public 
awareness of, and simplify access to State-based complaint mechanisms. 
                                               
1277 Guiding Principles Commentary 28. 
1278 Principle 26. 
1279 Ibidem  
1280 Commentary to GP 27. 
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Likewise, States must provide favorable conditions in relation to non–State-based 
complaint mechanisms tackling business-related human rights abuses to the extent that 
such remedies should be incorporated into the broader State-based system. 
The UN Guiding Principles provide different classes of non–State-based complaint 
mechanisms such as: firstly, operative complaint mechanisms that are managed by 
corporations alone, or featuring stakeholders; secondly, mechanisms administered by 
industry association, multi-stakeholder. Lastly, the Guiding Principles provide 
international or regional human rights mechanisms.  
Even though non-State-based mechanisms are non-judicial, in practice they can be 
more effective since they provide access and remediation promptly, at a lower cost and 
at better transnational reach1281. 
The approach envisaged by the Guiding principles is dualist in both scope and 
jurisdictional extent. In fact, they establish stipulations for ensuring the effectiveness 
of both state-based and non-state-based entities, such as legitimacy, accessibility, 
predictability, equitability, transparency and rights-compatibility1282. 
As mentioned above, States are the primary actors in ensuring access to remedies with 
the expectation of the incorporation of international human rights in the domestic court 
system and the autonomy of every state to regulate them within their jurisdiction.  
 
 
4.3.3. The legal status of the UN Guiding Principles 
 
The UN Guiding Principles have demonstrated that the challenge in addressing 
corporate-human rights issues stems mainly from the institutional misalignments 
resulting in governance gaps. Such gaps allow corporations to shield their actions 
behind their corporate veils, which often result in human rights violations without 
neither having to face consequences nor provide victims with access to effective 
remedies.  
                                               
1281 Commentary to GP 28. 
1282 Ibidem 31 
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The Ruggie’s framework was, thus, established in order to provide a manifesto of 
guidance to which relevant actors could resort in order to fill the aforesaid governance 
gaps. Since the Guiding Principles adoption, the prospect has been that once this 
guidance reached adequate endorsement, it may lead into a systemic revolution and 
finally result in the institutionalization of a new coordinated global business and human 
rights framework. 
In light of such premises, it is important to assess whether the Guiding Principles are 
actually capable of achieving the aforementioned goals. Accordingly, one of the key 
perspectives that must be studied is the legal status of the Principles in order to 
determine the legal strength and bite that such framework is able to emanate. 
The text of the Guiding Principles does not provide any assistance in accomplishing 
such task and does not present any reference to its legal status whatsoever. That is why 
an evaluation of the legal character of the Principles will be here provided in light of 
both the sources of international law as envisaged by Article 38(1) of the Statute of the 
ICJ and relevant definitions of soft law provided by leading scholars. 
To be fair, the Special Representative himself was clear about the non-legally binding 
character of the framework since its inception. Further, Ruggie emphasized that 
“nothing in these Guiding Principles should be read as creating new international law 
obligations, or as limiting or undermining any legal obligations a State may have 
undertaken or be subject to under international law with regard to human rights”1283. 
Likewise, State parties of the Human Rights Council have expressed their anonymous 
endorsement of the Guiding Principles on the premises of the non-binding nature of the 
instrument as evinced by the oral statements delivered at the time1284.  
Hence, it would inadequate to perceive the Principles as constitutive evidence of State 
practice or opinion iuris sive necessitates which lead to the creation of new customary 
norms nor can they be perceived as a binding treaty among the parties under Article 
                                               
1283 Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework. U.N.Doc. A/HRC/17/31, General Principles 
(March 21, 2011) 
1284 Noteworthy is that Ruggie was carrying out his activities in light of a special procedure of the HRC. 
This leads to the conclusion that he did not have the legal mandate to develop this kind of legal provisions. 
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38(1)(a) and (b) of the Statute of the ICJ.  
On the contrary, the study of the Guiding Principles text mirrors a common perception 
of existing and emerging standards that regulate the responsibility and accountability 
of corporations and human rights law as codified in international treaties and customary 
international law. Such standards do not stem solely from the State positive legal 
sources, but include, among others, non-State based social and moral rules.  
In light of the aforesaid considerations, the Principles solely reinforce already existing 
obligations, especially in regard to the State duty to protect human right under a lege 
lata approach. To this end, such instrument has direct legal effect on States and at the 
most can produce a sort of “pro-memoria and declaratory effect”1285. In addition, in 
regard to States’ obligations, the Guiding Principles could possibly be viewed as 
auxiliary evidence of international human rights serving the function of clarifying the 
findings of the most highly qualified scholars worldwide1286. 
As a result of the aforesaid analysis, the Guiding Principles fall outside the typical 
sources of international law envisaged by Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ, which 
merely refer to treaties, customs and general principles of law as recognized by 
“civilized nations”, the decisions of national and lower courts, and juristic writings. 
The aim of this section, however, is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
sources of international law, but rather to determine on which legal grounds the Guiding 
Principles can be regarded as a soft law instrument.  
In a quickly changing and developing world order, scholars regarded soft law as both 
a significant intermediate phase towards a more severely binding system as well as a 
tool allowing experiments and speedy adjustments 1287 . Unfortunately, consensus 
cannot be found on a common understanding to what the notion soft-law refers. 
Scholars have dated the usage of such terminology to the aftermath of the second World 
                                               
1285 Ian Brownlie, “Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for MNEs: Commentary” in Legal Problems of 
Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, Deventer, 1983, 41. 
1286  D. Kinley and R. Chambers, “The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private 
Implications of Public International Law”, 6 Human Rights Law Review, 2006, 36. 
1287 M. E. O’Connell, “The Role of Soft law in a Global Order”, in D. Shelton, Commitment and 
Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System, Oxford University 
Press, 2000, 100. 
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War. At that time the term soft-law was announced to label legally relevant 
pronouncements formulated in international organizations and amongst States1288 . 
Nonetheless, consensus arose on the understanding of soft law instruments as 
instruments in which their binding quality is somehow missing or attenuated1289.  
Thirlway provides a definition of soft law which properly reflects the aim and scope of 
the Guiding Principles. In fact, he argued that such peculiar law “is a system of 
international commitments or obligations that are not regarded by those concerned as 
binding in the sense that can be enforced in the same way as those imposed by 
international law proper, but yet are considered as something more than mere political 
gestures, so that there is an expectation of compliance even if there is no legal duty”1290. 
Sources such as resolutions and declarations of international organizations, quasi-
legislative activities adopted within the UN, and non-legally binding but influential 
codes of conduct from States and State declarations of intentions are generally 
recognized as soft law instruments1291. They arose and stem from States’ authority and 
were usually adopted within Inter-Governmental organizations. No doubts, thus, arose 
on their solid international and public nature. 
According to Thirlway, two kinds of soft law categories can be listed, namely, soft 
negotium and soft instrumentum. Briefly stated, the former mainly focus on the 
intention of the stakeholders rather than the instrument of adoption. In other words, 
specific provisions of a treaty, which constitutes the archetypical source of international 
law, could establish soft law provisions if the parties so intended. In the case of the 
Guiding Principles, States never agreed to confer legal effects to them; instead they 
endorsed such instrument bearing in mind their non-legal character. 
On the contrary, the category referred to as soft instrumentum pays attention to the 
means of creation of such instrument, rather than to the intention of the parties 
concerned. The aforesaid Guiding Principles fall under such category of soft law, since 
                                               
1288 E. Riedel, “Standards and Sources. Farewell to the Exclusivity of the Sources Triad in International 
Law?”, European Journal of International Law, 2013, 63. 
1289 Thirlway, The Sources of International Law, 186. 
1290 Ibidem, 187. 
1291 Riedel, Standards and Sources, 59. 
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resolutions adopted within the Human Rights Council are, per se, non-binding source 
of law. Such is the case of “legislative action by bodies lacking the authority, under 
international ‘hard’ law to impose binding obligations”1292. This means that, even if 
the adopting States manifested ardent wishes that the Principle were to create hard law, 
the result could be a soft law instrument at most. 
Notwithstanding, soft-law instruments do create certain effects. For example, failure to 
observe such provisions could theoretically result in ostracism from other States within 
the UN. Regardless of the political rather than juridical consequences, these provisions 
were recognized as having a noticeable influence in the behavior of States1293.  
At this point, it is important to determine and discuss whether soft law has different 
impacts in relation to human rights law rather than to the public international law. In 
fact, human rights law is characterized by specific features, which will be only partially 
outlined in this section, since debates on the fragmentation of international law and on 
the specific nature of human rights law are not the objects of the present analysis.  
Nonetheless, two main properties are traditionally regarded as relevant to international 
human rights law. Firstly, generally speaking, traditional international treaties bind the 
parties and only the parties under the pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt principle. On 
the contrary, human rights instruments bind states to protect the rights of third parties 
to the treaty, namely individuals. The human rights obligations that states commit to 
fulfill have been regarded as erga omnes, since it is commonly recognized that human 
rights treaties shield the common interest of all states parties, autonomously from 
particular self-interests1294 . Such peculiar feature produces its consequences on the 
relevant reservation’s regime as well as the interpretive rules of human rights treaties, 
which, in fact, follow a completely different pattern. For instance, reservations are not 
admitted unless they do not hinder the object and scope of the treaties and interpretation 
must always lead to a concrete application of the treaty’s provisions1295. 
                                               
1292 Thirlway, The Sources of International Law, Second Edition, 191. 
1293 Riedel, Standards and Sources, 62. 
1294 This perception has been presented in several occasions by both the ICJ and European Court of 
Human Rights. For example, see ICJ Advisory Opinion concerning Reservations to the Genocide 
Convention, 1951, ICJ Re at 15 and ECtHR Judgment Ireland v.UK, 18 Jan. 1978, A.25, at 239 
1295 T. Scovazzi, Corso di Diritto Internazionale, Parte III, Giuffrè Editore, 2013, 39-54. 
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The second property of international human rights law concerns the establishment of 
independent and autonomous supranatural judicial and quasi-judicial monitoring 
bodies. Accordingly, alleged victims (individuals) have the right to start different kinds 
of supranational proceedings against Sates, whose activities are constantly monitored. 
In this scenario, supranational bodies and domestic courts engage regular dialogues 
with each other, creating synergies and confrontations in the enforcement of human 
rights obligations. As a result, these interactions endorse the shaping and development 
of international human rights law and in such context, soft law does not provide 
individuals the same legal protection. 
In light of the aforesaid observations, in traditional international law soft law only 
reduces the value and power of the commitments that states made to each other; on the 
contrary, in the human rights realm, non-binding provisions reduce the legal quality of 
the protection accorded to individuals. This is the reason debates over the legal nature 
of the Guiding Principles are not merely theoretical but rather practical. 
Following the definition provided by Shelton, the Guiding Principles are acknowledged 
as secondary soft law, since they are non- binding standards produced by 
intergovernmental bodies and institutions. On the other hand, primary soft law refers 
to normative texts not adopted in treaty form, such as Declarations, which provide new 
norms, elaborate or reaffirm formerly accepted binding and non- binding provisions1296. 
In practice, most scholars argue that the legal effects of soft law provisions need to be 
explained in light of dynamic perspective concerning sources of international law. 
When such instruments do not reproduce existing international law, they promote lege 
ferenda, namely future law that the international community regards as more 
appropriate for the regulation of a certain conduct. A concrete consequence is 
represented by the fact that domestic courts cannot apply such non-binding provisions 
in order to directly address pending cases before them. These national courts may, 
however, use lege ferenda provisions with the aim at innovating existing international 
                                               
1296 D. Shelton, “International Law and “Relative Normativity”, in M. D. Evans, International Law, 
Oxford University Press, 2010, 169. 
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law in light of universal justice1297. Further, soft law provisions can turn into binding 
obligations following to different situations: firstly, if States reproduce their contents 
in legally binding instruments such as treaties. Secondly, if States’ practice (diuturnitas) 
as well as States’ understanding of such provisions as binding upon them (opinio juris), 
transform soft law into customary international law1298.  
In conclusion, the UN Guiding Principles can be considered a soft law instrument. 
Better said, they are a typical case of expert- driven soft law, under two considerations. 
Firstly, even though they have not been negotiated directly by States, the Guiding 
Principles were the result of the anonymous “endorsement” by the Human Rights 
Council, which is a proof of the State backing and acceptance of such instrument. 
Nonetheless, controversies arose on the exact legal consequences of endorsement as 
divergent from acceptance, which is far from obvious. Further, their international 
character is demonstrated by the fact that they were adopted within the United Nations. 
Secondly, the content of the Guiding Principles clearly testifies their character as soft 
law instrument, since in the words of their creator, they provide non-binding provisions 
that mostly reflect lex lata “that prescribes minimum standards of conduct for all states 
and all business enterprises in relation to all human rights”1299. 
In addition, as a final remark, Ruggie embarked on a soft law journey as opposed to 
starting negotiations for a predominant international treaty placing binding obligations 
on business enterprises under international law for three main reasons. “Firstly, treaty-
making can be painfully slow, while the challenges of business and human rights are 
immediate and urgent. Second, and worse, a treaty-making process now risks 
undermining effective shorter-term measures to raise business standards on human 
rights. And third, even if treaty obligations were imposed on companies, serious 
questions remain about how they would be enforced”1300. 
 
                                               
1297 S. Lagoutt and T. Gammeltoft-Hansen, Tracing the Roles of Soft Law in Human Rights, Oxford 
University Press, 2016, 19. 
1298 Ibidem,  23. 
1299 Ruggie, Regulating Multinationals: The UN Guiding Principles, 6.. 
1300 J. Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: Treaty road not travelled, Ethical Corporation, 2008. 
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5. The 2011 Statement by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
and the General Comment No. 16 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
 
The analysis here provided concerning the United Nations realm would not be adequate 
without mentioning two documents adopted respectively by the Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights Committee (ESCRC) and by the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC). Both instruments aim at clarifying corporate activities in relation to their 
corresponding “jurisdiction”. The analysis here presented stems from the study of the 
texts of the two instruments. 
The ESCRS adopted a document labelled Draft Statement on the obligations of States 
Parties regarding the corporate sector and economic, social and cultural rights in May 
20111301. The Statement confirms that the main obligation of States under Article 2(1) 
of the ICESCR is to respect, protect and fulfill the rights of all persons under their 
jurisdiction in the context of corporate-related activities undertaken by state-owned or 
private enterprises1302. 
Firstly, the Committee regards the State duty to respect as imposing a duty on States to 
assure that laws and policies concerning corporate activities adopted within their 
jurisdiction comply with the rights envisaged by ICESCR. States must ensure that 
companies “demonstrate due diligence to make certain that they do not impede the 
enjoyment of the Covenant rights by those who depend on or are negatively affected by 
their activities”1303. Such interpretation grounds on the societal expectation provided 
in the aforesaid Ruggie’s framework. In other words, the community has an expectation 
upon corporations that they will conduct their activities under a due diligence approach. 
Such approach serves a dual purpose: it is necessary in order to regulate corporation’s 
negative impacts on human rights on the one hand; and it helps determining the 
obligation of States to respect human rights as States place the burden of proof on 
                                               
1301 U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Statement on the obligations of States parties 
regarding the corporate sector and economic, social and cultural rights, U.N. doc. E/C.12/2011/1, 46th 
Sess. (July 12, 2011). 
1302 Ibidem, par. 3. 
1303 Ibidem, par. 4. 
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corporations in order for them to manifest their compliance with the societal 
expectation of conduct. 
Moreover, the statement poses a due diligence duty on States which binds States’ action 
to ensure that rights holders are effectively protected against violations of their ESCR 
rights by corporate actors. In this regard, States must provide regulatory measures, such 
as “establishing appropriate laws, regulations, as well as monitoring, investigation 
and accountability procedures to set and enforce standards for the performance of 
corporations”1304 . Further, the Committee emphasized the importance for States to 
establish mechanisms “to ensure access to effective remedies to victims of corporate 
abuses of economic, social and cultural rights, through judicial, administrative, 
legislative or other appropriate means”1305. 
Interestingly, recalling its General Comment 15 on the Rights to water, the Committee 
stressed that the State duties extend to extraterritorial activities and impose States to 
“take steps to prevent human rights contraventions abroad by corporations which have 
their main seat under their jurisdiction,  without infringing the sovereignty or 
diminishing the obligations of the host States under the Covenant”. 
The statements went even further and placed a duty on States their capacity to influence 
corporations to respect the right, through legal or political means, such steps should 
be taken in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and applicable 
international law. In addition, the statement recalls the social duty provide by 
corporations which “have a particular role to play in job creation, hiring policies and 
non-discriminatory access to work. They should conduct their activities on the basis of 
legislation, administrative measures, codes of conduct and other appropriate measures 
promoting respect for the right to work, agreed between the government and civil 
society”1306.  
In conclusion, the Statement recognized the framework provided by the Guiding 
Principles and respective framework. Its legal value revolves around the consideration 
                                               





that another UN organ accepted and reaffirmed the structure provided by Ruggie, 
however it does not add much either from a qualitative nor does so from substantive 
approach. In fact, the committee does not even attempt to define the functional content 
of the responsibility to respect human rights, and actually recognizes that such 
responsibility should be interpreted in light of the hopes envisaged by the Guiding 
Principle. As a result, “the Committee calls on States Parties to include in their initial 
and periodic reports information on challenges faced and measures taken in relation 
to the role and impact of the corporate sector on the realization of economic, social 
and cultural rights. Other stakeholders are also encouraged to include relevant 
information into their presentations to the Committee, as appropriate”1307.  
 
 
5.1. General Comment No. 16 of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child  
 
In February 2013, the Committee on the Rights of the Child adopted General Comment 
No. 16 which concerns the state obligations in relation to the impact of businesses on 
children’s rights. The Comment is one of the most recent and significant instruments 
of international law available on the issue of business and children’s rights. Briefly 
stated, such Comment grounds on three main pillars: firstly, it provides guidance on 
the measures that States must implement in order to prevent and remedy violations of 
child rights committed by business actors in light of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC) and the Operational Protocols thereto; secondly, the Comment 
confirms the responsibilities that the business sector to shall fulfil for the realization of 
the rights of children; and lastly, it encourages and urges business to positively 
contribute for the actual the implementation of these rights. Further, the General 
Comment sets on principles envisaged by the CRC such as, the best interests of the 
child (article 3(1)) ; the right to non-discrimination (article 2); the right of the child to 
be heard (article 12) and the right to life, survival and development (article 6)1308. 
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In particular, the Committee acknowledged that in light of the peculiar and vulnerable 
character of the subjects protected by the CRC, namely children, States are obliged “to 
have adequate legal and institutional frameworks to respect, protect and fulfil 
children’s rights, and to provide remedies in case of violations in the context of business 
activities and operations”1309.  
Likewise, the Committee provides guidance to in order to1310:  
 ensure that the activities and operations of business enterprises do not adversely 
impact on children’s rights; 
 Create an enabling and supportive environment for business enterprises to re-
spect children’s rights, including across any business relationships linked to 
their operations, products or services and across their global operations; 
 Ensure access to effective remedy for children whose rights have been infringed 
by a business enterprise acting as a private party or as a State agent. 
The Comment recognizes that currently no international legally binding instrument 
concerning the business sector’s responsibilities vis-à-vis human rights exists. 
Notwithstanding, the Committee emphasized that all corporations must comply with 
their responsibilities concerning children’s rights and States must ensure they do so. 
Accordingly, “duties and responsibilities to respect the rights of children extend in 
practice beyond the State and State-controlled services and institutions and apply to 
private actors and business enterprises. Therefore, all In addition, business enterprises 
should not undermine the State's ability to meet their obligations towards children 
under the CRC and its protocols”1311.  
In relation to States’ obligations the General Comment sets on the typical tripartite 
structure of human rights, namely respect, protect and fulfil. The obligation to respect 
imposes that States do not directly or indirectly facilitate, aid and support any violations 
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of children’s rights. Unfortunately, plenty were the cases in which States have been 
found guilty of participating in unlawful practices which concerned child labor 
especially in developing countries1312 . As a result, a State should “not engage in, 
support or condone abuses of children’s rights when it has a business role itself or 
conducts business with private enterprises”1313.  
The obligation to protect envisages that States must take all necessary, appropriate and 
reasonable measures to prevent business enterprises from causing or contributing to 
abuses of children’s rights. In relation to pharmaceutical companies, such include the 
adoption of laws and regulations, their monitoring and enforcement, and policy 
adoption that frame how such corporations are able to have an impact on children’s 
rights. States must investigate, adjudicate and redress violations of children’s rights 
caused or contributed to by a business enterprise1314. This means “having in place 
child-sensitive mechanisms – criminal, civil and administrative – that are known by 
children and their representatives, that are prompt, genuinely available and accessible 
and that provide adequate reparation for harm suffered”1315. 
Lastly, “the obligation to fulfil requires States to take positive action to facilitate, 
promote and provide for the enjoyment of children’s rights. This means that States must 
implement legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other 
measures in conformity with article 4 relating to business activities that impact on 
children’s rights”1316. In light of such statement, it seems clear that the adoption of a 
trade agreement which hinders and infringes the proper enjoyment of the right to access 
to medicines, constitutes a clear violation of the aforesaid obligation. 
In this regard, home States should accurately and comprehensively inform businesses, 
that are willing to or are already operating in a certain State’s jurisdiction, about the 
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local children’s rights situation bearing in mind that corporations have “identical 
responsibilities to respect children’s rights in such setting as they do elsewhere”1317. 
Remarkably, the General Comment directly mentions the Ruggie’s Framework and the 
UNGPs, as well as the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles, the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises and the Children’s Rights and Business Principles. 
Notwithstanding, as opposed to the Ruggie’s understanding of the extraterritorial effect 
of human rights, the Committee argues the State duty to protect children’s rights 
extends beyond states’ borders to all children subject to the State’s jurisdiction. In 
particular, home States have extraterritorial obligations to assure that realization 
children’s rights in the field of corporations’ “extra-territorial activities and operations 
provided that there is a reasonable link between the State and the conduct concerned. 
A reasonable link exists when a business enterprise has its centre of activity, is 
registered or domiciled or has its main place of business or substantial business 
activities in the State concerned”1318.  
In conclusion, the General Comment provided detailed content concerning States’ 
obligation in relation to business-related activities in a comprehensive and coherent 
way. Some scholars attach particular normative significance to General Comments of 
quasi-judicial bodies, which strongly calls for a brief discussion on their legal status as 
under international law. 
Generally speaking, such comments are usually regarded as non-binding instruments, 
but their legal values should not be underestimated. Some scholars consider them as 
valuable tool for interpreting relevant treaties as well as advantageous signposts since 
they provide indications of the content of rights and the steps that states parties are 
required to take in order to ensure adequate compliance1319 . On the contrary, other 
commentators argue that General Comments have “practical authority” because they 
reflect the legal perspective and argumentation of important body of experience in light 
                                               
1317 Ibidem, par. 51. 
1318 Ibidem, par. 43. 
1319  K. Mechlem, “Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights”, Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 42, 2009, 929.  
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of the distinguished personalities who compose such committees1320. In this regard, it 
must be taken into account that UN Committees are composed of prominent legal 
scholars globally recognized for their outstanding contributions to international law.  
Accordingly, some scholars acknowledge that General Comments have significant 
legal strength and they argue that a committee is the most authoritative interpreter of 
the treaty it monitors1321 . States parties are, thus, not free to ignore a committee’s 
understanding of the relevant treaty’s provisions, even if such parties do not agree with 
the committee’s work and even in light of their nonbinding nature. 
The treaty’s interpretation provided by a committee is accordingly regarded as more 
than a simple recommendation and some scholars even supported the “authoritative 
interpretative” character of the committee’s views1322. This understanding stems from 
the fact that General Comments also participate in the formation of customary 
international norms by assisting in framing opinio iuris and state practice. Given their 
normative authority and role, the Committee on the Right of the Child here complied 
with a specific responsibility to adopt a comprehensive legal methodology when legal 
questions concerning States’ obligations in relation to children’s’ rights were at stake. 
It that was not the case, no other body was entitled to provide useful interpretations on 




                                               
1320 Ibidem  




6. The Responsibilities of Pharmaceutical Corporations 
The whole chapter adopted a deductive approach in order to illustrate the legal role that 
pharmaceutical corporations play in granting access to essential medicines. In fact, the 
analysis commenced with an introduction on of globalization and with an attempt at 
providing a suitable definition of multinational corporations. The task was not easy, 
and even harder was the understanding of the particular legal status that such economic 
actors currently enjoy under international law. The third section illustrated the main 
theories on legal personality of non-state actors with a particular focus on multinational 
corporations.  
Regardless of a desirable change of such theories, relevant State’s practice and 
international instruments have proven that States remain the primary duty bearers in 
relation to human rights obligations. This argumentation led to the analysis of the so 
called Social Corporate Responsibility, which as presented, grounds on the social 
expectation that corporations should not only be profit-driven, but rather take also into 
consideration social issues while operating. Accordingly, international organizations, 
such as the United Nations, have, in fact, embarked on a tortuous journey with the aim 
at addressing human rights impacts of multinational corporations’ activities, since there 
is now wide consensus on the adverse consequences that such powerful private actors 
can have on the proper enjoyment of human rights of individuals.  
In this regard, the chapter provided an analysis of the relevant instruments adopted, 
such as the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, in order to determine, 
if possible, the legal responsibilities of corporations. Hence, at this point of the study, 
the present section focuses on the responsibilities of a particular kind of corporations, 
namely pharmaceuticals as well as on a specific activity carried out by such actors, 
namely granting access to medicines. In other words, this section aims at narrowing 
down the human rights responsibilities that society places upon pharmaceutical 
companies with regard to access to essential medicines1323 in developing countries. The 
                                               
1323 Essential Medicines refer to “Those that satisfy the priority health care needs of the population.... 
selected with due regard to public health relevance, evidence on efficacy and safety, and comparative 
cost-effectiveness…[and] intended to be available within the context of functioning health systems at all 
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methodological approach of the section sets on the work of Paul Hunt, who was 
appointed by the Human Rights Council in 2002 as the first UN Special Rapporteur on 
the right to health. 
 
 
6.1 The Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Corporations on Access to 
Medicines 
 
In 2002, the Commission on Human Rights appointed Paul Hunt as the first United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to health for three years; and in 2005, the 
mandate was extended for three more years. Interestingly, Hunts’ mandate (2005-2008) 
overlapped with that of Ruggie (2005-2011). Such overlapping makes the comparative 
analysis of the works of the two experts both theoretically challenging as well as 
relevant in practice. 
The product of Hunts’ mandate, which constitute the normative baseline for the 
attribution of responsibilities for pharmaceuticals, was the Human Rights Guidelines 
for Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to Access to Medicines. Hunt presented the 
aforesaid Guidelines in August 2008 before the UN General Assembly, after having 
received comments and observations from relevant stakeholders, including states, 
NGOs and pharmaceuticals1324. 
The 2008 United Nations Human Rights Guidelines provide for 47 guidelines covering 
a wide range of areas, including transparency, management, lobbying, research, patents 
and licensing, and pricing. The Guidelines ground on the consideration that the 
pharmaceutical sector plays an indispensable role in relation to the right to health and 
access to medicines. Notwithstanding, the nature and scope of pharmaceutical 
companies’ human rights responsibilities concerning the access to medicines are not 
                                               
times in adequate amounts, in the appropriate dosage forms, with assured quality and adequate 
information, and at a price the individual and the community can afford”. World Health Organization, 
“Essential Medicines.” Available at http://www.who.int/topics/essential_ medicines/en/. 
1324 Special Rapporteur on the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, UN Doc. A/63/263, 
August 11, 2008. 
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easy to determine. Further, such responsibility is to be understood as a shared 
responsibility among numerous private and public actors, such as governments, NGOs 
and the business sector, since it would not be feasible to place such a huge burden 
merely on pharmaceuticals. Others relevant documents, such as the Millennium 
Development Goals, confirms and recognizes that pharmaceutical companies are 
among the key players sharing this responsibility. 
Notwithstanding, the absence of a “detailed guidance” for pharmaceutical companies 
and human rights led to a paradox in which even if these actors wished to respect and 
fulfill their right-to-health responsibilities, they simply did not know what they were1325. 
As a result, there is a crucial need to move from general and abstracts provisions to 
specific and operational responsibilities for the pharmaceutical sector1326.  
According to the Special Representative, States remain the main duty bearers, but 
pharmaceutical companies hold corporate responsibilities to respect the right to access 
to medicines (and implicitly the right to health) which derive from “social 
expectations”. As Ruggie emphasizes in its framework, corporate social responsibility 
stems from the so-called social license, and thus requires human rights “due 
diligence”1327. Accordingly, both experts suggested that the corporate responsibility to 
respect is not source of legally binding provisions under international law, unless States 
provide corresponding binding obligations under their respective domestic law1328. 
Remarkably, the complexity of the pharmaceutical sectors makes the task of 
determining the scope and terms of the social license to operate even more complex. 
In fact, such sector encompasses a range of different companies both from a qualitative 
                                               
1325 L. Joo-Young, and Paul Hunt. “Human Rights Responsibilities of Pharmaceutical Companies in 
Relation to Access to Medicines”, The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 40, 2012, 221. 
1326 For instance, as it was presented in the first chapter, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, emphasizes that the private business sector has responsibilities in relation to the 
realization of the right to health, but the Committee has not provided further guidance in order to specify 
these responsibilities. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14: The 
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of 
Physical and Mental Health, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, par. 42. 
1327 Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, “Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework 
for Business and Human Rights,” A/ HRC/8/5, April 7, 2008, par. 25. 
1328 Joo-Young, Human Rights Responsibilities of Pharmaceutical Companies, 221. 
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as well as quantitative perspective. Social expectations, thus, vary in light of specific 
sectoral area taken into account such as, among others, innovator, generic and 
biotechnology companies. For example, a company holding ius excludendi rights on a 
life-saving medicine is different from a company that struggles for the production of 
the relevant generic version. 
Accordingly, Ruggie and Hunt recognized that when corporations perform certain 
public functions, “additional corporate responsibilities may arise as a result of the 
specific functions the company is performing”1329. Even thought, it remains unclear 
what the full range of public functions might be, Hunt places additional responsibilities 
on the grounds of the peculiar and delicate activities they perform. 
 
 
6.1.1. Social license to operate of Pharmaceutical Corporations which do not hold 
Patents Rights 
 
There is a particular element which distinguishes the methodological approach 
employed by Ruggie as opposed to the one adopted by Hunt. In fact, as outlined in the 
previous sections, Ruggie clearly distinguished the duties imposed on States from the 
responsibilities of corporations concerning business and human rights. Likewise, Hunt 
shared the perspective that human rights responsibilities of companies cannot be 
identical to the human rights duties of States. For example, typical duties of States, 
such as enacting appropriate legislation and provide enforceability of such rights, 
cannot be imposed upon private businesses. Notwithstanding, Hunt took the reasoning 
a step forward and found in the overanalyzed UN General Comment 14 (concerning 
the Right to health) the legal basis for grasping detailed responsibilities for 
pharmaceuticals. Accordingly, mutatis mutandis, Hunt adopted on pharmaceutical 
corporations the Availability, Accessibility, Acceptability and Quality framework 
established for States in relation to their right-to-health obligations.  
                                               
1329 Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, Business and human rights: Towards 




The Guidelines provide a general responsibility on pharmaceuticals to consistently 
integrate the right to health and endorse impact assessment across all relevant policies 
and programs, such as pricing, intellectual property, research and development, clinical 
trials, and marketing1330.  
With respect to Availability, the Guidelines prescribe that pharmaceutical companies 
do all they reasonably can to assure that drugs are available in sufficient quantities in 
the regions where they are required. Such responsibility is key in underdeveloped 
regions in which pharmaceutical companies have an additional “burden” to take 
adequate steps since they have not properly addressed the priority health needs of such 
countries1331. A suitable example concerns the so-called “diseases of the developing 
world”, which affect the poorest populations of the poorest countries. Development 
departments of pharmaceuticals often ignore furthering research for the production of 
relevant medicines, such as drugs against tuberculosis or malaria, due to the scarce 
revenues that come from them1332. 
With respect to Accessibility, the Guidelines provide that in addition to being available, 
medicines must also be accessible. Accessibility can be understood in light of different 
perspectives: firstly, medicines must be accessible everywhere within a country, from 
big cities to remote rural areas. Obviously, pharmaceutical companies are not the 
exclusive holder of such overwhelming responsibility, but they must do everything they 
reasonably can. In this regard, such companies should provide medicines with adequate 
packaging in relation to different local climates1333. 
Moreover, medicines must be financially accessible to all segments of society, 
especially for those living in poverty. As the present work has demonstrated throughout, 
                                               
1330 Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, “Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework 
for Business and Human Rights,” A/ HRC/8/5, April 7, 2008, paras. 60-62. 
1331 S. Moon, “Respecting the right to access to medicines: Implications of the UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights for the pharmaceutical industry”, Health and human rights volume 15, 
2013, 37. 
1332  S. Ahmadiani and S. Nikfar, “Challenges of access to medicine and the responsibility of 
pharmaceutical companies: a legal perspective”, Ahmadiani and Nikfar, DARU Journal of 
Pharmaceutical Sciences, 2016, 24:13, 3. 
1333Joo-Young, Human Rights Responsibilities of Pharmaceutical Companies, 225. 
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high prices often constitute the main obstacles for accessing to medicines, which are 
often too costly for poor peoples in developing countries. 
It is worth noting that also financial accessibility falls under the category of shared 
responsibilities, since the final price of a particular drug includes the price charged by 
the manufacturer as well as tariffs, shipping costs, VAT, and the mark-up added by 
retailers. Accordingly, pharmaceutical companies must take into account the 
introduction of a differential policy in relation to prices, which does not only concern 
different countries as well as providing market segmentation in the same country1334. 
In addition, Accessibility refers to information about medicines in relation to their 
safety and possible side effects, so as to ensure that individuals can make informed 
decisions about their use1335.  
In addition to being available and accessible, drugs and corresponding developing 
procedures such as clinical trials, must be acceptable, understood as they must be 
respectful of medical ethics, culturally appropriate and sensitive to gender and life 
cycle issues1336 . In this regard, pharmaceutical companies must ensure that clinical 
trials are based on informed consent and comply with the highest ethical and human 
rights standards. Further, with respect to quality, pharmaceutical companies must 
guarantee that their drugs are of good quality, safe and effective in light of national and 
international manufacturing standards1337. 
Having outlined the Framework provided by the Human Rights Guidelines for 
Pharmaceutical Companies on Access to Medicines of 2008, it is now important to 
address the issue of accountability and the consequences of non-compliance. 
According to legal philosophers, such as Hobbes and Austin, rules must be enforced 
by an autonomous power in order to be law. In particular, the latter argues that, since 
international rules are not usually enforced, they cannot be considered as law, by 
definition1338. Also, Kelsen considered sanctions a decisive feature of a legal system, 
                                               
1334 Ibidem 
1335 Ibidem,  226. 
1336 Ibidem 
1337 Guideline 20. 
1338 S. Raponi, “Is Coercion Necessary for Law? The Role of Coercion in International and Domestic 
Law”, 8 Wash. U. Jur. Rev. 35, 2015, 39. 
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since law can be the source of coercive orders only if it is backed by sanctions1339. This 
brief premises are significant in order to comprehend the perspective that Hunt adopted 
while drafting his guidelines regarding pharmaceuticals.  
Human rights place both obligations (either duties or responsibilities) on different 
actors as well as positive legal entitlements for individuals and communities. Such 
rights and obligations, however, remain mere aspirational language, practically devoid 
of content, unless effective systems of accountability are established. Hunt, thus, argues 
that a right to-health approach must emphasize that all duty-holders must be held 
accountable for their behavior1340. 
In many cases, however, accountability is used as a synonym of sanctioning, but such 
limited interpretation of the notion is much too narrow. In practice, due to the peculiar 
legal nature of both pharmaceutical corporations and their quasi-legal responsibilities, 
accountability comes in many formulae. An accountability mechanism for the right-to-
health must determine which health policies and practices are effective with the aim at 
improving the actual realization of the right to health. This means that the objective is 
not necessarily to blame and punish, but rather ensuring the no one is a victim of human 
rights violations. 
Unfortunately, in this context, practice is much too far from theoretical considerations. 
Monitoring and accountability mechanisms are rarely accessible, effective, transparent, 
and independent in relation to corporate social responsibility of pharmaceutical 
companies. In fact, such companies usually report on access to medicines-related issues 
thought out self-reporting mechanisms, which obviously are far from unbiased1341.  
Accordingly, Hunt urges for the establishment of monitoring and accountability by an 
independent body to determine whether or not a pharmaceutical company is complying 
with its duties and to ensure the right to access to medicines is protected1342. A system 
featuring both internal and external monitoring and accountability mechanisms is, thus, 
                                               
1339 H. Kelsen, “Sanctions in International Law Under the Charter of the United Nations”, 31 Iowa Law 
Review, 1946, 499. 





required. Actually, pharmaceutical companies are already exposed to the scrutiny of 
internal and external mechanisms. Nonetheless, such mechanisms are rarely effective 
in holding a company accountable for its human rights responsibilities to improve 
access to medicines. To this end, Hunt proposed the establishment of a specific 
Ombudsman for pharmaceuticals, with the function of oversighting the company’s 
human rights responsibilities, particularly those relating to access to medicines.  
 
 
6.1.2.  Responsibilities of Patent-Holding Pharmaceutical Corporations 
 
This last section tackles one of the main topics of the present work, which concerns the 
responsibilities of patent-holding pharmaceutical companies. It does not take an expert 
to understand that such companies play a delicate and decisive role in the realization 
of the right to health, as the two relevant case studies have demonstrated in Chapter 2. 
Originator companies have been capable of finding cures and treatments for the 
deadliest diseases, and in so doing they were able to enhance the quality of life not only 
of individuals, but of entire regions and communities. These companies, thus, perform 
a critically important public function, which is legally protected by the monopoly rights 
over the relevant medicine (ius excludendi) established by patents. Chapter 2 provided 
broad analysis of the legal consequences of patents. Such chapter demonstrated that 
patent-holding companies often negatively impact the affordability of relevant drugs, 
which then results in an obstruction for enjoyment of the rights to life and health.  
The relationship between society and patent- holder has been differently described by 
relevant experts, which often found the legal basis of the privileges and responsibilities 
arising from a patent in terms such as, “social contract” 1343  or “social license to 
operate”1344 .  Others acknowledge such relationship as fiduciary, emphasizing the 
                                               
1343 Pharmaceutical Shareowners Group, The Public Health Crisis in Emerging Markets, London, 2004, 
1.  
1344 Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, “Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework 
for Business and Human Rights,” A/HRC/8/5, April 7, 2008, par. 54. 
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limited period of the ius excludendi as the result of a trust for society. No matter what 
terms is employed to refer to the aforesaid relationship, society has legitimate hopes on 
a corporation granted with a patent on a life-saving medicine, in light of its critical 
social function. This results in important right-to-health responsibilities on the patent 
holder, which are strengthened when the patent was the result of publicly funded 
research and development processes1345. 
Since patent-holding pharmaceutical companies mainly affect the right to access to 
medicines because of the high prices they impose, such companies must to whatever 
they can “to avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse 
human rights impacts with which they are involved1346”. As already mentioned, the UN 
Guiding Principles require al companies, thus, pharmaceuticals as well, to establish 
policies and processes on the basis of human rights due diligence approach, which 
includes “remediation” of any adverse human rights impacts they cause. For example, 
a patent-holding company should “assess the [potential and actual] impact of the 
company’s strategies, policies, programs, projects and activities on access to 
medicines, especially for disadvantaged individuals, communities and populations”1347 
In a case in which an impact assessment proves that a company’s policy, such as on 
patenting, licensing and pricing, results in an adverse impact on access to medicines, 
such company should take the necessary steps in order to dodge this effect. “In order 
to prevent or address the potential and actual adverse impacts on access to affordable 
medicines, the company must use all the arrangements at its disposal, including non-
exclusive commercial voluntary licenses, non-commercial voluntary licenses, donation 
programs, public-private partnerships, and so on”1348. 
The company holding a patent on a life-saving medicine has a supplementary human 
rights responsibility to take all reasonable steps to make the medicine as accessible as 
                                               
1345 Joo-Young, Human Rights Responsibilities of Pharmaceutical Companies, 228. 
1346 The Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights are annexed to the Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, March 21, 2011. par. 11. 
1347 Guideline 14. 
1348 Joo-Young, Human Rights Responsibilities of Pharmaceutical Companies, 228. 
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possible to all those who need it at the earliest opportunity 1349.  
Remarkably, such responsibility does not entirely fall on corporations which in fact are 
responsible for compliance along with States. In addition, as such responsibility is not 
immediate for States, so it is for corporations which can progressively fulfill their 
responsibilities expeditiously and effectively, by way of deliberate, concrete, and 
targeted measures, to make the medicine as accessible as possible1350. 
Akin to State’s responsibility to take steps “to the maximum of its available 
resources”1351 , pharmaceuticals activities depend on their capacity. Hence, more is 
required from powerful transnational company with global networks than of from local 
businesses. It must always be taken into account the economic and financial nature of 
such entities which are conditioned by market realities and economic cycles. 
Accordingly, companies must be permitted to adopt a viable business model with the 
objective of making a reasonable profit and enhancing shareholder value 1352 . 
Nonetheless, particular situations may require for a pharmaceutical company to operate 
on a not-for-profit basis, such as in relation to rural poor areas. Naturally, the State 
remains the key actor and may provide subsidies so that the companies recover their 
costs such as shipping and administrative procedures1353. 
In conclusion, pharmaceuticals holding patents are expected to provide mechanism 
such as differential pricing between and within countries, to improve access for those 
who cannot afford the high prices resulting by patents. Besides the few cases outlined 
in Chapter 2, pharmaceuticals holding patents are the only one authorized to take these 
steps. The aforesaid relationship between society and patent holder, thus, imply that if 
the patent is worked without such steps being taken, then the pharmaceutical company 
is in breach of its right-to-health responsibilities. Of course, the success of the patent 
                                               
1349 Ibidem 
1350 Ibidem 
1351 Article 2 of the Covenant 
1352  L. Forman and  J. Clare Kohler, Access to Medicines as a Human Right: Implications for 
Pharmaceutical Industry Responsibility, Toronto University Press, 2012, 5. 
1353 J. Mesquita, P. Hunt, and R. Khosla, “The Human Rights Responsibility of International Assistance 
and Cooperation in Health,” in M. Gibney and S. Skogly, Universal Human Rights and Extraterritorial 
Obligations, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010, 114. 
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holder’s actions will sometimes depend upon States, donors, and others in the 
pharmaceutical sector fulfilling their responsibilities. Nonetheless, the patent holder 
has a right-to-health responsibility to do what it reasonably can. In sum, the Human 
Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies on Access to Medicines provide that 
these companies recognize the importance of human rights in their corporate mission, 
provide board level responsibility and accountability for their access strategy, publicly 
commit to contributing to the research and development of less common diseases and 
respect the right of countries to use TRIPS flexibilities. 
Unfortunately, as highlighted in this section, international law does not impose direct 
obligations on pharmaceutical companies, nor do the above-mentioned guidelines 
establish a binding legal framework for them. This is because it is only states that are 
responsible under international human rights law. Therefore, although there may be a 
moral and political justification for such obligations, there is no legal basis for 
transposing into multinational corporations the obligations assumed by States under 
international law. Thus, in examining the obligations of non-State actors under 
international law, it is necessary to distinguish between what is law (lex lata) and what 
should be law (lex ferenda). 
However, this does not mean that non-state actors are immune from the consequences 
of actions necessary to ensure that a state can progressively realize the right to health. 
On the contrary, States, in light of their obligations to protect and implement, and not 
just respect, must inevitably adopt measures to guarantee the right to health that impose 
obligations on non-state actors. Furthermore, the central objective of the Guidelines is 
to provide practical, constructive and specific guidance to pharmaceutical companies 
and other stakeholders, including those who wish to monitor and hold companies 
accountable, with the aim of realizing the most prominent enjoyment of the right to 
access to medicines. Currently, the remedies for holding a corporation accountable and 
obtaining reparations for eventual human rights breaches are1354: 
                                               




a) Sue pharmaceutical companies before the national authorities, or the State of origin 
or the host State. 
b) Suing the State of origin or the host State before national courts for failure to comply 
with the obligation to protect or for failure to carry out due diligence in controlling 
pharmaceutical companies. 
c) Suing before international tribunals the States on behalf of which the companies 
have acted. 
d) Organizing media awareness campaigns of naming and shaming by public opinion 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to tarnish the reputation of the 







Patent protection for medicines does interfere with patients’ access to essential 
medicines. The research has demonstrated that patients worldwide, especially in 
developing countries, still encounter obstacles in relation to access to medicines, 
mainly due to scarcity and high prices. The argument often made that patents negatively 
impact patients’ access to medicines was found throughout the dissertation, mainly due 
to the higher prices resulting from IP protection.  
Access in the context of this research must be understood in the sense that medicines 
are available, physically accessible and affordable on a non-discriminatory basis (as 
well as being culturally acceptable and of good quality). Certainly, the interplay 
between medicines and patents shifts the focus of the analysis primarily to the element 
of financial accessibility of essential medicines. Such situation most directly affects 
developing countries, in which policy makers are in a constant struggle to gather and 
allocate the resources required to adequately administer their public healthcare systems.  
The two case studies provided have illustrated the crucial need for developing countries 
to ensure that medicines’ prices are as low as is realistically possible, so as to monitor, 
and it is hoped, to defeat the widespread of diseases, such as the HIV dissemination. 
On the contrary, the pharmaceutical industry argues that such higher prices are justified 
due to the fact that patents are indispensable for innovation, since otherwise there 
would be no incentive to invest. Pharmaceutical corporations can, thus, recoup their 
substantial research and development costs.  
The innovation argument is not contested here, since it seems a quite understandable 
position in light of the non-philanthropic nature of pharmaceutical companies. 
Notwithstanding, it must be noted that many are the cases in which the private sectors 
receives public funding by national governments, thus surely making weaker the 
argument of large resources involved. If the research is primarily founded and 
sponsored with public resources, patents would hence result in a disproportionate 
advantage for such economic actors, which would make huge profit at the expenses of 
both patients and governments. Furthermore, extensive relevant literature has shown 
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that innovation is not always a direct consequence of higher and stricter IP provisions. 
For example, evergreen patents on the one hand and neglected diseases on the other 
are concrete examples of how the pharmaceutical industry and health research are 
mainly economically driven, as they focus primarily on the diseases of the developed 
world. Evergreen patents refer to the de facto extension of the protection granted to an 
already patented drug on the grounds of minor modification. On the other hand, 
neglected diseases are illnesses that concern the vast majority of the world population 
but that receive little to zero attention since their treatment is not considered profitable. 
Such diseases (for example, malaria and tuberculosis) occur most often in developing 
and least developed countries which feature a general population with limited financial 
power. In light of these considerations, the argument regarding the importance of patent 
protection for innovation seems to be true only in regard to diseases to which the use 
of medicines is lucrative and not for the majority of affected individuals worldwide. 
Once the dissertation has presented the negative impact of patents on the right to access 
to medicines, the next logical step is to determine whether or not such right is protected 
under international human rights law. The work grounded on the assumption that the 
leading task of human rights is to protect the dignity of any individual. Many are the 
criticisms concerning the work of the United Nations, but human rights protection 
definitely constitutes an area of success for the organization which adopted many 
treaties, declarations and instruments on human rights since the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.  
Chapter I addressed the question on whether (and in which manner) the international 
human rights framework protects a “subcategory of the right to health”, namely access 
to (essential) medicines. The dilemma was answered positively, since there is an array 
of sources which protect access to medicines, and even more significantly to essential 
medicines, to different extents.  
The analysis departs from the most noticeable and rational baseline, which is article 12 
ICESCR. Such article implies a right to access to essential medicines as part of the 
minimum core content of the right to health. This conclusion grounds on the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) interpretation of the 
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scope of the right to health, which, thus, includes the availability, accessibility and 
affordability of essential medicines on a non-discriminatory basis (General Comment 
14). Alongside the latter General Comment, other international human rights treaties 
containing health rights, such as the Inter-American Human Rights framework, have 
also included access to medicines as a key component of the right to health. 
Accordingly, the present dissertation has highlighted the precious work for the 
protection of such peculiar right conducted by the Inter-American Court. This judicial 
body played a fundamental role in determining specific obligations upon States and 
emphasized the value of interpretation for the effective protection of the rights at stake. 
The effect utile principle, according to which the effects of conventional provisions 
must be ensured in practice (ut res magit valeat quam pereat), constitutes a founding 
pillar of the approach adopted by the Court towards the right to health. To summarize, 
the provisions of a certain treaty must be interpreted in a manner that ensures practical 
application of such provisions. 
The two case studies provided illustrated different degrees of protection of the right of 
access to medicines. While both Guatemala and Costa Rica have the obligation to 
progressively realize the right to health and a core obligation to provide essential 
medicines, such countries adopted a margin of discretion when complying with the 
Covenant’s obligations. As such States parties are free to determine the exact manner 
in which to implement the right to health, as long as they take all appropriate measures 
to the maximum of their available resources in order to ensure that the right to health 
and access to medicines is respected, protected and fulfilled. In specific, both 
Guatemala and Costa Rica are parties to the ICESCR and the American Convention on 
Human Rights on the one hand, as well as to the TRIPS and CAFTA Agreement to the 
other. The membership to the latter treaty required these countries to adopt the so-called 
TRIPS Plus provisions, thereby moving away from their right to health undertakings. 
In this regard, bearing in mind the General Comment No. 14 (CESCR), one must 
differentiate between a state party’s inability and its unwillingness to comply with its 
obligations under the ICESCR in order to assess whether or not a state has violated the 
right to health. For example, Guatemala’s protection of test data for a period of 10 years 
376 
 
constitutes an example of unwillingness, since it has proven to have prevented HIV-
infected patients from accessing ARVs. On the contrary, Costa Rican’s fairly successful 
HIV/AIDS policy agenda demonstrated willingness of complying with health-related 
obligations. Regardless of economic and financial constraints, States are under the 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfill health-related core obligations as well as to 
take steps through all appropriate means in order to progressively recognize and 
institute the right to access to medicines. The CESCR has stressed that the obligation 
of progressive realization cannot be regarded as an excuse for noncompliance. 
Accordingly, progressive realization must be considered in conjunction with the 
prohibition of regressive measures, entailing that "all measures of a deliberately 
retroactive nature in this regard shall require the most careful consideration and shall 
be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant 
and in the context of the full use of the maximum available resources". Such a 
perspective seeks to understand the obligation of progressive realization as a mixture 
of practicality and sensitivity to the local context. Thus, in terms of implementation, 
progressive realization imposes an obligation on States to justify the measures they 
have taken to guarantee the right to access to medicines in light of the resources at their 
disposal. In this respect, the CESCR has presented criteria for the assessment of 
retrogressive measures. In order for regressive measures to be legitimate, States must 
demonstrate, inter alia, that such measures are (a) temporary, (b) necessary, (c) non-
discriminatory or do not disproportionately affect disadvantaged and marginalized 
individuals and groups, and (d) that they at least respect the basic obligations of the 
social rights in question and are applicable to the specific population group in 
question1356 
In a similar fashion to the CESCR, but to a greater extent, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights played a key role in both shaping the content of the right to health amd 
                                               
1356Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 22 on the right to sexual 
and reproductive health (article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights), E/C.12/GC/22, 2 May 2016, para. 38 and General Comment No. 23 on the right to just and 
favourable conditions of work (article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 




in identifying specific obligations of members states in relation to ARVs. As presented 
in the first Chapter, the shift in the Court's approach and jurisprudence in addressing 
the protection of health-related issues is both remarkable and surely relevant for the 
effective protection of human rights. The aforementioned analysis on the Inter-
American system has presented the evolution of the Court's approach from those cases 
in which health related issues were assessed as violations of the right to life and 
personal integrity on the one hand to the most recent cases in which the Court ruled on 
violations of the right to health, considered for the first time as an autonomous and 
directly enforceable right. In this regard, the Cuscul Pivaral Judgment constitutes a 
milestone in the Court’s jurisprudence, since in light of an extensive interpretation of 
Article 26 of the American Convention, the right at stake becomes autonomously 
justiciable before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. This new approach 
towards the right to health has important practical implications, for it broadens and 
enhance the effective protection of economic and social rights in general and access to 
medicine in particular. 
The analysis presented in the first chapter, thus, allows the reader to answer in the 
affirmative all three of the research questions outlined in the introduction of this 
dissertation. Firstly, it can be concluded that the right to access to medicines constitutes 
a key part of the broader right to health. Secondly, the chapter presented that States do 
have specific legally binding obligations concerning the right to access to medicines 
under international law. Lastly, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights provides 
broad and extensive protection of the human rights at stake in light of a comprehensive 
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights. 
Another relevant issue addressed in the thesis concerns the interface between access to 
medicines and patents. Accordingly, Chapter II revolved around the TRIPS Agreement 
as one of the most relevant and far-reaching international agreements within the field 
of intellectual property protection. Even more interesting is the fact that such agreement 
was concluded within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO), thus 
extending the jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to the agreement, 
as well. The transfer of intellectual property from the World Intellectual Property 
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Organization (WIPO) to the competence of the WTO should not be underestimated. As 
highlighted throughout the thesis, the stronger enforcement mechanisms within the 
WTO provided a more effective international regulation of IP compared to the weak 
and ineffective monitoring system within the UN human rights system.  
Notwithstanding, developing countries have raised concerns over the dispute 
settlement mechanism under the WTO. These countries argued that such mechanism 
has been allegedly used by developed countries as a tool to prevent developing nations 
from fully adopting the so-called TRIPS’ flexibilities. These flexibilities were in fact a 
key issue addressed in the dissertation.  
Under Article 27 TRIPS, patent’s protection has now been extended to all fields of 
technology, thus making mandatory that members incorporate patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals into their domestic law. Further, Articles 28 and 33 of TRIPS require 
that members grant patent holders a set protection for a minimum period of 20 years. 
Under a superficial reading of the latter provisions, the TRIPS Agreement appears as 
an insurmountable barrier to access to medicines.  
Nonetheless, as the second chapter illustrates, the objective and purpose of the TRIPS 
Agreement (under both its preamble, articles 7 and 8 and as established by the Doha 
Declaration) do not hinder the protection of intellectual property rights in itself. In fact, 
the TRIPS agreement does acknowledge the need to strike a balance between free trade 
and IP protection on the one hand and public health necessities on the other, between 
the needs of highly developed and developing and least-developed countries, and 
between the private rights of the right holders and public policy objectives, including 
technological and developmental objectives of national systems of IP protection.  
In addition, both the TRIPS system does take into consideration the different needs of 
developing and least-developed countries by establishing transitional periods. For 
example, pre-TRIPS Guatemala did not impose product patents for pharmaceuticals; a 
situation that did not change until the end of the aforesaid transnational period. Further, 
TRIPS provides flexibilities which go beyond a favorable access to medicines 
interpretative approach. Articles 30 and 31 establish a set of concrete possibilities for 
developing members to balance patent protection with the right of access to medicines.  
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Accordingly, developing members such as Guatemala and Costa Rica can implement a 
number of effective instruments to protect their public health needs, such as 
compulsory licensing, parallel importation and the highly debated Bolar exception. 
Unfortunately, the actual effectiveness of these flexibilities mainly depends on political 
and economic considerations, rather than on legal opportunities.  
Another important issue that Chapter II has taken under consideration regarded the two 
distinct conceptual approaches in relation to collision among treaty norms, namely 
genuine and apparent conflict. In the case of access to medicines and trade-related 
treaties, genuine conflict refers to the fact that collisions among norms cannot be 
avoided using interpretative means. On the contrary, apparent collision refers to actual 
coexistence between human rights and intellectual property rights, since they are 
essentially compatible. Under appropriate interpretative means is, thus, possible to 
assess how a fair balance between patents and access should be determined as well as 
to avoid opening the Pandoras’ box of state responsibility. 
The issue of access to medicines concerns both the human rights and trade-related 
systems and, thus, constitutes a valuable example of how these two systems overlap in 
practice. As a result, the chapter highlighted two different scenarios: firstly, the 
relationship between TRIPS provisions dealing with protection of patents and 
international human rights law. And secondly, the interplay between the CAFTA 
Agreement and human rights.  
In regard to the first scenario, the findings demonstrated that the alleged conflict is 
merely apparent. In fact, a genuine conflict between TRIPS and ICESCR can be 
avoided by interpreting the TRIPS Agreement in a manner favorable to promoting and 
protecting human rights, in particular public health and the right to access to medicines. 
In fact, both the TRIPS agreement as well as the Doha Declaration provide all the tools 
needed in order to avoid conflicts among norms. Such understanding must be 
confirmed in light of the recent WTO dispute regarding Australia and plain packaging 
of tobacco products, in which the panel reached two conclusions: firstly, the Doha 
Declaration has the status of an a ‘subsequent agreement’ of WTO Members within the 
meaning of Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention, and secondly, that such 
380 
 
Declaration applies broadly to health-related issues.  
On the other hand, the second scenario, namely the one concerning the CAFTA 
Agreement, poses additional legal challenges. The TRIPS-Plus provisions envisaged 
therein seem to constitute an example of genuine conflict among international norms 
at first sight. For instance, test data protection provided in the CAFTA is an obstacle 
that appears to be insurmountable throughout interpretations. As was illustrated in the 
chapter, a combination of methods for resolving treaty conflicts was presented: the 
principles of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt, lex specialis derogat generali and 
pacta sunt servanda provide the tools in order to determine which norm must prevail. 
Notwithstanding, the horizontal nature of the international system further complicates 
the analysis, since it is impossible to assess hierarchical superiority among its norms. 
Questions were posed, however, on the peculiar nature of human rights, under which 
some scholars have proposed a sort of constitutional nature of such special group of 
norms. Unfortunately, neither international practice of states nor the rulings of relevant 
judicial and quasi-judicial human rights bodies has demonstrated that the right to health 
and/or access to medicines has achieved a position of superiority in international law. 
In practice, besides few ius cogens norms examples, such as inter alia the prohibition 
of genocide, slavery and torture, human rights provisions do not enjoy a particular 
status at the moment. A genuine conflict leads to the conclusion that the State which 
breaches a human rights provision, while complying with CAFTA provisions, must 
incur international state responsibility and provide appropriate remedies for the 
affected party. Legally speaking, when States conclude trade-related treaties which 
directly or indirectly hinder human rights obligations assumed in other treaties, such 
States must be held accountable in the appropriate fora. Nonetheless, competent human 
rights bodies often lack any sort of effective enforcement system, which grant a de 
facto hierarchy in favor of the WTO framework. 
The relevant issue is, thus, to determine whether or not the CAFTA Agreement 
constitute a genuine conflict which cannot be overcome by interpretative means. The 
analysis conducted, however, led to the opposite conclusion. According to the 
examination presented in the second Chapter, the CAFTA incompatibility with health 
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related-provisions is merely apparent. Such assumption grounds on, inter alia, three 
main considerations: firstly, on the vague and blurred nature of the provisions 
envisaged by CAFTA; secondly, on the 2004 Understanding to CAFTA regarding 
public health-related concerns; and thirdly, on the subsequent practice within the WTO 
framework in relation to TRIPS-flexibilities. The broad wording of the Free Trade 
Agreement under consideration allows the interpreter to tailor related provisions in a 
manner compatible with the right to health. Furthermore, the 2004 Understanding to 
CAFTA regarding public health-related concern demonstrated State’s 
acknowledgement and consent to the health-related provisions envisaged by TRIPS 
and by the Doha Declaration, such as the recognition of compulsory licensing as well 
as parallel imports as means to grant disposal of the required medicines. Lastly, worth 
mentioning is the so-called continuing or living theory regarding multilateral treaties, 
which was outlined at the end of Chapter II in relation to the TRIPS Agreement. These 
kinds of multilateral treaties are meant to produce their effects over time, thus allowing 
an evolutionary approach which reflects the intention of the parties to apply a dynamic 
interpretation of the treaty itself. Stated differently, the will of the parties concerned 
cannot be crystallized at the moment in which the treaty entered into force, since the 
goals and purposes can change over time. For example, even though CAFTA does not 
make any specific reference to access to medicines-related flexibilities, the conclusion 
does not follow that the parties concerned have decided to ignore them. On the contrary, 
subsequent developments in TRIPS, in which the relevant parties participated, have 
further clarified the scope and application of such important tools. To this end, the 
CAFTA opens to the waivers and flexibilities under consideration. Accordingly, in 
order to assess the compatibility between CAFTA and the right to health, a sort of 
transitive property test might need to be adopted. The conflict between TRIPS and 
CAFTA (and consequently between intellectual property law and human rights) is, thus, 
only apparent, since systemic integration constitutes the means thorough which the 
patent’s protection regime is compatible with the right to access to medicines. Now, 
since CAFTA is compatible with TRIPS, which in turn is compatible with the human 
right to access to medicines in light of the aforesaid principle of systemic integration, 
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we conclude that that CAFTA can be interpreted in a manner consistent with the right 
to access to medicines. In accordance with this principle, both treaties should be 
interpreted simultaneously taking into consideration the larger normative environment 
within international law, so as to reach a harmonious interpretation in which a balance 
is determined between patents and access to medicines.  
The third, and final chapter, completed the analysis by addressing another perspective 
of the issue under consideration, namely whether or not pharmaceutical companies 
have human rights responsibilities under international law. The study began with the 
presentation of the main theories regarding international personality of non-state actors, 
with a particular focus on pharmaceutical corporations. Regardless of the fact that some 
scholars have suggested granting international personality to multinational 
corporations, such economic actors cannot be considered subject of international law 
in light of relevant practice. Accordingly, no direct legal obligations can be imposed on 
pharmaceutical companies.  
In this regard, the “Recognition conception” seems to be the theory that most mirrors 
the current international realm. This conception arose as a result of the changes that 
have been occurring internationally and which destabilized the theoretical foundations 
of the “States-only’ conception”. For example, the greater role played by international 
organizations and by other non-states questioned the unique role of States as exclusive 
international actors. The Recognition conception took such consideration into account 
and proposed a corrective doctrine in order to reconcile the primary role of States with 
the emergence of new actors. In brief, in light of such conception, while States remain 
the main subjects of international law and have full personality, other entities can obtain 
limited international legal personality if States recognize them as such. Accordingly, 
the limited legal personality of a non-State actor depends completely on the will of 
States, which are the only competent authorities in determining which entities can take 
part in the international system. States have not granted the status of international 
subject to pharmaceutical companies, as opposed to the formal recognition delivered 
to international organizations and other non-state actors, such as insurgents.  
In line with this reasoning, the chapter has demonstrated that international human rights 
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obligations cannot be imposed directly upon corporations. Nonetheless, this does not 
mean that pharmaceutical companies are exempt from complying with international 
human rights law. The practice has shown that multinational corporations are very 
much capable of negatively impacting the adequate enjoyment of human rights of 
private actors, such as individuals and communities. In such circumstances, violations 
of human rights result from the actions put in place by private actors (corporations), 
rather than by the States. In order to prevent such violations from occurring, scholars 
have debated on the horizontal application of human rights, which concerns the ability 
of this category of rights to have effect in relations between private actors. Although a 
direct horizontal effect is commonly declined, the international community agrees on 
the indirect horizontal effect of human rights. Accordingly, those whose rights have 
been negatively affected by corporations are not able to hold them directly accountable, 
for example through a legal complaint against the corporations for not complying with 
human rights standards. On the contrary, while it is generally true that the States do not 
respond internationally for the unlawful conduct perpetrated by corporations, they do 
so only in light of an omissive conduct by the State for not having complied with its 
positive duties to prevention and repression. This grounds on the consideration that 
States’ international obligation to protect human rights compels national authorities to 
provide direct obligations (or at least standards of conduct) for corporations at the 
domestic level. 
As a response to what is commonly perceived as corporate unaccountability, an entire 
new area of law emerged in order to limit and monitor the human rights responsibilities 
of these actors, namely Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). This refers to the 
voluntary commitment of such entities to address social and environmental issues in 
parallel to their natural goal of maximizing shareholders value and to make profits. The 
emergence of such movement, which cover both internal and external soft law 
instruments, testifies the importance of the issue under consideration. The Chapter 
highlighted the development and legal status of such peculiar framework, which mainly 
grounds on the work of Ruggie and Hunt. The Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights and the Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Corporations on 
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Access to Medicines constitute the departing point for any study on this topic. 
Accordingly, while States remain the main duty bearers, pharmaceutical companies 
hold corporate responsibilities to respect the right to access to medicines (and implicitly 
the right to health) which derive from “social expectations”. As Ruggie emphasizes in 
its framework, corporate social responsibility stems from the so-called social license, 
and thus requires human rights “due diligence”1357. Both experts, however, highlighted 
that the corporate responsibility to respect is not source of legally binding provisions 
under international law, unless States provide corresponding binding obligations under 
their respective domestic law1358. Nonetheless, the latter scholars recognized that while 
social corporate responsibility grounds mainly on soft law instruments, corporation do 
have to tailor their activities in a human rights-attentive manner.  
The lack of legally binding power of such instruments should not be underestimated. 
These provisions are considered as something more than mere political commitments, 
so that there is an expectation of compliance even if no legal duty has been prescribed 
on corporations. In this regard, CSR can serve as an important pathway from lex lata 
to lex ferenda. It has been persuasively argued that in a rapidly changing and 
developing world order, CSR is an essential intermediate stage towards a more 
rigorously binding system on corporations, permitting experiment and rapid 
modification. 
Possibly, human rights law has reached a deadlock with the issue of holding 
international corporations accountable for the harm they cause to human rights. The 
solution to such dilemma may not be within international human rights law as it 
currently stands. Much progress remains to be made, however, especially in light of the 
overwhelming number of cases in which corporations did not face the legal 
consequences due to their effective supremacy and transnational legal structure. This 
leads to two main paths for moving forward: extending the scope of international 
                                               
1357 Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, “Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework 
for Business and Human Rights,” A/ HRC/8/5, April 7, 2008, para. 25. 
1358 L. Joo-Young, and P. Hunt. “Human Rights Responsibilities of Pharmaceutical Companies in 
Relation to Access to Medicines”, The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 40, 2012, 221. 
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human rights law in order to directly apply to pharmaceutical corporations, or seek 
elsewhere beyond the international legal framework to enhance the conduct of such 
corporations for what concerns the right to access to medicines. The dissertation has 
demonstrated that non-legal measures such as the so-called blaming and shaming 
approach proved to be very effective in the easing of difficult cases as the ones of Brazil 
and South Africa. 
In conclusion, the main question to be answered at this point is whether or not 
recognizing legal status to corporations improves the efficacy of the human rights 
framework, or on the contrary, whether the protection of human rights can be better 
achieved under the State’s guardianship. Accordingly, doubts arose on the assumption 
which considers a legally binding treaty on corporations to be the most adequate answer 
to the challenge under consideration. These interesting topics surely deserve further 
analysis and examination in light of current practice and lex lata on the one hand, but 
mostly in light of lex ferenda which must serve as a lighthouse for championing the 
effective application (effet utile) of relevant human rights provisions with the aim at 
granting the highest degree of protection for the individuals involved.  
How TRIPS law relates to human rights provisions, and whether one prevails over the 
other in the event of conflict, still remains a quite controversial and debated topic. 
Nonetheless, lex ferenda should provide guidance for the establishment of a certain 
international legal system in which human rights take precedence over trade-related 
rules. This reasoning grounds on at least four considerations: firstly, international trade 
is mainly a means to advance socioeconomic objectives, most of which are already 
acknowledged as human rights by the international community. Accordingly, in a case 
of conflict between the two systems, the purposes should always prevail over the means. 
Secondly, while at least certain human rights norms have ius cogens character, WTO 
law is merely made of ordinary treaties of reciprocal character. Thirdly, the primary 
status enjoyed by the U.N. Charter, which is commonly regarded as the cornerstone of 
modern human rights law, should confer upon human rights a greater status compared 
to ordinary treaties. Finally, the peculiar purpose and features of human rights law 
should always be taken into account. The primary function of human rights is to limit 
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the power of the State in its interactions with the individual, which, thus, extend beyond 
reciprocal commitments between States. To this end, human rights norms are different 
from conventional commitments among trading countries, for they are inalienable, 
inherent, indivisible and universal for all human beings. Therefore, one should be very 
careful of confusing the interests of the pharmaceutical industry with the interest of the 
millions of patients affected with treatable diseases worldwide. The fact that medicines 
are not ordinary commodities is a part of the reasoning that cannot be ignored. As such, 
bearing in mind that the fundamental function of medicines is the comprehensive 
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